The Olympics As A Public Relations Strategy: Americans Views About China Before And After The 2008 Beijing Olympics
•Download as PPTX, PDF•
1 like•647 views
Research examining Americans' perceptions of China before and after the 2008 Olympics. Implications for using Olympics as a public relation strategy to change global perceptions.
Recommended
Recommended
More Related Content
Viewers also liked
Viewers also liked (8)
Similar to The Olympics As A Public Relations Strategy: Americans Views About China Before And After The 2008 Beijing Olympics
Similar to The Olympics As A Public Relations Strategy: Americans Views About China Before And After The 2008 Beijing Olympics (20)
More from Pamela Rutledge
More from Pamela Rutledge (20)
Recently uploaded
Recently uploaded (20)
The Olympics As A Public Relations Strategy: Americans Views About China Before And After The 2008 Beijing Olympics
- 1. The Influence of Media on Beliefs The Olympics As A Public Relations Strategy: Americans Views About China Before And After The 2008 Beijing Olympics Pamela B. Rutledge Fielding Graduate University
- 2. Purpose To address a gap in the literature on belief formation and conflict by examining the impact of information sources on the beliefs that predispose individuals toward conflict
- 3. Globalization Communication technologies McLuhan’s global village New definitions of identity and culture are no longer confined by geographic boundaries Globalization will not go away
- 4. New Relationship with China Technology has led to rapid economic growth with global implications Jobs Energy Loss of Soviet Union as enemy ‘promotes’ China
- 5. Media Makes China the Enemy Media defines nations through images and symbols Americans know very little about China and culture is difficult to understand Easy to stereotype Information about China is often inaccurate Government control Journalistic license and old metaphors Consistent negative framing
- 6. The 2008 Beijing Olympics Olympics bring increased media attention Intangible benefits Qualitative features of media coverage
- 7. Information Sources Media is pervasive Qualitatively different channels elicit different cognitive and affective responses Measurements of media consumption still being developed What do we want to measure? Attention Time Recall Meaning
- 8. Psychology of Fear What Gets our Attention? The human brain uses economy measures to process information Salience Relevance Mental models (stereotypes) Fear an effective way of eliciting an affective response Triggered by perceptions of significant and personally- relevant threat Fear of Threats Risk assessed against perceived efficacy rather than prior experience Mass perceptions of threat influence national policy and international relations Fear increases the need to affiliate
- 9. The Role of Identity in Conflict Social psychology conflict literature originally focused on group identity and affiliation Returning to role of self and individual Freud, Vygotsky, Personality theorists, Evolutionary Psychology From self to social More system-oriented Self and social identity conflictual in nature COSMIDES, PINKER, TOOBY, FREUD, VYGOTSKY, TAJFEL, ASCH, KELMAN, SEN, BREWER
- 10. Why Affiliate? Motivations for affiliation Self-esteem, status, value Uncertainty reduction, terror reduction Shift focus from self-esteem to order-seeking Biological and psychological need for order Internal consistency Biological imperative for survival
- 11. Evaluative filters to process information and experience Continually reconstructed through interaction with the wider social system Core beliefs serve need for internal consistency Social psychology articulates interaction of the individual with social structures Social identity theory Self-categorization theory Relative deprivation theory Core beliefs operate at both individual and group levels Definition Integration Core Beliefs Cognitive psychology distills conflict into core beliefs that establish the themes that drive human behavior
- 12. Five Domain Framework Central beliefs to group conflict Vulnerability Injustice Helplessness Distrust Superiority Operate at three levels: Individual view of personal world Individual’s beliefs about their group Individual’s perceptions about the group worldview • IGBI, Roy J. Eidelson & Eidelson (2003)
- 13. Information Sources Explanatory Style Core Beliefs Subjective Well-Being Attitudes toward China Group Affiliation Conflict Strategies Theoretical model Information sources and explanatory style influence conflict strategies through core beliefs, group affiliation, and attitudes toward China.
- 14. Media-Saturated Environment Prevalence 98% of homes have TV 50% of Americans text message Virtually all teenagers play video games Cell phone subscribers equal 75% of population Source: Pew Research Center (2008) http://pewresearch.org/pubs/928/key-news- audiences-now-blend-online-and-traditional-sources
- 15. Methodology Internet survey-based study Participants provided by Zoomerang (N=896) Likert-type questions Data collected June 27, 2008 (N=418), August 27, 2008 (N=478) Demographics: Approximation of U.S. Census Minimum high school education 50/50 Male/Female Ages 18 to 44 Racial distribution Assessment instruments Individual and Group Beliefs Inventory Life Orientation Test Satisfaction with Life Survey Group Affiliation Conflict Strategies Attitudes toward China Media measures Preference Percentage use Political orientation Analysis Bivariate correlation Multiple regression
- 16. The Hypotheses More television increases core beliefs New media decreases core beliefs Optimism decreases core beliefs Olympics media increases core beliefs Core beliefs increase group affiliation, attitudes toward China and conflict strategies
- 17. Results
- 18. Empirical Analysis Empirical analysis conducted in 2 stages: 1st stage: Correlations between media use, explanatory style, core beliefs and conflict measures 2nd stage: Regression analyses to estimate the model
- 19. Correlation Analysis In general, optimism proved to be significantly correlated with core beliefs at both the personal and group levels Broadcast media was significantly correlated with most core beliefs and conflict measures at the group level Broadcast media split into liberal and conservative programming proved to be significantly correlated with most core beliefs at the individual and group levels
- 20. IGBI-IG Vulnerabilit y IGBI-IG Injustice IGBI-IG Helplessness IGBI-IG Distrust IGBI-IG Superiority Group Negativity SWLS IG LOT-R Scale -.20** -.071* -.263** -.074* -0.042 -.201** .203** Broadcast 1st Choice .113** .121** 0.059 0.064 0.045 .118** 0.048 New Media 1st Choice -.098** -.118** 0.033 -.069* -0.059 -.085* -0.04 % Television .076* .156** -0.013 0.058 .122** .093** .066* % Internet -.070* -.148** -0.028 -.10** -.09** -.12** -0.052 Liberal Television -0.054 -.100** 0.054 -.097** -0.063 -.068* 0.011 Conservative Television .143** .144** 0.022 .111** .132** .140** .148** N = 896, * p < .05, ** p < .01 Correlations Group Level: Optimism
- 21. IGBI-IG Vulnerability IGBI-IG Injustice IGBI-IG Helplessness IGBI-IG Distrust IGBI-IG Superiority Group Negativity SWLS IG LOT-R Scale -.20** -.071* -.263** -.074* -0.042 -.201** .203** Broadcast 1st Choice .113** .121** 0.059 0.064 0.045 .118** 0.048 New Media 1st Choice -.098** -.118** 0.033 -.069* -0.059 -.085* -0.04 % Television .076* .156** -0.013 0.058 .122** .093** .066* % Internet -.070* -.148** -0.028 -.10** -.09** -.12** -0.052 Liberal Television -0.054 -.100** 0.054 -.097** -0.063 -.068* 0.011 Conserv. Television .143** .144** 0.022 .111** .132** .140** .148** N = 896, * p < .05, ** p < .01 Correlations Group Level: Broadcast Media
- 22. IGBI-IG Vulnerabilit y IGBI-IG Injustice IGBI-IG Helplessness IGBI-IG Distrust IGBI-IG Superiority Group Negativity SWLS IG LOT-R Scale -.20** -.071* -.263** -.074* -0.042 -.201** .203** Broadcast 1st Choice .113** .121** 0.059 0.064 0.045 .118** 0.048 New Media 1st Choice -.098** -.118** 0.033 -.069* -0.059 -.085* -0.04 % Television .076* .156** -0.013 0.058 .122** .093** .066* % Internet -.070* -.148** -0.028 -.10** -.09** -.12** -0.052 Liberal Television -0.054 -.100** 0.054 -.097** -0.063 -.068* 0.011 Conservative Television .143** .144** 0.022 .111** .132** .140** .148** N = 896, * p < .05, ** p < .01 Correlations Group Level: New Media
- 23. Information Sources Explanatory Style Core Beliefs Well-Being Attitudes toward China Group Affiliation Conflict Strategies 1. Conservative TV 2. Liberal TV 3. New Media 1st Choice 4. LOT-R Regression Analysis Phase 1 Variables 1. Vulnerability 2. Injustice 3. Helplessness 4. Distrust 5. Superiority 6. SWLS Belief = 0 + 1ICTV + 2I1stNM + 3ILTV + 4SWLS + 8PCON +
- 24. Regression Analysis Phase 1 Results In general, optimism was a significant negative predictor for core beliefs at the personal and group levels as hypothesized by the model New media was a significant negative predictor for most core beliefs at the group level Broadcast media, split into liberal and conservative programming, proved to significant predictors with most core beliefs at the group level
- 25. Regression Analysis Group Level: Conservative and Liberal Programming β Vulnerability Injustice Helplessness Distrust Superiority Well-Being Conservative TV 0.143** 0.135** 0.108** 0.120** 0.122** Liberal TV -0.107* -0.100** -.060* New Media 1st Choice -0.082** -0.107* -0.061* Conservative Political Beliefs 0.105** 0.207** -0.104** 0.154** 0.206** 0.188** Lot-R -0.203** -0.073* -0.266** -0.076* 0.192** N = 896, * p < .05, ** p < .01 Belief = 0 + 1ICTV + 2I1stNM + 3ILTV + 4SWLS + 8PCON + N = 896, * p < .05, ** p < .01, predictors are in left column
- 26. Significant changes in first choice preference from Internet toward television Changes in media use had no impact on core beliefs at any level No significant change in core beliefs pre- to post- Olympics Pre- to Post-Olympic Measures 42% 44% 46% 48% 50% 52% 54% 56% Pre-Olympics Post-Olympics Broadcast 1st Choice New Media 1st Choice N = 896
- 27. Us versus Them 3.80 3.85 3.90 3.95 4.00 Pre-Olympics Post-Olympics Group Affiliation 3.08 3.10 3.12 3.14 3.16 3.18 3.20 3.22 Pre-Olympics Post-Olympics Enemy Image of China N = 896, Mean
- 28. Information Sources Explanatory Style Core Beliefs Well-Being Attitudes toward China Group Affiliation Conflict Strategies Regression Analysis Phase 2 Variables 1. Group Affiliation 2. Positive Regard for China 3. China as the Enemy 1. Aggressive or Cooperative Conflict Strategies 1. Vulnerability 2. Injustice 3. Helplessness 4. Distrust 5. Superiority 6. SWLS Conflict Measure = 0 + 1BVUL + 2BINJ + 3BHELP + 4BDIS + 8BSUP + SWLS +
- 29. Regression Analysis Phase 2 Results Predictor Dependent Variable Conservative Programming Conservative Political Views U.S. Vulnerability (IG) Unjust treatment of U.S. (IG) U.S. Superiority (IG) U.S. Vulnerability (IG) Unjust treatment of U.S. (IG) U.S. Superiority (IG) Group Affiliation China as an Enemy Conflict Strategies Subjective well being (IG) Group Affiliation China as an Enemy Conflict Strategies Conservative Political Beliefs Conflict Strategies
- 30. Group Affiliation Enemy Image of China Attitudes toward China Conflict Strategies Vulnerability IG .201** .119** -.200** Injustice IG .199** .233** .119** Helplessness IG -.361** .164** Distrust IG -.354** -.350** Superiority IG .103** .242** Well-Being IG .191** .178** .182** Conservative Political Beliefs .108** .057* .087** Regression Analysis: Group Beliefs and Conflict Measures Conflict Measure = 0 + 1BVUL + 2BINJ + 3BHELP + 4BDIS + 8BSUP + SWLS + N = 896, * p < .05, ** p < .01, predictors are in left column
- 31. Additional Findings Differences between belief levels were significant for all core beliefs 84% said Olympics did not change view of China 4% had traveled to China For 96% the Olympics had no change on their attitudes about China
- 32. Beliefs Differences Among Levels 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Vulnerability Injustice Helplessness Distrust Superiority Personal Beliefs Personal Beliefs about the U.S. Perceptions of Most Americans Beliefs
- 33. Changing Views of China 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Country People Culture Government Opinions of Chinese People and Culture Significantly More Positive than Perceptions of Chinese Government N = 478; Higher scores equal more positive perception
- 34. The Impact of Personal Experience on Perceptions 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 Group Affiliation Attitudes Toward China Enemy Image Have Traveled to China Have Not Traveled to China 4% of sample have traveled to China (N=36) Mean differences between group means significant, p < .01 Note: N=896. Higher scores for Attitudes Toward China indicates more positive feelings.
- 35. 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 Pre Post Pre Post TravelNoTravel Attitudes Toward China 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 Pre Post Pre Post TravelNoTravel Group Affiliation 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 Pre Post Pre Post TravelNoTravel Enemy Image Never Traveled to China Group affiliation increased Attitude and enemy views either did not change or became more negative Have Traveled to China Positive regard increased Image of China as an enemy decreased Change in Views Pre- and Post-Olympics
- 36. Changes in perceptions of media accuracy from before to after the Olympics Perceptions of Media Accuracy N = 896 US Media Accuracy China's Media Accuracy 2.35 2.45 2.55 2.65 2.75 2.85 Pre-Olympics Post-Olympics
- 37. Conclusions Overall model confirmed by correlations Regression results not consistent Only at the IG level did the information predictors confirm the model TV predicted stronger beliefs, new media predicted decrease Explanatory style was strong predictor Programming content and political views emerged as strong predictors Ideological buffer, just-world, security, biology Well-being consistently aligned
- 38. Do Media Choices Matter? < Strong predictors for conflict: Conservative political views Group affiliation Enemy Image Do people choose media based on their beliefs rather than the other way around? Basic assumptions of media effects research Programming and media content Validate personal identity, group affiliation, tribal allegiance Restore order to uncertain world Identify scapegoat
- 39. Orange Alert Escalation in negative beliefs from personal to group levels Fear as normalizing? Projections to externalize fear Climate of “orange alert” Media emphasis Biological reaction Psychological response Olympics television coverage benign to positive Negative attitudes increased
- 40. Gated Communities of Ideology Frightened people build gated communities Media becomes ritual for affirmation not a quest for knowledge Increased measures of subjective well-being indicates successful wall building Media producers are driven by economics not ideology Challenge to create messages that break through walls
- 41. Limitations Population: self-selected from Zoomerang market poll Apathetic or representative? Media measures Conflict identified as U.S. versus China Television coverage distracted by Russia-Georgia military confrontation No true repeated measures (pre-post) design, although samples were similar in demographics
- 42. Future Research Technical issues: survey data, sample Cross-cultural comparison, i.e. China’s point of view Perceptions of conflict and the “other” Effectiveness of global media event Media choice with core beliefs and social zeitgeist Effect of media events and content on nation brands Media content compared with viewer perceptions and beliefs Types and strength of belief clustering as precursors to conflict
- 43. Reflections Importance of recognizing simultaneity in media psychology Needs system analysis Disconnected research across disciplines Analytical frameworks, jargon, measures Ivory Silos Media is not a “thing.” It is a conduit for who we are and what we do Media reinforces beliefs does not create them
- 44. Conclusion Perceptions of China were not significantly changed by Olympic coverage Viewers’ beliefs about their own and their countries vulnerabilities were the stronger predictors of perceptions of China as an enemy, regardless of programming Viewers’ programming choices reflected their beliefs, not the other way around The only significant positive change in perceptions of China came from people who had visited China in person
- 45. Implications The massive financial investment in the Olympics does not results in negative perceptions turning positive Brands should consider their own goals and potential halo effects in where and how they choose to make sponsorship investments Increased fear and the sense of vulnerability increases the need for us vs. them thinking and the creation of villains No easy solutions: Increase sense of safety of home populations Increase opportunities for personal contact and exchange
- 46. Thank You
Editor's Notes
- Can media change our perceptions of nations? Does the investment in the Olympics change pre-existing beliefs? The Predisposition of Americans Toward Conflict with China before and after the 2008 Beijing Olympics
- Conflict is a very real event experienced by individuals, groups and nations. It can have catastrophic consequences in loss of life, economic opportunity, and human rights. Communication technologies are emerging and evolving rapidly. We need to understand what role they play in society and how to use the power of the media to positive ends.
- This story starts with globalization. Media technologies are bringing historically isolated cultures and countries into close and continuous contact. Much debate over pros and cons of interdependence and integration. McLuhan had a vision of a global village. “eating a McDonald’s burger doesn’t make me an American” Conflict on the rise; allegiances tribal and cultural more than geographic
- China has experienced rapid growth since the end of the Mao era U.S. now competes with China for jobs, factories, investment capital and finite natural resources Chinese government committed to delivering sustainable growth; need it for social stability and to retain government control The rise of China coincided with the loss of the Soviet Union which deprived the media and western culture of an enemy figure Since 9/11, we have seen some villainization of the Middle East. However, China not only represents a real and longer-term threat in economic impact and global political power but carries some of the emotional baggage of “Cold War Communism” and ready supply of Mao-era images.
- Mass media helps make nations real and tangible through images, symbols and events. Information from within China was cut off during the Mao regime and is still controlled. Documented negative framing in a body of research; notable examples of Jack Cafferty referring to the Chinese as the “same bullies and thugs” and coverage of Tibet showing Laotian soldiers. Neil Cavuto - Isn’t that the same? Americans are not very knowledgeable about China (or most of the world); many picturing China as full of people in Mao jackets on bicycles carrying little red books. The Tibetan position is an example of the power of the media and imagery. While mainland China was closed during the Mao years, pro-Tibetan liberation advocates been promoting their position to western media. Not saying right or wrong, it is a very complex issue. But just comparing the face of the Dalai Lama to Mao Zedong 29% of the respondents in this study worried personally about the Chinese because they are “Communists”; 48% believed “ most Americans” worried about China because they were communists compared to who 10% did not endorse that statement. The difference between the means significant at < .001
- Global mega-events generate extensive media coverage Choice of Beijing controversial but important to China to increase global awareness and appreciation of Chinese culture. Chinese are aware of the negative press they receive, both justly and unjustly. Eager to improve their image and stake out their position as a major player. Mixed results from other Olympics: positive for Australia 2000 in terms of national pride and enthusiasm; Seoul (1988 summer) and Calgary (1988 winter) both had economic benefits of increased tourism and trade. Atlanta, 1996, had mixed results with negative perceptions of security due to bombing in Centennial Square. China’s goal is more qualitative than economic. Anecdotally, it has been a success in terms of national pride.
- TV versus Internet have been the focus of research; classic example is studies of the Kennedy-Nixon debate. TV watchers thought Kennedy had won; radio thought Nixon had. Comparison research has focused on: Political messages Political and civic engagement Health messages Trust in products, people and institutions Nielson Media Research earmarked $7.5 to establish media usage benchmarks; Pew research Institute continually measures types of technology and media use. Most research firms focus on overt behaviors not experience What measures make sense: Time, preference or attention? What about simultaneous use? What are we trying, in fact, to measure?
- All these sources produce information flows that have to be processed. We can of course ignore information But to even decide what to ignore the human brain uses economy measures because of the quantity of information flows What matters to getting a message through? Salience 2. Relevance 3. Mental models – can we stick it to something that already exists Human brains are wired to scan the horizon for threats. A personally-relevant threat elicits a fear response The intensity of the response is based primarily on our perceptions of self-efficacy rather than personal experience As a society, perceptions of threat and fear influence national policy , such as endorsement of anti-terrorism policies or trade Identification with ingroups and outgroups – politics make use of this, heightening our sense of threat by increasing our sense of affiliation SETS UP CONFLICT
- Analysis of self and identity are advancing the understanding of conflict and mediation by joining theoretical approaches of group processes and behaviors, such as social identity and self-categorization theories (e.g., Tajfel, 1982) with cognitive theories of individual beliefs. Social Identity Theory and Self-categorization approaches to understanding individual and group identity formation and behaviors Several constructs have been identified as contributors to conflict. At the level of the individual, ethnic identity, self-efficacy, and vulnerability contribute to hostility toward other groups At the group level, group-based identities and beliefs of superiority promote increased competition and aggression Vulnerability and distrust increase group allegiance and outgroup depersonalization, motivating individuals to take action on behalf of their group Perceived injustices by minority populations can trigger violence At the national scale, fear of losing cultural identity is the basis for the most intractable conflicts (Kelman, 2007).
- EFFECTS OF AFFILIATION: Group and individual identities are defined by the interaction between them as well as establishing boundaries. It is the boundaries that contribute to conflict. Sen – solitarist view of the self Brewer Social Identity Complexity Theory Individuals with multiple, non-converging group affiliations are posited to have a more a complex and flexible identity structure, are less likely to submerge their own identity to that of a group, and are more tolerant of others. WHY DO WE AFFILIATE: People have stronger engagement with a group when the group identification has positive consequences for their self-esteem, status, and value Uncertainty Reduction Theory and Terror Reduction Theory shift the focus from social comparison for self-esteem to order-seeking as motivation. Similarly, the need for cognitive closure—the need for predictability and certainty—generates heightened group identification to alleviate cognitive ambiguity. Research results have shown the need for cognitive certainty to be significantly related to a hostile conflict schema that manifests as a socially-disruptive, single-minded pursuit of resolution in favor of one’s own goals Individuals unconsciously construct and maintain core beliefs to serve their need for internal consistency. Internal consistency gives an individual the ability to make sense of and successfully negotiate his/her environment
- Coleman identified more than 50 variables that contribute to intractable conflict which include a variety of context, issues, relationships and consequences. These can be summarized as perceptions of malevolence, intentionality, and injustice that lead to reactions of increasing To clarify the interplay of individual and group dynamics in the development of conflict, Roy J. Eidelson & Eidelson (2003) identified five belief domains that are central in group conflict settings: vulnerability, injustice, distrust, superiority, and helplessness. Drawn from the literature, the five domains function at dual levels, addressing core beliefs fundamental to the daily experiences of individuals (Beck, 1976; Kelly, 1955; J. E. Young, 1999) and perceptions of collective core beliefs that represent the shared worldviews of the group (D. Bar-Tal, 2000). This five-domain framework has been additionally validated and tested by Eidelson and Plummer (2005), and R.J Eidelson (2002, 2006) and applied in cross-cultural populations by Lyubansky and Eidelson (2005) and Maoz and Eidelson (2007).
- Relationship among levels To clarify the interplay of individual and group dynamics in the development of conflict, Roy J. Eidelson & Eidelson (2003) identified five belief domains that are central in group conflict settings: vulnerability, injustice, distrust, superiority, and helplessness . Drawn from the literature, the five domains function at dual levels, addressing core beliefs fundamental to the daily experiences of individuals and perceptions of collective core beliefs that represent the shared worldviews of the group
- The flow of information activates our sensitivity and influences our worldviews in the context of our individual differences Negative information from the media environment increases negative core beliefs and decreases subjective well-being Negative beliefs increase the negative perceptions of China and increase the need for group affiliation Greater group affiliation and negative attitudes toward China increase the propensity for endorsing aggressive conflict strategies
- NBC announced it was producing 3000 hours of Olympics programming, a historic amount, and making video available online as well as video and text results delivered to mobile devices
- PERSONAL BELIEFS In the correlation analysis, generally Pearson product moment correlation procedures LOT-R as measure for explanatory style showed correlations as expected with good effect size. LOT-R measures outcome expectancies according to Carver and Sheier. The consensus is that there is a genetic basis to optimism; they drew on Erikson’s developmental model suggesting that optimism in influenced by early childhood experiences that foster trust and secure attachments.
- PERSONAL BELIEFS In the correlation analysis, generally Pearson product moment correlation procedures LOT-R as measure for explanatory style showed correlations as expected with good effect size. LOT-R measures outcome expectancies according to Carver and Sheier. The consensus is that there is a genetic basis to optimism; they drew on Erikson’s developmental model suggesting that optimism in influenced by early childhood experiences that foster trust and secure attachments.
- BELIEFS ABOUT THE GROUP Again, explanatory style correlates consistent with the model, decreasing core beliefs and increasing well-being
- BELIEFS ABOUT THE GROUP Broadcast correlations in keeping with model, positive relationship to beliefs, negative to LOT-R
- New Media correlations in keeping with model, negative relationship to beliefs
- Listing of variables for first part of regression analysis Estimating model in two parts, phase 1 regressing each core belief and subjective well-being on media sources and explanatory style, at each level
- PERSONAL BELIEFS In the correlation analysis, generally Pearson product moment correlation procedures LOT-R as measure for explanatory style showed correlations as expected with good effect size. LOT-R measures outcome expectancies according to Carver and Sheier. The consensus is that there is a genetic basis to optimism; they drew on Erikson’s developmental model suggesting that optimism in influenced by early childhood experiences that foster trust and secure attachments.
- Content preference at IG level. I have since read a couple of articles where research showed that radio listeners were more conservative and newspaper readers were more liberal which may mean that they offset one another when grouped as “traditional media” on reanalysis, however, the numbers separated did not add anything, although not significant, the directions of the correlations were opposing. IGG level New Media – 0.72 Superiority Conservative Beliefs - .078 Injustice LOT-R – only helplessness -.128
- Hypothesis that change in media would results in change of beliefs not supported
- Although beliefs did not change, two conflict measures did
- In Phase 2 of the analysis Variables for part 2 of regression analysis. Hypothesized that core beliefs would influence attitudes as measured by group affiliation, positive regard, and enemy image and that those would predict conflict strategies. Tested for potential mediating influence of group affiliation, positive regard, and enemy image, but it was not significant. Impact of beliefs on conflict strategies was not mediated by attitudes.
- PERSONAL BELIEFS In the correlation analysis, generally Pearson product moment correlation procedures LOT-R as measure for explanatory style showed correlations as expected with good effect size. LOT-R measures outcome expectancies according to Carver and Sheier. The consensus is that there is a genetic basis to optimism; they drew on Erikson’s developmental model suggesting that optimism in influenced by early childhood experiences that foster trust and secure attachments.
- Ability of Americans to see China as multi-dimensional. Opinions about people significant more positive than about government at p <.01
- Those who have traveled to China tend to have lower group affiliation, lower perceptions of China as an enemy and more positive regard for China.
- Schacter & Festinger fears heightens desire for social comparisons and affiliation; cognitive dissonance Olympics television coverage benign to positive
- Challenge of creating media messages that not only lessen the negative, but reinforce the positive a la learned optimism. We know that negative emotions alter neurobiological activity; the same is true for positive emotions—electrochemical associations that play a large part in our emotional and physical health (immune system).