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110101 A Laptop 101010
010101 In Every 0101010
01010 Classroom 101010

        Joe Schorr




                     © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
Introduction


        Do you lose patience with
        people that can't convert binary
        to decimal at a glance?


        Does your grandmother ever ask
        you what you do for a living, and
        after a 5-minute explanation, she
        blinks, then asks you what you do
        for a living?



                                            © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
Agenda




         Goals
         Threats
         Remediation
         Lessons learned




                           © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
The Goals…

     An environment that is…
      Safe
      Secure
      Stable
      Scalable

       And…
                               © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
They will never know…




                        © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-04
Threat Management
                                                   Stealth / Advanced
  EXPERTISE REQUIRED                              Scanning Techniques
                                                                                Hacker
                                                    Denial of                 Tool Kits
                              Packet Spoofing
                                                     Service
                                   Sniffers                                DDoS Attacks
                                 Sweepers                          WWW Attacks
                                                      Automated Probes/Scans
                            Back Doors
                   Disabling Audits                GUI
                                              Network Management Diagnostics
  SOPHISTICATION                Burglaries
                                       Hijacking Sessions
     Of TOOLS           Exploiting Known Vulnerabilities
                        Password Cracking
                  Self-Replicating Code
           Password
           Guessing
          1980                                                                     2010


                                                                © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
Threats - State of the Web
    75% of respondents to the FBI/CSI survey cite their Internet
    connection as a point of attack
    40% of respondents detected external penetrations/probes
    85% of large corporations and government agencies detected
    computer security breaches
    64% of respondents experienced malware infection, compared to
    2008's 50%
    29% experienced denial-of-service attacks, up from 2008's 21%
    17% experienced password sniffing, up from 9% in 2008
    14% experienced Web site defacement, up from 2008's 6%
    Over 1,000,000 WWW pages contain some form of Hacker Tools
    OS holes and bugs
    User privacy “sploits”
    Stalking issues
    Wireless
                                                  © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
Threats - Closer to home

    Servers and clients via broadband/DSL access
    Home broadband/Cable/DSL access
    Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Zombie Attacks
    IM (Instant Messenger), IRQ, Chat
    Viruses
    SPAM
    Unsuitable Content
    Music, Games, Video
    Pop-ups
    Click-jacking
    WIRELESS ACCESS !!!
                                           © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
A Simple Problem
                               Local Network



                              Reachable Total
       Internet
                               Network Network




    Any host on the Internet can attack every
     reachable node on your internal network.


                                   © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
Just when we thought we „got it‟…




                                    © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
Lesson 1…


       “If you reveal your
        secrets to the wind
      you should not blame
      the wind for revealing
        them to the trees.”
            -Khalil Gibran
                             © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
WLANs are broadcast networks and…



                          Locators
                              Windows XP
                              ApTools
                              NetStumbler
                              Kismet




                                 © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
… Sniffers love broadcast networks




                 Ethereal
                 AiroPeek
                              © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
“but whadda„bout WEP?”

      Wired Equivalent Privacy was designed to
      stop casual interception of data
      It is not “on” by default
      Takes some overhead
      64 and 128 Encryption
      Static, shared algorithm
      All nodes use the same key
      You can still capture traffic
      And if you can catch it… you can crack it!
                Airsnort
                WepCrack

                                      © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
Wireless Intrusion Detection

     Look for WEP traffic from an unknown MAC
     address
     Identify rogue APs by scanning channels
     Search for TCP/IP and UDP attack signatures
     in WEP encrypted traffic
     Monitor for high number of failed
     authentications
                     ISS Wireless
                      Scanner
                     AiroPeek NX
                     AirMagnet
                     Air Defense    © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
Countermeasures Summary

     Use WEP, dynamic if your hardware allows
     Don’t use the default SSID
     Don’t broadcast the SSID
     Don’t use an obvious name for SSID
     If VPN-ing, restrict access to VPN clients only
     Limit access of Wireless clients to sensitive
     resources
     Conduct periodic wireless audits
     Ongoing WIDS


                                        © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
The “Big Three” Lesson Learned

                        Get focused




                   Understand Global
                   vs. Local threats

    Make the technology fit
    your goals –
    not the other way around
                                      © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
Big Lessons Learned

    1)   Wireless “Security” is an oxymoron
    2)   You are not secure
    3)   Pick a great partner
    4)   Start early
    5)   Take care of the perimeter
    6)   A Firewall will not protect you



                                    © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
Name this man




                © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
Big Lessons Learned

   1) Wireless “Security” is an oxymoron
   2) KISS
   3) Pick a great partner
   4) Start early
   5) Take care of the perimeter
   6) A firewall will not protect you
   7) Control the laptop
   8) Content Filter
   9) Intrusion Detection
   10)Test!

                                     © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
Little Lessons Learned

   1)   Try multiple brands of Access Points and stress test
   2)   Beat up your Telco, early and often
   3)   UPS the APs
   4)   Be prepared for breakage
   5)   Avoid “Do-everything” products
   6)   Don’t re-invent the wheel
   7)   “Walk around”
   8)   The kids are WAAAYYY smarter than you
          a)   Disable Chat, IRQ, IM, Music, Games, Video
   9) Establish teacher needs ASAP
   10) RELAX!


                                                       © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
Questions?




             © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
010101010101010101010101010101010




        Thank
         You!
          Contact me:   jpschorr@cybertage.org
          LinkedIn:     http://www.linkedin.com/in/jpschorr



                                                    © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11

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FETC - A Laptop in Every Classroom: Lessons Learned

  • 1. 110101 A Laptop 101010 010101 In Every 0101010 01010 Classroom 101010 Joe Schorr © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 2. Introduction Do you lose patience with people that can't convert binary to decimal at a glance? Does your grandmother ever ask you what you do for a living, and after a 5-minute explanation, she blinks, then asks you what you do for a living? © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 3. Agenda Goals Threats Remediation Lessons learned © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 4. The Goals… An environment that is… Safe Secure Stable Scalable And… © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 5. They will never know… © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-04
  • 6. Threat Management Stealth / Advanced EXPERTISE REQUIRED Scanning Techniques Hacker Denial of Tool Kits Packet Spoofing Service Sniffers DDoS Attacks Sweepers WWW Attacks Automated Probes/Scans Back Doors Disabling Audits GUI Network Management Diagnostics SOPHISTICATION Burglaries Hijacking Sessions Of TOOLS Exploiting Known Vulnerabilities Password Cracking Self-Replicating Code Password Guessing 1980 2010 © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 7. Threats - State of the Web 75% of respondents to the FBI/CSI survey cite their Internet connection as a point of attack 40% of respondents detected external penetrations/probes 85% of large corporations and government agencies detected computer security breaches 64% of respondents experienced malware infection, compared to 2008's 50% 29% experienced denial-of-service attacks, up from 2008's 21% 17% experienced password sniffing, up from 9% in 2008 14% experienced Web site defacement, up from 2008's 6% Over 1,000,000 WWW pages contain some form of Hacker Tools OS holes and bugs User privacy “sploits” Stalking issues Wireless © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 8. Threats - Closer to home Servers and clients via broadband/DSL access Home broadband/Cable/DSL access Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Zombie Attacks IM (Instant Messenger), IRQ, Chat Viruses SPAM Unsuitable Content Music, Games, Video Pop-ups Click-jacking WIRELESS ACCESS !!! © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 9. A Simple Problem Local Network Reachable Total Internet Network Network Any host on the Internet can attack every reachable node on your internal network. © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 10. Just when we thought we „got it‟… © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 11. Lesson 1… “If you reveal your secrets to the wind you should not blame the wind for revealing them to the trees.” -Khalil Gibran © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 12. WLANs are broadcast networks and… Locators  Windows XP  ApTools  NetStumbler  Kismet © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 13. … Sniffers love broadcast networks  Ethereal  AiroPeek © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 14. “but whadda„bout WEP?” Wired Equivalent Privacy was designed to stop casual interception of data It is not “on” by default Takes some overhead 64 and 128 Encryption Static, shared algorithm All nodes use the same key You can still capture traffic And if you can catch it… you can crack it! Airsnort WepCrack © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 15. Wireless Intrusion Detection Look for WEP traffic from an unknown MAC address Identify rogue APs by scanning channels Search for TCP/IP and UDP attack signatures in WEP encrypted traffic Monitor for high number of failed authentications  ISS Wireless Scanner  AiroPeek NX  AirMagnet  Air Defense © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 16. Countermeasures Summary Use WEP, dynamic if your hardware allows Don’t use the default SSID Don’t broadcast the SSID Don’t use an obvious name for SSID If VPN-ing, restrict access to VPN clients only Limit access of Wireless clients to sensitive resources Conduct periodic wireless audits Ongoing WIDS © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 17. The “Big Three” Lesson Learned Get focused Understand Global vs. Local threats Make the technology fit your goals – not the other way around © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 18. Big Lessons Learned 1) Wireless “Security” is an oxymoron 2) You are not secure 3) Pick a great partner 4) Start early 5) Take care of the perimeter 6) A Firewall will not protect you © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 19. Name this man © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 20. Big Lessons Learned 1) Wireless “Security” is an oxymoron 2) KISS 3) Pick a great partner 4) Start early 5) Take care of the perimeter 6) A firewall will not protect you 7) Control the laptop 8) Content Filter 9) Intrusion Detection 10)Test! © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 21. Little Lessons Learned 1) Try multiple brands of Access Points and stress test 2) Beat up your Telco, early and often 3) UPS the APs 4) Be prepared for breakage 5) Avoid “Do-everything” products 6) Don’t re-invent the wheel 7) “Walk around” 8) The kids are WAAAYYY smarter than you a) Disable Chat, IRQ, IM, Music, Games, Video 9) Establish teacher needs ASAP 10) RELAX! © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 22. Questions? © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11
  • 23. 010101010101010101010101010101010 Thank You! Contact me: jpschorr@cybertage.org LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/jpschorr © Joseph P. Schorr 2003-11