1. Rickover’s Legacy:
Secrets of the Nuclear Navy’s
Success
Ken Reed
Senior Associate
System Improvements
Why is Rickover’s methodology so
Important?
Consequences of errors can be SEVERE
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2. About me
• 21 years Nuclear Submarine Experience
– Retired Master Chief Electronics Technician
– Served on:
• Ballistic Missile Boat
• Fast Attacks
• Nuclear Research sub
– Last boat – USS SEAWOLF (SSN-21)
What did I do?
• Operation and maintenance of Reactor
Control Electronics
• Reactor operator and propulsion plant
supervisor
• Squadron Reactor Operator
– In charge of training and maintenance
oversight on 6 boats in the squadron
• Last ship – USS SEAWOLF
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3. On board SEAWOLF:
• Senior Enlisted nuke
• In charge of training and maintenance
planning for 4 engineering divisions
• Ran training and drill program
• Earned highest possible grade (Excellent)
on 2 successive Operational Reactor
Safeguards Examinations
A Little Nuclear History
• Dec 2, 1942 - 1st “nuclear reactor”
reactor”
operated by Enrico Fermi at University of
Chicago
• 1947 – Rickover trained in Nuclear
Engineering
• 1954 - USS NAUTILUS launched
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4. From this:
…to this
In 12
Years!!
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5. And since then:
• As of 2004:
– 103 reactors
– 82 ships
– 5600 reactor-years of operation
• 2900 civilian reactor-years
– May be as many as 20 reactors in a single
port
– No major accidents or releases
How has this been accomplished?
• Integrity
• Training
• Discipline
• Root Cause Analysis
• Inspections
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6. Military vs Business
• I’ve heard it said that you can’t run a
can’
business like the military
• I believe that there is a lot that can be
learned in both directions
• See what you may be able to apply to the
business model
• Substitute “company” for “command”
company”
command”
“Good” ships
• Obviously, differences ship to ship
• As an inspector, I saw “good” ships and
good”
“bad” ships
bad”
• I will highlight the differences
• NOTE: Even the “bad” ships are held to
bad”
minimum high standards
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7. Nuclear Navy Bell Curve
Performance
Excellent
Excellent
Above Average
Above Average
Average
Average
Below Average
Below Average
Significantly BA
Significantly BA
Unacceptable
Unacceptable
Does not
exist
Integrity
• Emphasized continuously
• No second chances
• Mistakes happen, but lack of integrity is a
conscious act
• You can include “responsibility” here also
responsibility”
• Adm Rickover:
“Half-truths are like half a brick - they
can be thrown farther”
farther”
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8. Integrity
• Adm Rickover:
– “Unless you can point the finger at the
man who is responsible when something
goes wrong, then you never had anyone
really responsible.”
responsible.”
– Doesn’t sound very TapRooT-ish, does it?
Doesn’
TapRooT-ish,
• Or Does It?
Integrity
• Remember, TapRooT® never says that
you shouldn’t hold someone responsible
shouldn’
for a problem.
• It just isn’t always the operator who is
isn’
responsible.
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9. Training
• Seems like this is the first thing cut in your
budget
• Rarely does this end up being a good
decision
• Training turns out to be the #2 priority,
following only mission accomplishment
– Even here, “mission accomplishment” usually
accomplishment”
includes required training value
Typical Weekly Schedule (at sea)
“We don’t have
time for training!”
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10. Notes on Training
• Average of 5 hours / man / week
– Classroom only
– Drills, OJT, qualification, study, etc counted
separately
• If training overridden, RESCHEDULED
• EVERYONE went to training
• On watch 6, “off” 12
off”
“Creeping Nuke-ism”
• Forward departments started doing same
regimen
– Didn’t like it
Didn’
• Nukes run forward and aft drill programs
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11. To Investigate, or not to
investigate…
• Issues always arise
• Some are minor, some not so minor
• You must decide at what level an
investigation is required
Questions to ask:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Critique
Integrity
Greenand
Book
Required?
Training
Entry
take care
How serious was the problem?
of these
Who knows about it?
Who could find out about it?
Who else needs to know about it?
What are the consequences of not
investigating?
Do I understand the problem, or is it pretty
complex?
Do I have all the information I need?
How much time is available for recovery?
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12. Is a Critique Required?
• Separates “good” boats from “not so
good”
good” boats
good”
• Naval Reactors has rules for when
problem is an Incident
– Rules not so clear on “critique”
critique”
– Up to discretion of Commanding Officer
– This separates the men from the boys
The Dreaded Critique
• Always bad
– Outcomes:
• Disqualification
• Oral reprimand
• Upgrade program
• Loss of pay / rank?
• Training
• New procedure / procedure change
• Rickover-inspired
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13. The New Navy
• Perception has changed
– No longer look bad at higher levels
– Less likely to be blame-oriented
– NR guidelines issued (based on “good” boats)
good”
– Commands more likely to conduct critiques
– Critique smaller issues
– “Fact-finding”
Fact-finding”
The Critique Sequence
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Involved parties assembled
CO / XO / COB / EDMC / ENG convene
Timeline quickly developed (interviews)
Procedures referenced
Further statements taken
Involved parties excused
Agree on root causes, STCA, LTCA
Involved parties informed
Tracking
Incident report or Near Miss submitted if required
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14. Why does this work?
• Integrity re-enforced
– Fair punishment can be expected for mistakes, but there is no
tolerance for a lapse of integrity.
• Military discipline can be easily enforced, so punishments
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
can be quickly meted out.
No one goes home when you are underway.
For the same reason, training can be quickly held.
There is a huge amount of outside oversight
The CO has ultimate authority
There is a large body of experience to draw upon when
determining the root causes and corrective actions.
A warship must be able to fulfill its assigned mission
The CO is informed of almost all problems, keeping him
abreast of the status of all his equipment
Disadvantages:
• Personnel are usually all interviewed together
• Interview held with the supervisor present
• Due to limited manpower and time, critique only
•
•
the “big” stuff
big”
The CO can quickly become overwhelmed by the
sheer number of issues
The same people normally decide on the root
causes and the corrective actions for every
incident
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15. Inspections
• Nuclear Propulsion Examination Board
– Conduct Operational Reactor Safeguards
Exams
– Previous Engineers, CO’s
CO’
– Every 12-16 months
– Most announced (scheduled 6-9 months out)
• Several per year only 3 days notice
– Answer directly to NAVSEA 08
ORSE Work-up
• Good boats need only moderate
preparations
• All need time in schedule dedicated to
drills
• Squadron personnel assist in w/u, reviews
w/u,
• “Good boats”: integrated into daily ship’s
boats”
ship’
schedule
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16. Integration
• Audits by all levels of command
• Drills whenever there is an opening
– Maybe only walk-throughs allowed
walk-throughs
– “Minor” drills any time
Minor”
• Training never to “check the box”
box”
• Test, test, test
• Internal audits of everything
The ORSE Inspection
• 2 Days
– Day 1
• Records Reviews
• Written Exams
• Monitored Evolutions
• Material Inspection
– Day 2
• Drills
• Observe a training session
• Oral interviews
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17. The ORSE Inspection
• Inspection now includes an observation of
ship control, piloting, navigation, etc
• Reactor safety includes things outside the
engineroom
– Tough for the reactor to be safe if the ship is
operated unsafely
Consequences can be severe
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18. Was this reactor safe???
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19. Nuclear Navy’s Guiding Principles
• Integrity from Day 1
• Training is part of daily life
• Whole ship must be safe
• Procedural compliance
– Understand procedure
– Question when it doesn’t make sense
doesn’
– Get it fixed
Nuclear Navy’s Guiding Principles
• Rising Standards of Excellence
• Facing facts
• Learn from experience
• Total Responsibility
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20. Tagout System
• Navy LO/TO system seems much more rigorous
• Steps
–
–
–
One man researches and writes LO/TO
Second man independently verifies boundaries
Worker must prove boundaries to supervisor
• Use prints
• Prints must be correct
– Workers prepare system
• Secure system, drain, vent
– Supervisor authorizes hanging tags
Tagout System (cont)
Steps:
– First worker positions components, hangs tags
– Second worker verifies positions, signs tags
– Supervisor approves commencement of work
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21. Why this works
• Rigorously followed
• Prints are correct
• All components correctly labeled
– No deviations from label allowed
• Rigorous auditing
• Walk-down NOT allowed as only check
– In fact, walk-down not even mentioned
Conclusions
• Rickover’s methods were required at the
Rickover’
time instituted
– Over the years, minor modifications, but
basics have NOT changed
• Adoption of his exact methods by civilian
businesses may not work in total
• However, his principles in general
will work anywhere.
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