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Public Lecture Slides (2019.2.5) The EU-Japan Partnership in the Shadow of China: The Crisis of Liberalism

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Title of the event: The EU-Japan Partnership in the Shadow of China: The Crisis of Liberalism
Title of the slides: Abe's Pro-active Pacifism, Values Diplomacy, China, and EU-Japan Political and Security Cooperation
Speaker: Paul Midford, Professor and Director of the Japan Program, the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)

Publicada em: Educação
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Public Lecture Slides (2019.2.5) The EU-Japan Partnership in the Shadow of China: The Crisis of Liberalism

  1. 1. 2019/2/13 1 By Paul Midford Director, NTNU Japan Program Norwegian University for Science and Technology ノルウェー科学技術大学 Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no Knowledge /Kunnskap The NTNU Japan Program Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet (NTNU) Norwegian University for Science and Technology Abe’s Pro-active Pacifism, Values Diplomacy, China, and EU-Japan Political and Security Cooperation
  2. 2. Book Overview  The Backdrop: The global crisis of liberalism, punctuated by the rise of China as an authoritarian peer competitor of the US  Not in our title, but Trump’s election is also part of our conception of this crisis of liberalism  Central hypothesis: There is great untapped potential in EU-Japan cooperation, and together these two liberal actors can uphold the liberal order in the shadow of China and the absence of US leadership  Timely, because of the historic EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) & Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) that went into force this month  Our book exams the potential for these two agreements (as they appeared in 2017-2018) to help the EU & Japan realize their leadership potential2019/2/13 2
  3. 3. Overview of My Chapter  Abe’s “pro-active pacifism”(積極的平和主義) and values diplomacy(価値観外交)  Meaning of pro-active pacifism & values diplomacy for EU-Japan security cooperation?  Post-conflict peace-building  Promoting liberal democratic values in aid policy  Promoting rule of law  Implications for EU-Japan cooperation based on “common values” 2019/2/13 3
  4. 4. Pro-active Pacifism  Term originates with the Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung  Developed as a Japanese foreign policy concept around 2009 by Japan International Forum, a research institute led by Itoh Kenichi  Adopted by Abe after returning to the premiership in 2012  A critique of Japan’s post-war pacifism as one-country pacifism, a posture characterized by professing peace but doing little to contribute to peace globally or even regionally  Implication that Japan under Abe is shifting toward making an active contribution to global peace, one that includes possible use of force by the SDF overseas  Galtung does not agree with Abe’s use of the term 2019/2/13 4
  5. 5. Peace-building: Pro-Active vs. Passive Pacifism  A potentially promising area for EU-Japan cooperation  Yes, under Abe Japan has been practicing passive pacifism  Previous DPJ governments practiced Pro-Active Pacifism by comparison  In 3 years and 4 months DPJ governments started 2 new PKO missions, Haiti and South Sudan, and maintained a third, Golan Heights, (started by a socialist prime minister in 1995)  Abe has started no new overseas SDF missions and ended all three  Counter piracy deployment off Somalia and short term disaster relief deployments (the Philippines) are the only related cases, but they are not peace-building missions  However, might now be considering a very small deployment to the Sinai peninsula 5
  6. 6. Peace-building & Abe’s Passive Pacifism  Has passed up opportunities to deploy the SDF overseas for meaningful non-combat missions that contribute to global security  Deployment of the SDF to West Africa to combat Ebola  Deployment of the SDF to Mali for reconstruction/development missions  However, some funding and technical assistance for this CSDP mission  Deployment of the SDF and Coast Guard (MSA) to help deal with the Mediterranean refugee crisis  Has appeared more interested in expanding the Rules of Engagement (ROEs) for the SDF overseas than in maximizing Japan’s contribution under the pre-existing legal framework  Provoked domestic opposition to SDF peace-building missions, notably in South Sudan 6
  7. 7. Values Diplomacy  Successor to the geographic based “Arc of Freedom”  The Arc of Freedom was geographically shaped to contain China, but included some very illiberal countries  Departure from post-war “developmentalism” that promoted peace and security by promoting economic development  Promotes “common values” of liberal democracy, human rights, and rule of law  Values Diplomacy lacks a geographic concept, but appears aimed at China more than at promoting common values 7
  8. 8. Values Diplomacy and Southeast Asia  Abe’s 2013 Jakarta speech: emphasized promoting “universal values, such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights”  ODA Charters since 1992 have emphasized “promoting democratization … and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country”  Yet, Japan’s aid track record shows little emphasis on these liberal values  The 4 least democratic countries in ASEAN have received the highest aid per capita from Japan, and 80% of all aid disbursements to ASEAN Vietnam’s human rights record has been no better than China’s, and worsened as Japanese aid to Hanoi tripled between 2008 and 2011  Cambodia and Laos made no progress and even backslid  (Asplund chapter) 8
  9. 9. Zimbabwe and Common Values  Abe has hosted Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe twice since 2015  Mugabe’s regime is one of the most illiberal in Africa with one of the worst human rights records  Has offered two aid packages to Zimbabwe  Reflects the goal of counteracting Chinese influence/competing with China in Zimbabwe and Africa and a general competition mentality w/ China  Also an attempt to enlist Zimbabwe’s support for Japan’s quest a permanent Security Council seat 9
  10. 10. Common Values: Rule of Law at Sea  The Abe administration has been emphasizing its support for the rule of law internationally  Special emphasis has been placed on the rule of law in maritime conflicts and on the inadmissibility of changing the status quo through the use of force  The last point undoubtedly represents a common value with the EU  However, it is unclear whether the EU and Japan always share a common understanding of maritime law  In some respects Japan’s understanding of maritime law may to closer to that of China2019/2/13 10
  11. 11. Foreign Naval and Intelligence Activities in EEZs  UNCLOS allows foreign naval activity in EEZs as long as these activities are not “hostile” to the littoral state  US and most western states define intelligence gathering as non-hostile  A number of other states led by China defines intelligence gathering activities as “hostile”  Although Japan publicly sides with western countries on this issue, in practice it appears closer to China’s interpretation (and other Asian states) 2019/2/13 11
  12. 12. Japan’s Response to Intelligence gathering in its EEZ  Late 1990s: Japan complained about Chinese intelligence gathering and maritime surveys in its claimed EEZ  Later a bilateral notification regime was enacted based on shared interpretation of UNCLOS (at variance w/ US interpretation)  Japan asserted the right to carry out a survey in a disputed EEZ area disputed w/ South Korea, although backed down when Seoul threatened to seize the Japanese Coast Guard (CG) vessels  December 2001: Japan’ CG chased a North Korean intelligence ship discovered in its EEZ into China’s EEZ, and after a fire-fight the North Korean ship sunk  Clearly clashes with US assertions of its right to operate intelligence ships in other states’ EEZs (e.g. China’s)  Just after this confrontation PM Koizumi even proposed introducing legislation banning foreign intelligence gathering in Japan’s EEZ2019/2/13
  13. 13. Conclusions  Hard to argue that Abe’s pro-active pacifism offers an opportunity for greater EU-Japan security cooperation based on shared liberal values  Counter (cynical) argument: the EU (and US) is also retreating from liberal values and future cooperation might be based on shared illiberal values  However, this would attenuate the values distinction with illiberal China and Russia  Abe’s “Pro-active Pacifism” can plausibly be described as liberal clothing for a realist strategy  Maybe a reasonable realist strategy aimed at China  Yet, this is not a good basis for cooperation with Europe given significant interest and China gaps between the EU and Japan 2019/2/13 13
  14. 14. 2019/2/13 14 Thank you for Listening! At Trondheim Cruising along the canal, From the windows Of houses are people Seen smiling and waving hands トロンハイムの運河を行けば家々の窓より人ら笑みて手を振る The 2006 New Years poem by his majesty, the Emperor of Japan Knowledge /Kunnskap The NTNU Japan Program
  15. 15. Extra Slides 2019/2/13 15
  16. 16. Waters around the Senkaku Islands  In June 2016 Japan recently complained about a “first ever” entry by the Chinese navy into the “contiguous zone” (CZ) of 12 nautical miles beyond the 12 mile territorial waters (TZ) of the Senkaku islands  Yet, the prevailing US/western interpretation of UNCLOS essentially regards CZs as high seas as far as naval vessels are concerned  Moreover, UNCLOS even allows naval vessels to transit through TZs, although with some significant restrictions  PRC naval vessels passed through the US TZ in Alaska in 2015 without the US registering any complaint 16
  17. 17. Okinotorishima (沖ノ鳥島)  A small reef (around 10 m2 at high tide) that Japan has used to claim a 200 nm EEZ  Article 121, Clause 3, of UNCLOS forbids claiming an EEZ around islands incapable of sustaining human habitation  Has also built up area to artificially preserve the decaying reef  In 2012 the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in April, 2012 denied Japan’s claim for giving Okinotorishima a continental shelf based on the inhabitability of this geographical feature  Risk that China could “Okinotorishimize” its SCS claims  Fiery Cross and Johnson Atoll both are both above high tide geographical features  Reflects some parallels in policy  Similar issues for Minami-Torishima 17
  18. 18. Japan’s Rejection of an Important Part of the UNCLOS Permanent Court of Arbitration Ruling  In July 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration dismissed a large part of China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea  In the process the Court also invalidated Japan’s EEZ claims around Okinotorishima and Minami Torishima  The Court argued that Article 121 must be interpreted “to prevent insignificant features from generating large entitlements to maritime zones”  Japan rejected the Court of Arbitration’s finding, clinging the discredited rock vs. island distinction and claiming the ruling did not apply in the Western Pacific  Like the Xi administration, the Abe administration has prioritized its own territorial interests over UNCLOS and the rule of law when the two come into conflict 2019/2/13 18
  19. 19. Competition Mentality with China  A tendency, pre-dating the second Abe administration, and especially prevalent among conservatives, to see competition with China as taking precedence over, and divorced from, liberal values  The provision of aid to Zimbabwe  The “me too” return to providing large scale infrastructure development aid  However, European and other donors do show a similar tendency in terms of infrastructure aid 2019/2/13 19
  20. 20. Competition Mentality with China: Liberal Values Do not Distinguish Japan from China  While this story appears to have mainly been a bureaucratic leak intended to undermine PM Hatoyama’s policy of ending the MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, the underlying assumption is that the US would quickly choose China as a naval partner to replace Japan irrespective of values  The implication is that to compete Japan sometimes has to pursue illiberal policies to match China [“China may take over Refueling”] 2019/2/13 20

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