Two modes of developing "Awareness" for n-disciplinary practices

1. D
Your domain,
discipline, or area
of expertise
“Ideation”: the quasi-experimental study of design ideation
Shah, J. J., Smith, S. M., & Vargas-
Hernandez, N. (2003). Metrics for
measuring ideation effectiveness. Design
Studies, 24(2), 111-134.
Cited by 895

2. Shah, J. J., Smith, S. M., & Vargas-Hernandez, N. (2003). Metrics for measuring ideation effectiveness. Design Studies, 24(2), 111-134.

3. D
Your domain,
discipline, or area
of expertise
Known
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project

4. time
“idea generation is a critical part of the creative design process
likely related to the quality of the final design solution”
(Shroyer, Lovins et al. 2018)

5. 2016 Dyson Award winner, a “folding, recyclable, vendable helmet for bike share” by Isis Shiffer
EcoHelmet: https://www.jamesdysonaward.org/2016/project/ecohelmet

6. But…
What if early ideas are not the same as final ideas?

7. D
Your domain,
discipline, or area
of expertise
Known
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
D1
D2
D3D4
Mode 1

9. D
Your domain,
discipline, or area
of expertise
Known
problem
or project
New
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
D1
D2
D3D4
Mode 2

11. planet transformations
↑
fully-formed planets
↑
proto-planets
↑
planetesimals
↑
pebbles
↑
chondrules
planetary accretion
final design
↑
proto-solutions
↑
“ideaspaces”
↑
“ideasimals”
↑
fragmentary ideas
↑
individual ideas pre-
brainstorming
design ideation
fragments
runaway accretion
↑
oligarchic accretion
↑
fully-formed
↑

13. D
Your domain,
discipline, or area
of expertise
Known
problem
or project
New
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
Known
problem
or project
D1
D2
D3D4
Mode 2

14. A glossary of ideation accretion
1. Ideation: from idea generation to idea growth
2. Accretion: (astrophysics) a process of growth by collision in which various
complex bodies form including planets
3. Assemblage thinking: the quality of a final design solution consists of an
assembly or aggregate of the qualities identifiable in early ideas
4. Early ideas: “ugly babies” (Catmull 2014); “messy middle” (Belsky 2018);
5. “Ideaspaces”: structured solution spaces (Shroyer et al 2018)
6. “Ideasimals”: network or cluster of fragmentary ideas within ideaspaces
7. “Runaway” vs “oligarchic” growth regimes
8. “Proto-solutions”: late-stage ideas converging into fully-formed solutions
9. “Idea” (Descartes; Hume; Locke; Leibniz; Spinoza; Plato; Kuhn…)
10. …

15. Definitions of IDEA Implications Author Reference
"Something which is in our mind" "He who has a method which will lead him to some object if he follows it does not therefore have an
idea of the object. Hence there must be something in me which not merely leads to the thing but
also expresses it… Although the idea of a circle is not similar to the circle, truths can be dereived from
it which would be confirmed beyond doubt by investigating a real circle"
Leibiniz's case against taking an idea as the act or form of thought is that it would mean that we could
have an idea in our mind only so long as we were thinking and that, accordingly, every time we
thought about the same thing we should have a different but similar idea of it. As for an idea as an
object, the one great advantage of so conceiving it is that it can be considered to continue to exist
even when we are not contemplating it.
To sum up Leibniz's theory: Idea, on the one hand, and thought and perception, on the other, are
related to one another as disposition or potentiality to act. Both idea (or disposition) and thought (or
act) are identified with expression,49 and in so far as an idea is defined as an object, it is so as
"expression."
Leibniz https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=eWYyBwA
AQBAJ&pg=PA207&dq="what+is+an+idea?"
Leibniz, G. W. (1989). What is an Idea?. In
Philosophical Papers and Letters (pp. 207-208).
Springer, Dordrecht.
Cartesian Ideas. According to Descartes’
ontology there are substances, attributes,
and modes. Insofar as ideas are modes,
they occupy the lowest rung on Descartes’
ontological ladder. For Descartes ideas are
among the least real things in the cosmos.
Descartes takes ideas as the vehicles of
representation, as the items doing the
representing.
Ideas are cast as modes of thinking that represent (or present or exhibit) objects to the
mind—objects such as a man, or Pegasus, or the sky, or an angel. For Descartes the objects
immediately presented to the mind (by way of an idea) are purely mental objects. This purely mental
object is said to constitute the content of the idea. On this view, an idea is sometimes referred to as a
tertium quid, a third thing, which “stands between” the mind’s eye, so to speak, and the object that
the idea represents ("Representationalist interpretation").
Descartes will say that [an idea] possesses formal reality. The formal reality of a thing is the kind of
reality the thing possesses in virtue of its being an actual or an existent thing... When speaking of
ideas as representing things to the mind, Descartes will refer to an idea’s objective reality. The
objective reality of a thing is the kind of reality a thing possesses in virtue of its being a
representation of something... ideas are the only items in his ontology that possess both formal and
objective reality.
Descartes considers three kinds of idea: innate ideas, adventitious ideas, and what are sometimes
called factitious ideas... Among my ideas, some appear to be innate, some to be adventitious, and
others to have been invented by me... Sirens, hippogriffs and the like are my own invention. (3rd
Med., II.26, AT VII.37-38)... Factitious ideas, whose contents have their origin in the contents of other
ideas, no doubt fall into the category of Non-Primary idea. A non-primary idea is one whose
objective reality has its origin in the objective reality of some other idea. The factitious idea of
Pegasus is an example of a non-primary idea.
To this day there are divergent interpretations of Descartes' account of sensory processes and ideas,
concerning where and how he distinguishes between them.
[Descartes] co-opts the term “idea” from its original use with respect to divine perception and
applies it to human cognition.
Descartes https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-
ideas/
David Clemenson, Descartes' Theory of Ideas,
Continuum, 2007, 162pp., ISBN 9780826487735.
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/descartes-theory-of-
ideas/
https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/
spr2012/entries/descartes-ideas/
Phantasm, notion, species. John Locke
David Hume
Spinoza defines an idea as "a conception
which the mind forms because it is a
thinking thing", and he adds in
explanation, "I use the word conception
rather than perception because the name
perception seems to indicate that the
mind is passive in its relation to the
object. But the word conception seems to
express the action of the mind
Spinoza McRae, R. (1965). " Idea" as a Philosophical Term
in the Seventeenth Century. Journal of the
History of Ideas, 26(2), 175-190.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2708226
Plato
The three conceptions are (a) that an idea
is an object (Malebranche, Locke,
Berkeley); (b) that an idea is an act
(Spinoza, Arnauld); (c) that an idea is a
disposition (Leibn
Malebranche saved himself from an inquiry into the cause of ideas as objects of perception by
locating them in God. His denial that they existed in the human mind was based, among other
reasons, on the impossibility of an infinite object or an infinite number of objects being contained in
a finite mind.
In reviewing the controversy between Arnauld and Melabranche, Thomas Reid found it "strange,
indeed, that the two most eminent disciples of Descartes and his contemporaries should differ so
essentially with regard to his doctrine concerning ideas". Reid's astonishment bears witness to the
extraordinary fertility of Descartes' thought. At the same time it provides a caution against talking
about an essence called "Cartesianism," for how a are we to identify the theory of ideas which
belongs to this "Cartesianism"?
McRae, R. (1965). "Idea" as a Philosophical Term
in the Seventeenth Century. Journal of the
History of Ideas, 26(2), 175-190.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2708226