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21 January 2019 | 56th TF-CSIRT, Tallinn, Estonia
RIPE Atlas
Ethical, Security and Legal Aspects of
Running an IoT Network
Mirjam Kühne, Senior Community Builder
Ivo Dijkhuis, Information Security Officer
I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01
RIRs Around the World
RIPE Atlas
I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01
RIPE Atlas is a global, open, distributed Internet measurement platform, consisting of
thousands of measurement devices that measure Internet connectivity in real time.
(wikipedia)
RIPE Atlas
I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01
• Measuring Internet access disruptions:
- Internet Access Disruptions in Turkey
- Internet Access Disruption in Gambia
• Measuring DNS censorship and hijacking:
- Using DNS Servers in Iran
- DNS Censorship
• Monitoring connectivity problems:
- Monitoring Game Service Connectivity
- Measuring Cloud Connectivity
- Debugging Network Connectivity Problems
RIPE Atlas Use Cases
I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01
• 10,000 probes and 400 anchors connected worldwide
• 5.6% IPv4 ASes and 9% IPv6 ASes covered
• 181 countries covered
• 7,000 measurements per second
RIPE Atlas in Numbers
I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01
• Low, cheap barrier of entry
• Active measurements only
- Probes do not observe user traffic
• Data, API, tools, source code: FREE and OPEN
• Set of measurement types limited
- Ping, trace route, SSL/TLS, NTP, HTTP (limited)
• Strong community involvement from the start
Design Principles
I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01
• No bandwidth measurement
- Other platforms provide that service
• HTTP measurements only towards RIPE Atlas anchors
because otherwise:
- It would rely on the hosts’ bandwidth
- Might put volunteer hosts at risk
• Encourage our users to think about ethical consequences
- https://labs.ripe.net/Members/kistel/ethics-of-ripe-atlas-measurements
Ethical Considerations
Securing RIPE Atlas
I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019
RIPE Atlas Architecture
!10
I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01
• Prevent re-use and re-purposing of probes
- Decided against Trusted Platform Model (TPM)
- Instead, we use cheap devices and discourage reusing them
- Accepting possible loss of probes
• Initialisation procedure before distribution
- Off-the-shelf firmware gets replaced with RIPE Atlas firmware
- Generating and registering individual keys
- Testing
Limiting Consequences (1/2)
I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01
• Trust anchors installed on all probes
- Two-way authentication; unique SSH key for probes used for identification
• Regular firmware updates
- All firmware updates are signed
- Pre-installed public keys to verify firmware signature before upgrading
• Mechanisms to detect unwanted behaviour
- Outliers or protocol violations
• No direct services to host or network
- No local configuration possible; reduces network-based attack surface
Limiting Consequences (2/2)
I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01
• Done in a “lazy fashion”
- Upgraded next time they connect to RIPE Atlas infrastructure
- We have means to force them to upgrade faster
• Each upgrade is cryptographically verified
Firmware Upgrades
Legal Aspects of
RIPE Atlas
I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01
• Radio Equipment Directive (2014/53/EU)
• Mandatory requirements for everything that has a radio
- Basis in health and safety, together with interoperability
- Also applies when you communicate via other means (e.g. WiFI, GPS, Bluetooth)
• Self-assessment on compliance
- Using CE mark to indicate you’re safe
- Ex-post compliance testing in (external) labs by regulator
- Non-compliance can result in EU-wide recall
Legal Considerations (1/2)
I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01
• Directive has a few “optional” requirements
- 3.3.d: Do not harm the network or misuse network resources
- 3.3.e: Protection of personal data and privacy
- 3.3.f: Protection from fraud
- 3.3.i: Only compliant software can be loaded
• Can be activated by means of a Delegated Act
- Decision by European Commission
Legal Considerations (2/2)
I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01
• IETF draft document: BCP for Securing IoT Devices
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moore-iot-security-bcp-01
• RIPE Atlas: https://atlas.ripe.net
https://labs.ripe.net/Members/kistel/ripe-atlas-probes-as-iot-devices
https://labs.ripe.net/Members/kistel/ripe-atlas-architecture-how-we-
manage-our-probes
Best Current Practices

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RIPE Atlas: Ethical, Security and Legal Considerations of Running an IoT Network

  • 1. 21 January 2019 | 56th TF-CSIRT, Tallinn, Estonia RIPE Atlas Ethical, Security and Legal Aspects of Running an IoT Network Mirjam Kühne, Senior Community Builder Ivo Dijkhuis, Information Security Officer
  • 2. I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01 RIRs Around the World
  • 4. I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01 RIPE Atlas is a global, open, distributed Internet measurement platform, consisting of thousands of measurement devices that measure Internet connectivity in real time. (wikipedia) RIPE Atlas
  • 5. I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01 • Measuring Internet access disruptions: - Internet Access Disruptions in Turkey - Internet Access Disruption in Gambia • Measuring DNS censorship and hijacking: - Using DNS Servers in Iran - DNS Censorship • Monitoring connectivity problems: - Monitoring Game Service Connectivity - Measuring Cloud Connectivity - Debugging Network Connectivity Problems RIPE Atlas Use Cases
  • 6. I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01 • 10,000 probes and 400 anchors connected worldwide • 5.6% IPv4 ASes and 9% IPv6 ASes covered • 181 countries covered • 7,000 measurements per second RIPE Atlas in Numbers
  • 7. I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01 • Low, cheap barrier of entry • Active measurements only - Probes do not observe user traffic • Data, API, tools, source code: FREE and OPEN • Set of measurement types limited - Ping, trace route, SSL/TLS, NTP, HTTP (limited) • Strong community involvement from the start Design Principles
  • 8. I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01 • No bandwidth measurement - Other platforms provide that service • HTTP measurements only towards RIPE Atlas anchors because otherwise: - It would rely on the hosts’ bandwidth - Might put volunteer hosts at risk • Encourage our users to think about ethical consequences - https://labs.ripe.net/Members/kistel/ethics-of-ripe-atlas-measurements Ethical Considerations
  • 10. I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 RIPE Atlas Architecture !10
  • 11. I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01 • Prevent re-use and re-purposing of probes - Decided against Trusted Platform Model (TPM) - Instead, we use cheap devices and discourage reusing them - Accepting possible loss of probes • Initialisation procedure before distribution - Off-the-shelf firmware gets replaced with RIPE Atlas firmware - Generating and registering individual keys - Testing Limiting Consequences (1/2)
  • 12. I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01 • Trust anchors installed on all probes - Two-way authentication; unique SSH key for probes used for identification • Regular firmware updates - All firmware updates are signed - Pre-installed public keys to verify firmware signature before upgrading • Mechanisms to detect unwanted behaviour - Outliers or protocol violations • No direct services to host or network - No local configuration possible; reduces network-based attack surface Limiting Consequences (2/2)
  • 13. I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01 • Done in a “lazy fashion” - Upgraded next time they connect to RIPE Atlas infrastructure - We have means to force them to upgrade faster • Each upgrade is cryptographically verified Firmware Upgrades
  • 15. I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01 • Radio Equipment Directive (2014/53/EU) • Mandatory requirements for everything that has a radio - Basis in health and safety, together with interoperability - Also applies when you communicate via other means (e.g. WiFI, GPS, Bluetooth) • Self-assessment on compliance - Using CE mark to indicate you’re safe - Ex-post compliance testing in (external) labs by regulator - Non-compliance can result in EU-wide recall Legal Considerations (1/2)
  • 16. I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01 • Directive has a few “optional” requirements - 3.3.d: Do not harm the network or misuse network resources - 3.3.e: Protection of personal data and privacy - 3.3.f: Protection from fraud - 3.3.i: Only compliant software can be loaded • Can be activated by means of a Delegated Act - Decision by European Commission Legal Considerations (2/2)
  • 17. I. Dijkhuis & M. Kühne | 56th TF-CSIRT | 21 January 2019 01 • IETF draft document: BCP for Securing IoT Devices https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moore-iot-security-bcp-01 • RIPE Atlas: https://atlas.ripe.net https://labs.ripe.net/Members/kistel/ripe-atlas-probes-as-iot-devices https://labs.ripe.net/Members/kistel/ripe-atlas-architecture-how-we- manage-our-probes Best Current Practices