6. H7N9 Avian Flu
• 1st
human case March 2013
• Severe illness
• No sustained human-to
human transmission… YET
7. Clinical case
25 yo male with pneumonia and infective
exacerbation of asthma
– PMHx – Asthma
– DHx - NKDA, PRN ventolin
– PR 110 BP 105/74 RR 32 Sats 100% 15LHM
T 37.8 GCS 15 BSL 9.0
Rx: IVABx, O2, IV crystalloid resuscitation,
Bronchodilators and steroids
18. P2/N95 Mask
• Fit Check
• Fit testing - Qualitative
– Aerosolised Saccharin Mist
– Exercises – 1 minute each
1. Normal breathing
2. Deep breathing
3. Moving head side-to-side
4. Moving head up-down
5. Bending/jogging
6. Talking
7. Normal breathing again
19. High Risk Interventions
• Advanced Airway management
• Nebulised therapy
• Invasive or ‘bloody’ procedures
• Care within enclosed space
• Post-response vehicle cleaning
23. Challenges for the medical team
• Confined treatment area
• No handwashing facilities
• Lack of ventilation
• Prolonged PPE
• Dehydration/Heat related illness
28. Swine Flu 2009
• Pre-2009 GSA-HEMS T/F 7 ECMO pts
• ECMO service established 1/12 prior to H1N1
– Funded for 10 per yr
• 1/6/09 – 31/8/09
– 722 patients with confirmed H1N1 admitted to ICU
– 456 required mechanical ventilation
– 24 ECMO
– 19 patients retrieved on ECMO
• During 2009 – 31 ECMO retrievals in total
Jones, C. Hommers, C. Burns, B. Forrest, C. ECMO Retrieval in NSW and beyond. Current Anaesthesia
29. Take home points
• Be vigilant
• Risk assess
• Phone a friend – SRC, DRC, PH, ID
• Protect yourself and your colleagues
• Follow up
30.
31. References:
• Jones, C. Hommers, C. Burns, B. Forrest, C. ECMO Retrieval in NSW and beyond. Current Anaesthesia and Critical Care react-text: 55 2
• MacIntyre, R., Dwyer, H., Seale, W., Quanyi, Z., Yi, P., Yang, S., Weixan. High risk procedures and respiratory infections in
hospital healthcare workers – quantifying the risk. International Journal of Infectious Diseases 16S (2012) e317–e473
• Brouqui, P., Ippolitto, G. Clinical Management of Highly Infectious Diseases: European Network for Highly Infectious
Diseases consensus guideline. Lancet ID.
• Tran, K., Cimon, K., Severn, M., Oessoa-Silva, L., Conly, J. Aerosol Generating Procedures and Risk of Transmission of Acute
Respiratory Infections to Healthcare Workers: A Systematic Review. PLoS ONE. April 2012/Vol 7/Iss 4/e35797
• ACB of Tranfser and Retrieval Medicine. A Law, J Hulme.Wiley Blackwell. 2015.
• http://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/year/2017/en/
• http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/influenza_h7n9/en/
• http://www.nipcm.hps.scot.nhs.uk/documents/tbp-environmental-decontamination-and-terminal-cleaning/
• https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/emergency-services/interfacility-transport.html#care
• https://idmic.net/2015/10/20/standard-precautions-infection-control-what-is-included/
• https://www.health.qld.gov.au/clinical-practice/guidelines-procedures/diseases-infection/infection-prevention/transmissio
mask
• http://www1.health.nsw.gov.au/pds/ActivePDSDocuments/PD2012_061.pdf
In December 2015, WHO released this list of disease most likely to cause severe epidemics
List includes respiratory viruses and viral haemorrhagic diseases
http://www.who.int/medicines/ebola-treatment/WHO-list-of-top-emerging-diseases/en/
Tasked to patient small hospital/medical centre in western NSW
Scored fixed wing – what we all hope for at 1am in the morning
Reasonably straightforward – on route prepare shopping list and consider actions you may need to take….
First notice the patient has been commenced on NIV, and has deteriorated significantly
Quick glance at settings PEEP 10 FiO2 0.7 Sats 100% RR 28
Increasing oxygen requirement
Girlfriend in attendance – gain some collateral history – backpackers from the Uk, on a gap year, heading for the red centre
Unwell 3 days with myalgias, fatigue, fevers, cough and SOB
Arrived 4 days ago, on a road trip heading to Alice Springs
Stopped off on route in United Arab Emirates
Alarm bells start ringing
https://www.whywesnore.com/cpap/
https://www.backpackerdeals.com/australia/alice-springs/the-rock-tour-3d-2n-alice-springs-to-alice-springs
http://www.jervisbaywild.com.au/australian-backpacker-bucket-list-jervis-bay/
http://qf1.info
Get some PPE, apply N95 mask immediately – biggest threat is airborne transmission, particularly as this patient is on NIV
PROTECT yourself and your colleagues
Precautions – Standard, Airborne, Contact
Reassess the situation – situation has changed somewhat – now appears dealing with an infectious disease that is contagious, need to consider how we are going to approach this to mitigate the risk
Re-evaluate patient management
How to treat hypoxia on route - 02 via NRB, CPAP, intubation, ECMO
Where should this patient be transferred to?
Now suspect – MERS/Influenza -> speak to SRC, DRC, public health -> complex mission, need to consider best modality of transport
? Commence antiviral – no evidence for benefit of antiviral therapy in MERS, purely supportive
Partner – does she need medical treatment
ALSO THINK ABOUT PARTNER
If we are lucky enough to know the patient has a cpntagious disease prior to being tasked, then what considerations do we need to make?
Interhospital Distance
Severity of disease/Stability of patient
Team required – does this patient need ECMO
Duration of transfer
Impact of vehicle being ‘out of action’ for decontamination – impact on retrieval service
http://apcollege.edu.au/toll-air-ambulance/
http://apcollege.edu.au/nsw-ambulance-jobs/
http://www.16right.com/16R%20Main%20Content%20More.htm
Who are you going to send?
WHO ARE WE GOING TO SACRIFICE ON THIS MISSION
We need to be familiar with the disease, how its transmitted and expected clinical course, incubation and infectious periods
What contagious diseases are we most likely to encounter in aeromedical retrieval
- For registrars cycling through – unlikely to be exposed to an epidemic such as H1N1, but there may be odd sporadic cases of pertussis, measles (recently CBD/Chatswood), transfer of meningococcal sepsis, most of our sick ICU patients have MRSA, VRE, ESBL
Who or what is this chap?
A plague doctor, during the most devastating pandemics in human history – the black death, caused by yersinia pestis, killing up to 200million people in eurasia
Costume – almost first attempt at PPE – protective suit – heavy, waxed fabric, leather hat/gloves/boots and a face mask with a glass eye opening and a beak shaped nose – this would be stuffed with aromatic – not just to block out the foul smelling odour of rotten flesh, but it was thought that disease spread through miasma theory – the smell alone could transmit the disease, this was finally dismissed in 1880 when germ theory came about
Ref:
http://blog.eleven-labs.com/fr/comprendre-le-ssltls-partie-4-handshake-protocol/
http://wonderopolis.org/wonder/why-do-you-sneeze
Standard infection control precautions for all patients regardless of their presumed infection status
This is the minimum acceptable level of practice in infection control – hand hygiene, safe work practices including sharps safety, use of PPE when in contact with bodily fluids, routine cleaning of equipment
https://idmic.net/2015/10/20/standard-precautions-infection-control-what-is-included/
Use PPE to behave as a barrier between HCW and patient – depending on level of contact anticipated with patient
Usually gloves and disposable gown
Droplet precautions
Large droplets, > 5 micrometers in diameter
Do not remain suspended in the air
If inhaled, contact upper resp tract, not alveoli
Influenza, rhinovirus, SARS, RSV, Pertussis, strept pharyngitis, ebola
Protective eyewear/face shield and P2 masks to prevent breathing in respiratory droplets
Airborne precautions
Small droplet nuclei, < 5 micometers diameter
Stay suspended in air
When inhaled can reach alveoli and cause infection
Measles, varicella, TB
Protective eyewear, P2 mask, gloves
Consider use of gown to minimise infectious particles being transmitted
If in doubt, wear maximal PPE
http://thepreventionist.info/tag/contact-precautions/
Fit check– all staff including pilots/ACM
Capable of filtering particles greater than 0.3 micometers in diameter
Place on face
Ties over head/neck
Compress/Seal
+ve pressure – exhale
-ve press – inhale
Inadequate seal – change mask
Formal qualitative fit testing is available – but NSW health does not specific when this should be done, however it is done to ensure P2 mask is appropriate sized for individuals
Place hood over head whilst wearing P2 mask
A fine saccharin mist introduced
If any sweetness detected – then failed
Then need to perform 7 exercises for at least 1 min each, pass all of these without sweet taste in mouth
Reducing risk of transmission to aeromedical staff
Advanced airway management
intubation, BVM, suctioning -> those that generate respiratory aerosols
These interventions pose HCW a 3 fold increase of respiratory infections
More specific to the SARS Cov – the risk of a HCW who is involved in endotracheal intubation being infected were 13 times higher than those who did not – high viral load
Risk mitigation -> maximal PPE, optimise for FPS, most experienced intubator, consider NIV
Nebulised therapy is obviously a concern
NIV – is a contentious issue, unfortunately there is a lack of high quality evidence to regarding transmission of infectious disease when using NIV and this can be conflicting
One particular paper reporting on the SARS- Cov outbreak in 2003, reports no evidence to support increased infection transmission to HCW with NIV, and that implementing NIV avoided –intubation in 2/3rds of patients in the SARS-Cov outbreak
Other systematic reviews from the same outbreak indicated an increased risk (although numbers were small)
Invasive/bloody procedures
thoracostomies, thoracotomy, surgical airway, hysterotomy, GI haemorrhage
Post exposure management strategy -> is there support for staff suffering needlestick
Maintain appropriate PPE at all times
Consider ‘fluid containment bag’
Closed In-line suction catheter
Disposable ventilator hose
Clamp ETT
No vehicle ventilation
Speaking to pilots/ACM -> generally guided by medical teams
An unresolved issues at present is the management of patients with airborne disease on the aircraft (measles, varicella, TB)
? Pilots/ACM wear N2 masks when flying the aircraft – communication is paramount to their job, will masks hinder this, whats the risk/benefit ratio
Partition curtain drawn down -> isolate cabin
+ve pressure in cockpit
No eating/drinking
We do have NSW health guidelines for the management of a patient with Ebola, but we are yet to have a case of Ebola on our soil
This picture demonstrates the isolation transfer units
As you can imagine the coordination of transfer for such a patient is incredibly complex, with a huge amount planning, logistics and preparation involved
From a clinical POV – there will be standard operating procedures for the management of Ebola, but they will be adjusted to respect local protocols and individualised to that patient being transferred
Preparation is paramount
Prior to departure with the patient, clinical care guidelines will be established number of specialists– transport agency’s medical director, state EMS, public health, hospital based teams -> this will determine what procedures could be performed and which will not be considered during transport (resucitation/intubation/invasive procedures)
https://cilisos.my/first-ebola-now-mers-should-malaysians-worry-about-an-outbreak/
Prolonged PPE
Temperature control
Perspiration
Dehydration
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/emergency-services/interfacility-transport.html#care
One of the high risk exposure procedures
Decontaminate vehicle in same PPE as required in transfer
Airborne – close vehicle to allow particles to settle
Viracidal disinfectant ++++
Time ‘offline’ – unclear at this stage
Chlorine based disinfectant OR TGA approved disinfectant with viracidal claim against influenza
Another unresolved issue in the infectious disease world at present is the decon of a vehicle after measles/varicella exposure
How long do we leave the car closed up, to allow the particles to settle before cleaning with airborne precautions, and how long should the vehicle be off line. Public helath units are suggesting anything from 10mins to 2hours
With regards to the aircraft – the TOLL manual advises decontamination protocols to be documented in local area supplements – which don’t exist at this stage
Functional areas categorised according to risk of infection transmission
The cleaning policy for each area depends on level of risk posed
Retrieval service consider high risk in comparison to where we are taking patients from and to
http://www1.health.nsw.gov.au/pds/ActivePDSDocuments/PD2012_061.pdf
Out of interest, this is the CEC directions for how to complete a terminal clean following the discharge of an infectious patient t ensure a safe environment for the next patient
http://www.cec.health.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/258666/ecsop-module-4-1.pdf
I am told there were 2 ICPs and 1 Pilot who contracted Swine flu during this epidemic
Jones, C. Hommers, C. Burns, B. Forrest, C. ECMO Retrieval in NSW and beyond. Current Anaesthesia and Critical Care react-text: 55 21(5):282-286/October 2010
And your colleagues won’t thank you for it!
https://memegenerator.net/instance/66334797/i-will-find-you-meme-to-whoever-started-the-office-man-flu-i-will-find-you-and-i-will-kill-you