O SlideShare utiliza cookies para otimizar a funcionalidade e o desempenho do site, assim como para apresentar publicidade mais relevante aos nossos usuários. Se você continuar a navegar o site, você aceita o uso de cookies. Leia nosso Contrato do Usuário e nossa Política de Privacidade.
O SlideShare utiliza cookies para otimizar a funcionalidade e o desempenho do site, assim como para apresentar publicidade mais relevante aos nossos usuários. Se você continuar a utilizar o site, você aceita o uso de cookies. Leia nossa Política de Privacidade e nosso Contrato do Usuário para obter mais detalhes.
The German population-unfair/An army of 100,000 men could not protect a country/the army was a symbol of German pride/Wilson’s fourteen points-disarmament none of the allies disarmed in the same way
Meeting in 1932, the conference was already floundering before Hitler came to power, because Germany demanded gleichberechtigung (“equality of armaments”) with other countries – as the Treaty of Versailles had virtually disbanded Germany’s armed forces, parity would have meant that where others were reducing their armaments, the Germans would have in fact been increasing theirs. Hitler, however, had no intention of having anything to do with disarmament, and in October 1933 he withdrew from the Conference and the League, blaming the French.
The British delegation made number of attempts were made to try to persuade Germany to return to the conference, but these only angered France (who saw them as an attempted ‘sell-out’), ending in April 1934 with the so-called ‘Barthou note’ in which French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou announced that France would no longer play any part in the Conference, but would look after its own security in whatever way was necessary.
This was a success for Hitler because: a. it wrecked the conference b. it left him free to rearm however he wanted c. it drove a wedge between the French and the British d. British politicians, while they were trying to persuade Germany to stay in the Conference, had agreed in principle that the arms clauses of the Treaty of Versailles were too harsh.
The Polish chief of state Józef Pilsudski signed a treaty with Germany, not to go to war with each other for the next ten years. This was soon followed by a trade treaty.
There is some evidence that in 1933 the Polish embassy in Paris sounded out the French government about the possibility of invading Germany to stop Hitler re-arming. When the French refused, the Poles made the treaty with Hitler. Some historians dispute that this happened – there are no documents to support the theory – and just put it down to Pilsudski’s weakness.
Hitler liked these ‘bi-lateral’ treaties between himself and another power; this arrangement: a. left his eastern border safe and gave him time to rearm b. undermined the principle of collective security of the League – after the treaty Poland actively neglected the League. c. divided the countries allied against him d. when he was ready, he simply invaded Poland anyway.
Nazi rearmament 1935 by milagros montanelli, flor claps, martina ibarbia, gonzalo criniti and vignesh manwani (1)