Original data on modern (1990-2008), international, price-fixing cartels and the antitrust penalties imposed on them around the world.

1. CARTELS & ANTITRUST
PORTRAYED:
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL CARTELS,
1990-2008
John M. Connor,
Purdue University
jconnor@purdue.edu
December 20, 2008

2. Introduction
• The purpose of the following 80 charts is to illustrate the size and
economic impacts of the modern international cartel movement
and the enforcement responses of the world’s antitrust authorities
and national courts.
• The data employed encompass 495 private hard-core cartels that
were subject to government or private legal actions (i.e., formal
investigations, damages suits, fines, or consent decrees) between
January 1990 and N
J d November 2008 E h cartel h d participants
b 2008. Each t l had ti i t
with headquarters in two or more nations.
• All monetary data are expressed in nominal U.S. dollars using
exchange rates during the cartel’s life or on the day a legal action
was announced.
• A special effort is made to create charts that illustrate trends in
cartel dimensions and antitrust decisions.

3. OUTLINE
SLIDES
4-11
Part 1: Number, Size, and Industries
•
13-23
Part 2: Cartel Detection
•
24-30
Part 3: Internal Structures of Cartels
•
31-54
Part 4: Corporate fines and Settlements
•
55-67
Part 5: Individual Sanctions
•
66-79
Part 6: Market Effects and Damages
•
80
Sources
•

4. PART 1
• Numbers and sizes of cartels and their
participants.
• Industry characteristics

5. Numbers of Cartels
• Between Jan. 1990 and Nov. 2008, there were
495 formal investigations (raids, grand juries,
class actions filed, et sim.) of suspected
international cartels.
• Incomplete information is available on 96 (19%)
because no adverse government decisions and no
private settlements were made public.
• Cases against 31 (6%) cartels were closed without
sanctions because of insufficient evidence of a
violation; these presumptive “non-cartels” are
omitted from most slides.

6. Numbers of Corporate Cartelists
• At least 5900 companies in total
• About 2900 ultimate parent companies known
by name and location*
• Ab
About 3000 more companies implicated, b
i i li d but
are anonymous
• Almost 2400 have been fined*
* Some double counting of recidivists

7. Numbers of Cartel Executives
Fined or Imprisoned
• At least 373 individual, named executives have
been penalized
• Hundreds more were guilty but given
immunity
• Thousands more were guilty but not
prosecuted

8. Total Known Affected Sales by
International Cartels Is $16.6 Trillion
8
7
6
5
4
$ Trillion Nominal
3
2
1
0
EC EU NCAs US Other
“EC” is cartels convicted by the Eur. Commission

9. Huge Increases in Known Affected Sales
by International Cartels, 1990-2008
16
14
12
10
8
$ Trillion
6
4
2
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Note: in $2008 dollars, sales are at least treble the nominal (current) dollars shown.

10. Estimated Affected Sales of Some
Recent (2005-08)International Cartels
Cartel Name and Type Sales ($ billion)
Airlines, passenger, fuel surcharge ,Global 1,164.0
Diamonds, rough gem quality, Global 303.2
Bank cards' fees, US 285.0
Airlines, cargo, fuel surcharge , Global 264.9
Insurance brokerage fees, US & UK 145.0
LCDs (Liquid Crystal Displays), TFP type, Global 131.0
Telecom, mobile services 2, Korea 96.0
Cleaning products, home and personal, EU 74.1
Tobacco products, UK 43.5

11. GENERAL CARTEL INDUSTRIES
17 agricultural or mining raw materials
•
202 intermediate industrial materials
•
21 industrial capital goods
•
32 undifferentiated consumer goods
•
37 differentiated consumer goods
•
155 business or consumer services
•

12. LEADING CARTEL INDUSTRIES
No.
Organic Chemicals
Food & Tobacco Mfg.
Distribution
Cement, graphite, glass
Transport services
Construction
Other services
Instruments & Misc.
Machinery
Rubber & plastic
Inorganic Chemicals
Metals
Telecom services
Banking & Insurance
Paper & printing
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Number of cartels 1990-2008

13. Part 2: DETECTION

14. International Cartels Are Now
Being Assaulted on All Fronts
• Indictments in the US and Canada peaked in
the late 1990s (with the 16 vitamins cartels
playing a major role).
• The EC’s cases are rising, but without
g,
settlements the rise in numbers is small.
• The EU’s National Competition Authorities
(NCAs) are now the biggest prosecutors.
• Asia (=Korea) is becoming a cartel tiger.
• Of late, So. Africa and Brazil are active also.

15. Rate of Discovery Are
Eight Times Higher in 2005-08
50
49.3
40
Number detecte per year
30
ed
20
10
6.2
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Year of Discovery of All International Cartels

16. Rates of Discovery of Global Cartels
Are Rising Slowly
9
8
8.0
7
6
5
4
3 Number per year
2
1 1.6
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
“Global” cartels affected prices in two or more continents

17. Rates of Discovery by the
European Commission Rise Steadily
6
5
4
3
5.5 cartels
2
3.6
2.4
1 1.8
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08

18. Cartel Detections by the EU’s NCAs
Surpass All Others since 2000
20
18
16
14
12
10
Detections
8
6
4
2
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08

19. Cartel Detections by the
US and Canada Are Stalled
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
Detections
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08

20. Asian Anti-Cartel Enforcement (Especially Korea)
Is Accelerating
9
8
7
6
5
4 Detections
3
2
1
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08

21. Cartel Detections in Africa and Latin
America Are Modest but Significant
7
6
5
4
Detections
3
2
1
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08

22. Despite Heavier International Cartel
Penalties, More Companies Are
Becoming Cartelists
More than 2400 instances of corporate
participation have been identified, and at
least 1620 have been fined during 1990-2008.

23. Number of Corporate Cartelists Is Rising
2000
Number of corpora participations
1500
ate
1000
500
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Year cartel was detected

24. Part 3:
Internal Structures of Cartels

25. Number of Companies per Cartel Steady
12
orporation/cartel
10
8
Average Number of co
6
4
2
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08

26. Number of Companies in Cartels,
1990-2008 Total
20
15
10
percent
5
0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of corporate participants

27. Duration of All International Cartels Falling
150
102
Months on average
100
83
63
57
50
0
1990-95 1996-99 2000-03 2004-07

28. Duration of Global-Scope International
Cartels
141
150
100
verage
84
80
72
Months on av
50
0
1990-95 1996-99 2000-03 2004-07
Note: Global cartels operated in multiple continents

29. Duration of Regional Cartels
150
100
verage
83
73
72
Months on av
59
50
0
1990-95 1996-99 2000-03 2004-07
Regional cartels operated in one jurisdiction

30. Duration of International Cartels
in Asia
150
100
verage
65
Months on av
50
50
31
24
0
1990-95 1996-99 2000-03 2004-07

31. PART 4
• Cartel fines and private settlements are about
equal and exceed $60 billion combined.
• The undisputed leader in fines – the DOJ – has
been overtaken by other authorities.
authorities
• EC fines exceeded the DOJ’s after 1999.
• Over 4300 companies investigated
• Over 1500 companies penalized
• Over 370 executives fined or imprisoned

32. Penalties on International Cartels
Total $ 61.2 Billion (1990-2008)
35
30
25
20
USD
15
10
5
0
Govt. Fines Private Settlements

33. Penalties on International Cartels
Are Surging
50
45
40
35
30
25
$ Billion
20
15
10
5
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08

34. Government Fines Imposed on
International Cartels Total $ 32.9 Billion
18
16
14
12
10
8 $ Billion
6
4
2
0
EC NCAs Other US Canada

35. Penalties Are Rising in All Jurisdictions
25
20
$ Billion
15
10 1990-94
2005-08
2005 08
5 1995-99
2000-04
1995-99
0 2000-04
1990-94
2005-08

36. Number of Corporations Fined,
U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1990-2008
80
70
60
50
40
Domestic
30 Intl
20
10
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

37. International Cartel Fines Collected,
U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1990-2008
1300
1200
1100
Total $5.4 billion
1000
900
800
700
$ Million
n
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Year First Member of Cartel Is Fined

38. International Cartel Fines/Total Collected,
U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1990-2008
800
700
600
500
400
Percent
300
200
100
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Fiscal years (DOJ) and calendar years do not match

39. International Cartel Fines/Total Collected,
U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1990-2008
160
140
120
100
nt
Percen
80
60
40
20
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Fiscal years (DOJ) and calendar years (Intl.) do not match: FIX?

40. Number of Dec
cisions
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Total 90
1995
1996
1997
Year of Decision
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Number of Cartel Decisions,
2005
European Commission, 1990-2008
2006
2007
2008

41. Number of Companies in European
Commission Decisions, 1990-2008
80
Total 598 Firms
70
60
mpanies
50
Number of Com
40
30
20
10
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Year of Decision

42. Number of Adverse Decisions about
Intl. Cartels, EC and DOJ, 1990-2008
16
14
12
10
8
EC
6 DOJ
4
2
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
[Add individual cases for US]

43. Intl. Cartel Fines Collected,
European Commission, 1990-2008
4000
3500
Total $15.6 billion
3000
2500
2000
$ Mil.
1500
1000
500
0
1990
1995
1996
1997
1998
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Year of Decision

44. International Cartel Fines Collected,
EC and DOJ Compared, 1990-2008
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
EC
1500 DOJ
1000
500
0
1990
1995
1996
1997
1998
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Year First Member of Cartel Is Fined

45. Intl. Cartel Fines Collected by NCAs
(EU’s National Authorities) 1990-2008
1400
1200
Total $6.2 billion
1000
800
600 $ Mil.
400
200
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Year of Decision

46. Intl. Cartel Settlements in the US
1990-2008
10000
9000
Total $26.4 billion
8000
7000
6000
5000
$ Mil.
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Year of Major Settlement

47. Total International Cartel Penalties,
EU and U.S. Compared, 1990-2008
12000
US total $32 billion
10000
EU total $22 billion
8000
6000
$ million
all EU
all US
4000
2000
0
1990
1995
1996
1997
1998
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

48. Other Government Fines on International
Cartels Exceed $5 Billion
4000
3500
3000
2500
on
2000
$ Millio
1500
1000
500
0
US AGs Korea Africa Latin Other Asia Oceania
America

49. Most Private Cartel Settlements Are with
Direct Buyers in the US
30
25
20
$ Billion
n
15
10
5
0
US Direct US Indirect Canada Other

50. Over 4300 Companies Investigated
2500
2000
Number of Fines
1500
1000
500
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08

51. At Least 94 Amnesties for
International Cartels Granted
43
37
mnesties
Number of Am
9
2 2
US EU Canada EU States Asia

52. Corporate Cartelists Are from
57 Nations
W. Europe
Asia
E. Europe
Lat.
Lat America
Nations
Oceanea
Africa
US & Canada
0 3 6 9 12 15 18
NUMBER OF NATIONS

53. Corporate Penalties Are Mostly Paid
by W. European Companies
W. Europe 36.2
US & Canada 11.0
Asia 6.7
Africa 0.38
Lat. America 0.2 $ Billion
E. Europe 0.11
Australia 0.05
Note : Western European international cartelists account for 66.3% of the total.

54. Most Penalized Corporations Are
Headquartered in Western Europe
US
German
French
Italian
Japanese
Dutch
British
Korean
Swiss
Belgian
Spanish
Hungarian
Swedish
0 50 100 150 200 250
NB : Western European cartelists account for 61.8% of the total of 1511.

55. Corporate Headquarters
of Non-European Penalized Firms
Number of Companies
US & Canada 251
Asia 217
E. Europe 44
Lat. America 50
Africa 18
Australia 16
NB : Non-Western European cartelists account for 38.2% of the total of 1511.

56. PART 5: Individual Sanctions
• DOJ prison sentences are more severe
• Fines on executives are insignificant

57. Number of Executives Penalized
by Nationality, International Cartels
US
Germany
Australia
Japan
Egypt
UK
Israel
So. Korea
Netherlands
Canada
France
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
NB : Totals 374, including a few anonymous cartelists.

58. Number of Executives Charged and
Penalized by the DOJ per Year
90
80
70
CHARGED
60
FINED
50
PRISON
40
Poly. (CHARGED)
30
Poly. (FINED)
20 Poly. (PRISON)
10
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

59. Proportion of Charged Persons
Fined or Imprisoned by DOJ
100
80
60 % FINED
Percent
t
% PRISON
40 Poly. (% FINED)
Poly. (% PRISON)
20
0
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006

60. Proportion Fined/Charged,
Individual Price Fixers, US, 1990-2008
90
80
70
60
50
PERCENT
All Cartels
40 International
30
20
10
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08

61. Proportion Imprisoned/Charged,
Individual Price Fixers, US, 1990-2008
80
70
60
50
PERCENT
All Cartels
40
International
30
20
10
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08

62. Mean US Prison Sentences for
All Price Fixers, 1990-2008
35
30
MONTH PE PERSON
25
20
ER
15
10
5
0
1990s 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Avg.
(NB: 2008 Workforce Stats due out early 2009)

63. Mean Length, US Prison Sentences
for All Price Fixers, 1990-2008
35
30
MONTHS PER PERSON
25
20
P
15
10
5
0
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008

64. Mean Length, US Prison Sentences for
International Price Fixers, 1990-2008
45
40
MONTHS PER PERSON
35
30
25
P
20
15
10
5
0
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
NB: The median of 104 international cases is 10 months (2008 has partial data)

65. LOG of $ ‘000 PER PERSON
1
10
100
1000
10000
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Price Fixers, 1990-2008
2006
2007
Average US Fines/Person for
2008
All Cartels
International

66. Mean US Fines/Person for
Price Fixers, 1990-2008
900
800
700
ERSON
600
500
$ ‘000 PER PE
All Cartels
400 International
300
200
100
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Note: The median 1990-2008 international fine is $100,000

67. Mean US Prison Days/Person for
Price Fixers, 1990-2008
700
600
500
RSON
400
DAYS PER PER
All Cartels
300 International
200
100
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08

68. Mean US Fines/Person for
Price Fixers, 1990-2008
900
800
700
ERSON
600
500
$ ‘000 PER PE
All Cartels
400 International
300
200
100
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Note: The median 1990-2008 international fine is $100,000

69. Part 6
Market Effects and Damages
• Data on price effects are incomplete

70. Mean Penalties on Global Cartels,
Relative to Affected Sales, 1990-2008 (%)
35
30
Penalties/Affected Sales (%)
25
20
S
Median
15
Mean
10
5
0
EU US Canada Private World

71. Severity of EU and US Median
Penalties, Non-Global Cartels (%)
20
18
16
Penalties/Affected Sales (%)
14
12
S
EU
10
US DOJ
8
Private
6
4
2
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
NB. Includes consent decrees, warnings, other zero dollar penalties

72. Severity of EU, US & Canadian
Mean Fines, Global Cartels
30
25
Fines /Affecte Sales (%)
20
ed
EU
15
US
Canada
10
5
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
NB. Includes consent decrees, warnings, other zero dollar penalties

73. Severity of Median Private
Settlements, Global Cartels
20
18
cted Sales (%)
16
14
12
Penalties/Affec
10 Private
8 Avg. US&EU
6
4
2
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
NB. Includes consent decrees, warnings, other zero dollar penalties

74. EU, US & Canada: Severity of
Median Fines, Global Cartels
20
18
cted Sales (%)
16
14
12
EU
Penalties/Affec
10
US
8
Private US
6
4
2
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
NB. Excludes consent decrees, warnings, other zero dollar penalties

75. Severity of Mean Private Settlements,
Global Cartels
45
fected Sales (%)
40
35
30
25
Private
Pi t
Settlements/Aff
20
Avg. US+EU
15
10
5
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
NB. Includes consent decrees, warnings, other zero dollar penalties

76. EU, US & Canada: Severity of
Mean Fines, Global Cartels
30
25
Fines /Affecte Sales (%)
20
ed
EU
15
US
Canada
10
5
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
NB. Excludes all zero-dollar penalties

77. Severity of Median Private
Settlements, Global Cartels
25
cted Sales (%)
20
15
Penalties/Affec
Private
10 Avg. US&EU
5
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
NB. Excludes all zero-dollar penalties

78. EU, US & Canada: Severity of Median
Fines, Global Cartels
18
16
Fines/Affecte Sales (%)
14
12
10
ed
EU
8 US
Canada
6
4
2
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
NB. Excludes all zero-dollar penalties

79. Mean Private Settlement Intensities,
Global Cartels (%)
45
40
Affected Sales
35
30
25
Settlements/A
Private
Pi t
20
Avg. US+EU
15
10
5
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
NB. Excludes all zero-dollar penalties

80. MEDIAN LAGS: From Investigation to First Sanction,
All Cartels, 1990-2008
40
36.41
33.3
30
Months
21.56
19.79
20
10
0
US DOJ Canada EC Other Govt.
Excludes secret investigations

81. MEDIAN LAGS: From Investigation to First Sanction,
Global Cartels, 1990-2008
40 37.75
35 32.58
30
23.76
Months
25
18.98
20
15
10
5
0
US DOJ Canada EC Other Govt.
Excludes secret investigations

82. MEDIAN INVESTIGATION LENGTH,
US DOJ, 1990-2008
35 32.82
30
25
20.98
Months
20 17.15
15
8.57
10
5
0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Year the first cartelist was fined

83. Transparency of International Cartel
Investigations, 1990-2008
nown Before Decisions
100%
73%
68%
61%
57%
Share of Investigations Kn
50%
0%
U.S. DOJ Canada EC Other Europe

84. Sources
John M. Connor. Private International Cartels: Full Data. [The PICs
•
spreadsheet, first created about 1998, is continuously updated. As of
November 2008, the combined (Full Data) spreadsheet was a file of 4.75MB
and consisted of 3767 observations of 498 cartels and 4090 cartelists
(companies and individual participants) with 810,000 cells of data. There are
also 13 back-up spreadsheets.]
John M. Connor. DOJ Cartel Enforcement 1990 2007. [A spreadsheet created
M Connor 1990-2007
•
late 2007 and completed in early 2008. Contains annual budgets, activities,
and enforcement actions with respect to cartels.]
John M. Connor and Gustav Helmers. Statistics on Modern Private
•
International Cartels: Working Paper 07-01. Washington, DC: American
Antitrust Institute (January 2007).
[http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/567.pdf]
John M. Connor. Cartel Amnesties Granted: Worldwide Whistleblowers SSRN
•
Working Paper (October 2008). [at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285469]