2. TI’s defence work
Armed Forces, Defence
Ministries
Arms transfers
Interior Ministries
Indexes, Research
Preventive Training
Civil Society Capacity
Defence companies
Police
Fragile states
Peacekeeping
3. DEFENCE Corruption - The problem
DANGEROUS It undermines military effectiveness
Poor equipment risks the lives of troops
DIVISIVE
WASTEFUL
It destroys citizens’ trust in the armed forces
Factional control risks; can trigger arms races
The defence sector is worth $1.6 trillion a
year
The waste from corruption is in billions of dollars
3
5. methodology
•77 questions, based on the TI typology. Scored on a 5-point scale
•‘Model answers’ to show good practice and guide assessor’s responses
•Questionnaire completed by independent assessor. Reviewed by two
independent peer reviewers; TI National Chapter review, TI-DSP review
•Government involvement requested, comments on drafts requested
•Reasoned assumptions acceptable where information is lacking
•All info publicly available: One page summary, 30-50 pp country detail
8. EXAMPLE country summary RESULTS
KENYA - BAND D+
POLITICAL
FINANCIAL
PERSONNEL
39%
39%
67%
OPERATIONS
25%
PROCUREMENT
32%
+ Standing orders forbid military involvement in natural resources
+ Robust and transparent payment systems for personnel
+ Separation between chains of command and chains of payment
+ Complaint mechanisms in place for suppliers
9. KENYA - WEAK AREAS
POLITICAL
39%
-
Little CSO involvement in helping improve standards
Little budget transparency
-
Percentage of secret spending not disclosed
-
Poor whistleblowing processes and protections
Lack of transparency surrounding prosecution of corrupt personnel
-
Lack of military doctrine recognising corruption on operations
Lack of operational training on corruption issues
-
Little transparency of procurement cycle or financing packages
No evidence of controls on subcontractors / subsidiaries
FINANCE
39%
PERSONNEL
67%
OPERATIONS
25%
PROCUREMENT
32%
12. Defence INDEX vs cpi
SUB SAHARAN AFRICA
Over-perform
relative to CPI
Under-perform
relative to CPI
13. Afghanistan RESULTS
AFGHANISTAN - BAND E
POLITICAL
FINANCIAL
PERSONNEL
39%
22%
34%
+
+
+
+
+
+
OPERATIONS
35%
PROCUREMENT
17%
‘Inspector General’ system of control in operation
A Military Anti-Corruption unit inside the MOD is in operation
No indication of corruption concerning military-owned businesses
No indications of corruption concerning natural resource links.
Personnel and soldier pay rates are published
‘ Ghost soldiers’ controlled
17. CONTROL OF CORRUPTION: WGI DATA +VE TRENDS
World Bank control of corruption indicators,
www.govindicators.org
18. MENA
THE REGION: RESULTS BY COUNTRY
LEBANON - BAND D+
POLITICAL
40%
+
+
+
+
-
FINANCIAL
PERSONNEL
41%
63%
Defence budget is reasonably transparent
Secret budget proportion below 1%
Competition in defence procurement
No military involvement in business
Very limited political oversight
Asset disposals seem to be politically influenced
No external audits
No external controls on intelligence services
OPERATIONS
35%
PROCUREMENT
39%
19.
20. GI MENA v CPI
Over-perform relative to
the CPI
Under-perform relative to
the CPI
21. Proposals 1 | PRESIDENT/ MOD/ Forces
President and Cabinet Insist that the military and Ministry of Defence
be pro-active in anti-corruption measures. Do not permit special treatment
Defence leaders
1. Build common understanding of corruption across your leadership.
2. Analyse the corruption risks in your defence context; develop a plan.
3. Set up an a-c unit with a senior Director/Officer
4. Put in place a robust Code of Conduct; implement anti-corruption training
5. Improve your whistle-blowing systems for personnel
6. Be open with the public in what you are doing: work with civil society
21
22. PROPOSALS 2 | African Union, ECOWAS
1. Encourage leadership dialogue on preventing corruption: use the typology
2. Sponsor corruption prevention training in all national MODs and forces
3. Develop a Centre of Excellence in defence anti-corruption
4. Provide a common approach for MODs to asses the corruption risks
5. Implement corruption prevention training in peacekeeping training centres
6. Include defence corruption risks in country peer review mechanisms
7. Support whistle-blowing systems for defence and MOD personnel
22
23. PROPOSALS 3 | research
1. Analyse corruption as cause of West African military weakness
2. Bring W. African military leadership together to review army governance
3. Apply TI’s Defence Index methodology to all AU Member States
4. Create an Africanised version of TI’s Defence Integrity and corruption
prevention handbook
5. Compare and contrast the Defence Budget detail for AU member states
6. Develop two training modules: One for Colonel level officers and officials
on preventing corruption. One for General officers in leadership courses.
23
24. PRACTICAL REFORMS - MOD AND ARMIES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Engage the leadership, build confidence
Analyse and understand the risks
Use good diagnostic tools
Use surveys and metrics
Develop a counter-corruption plan
Serious training on counter-corruption
Clear conduct standards for officials, officers
Procurement reforms; use of monitors
Engage media, civil society
Work with the defence and security contractors
Establish a counter-corruption Director and unit
24
25. BUILDING DEFENCE LEADERSHIP UNDERSTANDING
Militaries and MOD leadership
almost never discuss corruption
Our approach:
•One day workshop with MOD and
military leadership
•Review the 29 corruption risks
•Identify priorities
•Outline counter-corruption plan
•Repeat six months later
27. DEFENCE COUNTER-CORRUPTION PLAN
+
Polish experience
Awareness of corruption and schemes within the MoD and military
Many organisations involved in anticorruption activity:
Control Department (MoD)
Audit Bureau (MoD)
−
=
Military Police
Military Prosecutors Office
Military Counterintelligence
Supreme Chamber of Control
No coordination
Lack of a prevention body
Very few system changes
Lack of an integrity policy
No integrity building, inefficient anticorruption measures
Inefficiency of procurement process: buying arms - not capabilities;
focusing on spending money - not on value for money
28. DEFENCE COUNTER-CORRUPTION PLAN
+
Polish experience
Awareness of corruption and schemes within the MoD and military
Many organisations involved in anticorruption activity:
Control Department (MoD)
Audit Bureau (MoD)
−
=
Military Police
Military Prosecutors Office
Military Counterintelligence
Supreme Chamber of Control
No coordination
Lack of a prevention body
Very few system changes
Lack of an integrity policy
No integrity building, inefficient anticorruption measures
Inefficiency of procurement process: buying arms - not capabilities;
focusing on spending money - not on value for money
29. CORRUPTION PREVENTION TRAINING
• 5 day counter-corruption course
• OF5 level officers, MOD officials
• Focus on personal integrity and on
corruption prevention
• Given 15-20 times to date; well received
• All materials available free
• Nations, military academies make own
version and give the training
Moving on…
No progress can be made without an anti-corruption plan.
Some years ago we worked with the Polish armed forces, who have taken significant initiatives against corruption. This slide is their description of the point from which they started.
On the positive side, there was awareness of corruption within the MOD, and many organisations with some responsibility for anti-corruption activity.
On the other hand, there was no coordination, no focus on prevention, very few changes to the existing system and processes, and no focus on building integrity.
The end result was: no strengthening of institutional capability and great inefficiency, especially in procurement.
Their analysis of the corruption risks was that two of them were much more important than the others. Corruption in high-value procurement, and the engagement of senior officers in that corruption.
Based on this analysis, they developed their plan and instituted, successfully, a number of changes.