A Wasted Decade - Syria

Syria
H U M A N
A Wasted Decade R I G H T S
Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Asad’s
First Ten Years in Power
W A T C H

A Wasted Decade
Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Asad’s
First Ten Years in Power

Copyright © 2010 Human Rights Watch
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
ISBN: 1-56432-663-2
Cover design by Rafael Jimenez

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July 2010 1-56432-663-2

A Wasted Decade
Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Asad’s First Ten Years in Power

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 1

I. Repression of Political and Human Rights Activism .......................................................... 5

II. Restrictions on Freedom of Expression .......................................................................... 11

III. Torture, Ill-Treatment, and Enforced Disappearances ................................................... 18

IV. Repression of Kurds .................................................................................................... 23

V. Legacy of Enforced Disappearances .............................................................................. 26

VI. Annex: List of Political and Human Rights Activists Detained during Bashar al-Asad’s
First Decade in Power ....................................................................................................... 29

Executive Summary

After Bashar al-Asad succeeded his father as president in July 2000, many people in Syria
hoped that the human rights situation would improve. In his first inaugural speech on July 17,
al-Asad spoke of the need for “creative thinking,” “the desperate need for constructive
criticism,” “transparency,” and “democracy.”1 A human rights lawyer summed up his initial
feelings on the succession, reflecting the mood and aspirations of many others in the
country: “Bashar’s inaugural speech provided a space for hope following the totalitarian
years of President [Hafez] Asad. It was as if a nightmare was removed.”2

Ten years later, these initial hopes remain unfulfilled, and al-Asad’s words have not
translated into any kind of government action to promote criticism, transparency, or
democracy. This report reviews Syria’s human rights situation in five key areas and proposes
concrete recommendations to the Syrian President that are essential to improving Syria’s
human rights record.

The Damascus Spring that followed al-Asad’s ascent to power, during which a number of
informal groups began meeting in private homes to discuss political reform, was a short-
lived experiment; its highpoint was the shutting down of Mazzeh prison in November 2000
and the release of hundreds of political prisoners shortly thereafter. It came to an abrupt end
in August 2001; Syria’s prisons are filled again with political prisoners, journalists, and
human rights activists (Annex 1 lists 92 political and human rights activists detained since
al-Asad’s ascent to power).

Syria’s opaque decision-making process and the lack of public information on policy
debates within the regime make it very difficult to know the real reasons that drove Bashar
al-Asad to loosen some of the existing restrictions early on, only to clamp down a few
months later and to maintain a tight grip ever since. Was al-Asad a true reformer who did not
have the capacity early in his reign to take on an entrenched “old guard” that refused any
political opening? If so, why has he not implemented these reforms in the ensuing years
after he had consolidated his power base and named his own people to key positions? Or
was al-Asad’s talk of reform a mere opportunistic act to gain popularity and legitimacy that
he never intended to translate into real changes?

1
Translation of President Bashar al-Asad's July 17, 2001 inauguration speech provided by the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA),
via http://www.al-bab.com/arab/countries/syria/bashar00a.htm.
2
Human Rights Watch interview with Syrian human rights activist (name withheld), Damascus, November 14, 2006.

1 Human Rights Watch | July 2010

There is not enough publicly available information to answer these questions definitively.
However, it is clear that after a decade in power, Bashar al-Asad has not taken the steps
necessary to truly improve his country’s human rights record. He has focused his efforts on
opening up the economy without broadening public freedoms or establishing public
institutions that are accountable for their actions. So while visitors to Damascus are likely to
stay in smart boutique hotels and dine in shiny new restaurants, ordinary Syrians continue
to risk jail merely for criticizing their president, starting a blog, or protesting government
policies.

The state of emergency, enacted in 1963, remains in place, and the government continues to
rule by emergency powers. Syria’s security agencies, the feared mukhabarat, continue to
detain people without arrest warrants, frequently refuse to disclose their whereabouts for
weeks and sometimes months, and regularly engage in torture. Special courts set up under
Syria’s emergency laws, such as the Supreme State Security Court (SSSC), sentence people
following unfair trials. Syria is still a de facto single-party state with only the Ba`ath Party
holding effective power.

Bashar al-Asad has permitted Syrians to access the internet but his security services detain
bloggers and censor popular websites such as Facebook, YouTube, and Blogger (Google’s
blogging engine). On September 22, 2001, one year after al-Asad assumed power, the Syrian
government adopted a new Press Law (Decree No. 50/2001), which provided the government
with sweeping controls over newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals, as well as
virtually anything else printed in Syria, from books to pamphlets and posters.

Despite statements by First Lady Asma al-Asad in January 2010 that the government “wanted
to open more space for civil society to work,” Syria’s security services continue to deny
registration requests for independent non-governmental organizations and none of Syria’s
human rights groups are licensed.3

The Kurdish minority, estimated to be 10 percent of the population, is denied basic group
rights, including the right to learn Kurdish in schools or celebrate Kurdish festivals, such as
Nowruz (Kurdish New Year). Official repression of Kurds increased further after Syrian Kurds
held large-scale demonstrations, some violent, throughout northern Syria in March 2004 in
order to voice long-simmering grievances. Since then, security forces have dispersed
Kurdish political and cultural gatherings, sometimes with lethal force, and have detained a

3
Cited in Rami Khouri, “Signals of Change from Syria,” Agence Global, January 27, 2010,
http://www.agenceglobal.com/article.asp?id=2244 (accessed June 10, 2010).

A Wasted Decade 2

number of leading Kurdish political activists, who they have referred to military courts or the
SSSC for prosecution under charges of “inciting strife,” or “weakening national sentiment.”
Despite repeated promises by al-Asad, an estimated 300,000 stateless Kurds are still
waiting for the Syrian government to solve their predicament by granting them citizenship.
Most of these had their Syrian citizenship stripped by the Syrian government after an
exceptional census in 1962 or are their descendants.

Promises by al-Asad for new laws that would broaden political and civil society participation
have not materialized. In March 2005 he promised while speaking to Spanish journalists
that “the coming period will be one of freedom for political parties in Syria.”4 In June 2005
the Ba`ath Party Congress recommended the establishment of a new political party law that
would allow the creation of new non-ethnic and non-religious political parties.5 To date, no
new draft law has been officially introduced.

Repression in Syria today may be less severe than during Syria’s darks years in the early
1980s, when security forces carried out large-scale disappearances and extrajudicial killings.
But that is hardly an achievement or measure of improvement given the different
circumstances. As a prominent dissident told Human Rights Watch recently, “In the 1980s,
we went to jail without trial. Now, we get a trial, but we still go to jail.”6

In public interviews and speeches, al-Asad has justified the lack of political reforms by either
arguing that his priority is economic reform, or by stating that regional circumstances have
interfered with his reform agenda. In his second inaugural speech in July 2007, following an
endorsement for a second term with 97.6 percent of the vote, al-Asad noted that:

Numerous circumstances hindered some of the political developments which
we wanted to achieve. Our supreme objective, amidst the chaos certain
parties have been exporting to our region—and which surrounds us now—
was to preserve the safety and security of our citizens and maintain the
stability our people enjoys.7

4
Sami Moubayed, “Syria's Ba`athists Loosen the Reins,” Asia Times, April 26, 2005,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GD26Ak04.html (accessed May 12, 2010).
5
Rhonda Roumani,“In Syria, Democrats Chomp at Bit,” Christian Science Monitor, September 23, 2005,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0923/p06s03-wome.html (accessed May 12, 2010).
6
Human Rights Watch interview with Syrian political activist, Beirut, April 5, 2010.
7
Bashar al-Asad’s Second Inaugural Address on July 18, 2007, available at
http://www.mideastweb.org/bashar_assad_inauguration_2007.htm (accessed on June 10, 2010).


While there is no doubt that Syria has faced numerous foreign policy challenges in the last
decade, from the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 to Syria’s forced withdrawal from Lebanon in
2005 and its subsequent isolation by Western powers, these do not explain, let alone justify,
the Syrian government’s repressive behavior toward its own citizens.

A review of Syria’s record shows a consistent policy of repressing dissent regardless of
international or regional developments. Al-Asad’s crackdown on dissidents began in August
2001, before the United States invaded Iraq, and continued throughout the decade,
irrespective of the state of Syria’s relations with the international community. Syria’s
emergence from its Western-imposed isolation since 2007 has not improved the situation for
Syria’s political and human rights activists.

In March 2007, the European Union reopened its dialogue with Damascus, after it had
suspended talks on an EU association agreement in 2005 following the murder of Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The US followed suit, with House of Representatives Speaker
Nancy Pelosi meeting al-Asad in Damascus in April 2007, followed by a visit to Syria in May
2007 by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Yet, in May 2007, Syrian courts sentenced
leading dissident Kamal Labwani and prominent political writer Michel Kilo to long jail terms
for their peaceful activities, only weeks after jailing human rights lawyer Anwar al-Bunni.

More recently, Europe’s, and particularly France’s, extensive engagement with Syria
following al-Asad’s visit to Paris in July 2008 has not eased Syria’s repression of human
rights activism. On July 28, 2009, the government detained Muhanad al-Hasani, a human
rights lawyer and the foremost monitor of the State Security Court. Three months later, on
October 14, 2009, it detained Haytham al-Maleh, 78, a human rights lawyer who criticized
the regime’s policies on an opposition TV station.

Writing ten years ago in June 2000, Riad al-Turk, a prominent Syrian opposition leader and
the former secretary general of the Syrian Communist Party (Political Bureau), asked in an
article whether Syria will remain a “Kingdom of Silence”—a country where criticism of
government policies is banned. His question still resonates today. Without reform in the five
areas outlined in this report, al-Asad’s legacy will merely extend that of his father:
government by repression.

A Wasted Decade 4

I. Repression of Political and Human Rights Activism

In the early months of his rule, Bashar al-Asad emphasized the principle of openness.
Sensing a possible opportunity, many political and human rights activists began to raise
their voices to demand the introduction of greater freedoms and political reforms in Syria. A
number of informal groups began meeting in private homes to discuss human rights and
reform efforts. The authorities allowed these forums to take place, leading to a period of
relative openness often referred to as the “Damascus Spring.” By early 2001, 21 such
informal groups functioned across Syria. 8

However, al-Asad’s brief promotion of tolerance came to an abrupt end. On January 29, 2001,
Syrian Information Minister Adnan `Omran declared that civil society is an “American term”
that had recently been given “additional meanings” by “groups that seek to become
(political) parties.”9 A month later, al-Asad repeated the warnings to the civil society
movement:

When the consequences of an action affect the stability of the homeland,
there are two possibilities: either the perpetrator is a foreign agent acting on
behalf of an outside power, or else he is a simple person acting
unintentionally. But in both cases a service is being done to the country’s
enemies, and consequently both are dealt with in a similar fashion,
irrespective of their intentions or motives.10

The crackdown began in August 2001. On August 9 the security services detained Ma’mun
al-Homsi, a deputy in the People’s Assembly known for his criticism of the regime.
Subsequent arrests of prominent political and rights activists soon followed, and within a
month, Syrian authorities had arrested 10 opposition leaders, including two members of
parliament, and cracked down on civil society advocacy groups. The two lawmakers, al-
Homsi and Seif, were convicted of “attempting to change the constitution by illegal means”
and “inciting racial and sectarian strife,” and sentenced by the Damascus Criminal Court to
five years in jail. The other eight activists, Riad al-Turk, `Aref Dalilah, Walid al-Bunni, Kamal

8
To read more about the mood in Syria at the time of Bashar al-Asad's accession to power, see Alan George, Syria: Neither
Bread nor Freedom (London: Zed Books, 2003), pp. 30-33; Eyal Zisser, Commanding Syria: Bashar al-Asad and the First Years
in Power (London: I.B. Taurus, 2007), pp. 77-81.
9
“The Emergency Law is Present but Frozen,” Al-Dustour (Amman, Jordan), January 30, 2001.
10
“Interview with Bashar al-Asad,” Asharq al-Awsat, February 8, 2001, http://www.al-
bab.com/arab/countries/syria/bashar0102b.htm (accessed June 10, 2010).


al-Labwani, Habib Salih, Hasan Sa`dun, Habib `Isa, and Fawwaz Tello, were referred to the
Supreme State Security Court, which issued prison sentences of between two to ten years.11

There is virtually no information from Syria to explain why al-Asad initially promised an
expansion of freedom only to subsequently reverse his policy. Al-Asad may have feared that
what he had planned as a controlled and superficial opening would gain momentum and
translate into a wider challenge to his regime. Some analysts argued that by demanding free
elections, opposition members and civil society activists had directly challenged a yet-
untested al-Asad which forced him to clamp down. 12 Other analysts focused on the role of
the “old guard” that surrounded al-Asad, who never looked kindly on any political opening
that could challenge their authority. In the words of Eyal Zisser, author of multiple books on
Syria, “the old guard forced him [al-Asad] to reverse gears” and pushed him into “leading a
counterattack against the supporters of reform.”13 Regardless of the underlying reasons, the
crackdown on the Damascus Spring in the absence of any real threat to the regime seems to
indicate that al-Asad was not truly committed to political reforms.

Since then, the Syrian authorities have regularly detained political and human rights
activists. Human Rights Watch has documented the arrest of at least 92 political and human
rights activists since al-Asad came to power (See Annex 1). However, the actual number is
likely much higher, given that it is hard to obtain information about the detention of less
prominent political activists, especially Kurds and Islamists.

In detaining and prosecuting activists, Syrian authorities rely on the emergency law, which
gives the security services broad powers of arrest, as well as broadly worded “security”
provisions in Syria’s Penal Code, such as “issuing calls that weaken national sentiment or
awaken racial or sectarian tensions while Syria is at war or is expecting a war” (Article 285 of
Syrian Penal Code), “spreading false or exaggerated information that weakens national
sentiment while Syria is at war or is expecting a war” (Article 286 of Syrian Penal Code), or
undertaking “acts, writings or speech that incite sectarian, racial, or religious strife” (Article
307 of Syrian Penal Code).

11
For more information regarding the crackdown on the Damascus Spring movement, see Amnesty International, “Syria
Smothering Freedom of Expression: the Detention of Peaceful Critics,” AI Index: MDE 24/007/2002, June 6, 2002,
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE240072002 (accessed May 20, 2010); and George, Syria: neither Bread nor
Freedom, pp. 47-63.
12
See, for example, Joshua Landis, “The United States and Reform in Syria,” March 2004,
http://www.ou.edu/ssa/US_Syrian_Reform.htm (accessed July 5, 2010) arguing that “[o]pposition members immediately
demanded free elections and regime change, forcing Bashar to crack down on them.”
13
Eyal Zisser, “Does Bashar al-Assad Rule Syria?,” Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2003, http://www.meforum.org/517/does-
bashar-al-assad-rule-syria (accessed July 5, 2010), para. 3.5.

A Wasted Decade 6

Dr. Kamal Labwani: Sentenced to 12 Years in Jail for Demanding Reform
Dr. Kamal al-Labwani, a physician and founder of the Democratic Liberal
Gathering, was sentenced in May 2007 to 12 years in prison for
“communicating with a foreign country and inciting it to initiate aggression
against Syria” after he visited the United States and Europe in the fall of
2005, where he met with government officials, journalists and human rights
organizations. During his trip, he appeared on the pan-Arab Al-Mustaqilla
and Al-Hurra television networks, where he called on the Syrian government to respect
fundamental freedoms and human rights. The 12-year sentence is the harshest sentence
against a political activist since al-Asad took power. Labwani received an additional three-
year sentence on April 28, 2008, for “insulting the authorities” while in detention.14

In March 2009 the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the body mandated with
investigating complaints of arbitrary deprivation of liberty, stated that Labwani’s
imprisonment since November 2005 constituted arbitrary detention. The Working Group
concluded that Labwani “had been condemned for the peaceful expression of his political
views and for having carried out political activities” that are protected under international
law. It also deemed that his trial was unfair.15

The Democratic Liberal Gathering is an unregistered group of Syrian intellectuals and
activists who advocate for peaceful change in Syria based on democratic reforms, liberalism,
secularism and respect for human rights.

Arrests and trials are only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Syria’s harassment of
dissidents. Syrian security services routinely prohibit or interrupt meetings and press
conferences by political activists, civil society, and human rights groups.16

The Syrian Bar Association has also harassed human rights lawyers by initiating disciplinary
measures to disbar lawyers who criticize the government or the president’s policies. On
November 10, 2009, the bar association’s disciplinary tribunal issued a decision to
permanently disbar Muhanad al-Hasani, President of the Syrian Human Rights Organization
(Swasiah), because he “headed an unlicensed human rights organization without obtaining

14
“Syria: Rights Activist Detained After Travel Abroad,” Human Rights Watch news release, November 17, 2005,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/11/17/syria-rights-activist-detained-after-travel-abroad.; “Syria: Peaceful Activist Gets 12
Years With Hard Labor,” Human Rights Watch news release, May 10, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/05/10/syria-
peaceful-activist-gets-12-years-hard-labor.
15
“Syria: UN Rules Dissident’s Detention Illegal,” Human Rights Watch joint news release, April 29, 2009,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/29/syria-un-rules-dissident-s-detention-illegal.
16
For more information on disrupting meetings and gatherings of human rights defenders see Human Rights Watch, No Room
to Breathe: State Repression of Human Rights Activism in Syria, vol. 19, no. 6(E), October 2007,
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/10/16/no-room-breathe-0, Part V.


the prior approval of the bar association” and “attended sessions of the State Security Court
to monitor its proceedings without being appointed as a defense lawyer by the accused.”17

Syrian authorities also use travel bans as punishment for activists and dissidents. The use of
such bans has expanded dramatically since 2006. The Syrian Center for Media and Freedom
of Expression, an unlicensed non-governmental organization (NGO), issued a report in
February 2009 listing 417 political and human rights activists banned from traveling. In some
cases, the ban extended to the families of the activists.18 The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Syria ratified in 1969, requires all states to ensure that
everyone has the right to leave any country, including their own. The only permissible
restrictions are those “provided by law” and that “are necessary to protect national security,
public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and
are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant” (including the right
to freedom of expression and association).19 In this case, the bans imposed on these
activists are tied simply to their political expression, and not based on any defined security
interests.

Syrian authorities deny all requests by human rights groups to register, and accordingly
none are officially authorized to exist. The main impediments to their registration is the 1958
Law on Associations and Private Societies (Law No. 93), which governs the establishment of
any type of association or organization in Syria and authorizes the security services to refuse
the registration request of these groups.20 The systematic denial of registration of human
rights groups has direct negative implications on their activities, allowing the government to
arrest members for participation in an “illegal organization,” and to ban meetings or events.
A human rights lawyer told Human Rights Watch that the “lack of registration is like a sword
over our necks. The mukhabarat [secret services] can act on it whenever they want.”21

In 2005 the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, the ministry officially responsible for
administering Law No. 93, said that it would review the law with an eye toward liberalizing

17
“Syria: Restore Jailed Lawyer’s Credentials,” Human Rights Watch news release, November 13, 2009,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/11/13/syria-restore-jailed-lawyer-s-credentials.
18
Syrian Center for Media & Freedom of Expression, Problematic of the Travel Ban in Syria, http://www.scm-
sy.org/?page=category&category_id=22&lang=en (accessed June 14, 2010). See also “Syria: Civil Society Activists Barred
from Traveling,” Human Rights Watch news release, July 11, 2006, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/07/11/syria-civil-
society-activists-barred-traveling.
19
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976, article 12.
20
For a detailed analysis of the legal framework for registration, see Human Rights Watch, No Room to Breathe, Part IV.
21
Human Rights Watch interview with human rights lawyer (name withheld), Damascus, November 17, 2006.

A Wasted Decade 8

its provisions.22 However, the drive to reform the existing law came to a complete stop
shortly thereafter, without any explanation. Were the Syrian authorities responding to
outside pressure to open up, or were there elements inside the government pushing for
reforms? Syria’s opaque politics and lack of public debate about policy choices make it
impossible to really know what drove these decisions.

Five years later, First Lady Asma al-Asad opened a conference in Damascus in January 2010
by declaring that the state “wanted to open more space for civil society to work, develop and
partner with the government and implement development-oriented policies.” She said, “We
will learn from our mistakes and a law will be passed soon—after consultation with civil
society—to provide non-governmental organizations (NGOs) the safeguards they need to
operate effectively.”23 However, no draft law has been made public, and it is not clear
whether the Syrian authorities will allow independent and human rights NGOs to officially
register or whether they will limit any easing of the law to NGOs that assist the government in
its “development-oriented policies.”

The combination of these laws and practices has kept Syria’s human rights activists in
constant fear of being detained. As one human rights lawyer told Human Rights Watch
recently, “I cannot go on like this. I keep getting called in for interrogation. Every time I go, I
don’t know if I will be detained or not.”24

Political activists in Syria are also still awaiting a new law for political parties following al-
Asad’s March 2005 declaration to a group of Spanish journalists that “the coming period will
be one of freedom for political parties” in Syria.”25 In June 2005, the Ba`ath Party Congress
recommended the passing of a new political party law that would allow the creation of non-
ethnic and non-religious political parties.26 However, to date, there is still no new draft law
for the creation of political parties.

22
For more details about the attempts to reform the law, see Human Rights Watch, No Room to Breathe, Part IV.
23
Cited in Rami Khouri, “Signals of Change from Syria,” Agence Global, January 27, 2010,
http://www.agenceglobal.com/article.asp?id=2244 (accessed June 10, 2010). While there is growing recognition in Syria of
the role of NGOs in development, these NGOs are closely tied to the authorities and they are being introduced to fill the gap
left by the weakness of the state bureaucracy and local administration. The First Lady, Asma al-Asad plays a key role in that
respect with a series of government-allied NGOs that are grouped under an entity called Syria Trust. However, these recent
initiatives so far appear more as an effort by the regime to gain legitimacy and to further the objectives of the state, as
opposed to efforts to foster an independent civil society.
24
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Syrian human rights activist (name withheld), May 23, 2010.
25
Sami Moubayed, “Syria's Ba`athists Loosen the Reins,” Asia Times, April 26, 2005,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GD26Ak04.html (accessed May 12, 2010).
26
Rhonda Roumani, “In Syria, democrats chomp at bit,” Christian Science Monitor, September 23, 2005,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0923/p06s03-wome.html (accessed May 12, 2010).


Accordingly, we urge President al-Asad to:

• Lift the state of emergency and repeal Syria’s Emergency Law. The continued
application of the Emergency Law since 1963 violates the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Syria is a party. The Syrian government
has failed to show that the state of emergency is strictly necessary for its security.
Release all individuals currently deprived of their liberty for peacefully exercising
their right to freedom of expression, association, or assembly.
• Order the security services to cease detaining activists and banning them from
traveling abroad merely for exercising their legitimate right to freedom of expression
and association.
• Enact a political parties law in compliance with international human rights norms,
and establish an independent electoral commission to register new political parties.
• Amend the 1958 Law on Associations and Private Societies (Law No. 93) to ensure
that groups formed for any legal purpose are allowed to acquire legal personality by
making registration of associations automatic once these associations fulfill the
formal requirements and by abolishing penalties for participation in unregistered
associations if such associations are not otherwise breaking the law.

A Wasted Decade 10

II. Restrictions on Freedom of Expression

The Baàth party banned all independent publications after it came to power in 1963, and for
the following 40 years only three newspapers existed in Syria, all of which were affiliated
with the party: al-Baàth (the party’s official mouthpiece since 1947), al-Thawra (a 1963
Baàth daily meaning “revolution”), and Tishreen (a 1973 Baàth daily).27

After Bashar al-Asad assumed power, he removed the outright ban on independent
publications, but introduced a new Press Law (Decree No. 50/2001), promulgated on
September 22, 2001, which provided the government with sweeping control over
newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals, as well as virtually anything else printed in
Syria, from books to pamphlets and posters. Provisions apply to publishers, editors,
journalists, authors, printers, distributors, and bookstore owners, and subject them to
imprisonment and steep fines for violations of the law.28

Initially, the authorities mostly granted licenses to economic and cultural publications, or to
political newspapers issued by individuals or parties close to the Baàth party, such as the
Communist Party which received a license to publish a weekly entitled Sawt al-Shaab (Voice
of the People) in February 2001.29 The most promising development was the granting that
same month of a license to Addomari (the Lamp Lighter), a satirical publication published by
renowned Syrian cartoonist Ali Farzat. The newspaper was an instant success as it was the
first Syrian newspaper in 40 years that printed something different from the views of the
Baàth party or those of its close allies. With a circulation of 75,000, it sold many times more
than the three “official” dailies, but the government closed it down in 2003 after officials

27
Teshreen and al-Thawra are published by the Unity Institution for the Press, Publication and Printing (Mu’assasat al-wihda
lil-sahafa wa al-tibaàt wa al-nashar) whose board is appointed by the Prime Minister. See, for example, the decision by Prime
Minister Òtari to appoint the board on April 11, 2007: “Al-Jarrad is President of the Administrative Board for the Unity
Institution for the Press, Publication, Printing, and Distribution,” SANA News Agency, April 11, 2007,
http://furat.alwehda.gov.sy/_archive.asp?FileName=47329122220070410233947 (accessed July 5, 2010).
28
A fuller analysis of the 2001 Press Law is available in Human Rights Watch, Memorandum to the Syrian Government, Decree
No. 51/2001: Human Rights Concerns, January 31, 2002.
29
Sawt al-Shaab had been outlawed since 1958. In contrast to the decision to grant a license to republish Sawt al-Shaab, the
Syrian government turned down in 2001 two applications to re-launch popular independent newspapers that existed prior to
the Baàth’s arrival to power in 1963: al-Qabas (The Firebrand) and al-Ayyam (The Times). For more information on
developments affecting the press in Syria in 2001, see Sami Moubayed, “Independent Journalism Slowly Returning to Syria,”
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July 2001,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:34rNEM_7W7MJ:www.wrmea.com/archives/july01/0107036.html+
baàth+in+syria+independent+newspaper&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=lb (accessed June 10, 2010).


told its founder, Ali Farzat, that he “went too far.”30 His publication had criticized Saddam
Hussein by showing him and his generals stuffing the Iraqi people as cannon fodder in the
face of the impending US invasion, at a time when the Syrian government’s policy was to
oppose the invasion of Iraq.31

Censorship remains widespread. The Arab Establishment for Distribution of Printed Products,
which is affiliated with the Ministry of Information, vets all newspapers prior to distribution.
Syria’s two private daily newspapers covering political topics that have succeeded in staying
open are owned by businessmen closely tied to the regime: al-Watan, launched in November
2006, is a daily political newspaper widely reported to be published by President al-Asad’s
cousin, Rami Makhlouf; Baladna, a social affairs newspaper, is published by Majd Suleiman,
son of security chief General Bahjat Suleiman.32

On July 13, 2005, Nizar Mayhoob, a spokesman for the Syrian Ministry of Information, told
Human Rights Watch that Syria would issue a new media law, “which will enhance the [press]
law issued in 2001 by overcoming its inadequacies.” Al-Asad himself, in his second
inaugural speech on July 18, 2007, noted that:

On the media law, the subject has been raised many times. There is a recent
proposal by the Ministry of Information on the need to amend the media law.
I heard many complaints from journalists and others that they are not happy
with the existing law. There could be proposals from the Ministry of
Information in this regard which could be studied by the People’s Assembly,
and the law could be passed. 33

As of July 6, 2010, no new law had been introduced and there is still no independent press in
Syria.

30
For more information about Addomari, including interviews with its founder Ali Farzat, check Dan Isaacs, “Hoping for Media
Freedom in Syria,” BBC News Online, March 25, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4381739.stm (accessed June
10, 2010).
31
David Hirst, “Saddam No Longer a Joke for Syrian Satirist,” The Guardian, August 21, 2003,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/aug/21/syria.davidhirst (accessed June 10, 2010).
32
For Makhlouf’s role in publishing al-Watan, see for example, International Research and Exchanges Board, Media
Sustainability Index (MSI) - Middle East & North Africa (MENA), Syria, 2008,
http://www.irex.org/programs/MSI_MENA/2008/MSIMENA_syria.asp (accessed July 4, 2010). Baladna is published by United
Group for Publishing, Advertising and Marketing, which is chaired by Majd Suleiman, see company website:
http://www.ug.com.sy/chairman-letter.html (accessed on July 4, 2010).
33
Bashar al-Asad’s Second Inaugural Address on July 18, 2007, available at
http://www.mideastweb.org/bashar_assad_inauguration_2007.htm (accessed on June 10, 2010).

A Wasted Decade 12

Instead, the government has extended restrictions it imposes on print media to online
outlets, reversing early hopes that al-Asad’s role as chairman of the Syrian Computer Society
(SCS) prior to his appointment as president would make him more receptive to freedom of
expression online. OpenNet Initiative, a partnership of four leading universities in the US,
Canada, and the UK, which monitors government filtration and surveillance of the internet,
says that filtering of political websites in Syria is “pervasive.” Internet censorship extends to
popular websites such as Blogger (Google’s blogging engine), Facebook, and YouTube.34

The authorities have also prosecuted journalists, bloggers, and citizens who dare criticize
the authorities or the president. The vast majority of journalists and bloggers have been tried
before the State Security Court (SSSC), an exceptional court with almost no procedural
guarantees. In 2009, the Committee to Protect Journalists named Syria number three on a
list of the ten worst countries in which to be a blogger based on the arrests, harassments,
and restrictions that online writers in Syria have faced.35 Human Rights Watch found that
between January 2007 and June 2008, the SSSC sentenced at least 10 writers and bloggers
who had criticized the authorities, and that overall the court convicted 153 defendants on
the basis of overbroad security provisions (described in Section 1 above) that violate basic
rights to freedom of expression. In one case, the SSSC sentenced Muhamad Walid al-
Husseini, 67, to three years in prison because a member of the security services overheard
him insult the Syrian president and criticize the country’s corruption while sitting at a
popular café in Syria.36

34
OpenNet Initiative, Syria, http://opennet.net/research/profiles/syria (accessed June 15, 2010); Khaled Yacoub Oweis,
“Syria blocks Facebook in Internet crackdown,” Reuters, November, 23, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSOWE37285020071123.
35
Committee to Protect Journalists, “10 Worst Countries to be a Blogger,” April 30, 2009,
http://www.cpj.org/reports/2009/04/10-worst-countries-to-be-a-blogger.php (accessed June 10, 2010).
36
For more information see Human Rights Watch, Far From Justice: Syria’s Supreme State Security Court, 1-56432-434-6,
February 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/02/23/far-justice, p. 35.


Table 1. Known Journalists and Bloggers Detained During Bashar al-Asad’s First
Decade in Power37

Name Date of Arrest and Context Charges/Sentence/Outcome
Ibrahim Detained on December 23, 2002, Charged with “publishing unfounded news,” a
Hamidi, after publishing article reporting that violation of Article 51 of the 2001 Publication
journalist at al- Syria was preparing to receive one Law. He was released on bail on May 25,
Hayat million Iraqi refugees in the event of a 2003. SSSC finally ruled on April 10, 2005,
war in Iraq. that it did not have sufficient evidence to
proceed with the case.
Two sisters Detained in 2002. Charged with “obtaining information that
Àziza and should be kept confidential for the integrity of
Shireen al- the state.” Aziza Sabini was also charged with
Sabini, who “promoting news that may weaken the morale
both worked of the nation.” The SSSC later sentenced them
for al-Muharir to one year in prison.
al-Àrabi
newspaper
Àbdel Rahman Detained on February 23, 2003. SSSC sentenced him to two and a half years in
al-Shaghouri, prison on June 20, 2004 for “disseminating
online false information” via the internet. He was
journalist for released on August 31, 2005.
the opposition
website Levant
News
Muhannad and Detained in September 2002 for SSSC sentenced them in July 25, 2004, for
Haytham sending e-mails to a UAE based “receiving secret information on behalf of a
Qutaysh, and newspaper about the reported death foreign state that threatens the security of
Yahya al-Aws of two construction workers in Syria,” using the internet to publish “false
Damascus. news outside of Syria” under the Press Law,
and “encouraging the transfer of secret
information.” The court further found
Haytham Qutaish guilty of “writing that
threatens the security of Syria and her
relations with foreign states.” The sentences
ranged from two to four years in prison.

37
The table is based on multiple sources of information, including interviews with journalists, Syrian human rights activists,
as well as a review of press releases by Syrian and other international human rights groups. For more information on arrest of
bloggers, see Human Rights Watch, False Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa (New York: Human
Rights Watch, 1995), http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11563/section/7, section 7.

A Wasted Decade 14

Masùd Hamed Detained on July 24, 2003, after he The SSSC sentenced him on October 10,
posted online photographs of police 2004, to three years in prison, after finding
violently dispersing a demonstration him guilty of “membership in a secret
of Syrian Kurdish children in front of organization” and “attempting to annex part
UNICEF’s offices in Damascus. of Syrian territory to another country.”
Ali Zein al- Detained on October 9, 2005, after he The SSSC sentenced him on September 23,
Àbideen posted comments online attacking 2007, to two years in prison for “undertaking
Mejàn Saudi Arabia. actions or writing or making speeches
unauthorized by the government ... that spoil
its ties with a foreign state.”

Omar al- Detained between January and March The SSSC sentenced the group to sentences
Abdullah, 2006 after developing a youth varying from five to seven years in jail for
Tarek Ghorani, discussion group and publishing “taking action or making a written statement
Maher Ibrahim certain articles online that were that could endanger the State or harm its
Asper, Ayham critical of Syrian authorities. relationship with a foreign country.”
Saqr, Ùlam
Fakhour, Diab
Siriya, and
Husam
Melhem
Muhammad Arrested on March 31, 2006, A military court found him guilty of insulting
Ghanem, reportedly for articles he had written the president, undermining the state’s
online advocating political and cultural dignity, and inciting sectarian divisions; it
journalist and rights for Syria’s Kurdish minority and sentenced him to six months in jail.
editor of the for criticizing the Baàth Party’s
news website handling of domestic issues. Ghanem
Surion. was previously arrested and detained
for 15 days by military intelligence in
March 2004.
Firas Saàd, Detained on July 30, 2006, after he On April 7, 2008, the SSSC sentenced him to
writer and poet published articles on the website four years in jail for “weakening national
www.ahewar.org, in which he sentiment.”
defended a call for improved
relations between Lebanon and Syria
and criticized the Syrian army’s role
in the July 2006 war between Israel
and Hezbollah.


Ali Sayed al- Detained on August 10, 2006, Released pursuant to amnesty on January 9,
Shihabi, following a number of articles he 2007, before his trial concluded.
English teacher published on the website
and writer www.rezgar.com, including one in
which he called for the creation of a
new political party called “Syria for
all.”
Muhanad Both were arrested in September Charged with Art. 287 (spreading false
Abdel-Rahman 2006 while conducting an information) before a military court. Charge
and Àla’ al- investigation of the state of labor eventually set aside as part of General
Deen unions in Syria. Amnesty No. 56 of September 2007. Both
Hamdoun, were released in September 2007.
journalists
Karim Àrbaji Detained in June 2007 for moderating The SSSC sentenced him to three years in
a popular online youth forum, prison on September 13, 2009, for “spreading
akhawia.net, that included criticisms false information that can weaken national
of the government. sentiment.”
Tariq Biasi, Arrested in July 2007after he posted The SSSC sentenced him to three years
blogger and critical comments about the security imprisonment on May 11, 2008, on charges of
son of former services on a website “weakening national sentiment” and
political “spreading false news”.
prisoner
Mazen Arrested on January 12, 2008, for A military court sentenced him on June 23,
Darwish, reporting on violent clashes in the 2008, to five days in jail.
journalist and Damascus suburb of Àdra.
president of
the Syrian
Center for
Media and
Freedom of
Expression
Abdullah Ali Detained on July 30, 2008, for 13 No charges brought.
Suleiman, days after authorities shut down his
publisher of website.
the website
Nazaha.com

A Wasted Decade 16

Accordingly, we urge President Bashar al-Asad to:

• Immediately and unconditionally release all those imprisoned or detained solely for
exercising their right to free expression, online or otherwise.
• Stop blocking websites for their content.
• Introduce a new media law that would remove all prison penalties for defamation
and libel; stop government censorship of local and foreign publications; and remove
government control over newspapers and other publications.
• Amend or abolish the vague provisions of the Syrian Penal Code that permit the
authorities to arbitrarily suppress and punish individuals for peaceful expression, in
breach of its international legal obligations, on grounds that “national security” is
being endangered, including the following provisions: Article 278 (undertaking “acts,
writings, or speech unauthorized by the government that expose Syria to the danger
of belligerent acts or that disrupt Syria’s ties to foreign states”), Article 285 (“issuing
calls that weaken national sentiment or awaken racial or sectarian tensions while
Syria is at war or is expecting a war”), Article 286 (spreading “false or exaggerated
information that weaken national sentiment while Syria is at war or is expecting a
war”), Article 307 (undertaking “acts, writings or speech that incite sectarian, racial
or religious strife”), and Article 376 (which imposes a sentence from one to three
years on anyone who insults the president).


III. Torture, Ill-Treatment, and Enforced Disappearances

Bashar al-Asad raised hopes for change with respect to the treatment of detainees when he
took two significant steps: closing the Mazzeh prison in November 2000, which held
numerous political prisoners, and transferring approximately 500 political detainees during
July-August 2001 from the notorious Tadmor prison, in Syria’s eastern desert, to Sednaya
prison, north of Damascus, which was considered to offer better facilities.

Al-Asad never explained his decision to transfer political prisoners out of Tadmor, but Syrian
activists saw the move as a hopeful sign given Tadmor’s association with government
repression of the 1980s. Human Rights Watch has documented extensive human rights
abuse, torture, and summary executions in Tadmor prison, a facility used to detain
thousands of political prisoners in the 1980s; it was also the scene in June 1980 of the
extrajudicial killings of an estimated 1,000 prisoners by commando units loyal to Rif`at al-
Asad, Hafez al-Asad’s brother (see more on Tadmor prison massacre in Section 5).38 Faraj
Beraqdar, a Syrian poet and five-year inmate in Tadmor, described the prison as “the
kingdom of death and madness.”39

But while closing Tadmor prison was a promising sign of detention reform, it has not led to
other positive improvements. Bashar al-Asad has done nothing to get rid of the practices of
incommunicado detention, ill-treatment, and torture during interrogation, which remain
common in Syria’s detention facilities.

Syria’s security services regularly hold detainees incommunicado—cut off from all contact
with family, a lawyer, or any other link with the outside world— for days, months, and in
some cases, years. For example, in August 2008, Syrian security forces detained a group of
13 young men from the northeastern district of Deir al-Zor suspected of having ties to
Islamists. To this day, the authorities have not disclosed where they are holding at least 10
of the men, why they arrested them, or whether they will charge them and put them on trial.
Prison officials returned the body of one of those detained in Deir al-Zor, Muhammad Amin
al-Shawa, 43, to his family on January 10, 2009, but they allowed them to see only his face

38
See Middle East Watch (now Human Rights Watch/MENA), Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad
Regime (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 54-78; Human Rights Watch, Syria's Tadmor Prison: Dissent Still
Hostage To a Legacy of Terror, vol. 8, no. 2(E), April 1996, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Syria2.htm.
39
Beraqdar used this term in a lengthy defense memorandum that he submitted to the state security court during his trial.
The court sentenced him to a fifteen-year prison term in October 1993.

A Wasted Decade 18

before burying him. Three Syrian human rights activists told Human Rights Watch that they
believe that al-Shawa died due to torture.40

Human Rights Watch and other human rights groups have also documented a frequent
pattern of torture and other ill‐treatment by Syria’s security services of political and human
rights detainees as well as criminal suspects.41 Out of 30 former Kurdish detainees held after
2004 and interviewed by Human Rights Watch following their release, 12 said that security
forces tortured them.42 Human Rights Watch has also documented the torture of bloggers
and beatings of prominent political activists by government security agents. For example,
eight of the twelve detainees from the Damascus Declaration for Democratic Change, an
umbrella group of opposition and pro-democracy groups, detained in December 2007, told
their investigative judge that state security agents had beaten them during detention. 43

The UN Committee against Torture, which is tasked with monitoring compliance with the
Convention against Torture, said in May 2010 that it was “deeply concerned about numerous,
ongoing and consistent allegations concerning the routine use of torture by law enforcement
and investigative officials…”44 An official Canadian Commission of Inquiry into the 2002 US
deportation to Syria of Maher Arar, a Syrian-born Canadian, concluded that “the SMI [Syrian
Military Intelligence] tortured Mr. Arar while interrogating him during the period he was held
incommunicado at the SMI’s Palestine Branch facility.”45

In an encouraging step in detainee practices, Bashar al-Asad’s government ratified the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
on July 1, 2004. However, it has not followed the ratification with concrete measures to end

40
For more background, see “Syria: Reveal Fate of 17 Held Incommunicado,” Human Rights Watch news release, April 15,
2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/15/syria-reveal-fate-17-held-incommunicado; Human Rights Watch telephone
interview with relative of one of the Deir al-Zor detainees, June 10, 2010.
41
See, for example, Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies, Alternative Report to the Syrian Government’s Initial Report
on Measures Taken to Fulfill its Commitments under the Convention against Torture,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/ngos/DCHRS.pdf (accessed June 15, 2010), p.3.; Amnesty International,
Briefing to the Committee against Torture, AI Index: MDE 24/008/2010, April 20, 2010,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE24/008/2010/en (accessed June 15, 2010); Al-Karama, Syria: Permanent State
of Emergency – A Breeding Ground for Torture, April 9, 2010,
http://en.alkarama.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=169&Itemid=80 (accessed June 15, 2010).
42
For more details, see Human Rights Watch, Group Denial: Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria, 1-
56432-560-1, November 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/11/24/group-denial, pp. 45-49.
43
“Syria: Opposition Activists Tell of Beatings in Interrogation,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 4, 2008,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/02/04/syria-opposition-activists-tell-beatings-interrogation;
44
UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture, CAT/C/SYR/CO/1 (adopted on
May 3-4, 2010), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/CAT.C.SYR.CO.1.pdf (accessed June 10, 2010), para. 7.
45
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to
Maher Arar, 2006, http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_rec-eng.pdf (accessed June 10, 2010), p. 187.


the practice of torture, such as investigations of allegations of torture or permission for
independent observers to visit Syria’s prisons and detention facilities.

According to the Syrian submission to the Committee Against Torture (CAT), the Syrian
Minister for Internal Affairs issued Circular No. 10 dated December 16, 2004, requesting
members of the police to hold meetings to “familiarize themselves with the prohibitions on
the use of violence against persons on remand and prisoners and to receive instructions on
performing their duties in a responsible manner. Successful investigators can arrive at the
desired result using proper scientific and technical methods to establish the facts of a case
without needing to resort to illegal methods.”46 In their submission, the Syrian delegation
mentioned six cases where police were held liable for torturing people.47

However, such cases remain exceptions; they are limited to the police force and not the
security services, which benefit from extensive legal immunity for acts of torture. Legislative
Decree No. 14, of January 15, 1969, which established the General Intelligence Division
(Idarat al-Mukhabaraat al-`Ama), one of Syria’s largest security apparatuses, provides that
“no legal action may be taken against any employee of General Intelligence for crimes
committed while carrying out their designated duties … except by an order issued by the
Director.” To Human Rights Watch’s knowledge, the director of General Intelligence has
issued no such order to date. On September 30, 2008, al-Asad issued Legislative Decree 69,
which extended this immunity to members of other security forces, by requiring a decree
from the General Command of the Army and Armed Forces to prosecute any member of the
internal security forces, Political Security, and customs police.48

Syria’s courts continue to accept confessions obtained under torture. For example, Human
Rights Watch’s review of trials in the SSSC in 2007 and 2008 revealed that 33 defendants
alleged before the judge that they had been tortured and that the security services had
extracted confessions from them by force, but in no case did the SSSC take any measure to
open an investigation into these claims.49

When human rights lawyers allege that their clients have been tortured, they risk being
prosecuted for “spreading false information,” a criminal charge. For example, on April 24,

46
Syrian Arab Republic, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention,
CAT/C/SYR/1, July 20, 2009, para. 79.
47
Syrian Arab Republic, Initial Submission to CAT, Paras. 82-83.
48
For further in depth analysis of these provisions, see Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies, Alternative Report, pp. 6-
8.
49
Human Rights Watch, Far From Justice, pp. 27-32.

A Wasted Decade 20

2007, a Damascus criminal court sentenced human rights lawyer Anwar al-Bunni to five
years in prison for alleging that a man had died in a Syrian jail because of its inhumane
conditions.50 More recently, on June 30, 2010, a Damascus criminal court sentenced another
prominent human rights lawyer, Muhanad al-Hasani, to three years in prison because he
publicly denounced the alleged death of a detainee under torture and criticized the SSSC.51

Syria’s prison facilities are still off-limits to independent observers, and Syrian authorities
continue to impose a blackout on information concerning the deadly shooting of as many as
25 inmates by military police in Sednaya prison on July 5, 2008.

Deadly Shooting in Sednaya Prison
Prison authorities and military police used firearms to quell a riot that began on July 5, 2008,
at Sednaya prison, about 30 kilometers north of Damascus. The prison holds at least 1,500
inmates and possibly as many as 2,500. Human Rights Watch obtained the names of nine
inmates who are believed to have been killed in a standoff between the prisoners and
authorities that reportedly lasted for many days. Syrian human rights organizations have
reported that the number of inmates who were killed may be as high as 25. One member of
the military police was also confirmed to have been killed.

The government imposed a total blackout on the events and has not released any
information about the action its forces took against the prisoners, or any investigation it may
have carried out regarding the violence at the prison. In July 2009 the authorities finally
allowed some families to visit relatives in the prison but have maintained a ban on visits by
others and on information about other detainees. In December 2009 Human Rights Watch
released a partial list of 42 Sednaya detainees whose families have not been able to get any
information about them.52 To date, they still have not received any information.

50
“Syria: Harsh Sentence for Prominent Rights Lawyer,” Human Rights Watch news release, April 24, 2007,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/04/24/syria-harsh-sentence-prominent-rights-lawyer. In a previous incident in
November 2002, Judge al-Nuri, the head of SSSC, ejected lawyer Anwar al-Bunni from the courtroom after he insisted on an
investigation into claims that the security apparatus had tortured his client, Aref Dalila, during his detention.
51
“Syria: Detained Lawyer Receives Martin Ennals Award,” Human Rights Watch news release, May 7, 2010,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/05/07/syria-detained-lawyer-receives-martin-ennals-award.
52
“Syria: Investigate Sednaya Prison Deaths,” Human Rights Watch news release, July 21, 2008,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/07/21/syria-investigate-sednaya-prison-deaths; “Syria: Lift Blackout on Prisoners’ Fate,”
Human Rights Watch news release, December 10, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/12/10/syria-lift-blackout-
prisoners-fate.


Aerial view of Sednaya prison.


• Order an independent investigation into torture allegations and make public the
results of the investigation. Discipline or prosecute, as appropriate, officials
responsible for the mistreatment of detainees, including those who gave orders or
were otherwise complicit, and make public the results of the punishment.
• Adopt effective measures to ensure that all detainees have prompt access to a
lawyer and an independent medical examination.
• Allow independent outside observers access to prisons and detention facilities.
• Order an independent investigation into the deadly shooting of inmates by military
police at Sednaya prison and make the findings public.
• Ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT), and invite its
Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture to visit and inspect Syria’s places of
detention.

A Wasted Decade 22

IV. Repression of Kurds

Kurds are the largest non-Arab ethnic minority in Syria; estimated at approximately 1.7
million, they make up roughly 10 percent of Syria’s population. Since the 1950s, successive
Syrian governments have pursued a policy of repressing Kurdish identity because they
perceived it to be a threat to the unity of an Arab Syria. Under Bashar al-Asad, Syrian
authorities have continued to suppress the political and cultural rights of the Kurdish
minority, including banning the teaching of Kurdish in schools and regularly disrupting
gatherings to celebrate Kurdish festivals such as Nowruz (the Kurdish New Year).

Harassment of Syrian Kurds increased further after they held large-scale demonstrations,
some violent, throughout northern Syria in March 2004 to voice long-simmering grievances.
Syrian authorities reacted to the protests with lethal force, killing at least 36 people, injuring
over 160, and detaining more than 2,000, amidst widespread reports of torture and ill-
treatment of detainees. Most detainees were eventually released, including 312 who were
freed under an amnesty announced by al-Asad on March 30, 2005. However, since then, the
Syrian government has maintained a policy of banning Kurdish political and cultural
gatherings. Human Rights Watch has documented the repression of at least 14 Kurdish
political and cultural gatherings since 2005. The security forces also have detained a
number of leading Kurdish political activists and referred them to military courts or the SSSC
for prosecution under charges of “inciting strife” or “weakening national sentiment.”53

In addition, large numbers of Kurds are stateless and consequently face a range of
difficulties, from getting jobs and registering weddings to obtaining state services. In 1962,
an exceptional census stripped some 120,000 Syrian Kurds—20 percent of the Syrian
Kurdish population—of their Syrian citizenship. By many accounts, the special census was
carried out in an arbitrary manner. Brothers from the same family, born in the same Syrian
village, were classified differently. Fathers became foreigners while their sons remained
citizens. The number of stateless Kurds grew with time as descendants of those who lost
citizenship in 1962 multiplied; as a result, their number is now estimated at 300,000.54

53
For more details on the repression of Kurdish activism following the 2004 riots, see Human Rights Watch, Group Denial:
Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria.
54
For a review of the stateless Kurds’ situation, see Human Rights Watch, Syria: The Silenced Kurds, vol. 8, no. 4(E), October
1996, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1996/10/01/syria-silenced-kurds; Maureen Lynch and Perveen Ali, Refugees
International, “Buried Alive: Stateless Kurds in Syria,” January 2006,
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/BuriedAlive.pdf (accessed June 10, 2010); Kurd Watch, Stateless
Kurds in Syria: Illegal Invaders or Victims of a Nationalistic Policy?, Report 5, March 2010, http://yasa-
online.org/reports/kurdwatch_staatenlose_en.pdf (accessed June 10, 2010).


Al-Asad has repeatedly promised Kurdish leaders a solution to the plight of the stateless
Kurds, but a decade later, they are still waiting. He first promised to tackle the issue when he
visited the largely Kurdish-populated region of al-Hasaka on August 18, 2002, and met with
a number of Kurdish leaders.55 In his second inaugural speech on July 17, 2007, he
mentioned the promise he made in 2002, but noted that political developments had
prevented progress in this area:

I visited al-Hasaka governorate in August 2002 and met representatives of
the community there. All of them without exception talked about this issue
[the 1962 census]. I told them, “we have no problem, we will start working on
it.” That was the time when the United States was preparing to invade Iraq.…
We started moving slowly, the Iraq war happened, and there were different
circumstances which stopped many things concerning internal reform. In
2004, the riots in al-Qamishli governorate happened, and we did not exactly
know the background of the riots, because some people took advantage of
the events for non-patriotic purposes.… We restarted the process last year on
the government’s initiative since the events have gone and it was shown that
there were no non-patriotic implications.56

Later in his speech, al-Asad referred to a draft law that would solve the problem for some
stateless Kurds, namely those who became stateless even though other members of their
family obtained citizenship.57 He concluded by saying that “the consultations continue…and
when we are done with those…the law is ready.” Three years later, and despite the fact that
the political justifications for the delays have long ceased to exist, there is no new law, and
no steps have been taken to address Kurdish grievances.


• Set up a commission tasked with addressing the underlying grievances of the
Kurdish minority in Syria and make public the results of its findings and

55
Human Rights Watch interview with Kurdish political activist in Azadi party, Damascus , November 1, 2009; Human Rights
Watch interview with Kurdish political activist in Yekiti party, Ras al-Ain, October 6, 2009; Kurd Watch, Stateless Kurds in
Syria, pp. 21-22.
56
Bashar al-Asad second inaugural speech, July 17, 2007, available at
http://www.mideastweb.org/bashar_assad_inauguration_2007.htm (accessed June 10, 2010).
57
Ibid. He indicated that the law would not grant any rights to those who are considered Maktumee, stateless Kurds who are
not listed on any register in Syria.

A Wasted Decade 24

recommendations. The commission should include members of Syria’s Kurdish
political parties.
• Redress the status of all Kurds who were born in Syria but are stateless by offering
citizenship to any person with strong ties to Syria by reason of birth, marriage, or
long residence in the country and who is not otherwise entitled to citizenship in
another country.
• Identify and remove discriminatory laws and policies on Kurds, including reviewing
all government decrees and directives that apply uniquely to the Kurdish minority in
Syria or have a disproportionate impact on them.
• Ensure that Syria’s Kurds have the right to enjoy their own culture and use their own
language; likewise, ensure freedom of expression, including the right to celebrate
cultural holidays and learn Kurdish in schools.
• Invite the UN Independent Expert on Minority Issues to visit Syria.


V. Legacy of Enforced Disappearances

Bashar al-Asad inherited a country with a legacy of abusive practices, but to date he has not
taken any concrete steps to acknowledge and address these abuses or shed light on the fate
of thousands of people who have disappeared since the 1980s.

Syria’s security forces were involved in gross human rights violations in the late 1970s and
1980s in an effort to quell opposition to Hafez al-Asad’s regime, including armed opposition
by certain segments of the Muslim Brotherhood. The security forces detained and tortured
thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, communist and other leftist parties, the
Iraqi Ba`ath party, Nasserite parties, and different Palestinian groups—many of whom
subsequently disappeared. While no exact figures exist, various researchers estimate the
number of the disappeared to be 17,000 persons.58 Syria’s armed forces and security
services also detained and abducted Lebanese, Palestinians, and other Arab nationals
during Syria’s military presence in Lebanon, hundreds of whom are still unaccounted for.

On June 27, 1980, commandos from the Defense Brigades under the command of Rif`at al-
Asad, Hafez al-Asad’s brother, killed an estimated 1,000 unarmed inmates, mostly Islamists,
at Tadmor military prison, in retaliation for a failed assassination attempt against Hafez al-
Asad.59 The names of those killed were never made public. Less than two years later, from
February to March 1982, commandos from the Defense Brigades and units of the Special
Forces circled the city of Hama, Syria’s fourth largest town and an opposition stronghold,
and engaged in heavy fighting against Islamists opposed to the regime. The Syrian security
troops committed large scale human rights violations during the fighting, including the
killing of hundreds of people in a series of mass executions near the municipal stadium and
other sites. While estimates of the number killed in Hama vary widely, the most credible
reports put the number at between five and ten thousand people.60

58
For more details about the disappeared in Syria, see for example, Radwan Ziadeh, ed., Years of Fear: The Forcibly
Disappeared in Syria, http://www.shril-sy.info/enshril/modules/tinycontent/content/Years%20of%20Fear%20-
%20English%20Draft.pdf (accessed July 5, 2010); Human Rights Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 8-21.
59
For more information on events in Tadmor, see Human Rights Watch, Syria's Tadmor Prison: Dissent Still Hostage to a
Legacy of Terror; Human Rights Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 15-16; Radwan Ziadeh, Years of Fear, pp. 23-24.
60
For more information about the killings of Hama see Human Rights Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 19-21; Syrian Committee for
Human Rights, The Massacre of Hama in February 1982: a Genocide and Crime against Humanity, February, 2, 2006,
http://www.shrc.org/data/aspx/d5/2535.aspx (accessed June 10, 2010).

A Wasted Decade 26

Table 2. Major Incidents of Human Rights Violations in the early 1980s61

Disappearances in Deir al-Zor on After teenage demonstrators set fire to the local Ba`ath party
April 15, 1980 headquarters, police rounded up 38 youths in the eastern city of
Deir al-Zor. Though none were charged with a crime, they soon
disappeared from the local jail. Parents have never learned their
fate.
Tadmur Prison, June 27, 1980 When Islamists were blamed for a failed assassination attempt on
Hafez al-Asad, government troops entered communal cells at the
notorious prison and fired indiscriminately on the prisoners
inside. More than a thousand prisoners were killed.
Sarmada, July 25, 1980 For reasons that remain unclear, security forces rounded up
hundreds of residents from the northern village of Sarmada for
interrogation and beating. Some 40 villagers were killed or
disappeared.
Hama, 1981 After a government checkpoint was attacked outside the city of
Hama, soldiers sealed off the city and began house to house
searches. Without so much as an identity check, hundreds of men
and boys were dragged outside and shot. At least 350 people were
killed.
Hama Uprising and Repression When government commandos entered Hama to round-up
(February 2 to March 5, 1982) opposition members, Islamist fighters resisted, barricading
themselves in the old city and killing 100 government and party
representatives. The government responded with a fierce
bombardment that destroyed much of the city. Troops rounded up
and executed hundreds of civilians. In total, between 5,000 and
10,000 people were killed.

While many political detainees from the 1980s were released pursuant to various amnesties,
some under Hafez al-Asad and others under Bashar, the fate of thousands of disappeared
remains unknown, and it is still dangerous to raise these issues inside Syria.

Lebanese groups have lobbied hard to shed light on the fate of the disappeared from
Lebanon. In May 2005, a joint Lebanese-Syrian committee was finally formed to address the
issue. However, five years after beginning its work, it has yet to produce any concrete results
or publish any findings.

61
Source of the information is Human Rights Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 14-21.



• Set up an independent national commission for truth and justice that includes
representatives of the victims’ families, independent civil society activists, and
international organizations with experience working on the issue of disappearances
such as the ICRC. The commission’s mandate will be to resolve the issue of the
missing and the disappeared in Syria, and those abducted from Lebanon and
suspected of being detained in Syria.
• Support the ratification of the United Nations Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances.

A Wasted Decade 28

VI. Annex: List of Political and Human Rights Activists Detained during
Bashar al-Asad’s First Decade in Power
(This is not an exhaustive list, but rather represents cases that Human Rights Watch was
able to document)

NAME DATE OF ARREST AND CONTEXT CHARGES/SENTENCE
Ma’moun al-Homsi, Detained on August 9, 2001, as part Damascus Criminal Court sentenced him to five years in prison
former member of of the crackdown on the Damascus in March 2002 for “an attempt to change the constitution by
parliament Spring. He had publicly demanded illegal means, trying to stop the authorities from carrying out
democratic changes. their duties mentioned in the law, trying to harm national
unity, defaming the state and insulting the legislative,
executive and judicial authorities.” Released on January 18,
2006, after serving his sentence.
Riad al-Turk, former Detained on September 1, 2001, as SSSC sentenced him on June 26, 2002, to two and a half years
head of the part of the crackdown on the for “attempting to change the constitution by illegal means.”
unauthorized Damascus Spring. He had stated on He received a presidential pardon and was released on
Communist Party Al Jazeera television in August 2001 November 16, 2002, for “humanitarian reasons” related to his
(Political Bureau) that “the dictator has died.” bad health.
Riad Seif, former Detained on September 6, 2001, as Damascus criminal court sentenced him to five years in April
Member of Parliament part of the crackdown on the 2002, for “attempting to change the constitution by illegal
Damascus Spring. He was a founder means,” among other charges. Released on January 2006, he
of a discussion forum, dubbed the was re-arrested in December 2007 (see Damascus Declaration
Forum for National Dialogue. detainees below).
Kamal al-Labwani, Detained in September 2001 as part SSSC sentenced him on August 28, 2002, to three years for
physician, founder of of the crackdown on the Damascus inciting armed rebellion. He was released on September 9,
the Democratic Liberal Spring. He had attended a political 2004, after completing his sentence. He was later re-arrested
Gathering seminar in the house of Riad Seif. in November 2005 and is currently serving a 12-year sentence
(see box in Section 1 above).
Walid al-Bunni, Detained in September 2001 as part SSSC sentenced him on July 31, 2002, to five years for
physician, member of of the crackdown on the Damascus “attempting to change the constitution by illegal means.”
the Committees for the Spring. He had attended a political Released on January 18, 2006.
Revival of Civil Society seminar in the house of Riad Seif.
Hassan Sa`dun, Detained in September 2001 as part SSSC sentenced him on August 28, 2002, to two years for
involved in the civil of the crackdown on the Damascus “spreading false information.” Released on September 9,
forum movement, Spring. 2003, after the end of his sentence.
member of the Human
Rights Association in
Syria
Habib `Issa, Lawyer, Detained in September 2001 as part SSSC sentenced him on August 19, 2002, to five years for
involved in the civil of the crackdown on the Damascus “attempting to change the constitution by illegal means.”
forum movement Spring. He was spokesperson for the Released in January 2006.
Jamal al-Attasi Forum for Democratic
Dialog and a founding member of
Human Rights Society of Syria.
Fawaz Tello, engineer Detained in September 2001 as part SSSC sentenced him on August 28, 2003, to five years for
of the crackdown on the Damascus “attempting to change the constitution by illegal means.”
Spring. Released on January 18, 2006.


Habib Saleh, key figure Detained in September 2001 as part SSSC sentenced him on June 24, 2002, to three years for
of the National of the crackdown on the Damascus “inciting racial and sectarian strife” and other charges.
Dialogue Forum, writer, Spring. Released in 2004. He was arrested again in May 2005 and a
and political analyst military court sentenced him to three years for “weakening
national sentiment” and “spreading false news” for articles
critical of the Syrian authorities that he had published on the
internet. Released in 2007. He was arrested for a third time on
May 7, 2008, and a Damascus criminal court sentenced him
on March 15, 2009, to three years in jail for “spreading false
information” and “weakening national sentiment” for writing
articles criticizing the government and defending opposition
figure Riad al-Turk.
Aref Dalila, Detained in September 2001 as part SSSC sentenced him on July 31, 2002, to 10 years for
economist and of the crackdown on the Damascus “attempting to change the constitution by illegal means.”
university professor, Spring. Released on August 7, 2008.
founding member of
the nongovernmental
Committees for the
Revival of Civil Society
Anwar Asfari, journalist Detained on July 20, 2002, for SSSC sentenced him on June 6, 2005, to five years for
holding talks and roundtables in the “belonging to a secret organization with the objective of
United Arab Emirates on reform in changing the economic and social status of the state.”
Syria. Released on July 21, 2007.

Haytham al-Maleh, Charged on October 14, 2002, for Charged with “spreading false news,” “belonging to an
human rights lawyer distributing HRAS’s publications and international political association,” and “publishing material
and former head of forming a human rights group that caused sectarian friction.” All charges were dropped on
Human Rights without governmental approval. July 15, 2003, as part of a presidential amnesty. Detained
Association of Syria again on October 14, 2009, for criticizing the continued
(HRAS) application of the state of emergency on a TV program. A
military court sentenced him on July 3, 2010, to three years for
“spreading false news.” He is currently in detention.
Hasan Saleh and Detained on December 15, 2002, SSSC sentenced them in February 2004 to three years for
Marwan Ùthman, two after they had led a sit-in outside the attempting “to cutoff part of Syrian land to join it to another
leaders in the Kurdish Syrian National Assembly calling for country.” Sentence later reduced to 14 months.
Yekiti party the removal of the barriers imposed
on the Kurdish language.
A group of 14 activists All were detained in August 2003 in A military court sentenced 13 of them to three months for
known as the “Aleppo Aleppo as they waited to attend a “membership in a secret organization” and sentenced Fateh
14”: Fateh Jamus, talk on the emergency law. Jamus to one year on the same charge. All 14 men were
Safwan Àkkash, Àbd released in June 2004.
al-Ghani Bakri, Hazim
Àjaj al-Aghra’i,
Muhammad Deeb Kor,
Àbd al-Jawwad al-
Saleh, Hashem al-
Hashem, Yaser Qaddur,
Zaradesht Muhammad,
Rashid Sha`ban, Fuad
Bawadqji, Ghazi
Mustafa, Najib Dedem,
and Samir Àbd al-
Karim Nashar

A Wasted Decade 30

Aktham Nuàisseh, Detained on April 14, 2004, in SSSC charged him with “publishing false news” and
former head of the response to the publication by the “opposing the objectives of the revolution.” He was released
Committees for the CDF of a human rights report that on bail in August 2004, and acquitted in 2005.
Defense of Democratic was highly critical of the
Liberties and Human government.
Rights in Syria (CDF)
Nizar Rastnawi, Detained on April 18, 2005, after a The SSSC sentenced him on November 19, 2006, to four years
member of Arab member of the security services for “spreading false news” and “insulting the President.” He
Organization for overheard a private conversation was scheduled to complete a four-year sentence in Sednaya
Human Rights—Syria Rastanawi was having with another prison on April 18, 2009, but there has been no information
(AOHR-S) person in which he reportedly about his well-being or whereabouts since then.
criticized the Syrian president.
Àli al-Àbdullah, Detained on May 15, 2005, for having Authorities released him on November 2, 2005, as part of a
writer, activist, and publicly read a letter written by Àli presidential amnesty. Detained again on March 23, 2006, with
member of CDF and Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni, London- his son Muhammad, after they participated in a
HRAS based leader of the Muslim demonstration in front of the SSSC. A military court sentenced
Brotherhood, at a gathering of the al- them to six months for “spreading false information that
Atassi Forum. weakens national sentiment” and they were released on
December 6, 2006. He was detained for a third time on
December 17, 2007, as part of the crackdown on the
Damascus Declaration group (see below) and sentenced to
two and a half years. Instead of being released on June 17,
2010, he was referred to the Military Prosecutor’s office which
kept him in detention on new charges of “weakening national
sentiment” and “muddying Syria’s relations with foreign
states” because of articles and statements he issued while in
jail.
Muhammad Ra`dun, Detained on May 22, 2005, after he Was held on charges of “spreading false news” and
head of the AOHR-S appeared on Al-Jazeera television, “involvement in an illegal organization of an international
highlighting the need for reform in nature.” Released November 2, 2005, before his trial
the country. concluded, on the basis of a presidential amnesty.
Riad Drar, active Detained on June 4, 2005, after he The SSSC sentenced him on April 2, 2006, to five years in
member of the made a speech at the funeral of prison on the basis of “belonging to a secret
unauthorized prominent Kurdish Islamic scholar organization,” “inciting sectarian strife,” and “spreading false
Committees for the Sheikh Muhammad Ma`shuq al- information.”
Revival of Civil Society Khaznawi. In his speech, Drar
demanded that the government
grant Syrian Kurds the same rights as
other citizens, particularly in regard
to issues of citizenship for stateless
Kurds.
Hasan Zeino, engineer Detained on July 10, 2005, for Military Court in Homs charged him with “possession of
carrying copies of a newsletter from publications of a prohibited organization.” He was released on
the unlicensed opposition umbrella bail on August 24, 2005.
group National Democratic Front.
Mohammed Àli al- Detained in July 27, 2005, in a Sentenced on September 27, 2005, to 10 days for “defaming
Àbdullah, the son of Damascus suburb after taking part in the country.” Detained again with his father, the writer Àli al-
detained activist Àli al- the inaugural meeting of the Àbdullah, on March 23, 2006, after their participation in a
Àbdullah, and Yassin Committee of the Families of demonstration in front of the SSSC. A military court sentenced
al-Hamwi, father of a Prisoners of Opinion and them to six months for “spreading false information that
political prisoner Conscience. weakens national sentiment” and they were released on
December 6, 2006.


Dr. Mahmoud Sarem, Detained in September 2005. SSSC charged him with criticizing the government and the
surgeon and poet president in public. Released on bail in September 19, 2006;
trial still ongoing according to publicly available information.
Fateh Jamus, political Detained on May 1, 2006, upon his A criminal court tried him for “spreading false information.” He
activist return from a trip to Europe where he was released on bail on October 12, 2006.
addressed an Amnesty International
conference and spoke to the media
about the need for reforms in Syria.
A group of four activists Detained between May 12 and 18, A criminal court sentenced Michel Kilo and Mahmud Ìssa on
detained for signing 2006, for signing the Damascus- May 13, 2007, to three years for “weakening national
“Beirut-Damascus Beirut Declaration, a petition which sentiment” and “inciting sectarian strife.” The court sentenced
Declaration”: Michel called for the normalization of Syria- in absentia Khalil Hussain and Sulaiman Shummar to ten
Kilo, a writer, Mahmud Lebanon relations. years for “weakening national sentiment” and “undertaking
Ìssa, a political acts and writings unauthorized by the Syrian government that
activist, Khalil Hussain, may expose Syria to aggressive acts or spoil its relations with
a member of the another state.” Michel Kilo was released in May 2009 and
Kurdish future Mahmoud Issa in June 2009
movement, Sulaiman
Shummar, a political
activist
Anwar al-Bunni, human Detained on May 17, 2006, for his A criminal court sentenced him on April 24, 2007, to five years
rights lawyer membership in a human rights for “spreading false or exaggerated news that weakens
group, for claiming that a detainee national sentiment,” and ordered him to pay the equivalent of
died under torture, and for signing US$2,000 to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor for his
the Beirut-Damascus declaration. membership in a unlicensed and now-closed human rights
center.
Fa’eq al-Mir, a leader in Detained on December 13, 2006, A criminal court sentenced him on November 8, 2007 to 18
the leftist People’s following a phone call to a leader of months for “undertaking acts that weaken national sentiment”
Democratic Party Lebanon’s March 14 Coalition, which during times of conflict.”
is known for its opposition to Syrian
policies in Lebanon. The call was to
express condolences for the
November 21, 2006 assassination of
Pierre Gemayel.
Sufian Bakor, son of Detained on January 13, 2007, Released on May 4, 2009.
political opposition reportedly as a way to put pressure
activist Mohammad on his exiled father, Mohammad
Bakor, head of the Bakor.
Syrian Committee for
Democratic Work
A group of five Detained on January 29, 2007, as Charged with undertaking “acts to cut off part of Syrian land to
members in the Yekiti they were gathered at the house of join it to another country” and their trial is ongoing before the
party: Yasha Kader, Yasha Kader to attend a cultural talk SSSC.
Nazmi Muhammad, on the Kurds.
Tahseen Mammo,
Dalkash Mammo, and
Ahmad Khalil Darwish
Àdnan Buzan, leader Detained on June 19, 2007, for Released on November 5, 2007. No charges filed against him.
in the Kurdish forming an unlicensed political party.
Democratic Party in
Syria (KDP-S)

A Wasted Decade 32

A Wasted Decade - Syria

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