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Publication F004E Issue 10/08
Established Leaders in Valve Actuation
Fluid Power Actuators and Control Systems
Understanding the use of valve
actuators in SIL rated safety
instrumented systems
SIL Explained
2
The requirement for Safety
Integrity Level (SIL) equipment can
be complicated and confusing. In
this document, Rotork has set out
to explain SIL and its consequent
impact upon the provision of valves
& actuators in relation to Safety
Instrumented Systems (SIS).
If you would like further
clarification, please contact us.
What is SIL?
SIL, an acronym for Safety Integrity Level, is a system used to
quantify and qualify the requirements for Safety Instrumented
Systems. The International Electro-technical Commission (IEC)
introduced the following industry standards to assist operators
with quantifying the safety performance requirements for
hazardous operations:
IEC 61508 	 Functional Safety of
		 Electrical/Electronic/Programmable
		 Electronic Safety-Related Systems
IEC 61511 	 Safety Instrumented Systems for
		 the Process Industry Sector
These standards have been widely adopted in the hydrocarbon
and oil & gas industries to define Safety Instrumented Systems
and their reliability as a means of improving safety and
availability of Safety Instrumented Systems.
What are Safety Integrity Levels?
Safety Integrity Levels are targets applied to the reliability and
performance of the safety systems used to protect hazardous
activities such as hydrocarbon refining or production. There
are 4 SIL levels. The higher the perceived associated risk,the
higher the performance required of the safety system and
therefore the higher the SIL rating number. The IEC standards
define the performance requirements of the safety systems for
the required SIL rating.
How are SIL ratings determined?
Once the scope of an activity is determined, the operator
can identify the possible hazard(s) and then assess their
potential severity. The risk associated with a hazard is
identified by assessing the likely frequency of occurrence and
the potential consequences if the hazard is realized.
The operator must then assign a number for the severity
of consequence and frequency.
These numbers are then fed into a matrix to allow the
operator to assign the required SIL rating to protect against
the hazard. Many tools are available to assist an operator with
this process (e.g., HAZOP software — Hazard and Operability).
An example of such a matrix is shown below in figure 1.
Fig. 1. Frequency/consequence matrix.
How are hazards protected against?
Once the SIL ratings have been determined, the operator can
then design a risk reduction strategy to protect against these
hazards. This is accomplished by applying multiple layers of
protection. Risk reduction can be an expensive procedure;
therefore, the operator will look to reduce the risk to a level
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
Fig. 2. Layers of hazard protection.
Figure 2 shows multiple layers of protection are used to
develop the required safety strategy. Safety Instrumented
System has been highlighted because this is the layer that
applies to shutdown systems and valve actuators. The SIS
assists in reducing the frequency of the likely manifestation
of the hazard and therefore improves the reliability of the
system. The consequence of a failure is not addressed by SIS
but by other aspects of the risk reduction strategy.
SIL Explained
Frequency
Severity of Consequence
5	 SIL3 	 SIL4 	 X 	 X 	 X	
4	 SIL2 	 SIL3 	 SIL4 	 X 	 X	
3	 SIL1 	 SIL2 	 SIL3 	 SIL4 	 X	
2	 - 	 SIL1 	 SIL2 	 SIL3 	 SIL4	
1	 - 	 - 	 SIL1 	 SIL2 	 SIL3	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Emergency Response
Passive Protection
Active Protection
Isolated Protection
High Level Process Control
Low Level Process Control
Design
Hazardous Activity
Plant Engineering & Design
Basic Production Control System
Operational Intervention
Safety Instrumented System
Relief Valve, Rupture Disc, etc.
Bund, Blast Wall, etc.
Emergency Response
MitigationPrevention
ProtectionLayersProtectionLayers
3Established Leaders in Valve Actuation Technology
How is SIL used?
Safety Integrity Levels are part of a larger scheme called
Functional Safety that deals with techniques, technologies,
standards and procedures that help operators protect against
hazards. Functional Safety adopts a life cycle approach to
industries that deal with hazardous processes that includes
plans from concept through to final decommissioning of
plants. This process is cyclical and any phase is effected by
the requirements of the previous stage(s) so, subsequent
stages must be revisited to assess the impact of a change to
a previous stage.
Figure 3 below is a simplified depiction of the four basic steps
of the life cycle.
Fig. 3. Functional safety life cycle.
Pre-Design Phase
This is the phase where the scope of the project is
determined, all hazards are assessed, and a Safety
Requirements Specification is formulated. This specification
will determine the SIL ratings to be applied to the various
activities.
Design Phase
Once the pre-design phase is completed, the operator will
design the required safety systems and plan how they will
be executed. It is this stage where the safety systems are
specified. This is also when the testing regimes are allocated
to ensure that the SIL ratings can be met.
Realisation Phase
Upon the completion of the design phase, the plant is built
and commissioned. All safety systems are tested to ensure
that they meet the established safety requirements.
Operation Phase
The plant is now operational and producing. The safety
systems are now regularly tested to ensure that they continue
to perform as designed and required.
How does equipment fail?
There are three ways in which safety equipment can fail:
systematic, common cause, and random hardware failure.
These failures are addressed by the safety life cycle in the
following manner.
Systematic Failures
These types of failure are not failures of individual
components but the system as a whole. These failures are
reduced by using proper engineering practice and design
during the design phase. These are very rare failures as years
of experience and documentation have helped engineers
understand how systems interact.
Common Cause Failures
This type of failure is when identical components within
the safety system fail at the same time. Again, experience
with products and documentation help engineers design
systems that prevent this. Also, these failures can be virtually
eliminated by using redundant and diverse systems. Common
cause failures are generally the result of environmental effects
like flooding or excessive temperatures.
Random Hardware Failure
This is the main type of failure mode — random by their
nature. This is the type of failure Safety Instrumented Systems
protect against. Engineers try to predict the probability of
these failures by assessing the failure rates of the equipment
used. This is where SIL specifies the performance and
architectural constraints that a safety system requires.
PRE-DESIGN PHASE
Concept & Scope
Hazard Risk Analysis
Safety Requirements Specification
DESIGN PHASE
Planning:
Installation
Commissioning
Validation
Safety
Instumented
System
E/E/PES
Other Safety
Systems and
Technologies
External Risk
Reduction
Plant
Community
REALISATION PHASE
Installation
Commissioning
Validation
OPERATION PHASE
Operation/Maintenance
Modification
De-commissioning
4
How is the SIS performance quantified?
The Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) is the measure
used to define the level of protection offered by the system.
EIC 61508 defines the maximum allowable PFDavg (the
average probability, from 0 to 1, that the safety function
will fail to operate on demand) for the Safety Instrumented
Function (SIF).
The allowable level is dependant upon whether the system
is deemed to be low demand or high demand. Low demand
systems are defined as having an expected safety demand
interval of greater than one year, and a proof test interval
for the equipment that is at least twice that of the expected
safety demand interval. The vast majority of fluid power
actuated safety valves fall into this low demand type.
IEC 61508 defines the required PFDavg as shown in figure 4.
Fig. 4. SIL ratings.
High Demand safety control systems are defined as those that
are operated more frequently than once per year.
What does this mean in terms of
performance for the SIF?
The figures quoted in figure 4 apply to the entire Safety
Instrumented Function and not the individual components.
Any SIF is comprised of three discrete areas: “Sensors”, “Logic
Solvers” and “Final Elements”. Figure 5 indicates these areas
of an SIF for over-pressure isolation.
Fig. 5. Example of an over-pressure shutdown.
The “Sensors” detect the presence of the potential onset of a
hazardous condition (e.g., over-pressure). The “Logic Solver”
is the programmable logic controller (PLC) which determines
what action to take after the “Sensors” have detected a
potentially hazardous event. The “Final Elements” perform the
required safety action (e.g., ESD of the valve). The scope of
this document only covers the “Final Elements” as this is area
where fluid power actuators function.
When assessing the performance of the SIF we must consider
the solenoid valve, actuator and valve as a single entity with
regard to the PFDavg calculation as the failure of any of these
components will cause the SIF to fail.
In order to prove that the SIF is performing to the required
SIL rating, it is necessary to know the failure rates of the
equipment used so that it can be verified that the maximum
allowable PFDavg is not exceeded. Failure rate data gives the
operator a measure of when the equipment is likely to fail
over a given period of time (i.e., the older the equipment,
the more likely it is to fail when required to operate). The
PFDavg can be calculated from this data. When it reaches the
maximum allowable level, the plant must be shutdown and all
safety systems fully tested.
Is it possible to procure an actuator with
a SIL rating approval?
The simple answer is no. Only the complete SIF can have a
SIL rating, not individual components. However, components
(e.g., actuators) can be certified “suitable for use” at a
particular SIL rating.
Operators and contractors may look for components certified
as “suitable for use” as this will simplify the design process.
In addition, if the component has failure rates that are known
to be compatible with the required SIL rating, the safety
calculations are also made much simpler.
How are actuators certified as “suitable
for use” for specific SIL ratings?
There are two aspects to the process of attaining a SIL
certificate. The first is assessing the design and failure rates of
the equipment. This can be accomplished through either of
two techniques: FMEDA (Failure Modes, Effect and Diagnostic
Analysis) and “Proven in Use”.
The second aspect is the auditing the vendor's manufacturing
and quality processes. This audit proves that the vendor
is capable of manufacturing the product to the designed
performance standard. These assessments must be audited by
an approved accreditation body such as Exida or TÜV.
SIL Explained
Final ElementsLogic Solver
PLC
Sensors
	SIL LEVEL	 Max PFDavg	 Chance of Failure
	 1	 0.1	 <10%
	 2	 0.01	 <1%
	 3	 0.001	 <0.1%
	 4	 0.0001	 <0.01%
5Established Leaders in Valve Actuation Technology
Suitable for Use Method 1 – FMEDA
FMEDA is a technique that assesses the performance of a
device by evaluating the effects of the different failure modes
of all components in the design. Every component is assessed
for the type of failure (dangerous or safe) and the likelihood
of failure (failure rate). All of this data is then collated to
produce overall dangerous and safe failure rates that can be
used in safety calculations.
FMEDA studies can be conducted either by the vendor or a
third-party body but, in both circumstances, must be audited
by an accredited body to prove that best practices have
been used.
Suitable for Use Method 2 – Proven in Use
It may not be possible, practical or cost effective to conduct
an FMEDA on a product, particularly if it is of an old or
complex design. In these cases, products may be certified by
using “Proven In Use”.
“Proven In Use” as defined in the IEC 61508 standard is
a documented assessment that has shown that there is
appropriate evidence, based on previous use history of the
component, that it is suitable for use in a safety system.
This documented evidence must include the following:
•	 The manufacturer’s quality and management systems.
•	 The volume of the operating experience with statistical 	
	 evidence to show that the claimed failure rate is 		
	 sufficiently low.
Failure Rate Data
Once the studies have been completed, the user is
presented with the failure rate data. This data falls into two
fundamental categories: dangerous failure rate (λD) and safe
failure rate (λS).
The dangerous failure rate (λD) data relates to failures that will
result in the SIF being unable to perform the required safety
function upon demand. The safe failure rate (λS) data relates
to those failure modes that will put the safety function in its
safe state (e.g., shutdown).
SIL is only concerned with the dangerous failure data but the
safe failure data is important as this provides the operator a
measure of how likely the safety system is to spuriously trip.
Do we need to test the SIF?
As described in earlier sections, SIL prescribes the maximum
level that the PFDavg is permitted to reach. There are
two types of tests that can be performed to help maintain
the PFDavg at a suitably low level: Proof Tests and
Diagnostic Tests.
Proof tests
A proof test is a manual test performed during shutdown
that tests the entire functionality of the SIF from sensing to
actuation. It must be suitably configured to test all aspects of
the safety function to prove that the SIF is “as good as new”.
There may be several negative ramifications — particularly
expense related — due to a proof test necessitating a process
shutdown.
Diagnostic Tests
A diagnostic test is an automatic test performed online that
does not necessitate process shutdown. This type of test
must be performed at least ten times more frequently than
the expected SIF demand rate.
A diagnostic test will test only a percentage of the total
possible failure modes of the SIF; this percentage is called the
Diagnostic Coverage (DC). These tests contribute to reducing
the PFDavg of the SIF and thus assist in the extension of the
proof test interval. The higher the DC, the greater the benefit
gained from the test. For the “final elements” within the
scope of this document, this type of test is called a partial
stroke test.
What is the experience of Rotork
Fluid Systems when addressing SIL
requirements?
In addition to having actuators currently operating in both
SIL 2 and SIL 3 environments, Rotork Fluid Systems also has a
Partial Stroke Testing tool (the SVM Smart Valve Monitor) that
provides the highest possible diagnostic coverage.
Rotork also provides services related to the safety calculations
for the entire final element assembly, including the valve
and controlling solenoid valves. By creating a database of
known failure rates for various final elements, Rotork is able
to provide recommendations for control mechanisms and
valves that will provide the end-user with the best possible
performing system that yields the best possible long-term
financial benefits.
Our services assist the end user in extending shutdown
intervals to the maximum possible time frame within the
required SIL rating and also provide peace of mind against
spurious trips.
6
Can RFS supply actuators for my SIL 2/3
requirements?
Yes.
SIL and other statutory requirements such as ATEX and PED
place great demands upon suppliers. A consequence of SIL
is the requirement for a product with a declared reliability
according to IEC standards.
A valve actuation provider must be much more than a
manufacturer to meet these ever increasing demands.
Suppliers for SIL applications must be extremely well versed in
the industries and applications that they serve. They must also
possess the engineering know-how and resources required to
properly execute the process of supply for SIL applications.
Rotork is a global leader in valve actuation technology.
We provide a comprehensive range of valve actuators,
controls and associated equipment, as well as a variety of
valve actuator services including commissioning, preventive
maintenance and retro-fit solutions. We are dedicated
to providing the marketplace with the latest technology,
consistently high quality, innovative design, excellent reliability
and superior performance. Most importantly, we have a
longstanding commitment to meeting the special needs of a
wide range of applications including: oil and gas exploration
and transportation; municipal water and wastewater
treatment; power generation; and the chemical and process
industries. With more than fifty years of engineering and
manufacturing expertise, we have tens of thousands of
successful valve actuator installations throughout the world.
Rotork Fluid Systems maintains dedicated engineering groups
for Applications, Product Improvement and New Product
Development so that our customers can gain all the benefits
that ever advancing technologies have to offer and also to
ensure our efforts are in step with the continually evolving
needs of our customers.
To properly support our customers around the globe, RFS
maintains several manufacturing facilities in both Europe and
the United States. In addition to these manufacturing facilities,
we maintain a network of Centres of Excellence strategically
located around the world. These fluid power actuation
specialist centres hold stock, provide application engineering
and packaging of control components as well as providing
sales, service, installation and commissioning support. With
these vast resources available, we are able to provide solutions
for any application requirement.
Are there examples of SIL 2 or SIL 3
systems that RFS can provide for review?
Yes.
RFS has employed all the methods outlined above. Specific
information can be made available for review upon request.
SIL Explained
7Established Leaders in Valve Actuation Technology
In conclusion, Rotork Fluid Systems
is capable of providing complete
SIL solutions for final elements
used in Safety Instrumented
Systems. We have extensive project
and industry experience working
with and providing SIL certified
actuators and services for the oil
& gas and hydrocarbon industries.
Latest product information and a full listing
of our worldwide sales and service network
is available on our website.
www.rotork.com
All Rotork Fluid Systems actuators
are manufactured under a third
party accredited ISO9001:2000
quality assurance programme.
Published and produced by
Rotork Fluid Systems.
Rotork recognises all registered
trademarks. As we are
continually developing our
products, their design is subject
to change without notice.
POWTG1008
Electric Actuators and Control Systems
Fluid Power Actuators and Control Systems
Gearboxes and Gear Operators
Projects, Services and Retrofit
Australia
Rotork Fluid Systems
Factory 1, 9 Malvern Street
Bayswater,
Victoria 3153
Tel: 	 +61 (0) 3 9729 8882
Fax: 	 +61 (0) 3 9729 8884
Email: 	sales@rfsaustralia.com
Canada
Rotork Fluid Systems
#9, 820 28th Street, NE
Calgary,
Alberta T2A 6K1
Tel: 	 +1 403 569 9455
Fax: 	 +1 403 569 9414
Email: 	info@rotork.ca
Spain
Rotork Fluid Systems
Larrondogoiko Kalea 2
48180 Larrondo - Loiu,
Bizkaia
Tel: 	 +34 94 676 6011
Fax: 	 +34 94 676 6018
Email: 	rotork@rotork.es
Singapore
Rotork Fluid Systems
426 Tagore Industrial Avenue
Singapore,
787808
Tel: 	 +65 6457 1233
Fax: 	 +65 6457 6011
Email: 	mail@rotork.com.sg
United Kingdom
Rotork Fluid Systems
Regina House, Ring Road
Bramley,
Leeds LS13 4ET
Tel: 	 +44 (0)113 236 3312
Fax: 	 +44 (0)113 205 7266
Email: 	sales@rotorkfluidsystem.co.uk
United States
Rotork Fluid Systems
9777 West Gulf Bank
Suite15A
Houston, TX 77040
Tel: 	 +1 713 856 5640
Fax: 	 +1 713 856 8127
Email: 	rfsinfo@rotork.com
United States
Rotork Fluid Systems
2180 South McDowell Blvd.
Suite B
Petaluma, CA 94954
Tel: 	 +1 707 769 4880
Fax: 	 +1 707 769 4888
Email: 	rfsinfo@rotork.com
United States
Rotork Fluid Systems
77 Circuit Drive
North Kingstown, RI
02852
Tel: 	 +1 401 294 1400
Fax: 	 +1 401 294 3388
Email: 	sales@remotecontrol.us
Germany
Rotork Fluid Systems
Rotork Controls (D) GmbH
Maschweg 51
49324 Melle
Tel: 	 +49 (0)5422 9414-0
Fax: 	 +49 (0)5422 9414-10
Email: 	sales@rfs-pci.de
Italy
Rotork Fluid Systems
Via di Casalino 6
55012 Tassignano - Lucca
Italy
Tel: 	 +39 0583 93061
Fax: 	 +39 0583 934612
Email: 	fluid@fluidsystem.it
Sweden
Rotork Fluid Systems
Remote Controls Sweden AB
Kontrollvägen 15
SE-791 45 Falun
Tel: 	 +46 (0)23-587 00
Fax: 	 +46 (0)23-587 45
Email: 	info@remotecontrol.se
United States
Rotork Fluid Systems
675 Mile Crossing Blvd.
Rochester, NY
14624
Tel: 	 +1 585 247 2304
Fax: 	 +1 585 247 2308
Email: 	rfsinfo@rotork.com
Manufacturing Centres
Centres of Excellence

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Sil explained in valve actuators

  • 1. Publication F004E Issue 10/08 Established Leaders in Valve Actuation Fluid Power Actuators and Control Systems Understanding the use of valve actuators in SIL rated safety instrumented systems SIL Explained
  • 2. 2 The requirement for Safety Integrity Level (SIL) equipment can be complicated and confusing. In this document, Rotork has set out to explain SIL and its consequent impact upon the provision of valves & actuators in relation to Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS). If you would like further clarification, please contact us. What is SIL? SIL, an acronym for Safety Integrity Level, is a system used to quantify and qualify the requirements for Safety Instrumented Systems. The International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) introduced the following industry standards to assist operators with quantifying the safety performance requirements for hazardous operations: IEC 61508 Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems IEC 61511 Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector These standards have been widely adopted in the hydrocarbon and oil & gas industries to define Safety Instrumented Systems and their reliability as a means of improving safety and availability of Safety Instrumented Systems. What are Safety Integrity Levels? Safety Integrity Levels are targets applied to the reliability and performance of the safety systems used to protect hazardous activities such as hydrocarbon refining or production. There are 4 SIL levels. The higher the perceived associated risk,the higher the performance required of the safety system and therefore the higher the SIL rating number. The IEC standards define the performance requirements of the safety systems for the required SIL rating. How are SIL ratings determined? Once the scope of an activity is determined, the operator can identify the possible hazard(s) and then assess their potential severity. The risk associated with a hazard is identified by assessing the likely frequency of occurrence and the potential consequences if the hazard is realized. The operator must then assign a number for the severity of consequence and frequency. These numbers are then fed into a matrix to allow the operator to assign the required SIL rating to protect against the hazard. Many tools are available to assist an operator with this process (e.g., HAZOP software — Hazard and Operability). An example of such a matrix is shown below in figure 1. Fig. 1. Frequency/consequence matrix. How are hazards protected against? Once the SIL ratings have been determined, the operator can then design a risk reduction strategy to protect against these hazards. This is accomplished by applying multiple layers of protection. Risk reduction can be an expensive procedure; therefore, the operator will look to reduce the risk to a level As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Fig. 2. Layers of hazard protection. Figure 2 shows multiple layers of protection are used to develop the required safety strategy. Safety Instrumented System has been highlighted because this is the layer that applies to shutdown systems and valve actuators. The SIS assists in reducing the frequency of the likely manifestation of the hazard and therefore improves the reliability of the system. The consequence of a failure is not addressed by SIS but by other aspects of the risk reduction strategy. SIL Explained Frequency Severity of Consequence 5 SIL3 SIL4 X X X 4 SIL2 SIL3 SIL4 X X 3 SIL1 SIL2 SIL3 SIL4 X 2 - SIL1 SIL2 SIL3 SIL4 1 - - SIL1 SIL2 SIL3 1 2 3 4 5 Emergency Response Passive Protection Active Protection Isolated Protection High Level Process Control Low Level Process Control Design Hazardous Activity Plant Engineering & Design Basic Production Control System Operational Intervention Safety Instrumented System Relief Valve, Rupture Disc, etc. Bund, Blast Wall, etc. Emergency Response MitigationPrevention ProtectionLayersProtectionLayers
  • 3. 3Established Leaders in Valve Actuation Technology How is SIL used? Safety Integrity Levels are part of a larger scheme called Functional Safety that deals with techniques, technologies, standards and procedures that help operators protect against hazards. Functional Safety adopts a life cycle approach to industries that deal with hazardous processes that includes plans from concept through to final decommissioning of plants. This process is cyclical and any phase is effected by the requirements of the previous stage(s) so, subsequent stages must be revisited to assess the impact of a change to a previous stage. Figure 3 below is a simplified depiction of the four basic steps of the life cycle. Fig. 3. Functional safety life cycle. Pre-Design Phase This is the phase where the scope of the project is determined, all hazards are assessed, and a Safety Requirements Specification is formulated. This specification will determine the SIL ratings to be applied to the various activities. Design Phase Once the pre-design phase is completed, the operator will design the required safety systems and plan how they will be executed. It is this stage where the safety systems are specified. This is also when the testing regimes are allocated to ensure that the SIL ratings can be met. Realisation Phase Upon the completion of the design phase, the plant is built and commissioned. All safety systems are tested to ensure that they meet the established safety requirements. Operation Phase The plant is now operational and producing. The safety systems are now regularly tested to ensure that they continue to perform as designed and required. How does equipment fail? There are three ways in which safety equipment can fail: systematic, common cause, and random hardware failure. These failures are addressed by the safety life cycle in the following manner. Systematic Failures These types of failure are not failures of individual components but the system as a whole. These failures are reduced by using proper engineering practice and design during the design phase. These are very rare failures as years of experience and documentation have helped engineers understand how systems interact. Common Cause Failures This type of failure is when identical components within the safety system fail at the same time. Again, experience with products and documentation help engineers design systems that prevent this. Also, these failures can be virtually eliminated by using redundant and diverse systems. Common cause failures are generally the result of environmental effects like flooding or excessive temperatures. Random Hardware Failure This is the main type of failure mode — random by their nature. This is the type of failure Safety Instrumented Systems protect against. Engineers try to predict the probability of these failures by assessing the failure rates of the equipment used. This is where SIL specifies the performance and architectural constraints that a safety system requires. PRE-DESIGN PHASE Concept & Scope Hazard Risk Analysis Safety Requirements Specification DESIGN PHASE Planning: Installation Commissioning Validation Safety Instumented System E/E/PES Other Safety Systems and Technologies External Risk Reduction Plant Community REALISATION PHASE Installation Commissioning Validation OPERATION PHASE Operation/Maintenance Modification De-commissioning
  • 4. 4 How is the SIS performance quantified? The Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) is the measure used to define the level of protection offered by the system. EIC 61508 defines the maximum allowable PFDavg (the average probability, from 0 to 1, that the safety function will fail to operate on demand) for the Safety Instrumented Function (SIF). The allowable level is dependant upon whether the system is deemed to be low demand or high demand. Low demand systems are defined as having an expected safety demand interval of greater than one year, and a proof test interval for the equipment that is at least twice that of the expected safety demand interval. The vast majority of fluid power actuated safety valves fall into this low demand type. IEC 61508 defines the required PFDavg as shown in figure 4. Fig. 4. SIL ratings. High Demand safety control systems are defined as those that are operated more frequently than once per year. What does this mean in terms of performance for the SIF? The figures quoted in figure 4 apply to the entire Safety Instrumented Function and not the individual components. Any SIF is comprised of three discrete areas: “Sensors”, “Logic Solvers” and “Final Elements”. Figure 5 indicates these areas of an SIF for over-pressure isolation. Fig. 5. Example of an over-pressure shutdown. The “Sensors” detect the presence of the potential onset of a hazardous condition (e.g., over-pressure). The “Logic Solver” is the programmable logic controller (PLC) which determines what action to take after the “Sensors” have detected a potentially hazardous event. The “Final Elements” perform the required safety action (e.g., ESD of the valve). The scope of this document only covers the “Final Elements” as this is area where fluid power actuators function. When assessing the performance of the SIF we must consider the solenoid valve, actuator and valve as a single entity with regard to the PFDavg calculation as the failure of any of these components will cause the SIF to fail. In order to prove that the SIF is performing to the required SIL rating, it is necessary to know the failure rates of the equipment used so that it can be verified that the maximum allowable PFDavg is not exceeded. Failure rate data gives the operator a measure of when the equipment is likely to fail over a given period of time (i.e., the older the equipment, the more likely it is to fail when required to operate). The PFDavg can be calculated from this data. When it reaches the maximum allowable level, the plant must be shutdown and all safety systems fully tested. Is it possible to procure an actuator with a SIL rating approval? The simple answer is no. Only the complete SIF can have a SIL rating, not individual components. However, components (e.g., actuators) can be certified “suitable for use” at a particular SIL rating. Operators and contractors may look for components certified as “suitable for use” as this will simplify the design process. In addition, if the component has failure rates that are known to be compatible with the required SIL rating, the safety calculations are also made much simpler. How are actuators certified as “suitable for use” for specific SIL ratings? There are two aspects to the process of attaining a SIL certificate. The first is assessing the design and failure rates of the equipment. This can be accomplished through either of two techniques: FMEDA (Failure Modes, Effect and Diagnostic Analysis) and “Proven in Use”. The second aspect is the auditing the vendor's manufacturing and quality processes. This audit proves that the vendor is capable of manufacturing the product to the designed performance standard. These assessments must be audited by an approved accreditation body such as Exida or TÜV. SIL Explained Final ElementsLogic Solver PLC Sensors SIL LEVEL Max PFDavg Chance of Failure 1 0.1 <10% 2 0.01 <1% 3 0.001 <0.1% 4 0.0001 <0.01%
  • 5. 5Established Leaders in Valve Actuation Technology Suitable for Use Method 1 – FMEDA FMEDA is a technique that assesses the performance of a device by evaluating the effects of the different failure modes of all components in the design. Every component is assessed for the type of failure (dangerous or safe) and the likelihood of failure (failure rate). All of this data is then collated to produce overall dangerous and safe failure rates that can be used in safety calculations. FMEDA studies can be conducted either by the vendor or a third-party body but, in both circumstances, must be audited by an accredited body to prove that best practices have been used. Suitable for Use Method 2 – Proven in Use It may not be possible, practical or cost effective to conduct an FMEDA on a product, particularly if it is of an old or complex design. In these cases, products may be certified by using “Proven In Use”. “Proven In Use” as defined in the IEC 61508 standard is a documented assessment that has shown that there is appropriate evidence, based on previous use history of the component, that it is suitable for use in a safety system. This documented evidence must include the following: • The manufacturer’s quality and management systems. • The volume of the operating experience with statistical evidence to show that the claimed failure rate is sufficiently low. Failure Rate Data Once the studies have been completed, the user is presented with the failure rate data. This data falls into two fundamental categories: dangerous failure rate (λD) and safe failure rate (λS). The dangerous failure rate (λD) data relates to failures that will result in the SIF being unable to perform the required safety function upon demand. The safe failure rate (λS) data relates to those failure modes that will put the safety function in its safe state (e.g., shutdown). SIL is only concerned with the dangerous failure data but the safe failure data is important as this provides the operator a measure of how likely the safety system is to spuriously trip. Do we need to test the SIF? As described in earlier sections, SIL prescribes the maximum level that the PFDavg is permitted to reach. There are two types of tests that can be performed to help maintain the PFDavg at a suitably low level: Proof Tests and Diagnostic Tests. Proof tests A proof test is a manual test performed during shutdown that tests the entire functionality of the SIF from sensing to actuation. It must be suitably configured to test all aspects of the safety function to prove that the SIF is “as good as new”. There may be several negative ramifications — particularly expense related — due to a proof test necessitating a process shutdown. Diagnostic Tests A diagnostic test is an automatic test performed online that does not necessitate process shutdown. This type of test must be performed at least ten times more frequently than the expected SIF demand rate. A diagnostic test will test only a percentage of the total possible failure modes of the SIF; this percentage is called the Diagnostic Coverage (DC). These tests contribute to reducing the PFDavg of the SIF and thus assist in the extension of the proof test interval. The higher the DC, the greater the benefit gained from the test. For the “final elements” within the scope of this document, this type of test is called a partial stroke test. What is the experience of Rotork Fluid Systems when addressing SIL requirements? In addition to having actuators currently operating in both SIL 2 and SIL 3 environments, Rotork Fluid Systems also has a Partial Stroke Testing tool (the SVM Smart Valve Monitor) that provides the highest possible diagnostic coverage. Rotork also provides services related to the safety calculations for the entire final element assembly, including the valve and controlling solenoid valves. By creating a database of known failure rates for various final elements, Rotork is able to provide recommendations for control mechanisms and valves that will provide the end-user with the best possible performing system that yields the best possible long-term financial benefits. Our services assist the end user in extending shutdown intervals to the maximum possible time frame within the required SIL rating and also provide peace of mind against spurious trips.
  • 6. 6 Can RFS supply actuators for my SIL 2/3 requirements? Yes. SIL and other statutory requirements such as ATEX and PED place great demands upon suppliers. A consequence of SIL is the requirement for a product with a declared reliability according to IEC standards. A valve actuation provider must be much more than a manufacturer to meet these ever increasing demands. Suppliers for SIL applications must be extremely well versed in the industries and applications that they serve. They must also possess the engineering know-how and resources required to properly execute the process of supply for SIL applications. Rotork is a global leader in valve actuation technology. We provide a comprehensive range of valve actuators, controls and associated equipment, as well as a variety of valve actuator services including commissioning, preventive maintenance and retro-fit solutions. We are dedicated to providing the marketplace with the latest technology, consistently high quality, innovative design, excellent reliability and superior performance. Most importantly, we have a longstanding commitment to meeting the special needs of a wide range of applications including: oil and gas exploration and transportation; municipal water and wastewater treatment; power generation; and the chemical and process industries. With more than fifty years of engineering and manufacturing expertise, we have tens of thousands of successful valve actuator installations throughout the world. Rotork Fluid Systems maintains dedicated engineering groups for Applications, Product Improvement and New Product Development so that our customers can gain all the benefits that ever advancing technologies have to offer and also to ensure our efforts are in step with the continually evolving needs of our customers. To properly support our customers around the globe, RFS maintains several manufacturing facilities in both Europe and the United States. In addition to these manufacturing facilities, we maintain a network of Centres of Excellence strategically located around the world. These fluid power actuation specialist centres hold stock, provide application engineering and packaging of control components as well as providing sales, service, installation and commissioning support. With these vast resources available, we are able to provide solutions for any application requirement. Are there examples of SIL 2 or SIL 3 systems that RFS can provide for review? Yes. RFS has employed all the methods outlined above. Specific information can be made available for review upon request. SIL Explained
  • 7. 7Established Leaders in Valve Actuation Technology In conclusion, Rotork Fluid Systems is capable of providing complete SIL solutions for final elements used in Safety Instrumented Systems. We have extensive project and industry experience working with and providing SIL certified actuators and services for the oil & gas and hydrocarbon industries.
  • 8. Latest product information and a full listing of our worldwide sales and service network is available on our website. www.rotork.com All Rotork Fluid Systems actuators are manufactured under a third party accredited ISO9001:2000 quality assurance programme. Published and produced by Rotork Fluid Systems. Rotork recognises all registered trademarks. As we are continually developing our products, their design is subject to change without notice. POWTG1008 Electric Actuators and Control Systems Fluid Power Actuators and Control Systems Gearboxes and Gear Operators Projects, Services and Retrofit Australia Rotork Fluid Systems Factory 1, 9 Malvern Street Bayswater, Victoria 3153 Tel: +61 (0) 3 9729 8882 Fax: +61 (0) 3 9729 8884 Email: sales@rfsaustralia.com Canada Rotork Fluid Systems #9, 820 28th Street, NE Calgary, Alberta T2A 6K1 Tel: +1 403 569 9455 Fax: +1 403 569 9414 Email: info@rotork.ca Spain Rotork Fluid Systems Larrondogoiko Kalea 2 48180 Larrondo - Loiu, Bizkaia Tel: +34 94 676 6011 Fax: +34 94 676 6018 Email: rotork@rotork.es Singapore Rotork Fluid Systems 426 Tagore Industrial Avenue Singapore, 787808 Tel: +65 6457 1233 Fax: +65 6457 6011 Email: mail@rotork.com.sg United Kingdom Rotork Fluid Systems Regina House, Ring Road Bramley, Leeds LS13 4ET Tel: +44 (0)113 236 3312 Fax: +44 (0)113 205 7266 Email: sales@rotorkfluidsystem.co.uk United States Rotork Fluid Systems 9777 West Gulf Bank Suite15A Houston, TX 77040 Tel: +1 713 856 5640 Fax: +1 713 856 8127 Email: rfsinfo@rotork.com United States Rotork Fluid Systems 2180 South McDowell Blvd. Suite B Petaluma, CA 94954 Tel: +1 707 769 4880 Fax: +1 707 769 4888 Email: rfsinfo@rotork.com United States Rotork Fluid Systems 77 Circuit Drive North Kingstown, RI 02852 Tel: +1 401 294 1400 Fax: +1 401 294 3388 Email: sales@remotecontrol.us Germany Rotork Fluid Systems Rotork Controls (D) GmbH Maschweg 51 49324 Melle Tel: +49 (0)5422 9414-0 Fax: +49 (0)5422 9414-10 Email: sales@rfs-pci.de Italy Rotork Fluid Systems Via di Casalino 6 55012 Tassignano - Lucca Italy Tel: +39 0583 93061 Fax: +39 0583 934612 Email: fluid@fluidsystem.it Sweden Rotork Fluid Systems Remote Controls Sweden AB Kontrollvägen 15 SE-791 45 Falun Tel: +46 (0)23-587 00 Fax: +46 (0)23-587 45 Email: info@remotecontrol.se United States Rotork Fluid Systems 675 Mile Crossing Blvd. Rochester, NY 14624 Tel: +1 585 247 2304 Fax: +1 585 247 2308 Email: rfsinfo@rotork.com Manufacturing Centres Centres of Excellence