1.
Neal 1
Ben Neal
Media Analysis: Television in Russia
Today, there is no doubt that television is the supreme medium of media in Russia, with
“74% of the population watching national television channels routinely and 59% routinely
watching regional channels.”1
There are a wide variety of channels to choose from as well –
“3300 in total.”2
Despite this, only “three channels have a nationwide outreach (over 90%
coverage of the Russian territory).”3
These three channels are First Channel, Rossiya, and NTV.
Like “most of the television stations in the country,” First Channel, Rossiya, and NTV “are either
owned and operated by the government … or by a parent company with close government ties.”4
With its vast control of the television networks, the Russian government has a stranglehold on
the information and the messages that are given to the Russian people. This is the way it had
been since the advent of the Soviet Union and the way it is still today. A headline from May 12,
2014, just three days ago, by the Moscow Times read: “94% of Russians depend on State TV for
Ukraine Coverage.”5
The Russian government has far too much control over the television
networks, and as a result it doesn’t promote a healthy and objective political climate.
To understand the current state of television in Russia, it is necessary to look at the
history of the three nationwide channels, and in particular how they coincide with the rise of
Vladimir Putin. “Channel Russia” (Rossiya) was the first to be established, being founded by the
state in May of 1991.1
Secondly came NTV in 1993, launched by Vladimir Gusinsky. The
channel quickly became popular, attracting many skilled news anchors and journalists. It soon
1
"Freedom of the Press in Russia." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 11 May 2014. Web. 15 May 2014.
2
"The World Factbook: Russia." Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency, 22 Apr. 2014. Web. 15
May 2014.
3
"Coverage by TV Broadcasting." Coverage by TV Broadcasting. N.p., 2010. Web. 15 May 2014.
<http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/19-08.htm>.
4
Beckhusen, Robert, and Matthew Gault. "Listening to Russia's State Media, It's Hard to Tell Fact From Fiction."
Medium. N.p., 11 May 2014. Web. 15 May 2014.
5
Tétrault-Farber, Gabrielle. "Poll Finds 94% of Russians Depend on State TV for Ukraine Coverage | News." The
Moscow Times. N.p., 12 May 2014. Web. 15 May 2014.

2.
Neal 2
became known for its professionalism and edgy analysis of current events, and by 1999 it had
gained an audience in excess of 100 million, containing people from 70% of Russia’s territory.6
This was the height of its popularity, and it also happened to be election season. In both the 1999
parliamentary elections and the 2000 presidential elections, NTV was highly critical of Vladimir
Putin and his political party, Unity. In February of 2000, NTV started airing Kukly, a show that
featured a puppet of Putin in an unflattering light. 7
A little more than a year later, in April of
2001, Gazprom, a massive conglomerate owned by the state, forcefully took over NTV and put
in its own management. In 2004, Leonid Parfyonov, the last journalist from the old NTV staff
who was still critical of the government, was fired.8
Lastly was First Channel, found in April of
1995. Like NTV, First Channel was critical of Putin, and as such it suffered a similar fate. In
2001, around the same time Gazprom took over NTV, the Putin administration forced Boris
Berezovsky to sell his controlling share to the government.9
It was at this point that the
Committee to Protect Journalists claimed that “All three major television networks are now in
the hands of Kremlin loyalists.” 10
Putin has continued to control the media with an iron fist. In 2008, there was a
controversy over “blacklisting.” Clifford J. Levy wrote an article for the New York Times in
which he claimed that: “All Putin's opponents are being made to vanish from Russian TV. They
are blacklisted and not allowed to appear in TV shows. In one example, a presentation critical of
6 G. Kertman, Star Wars (Political Commentators on Television), The Public Opinion Foundation, 1 March 2000.
7
Viktor Shenderovich, "Tales From Hoffman" (48–57), Index on Censorship, Volume 37, Number 1, 2008, p. 49.
8
Walsh, Nick Paton. "Television Station Sacks Kremlin's Last Critic." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media,
02 June 2004. Web. 15 May 2014.
9
"ORT Officials Accused of Contraband and Evading Customs Tariffs." Eurasia Daily Monitor. The Jamestown
Foundation, 3 Jan. 2001. Web. 15 May 2014.
10
Simon, Joel. "Who Will Be Russia's Conscience?" Cpj.org. Committee to Protect Journalists, 24 Oct. 2006. Web.
15 May 2014.

3.
Neal 3
Putin's policies has been digitally erased.”11
While some Russians, including scientist Sergey L.
Lopatnikov refuted this claim; this story isn’t hard to believe. Putin has a history of eliminating
the people and organizations in the media that are critical of him and his policies.
While Putin gets rid of the people on television who threaten him, he rewards the people
who support him quite handsomely. In April, three hundred members of the Russian media were
awarded with “The Order of the Merit of the Fatherland.” According to the decree, this
represented journalists who displayed “high professionalism and objectivity in the reporting of
events in the Republic of Crimea.”4
With this in mind recall that the Moscow Times has found
that “94% of Russians depend on State TV for Ukraine Coverage.” This is an interesting
correlation to say the least. With the state having that much of a presence in the media, how can
it possibly be objective? Isn’t Putin just giving these three hundred journalists this recognition
because they’re propagating the message of the state to Putin’s liking? Do the Russian people
seriously believe what they’re seeing on their television screens?
The answer to these questions, in part, can be found in the same Moscow Times article.
On the subject of objectivity, it claims: “47 percent of respondents were confident in the
objectivity of their country's [Russia’s] federal media outlets.”5
While this is a significant
amount, it is not a majority. The majority of Russians are not confident in the objectivity of their
federal media outlets. This is a distressing notion in a modern world where objective journalism
should be readily available.
As an unfortunate continuation of this, the future for Russian television is not looking
bright. Putin has not relented in his continuous attempts to limit free speech. Just recently, as in
within the last month, he signed legislation that “forbids the dissemination of patently false
11
Levy, Clifford J. "It Isn't Magic: Putin Opponents Are Made to Vanish From TV." The New York Times. The New
York Times, 02 June 2008. Web. 15 May 2014.

4.
Neal 4
information about the actions of the Soviet Union during World War II—or the Great Patriotic
War, as it is known in Russia.” In the context of this law, all it takes for information to be
“patently false” is for it to be against what the Kremlin believes. This is no slouch of a law either,
and to show that he’s serious about enforcing this law, Putin has made the punishment for
breaking it quite harsh. Anyone caught “disseminating patently false information” about the
“Great Patriotic War” could face up to five years in prison. This is reminiscent of the “Cult of
Personality” era of Stalin in the 1930s when historians rewrote history books to portray great
Mother Russia in a favorable and glorious light. As Tatiana Murzina, a Muscovite lawyer puts it:
“The Internet and TV here will soon consist of nothing else but Soviet cartoons interspersed with
stirring patriotic songs.” Many other Russians feel the same way. To many of them, they refer to
the television as the “zombie box” due to the states control over it. 12
It is absolutely absurd that
this is happening in 2014, and Russia’s stranglehold over television is not healthy whatsoever.
12
Bennetts, Marc. "The Future of Russia: Soviet Cartoons and Stirring, Patriotic Songs." Vocativ. N.p., 12 May
2014. Web. 15 May 2014.

5.
Neal 5
Bibliography
"Freedom of the Press in Russia." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 11 May 2014. Web. 15
May 2014.
"The World Factbook: Russia." Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency, 22
Apr. 2014. Web. 15 May 2014.
"Coverage by TV Broadcasting." Coverage by TV Broadcasting. N.p., 2010. Web. 15 May 2014.
<http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/19-08.htm>.
Beckhusen, Robert, and Matthew Gault. "Listening to Russia's State Media, It's Hard to Tell Fact
From Fiction." Medium. N.p., 11 May 2014. Web. 15 May 2014.
Tétrault-Farber, Gabrielle. "Poll Finds 94% of Russians Depend on State TV for Ukraine
Coverage | News." The Moscow Times. N.p., 12 May 2014. Web. 15 May 2014.
G. Kertman, Star Wars (Political Commentators on Television), The Public Opinion Foundation,
1 March 2000.
Viktor Shenderovich, "Tales From Hoffman" (48–57), Index on Censorship, Volume 37,
Number 1, 2008, p. 49.
Walsh, Nick Paton. "Television Station Sacks Kremlin's Last Critic." The Guardian. Guardian
News and Media, 02 June 2004. Web. 15 May 2014.
"ORT Officials Accused of Contraband and Evading Customs Tariffs." Eurasia Daily Monitor.
The Jamestown Foundation, 3 Jan. 2001. Web. 15 May 2014.
Simon, Joel. "Who Will Be Russia's Conscience?" Cpj.org. Committee to Protect Journalists, 24
Oct. 2006. Web. 15 May 2014.
Levy, Clifford J. "It Isn't Magic: Putin Opponents Are Made to Vanish From TV." The New York
Times. The New York Times, 02 June 2008. Web. 15 May 2014.
Bennetts, Marc. "The Future of Russia: Soviet Cartoons and Stirring, Patriotic Songs." Vocativ.
N.p., 12 May 2014. Web. 15 May 2014.