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De la Llana vs Alba
Constitutional Law – Political Question – if there is no question of law involved – BP 129
In 1981, BP 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes”, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the
judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He
averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP
129).
HELD: The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of
inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that

from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its
effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation,
therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the
fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic
principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were
the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no
departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved
by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents
vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to
be preferred.”
Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board
e Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill
Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The
PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment
provides that “there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback,
regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or imported blank
video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.” The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the
sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has
significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be
recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts
payable to the LGUs. Tio countered, among others, that the tax imposition provision is a rider and is not
germane to the subject matter of the PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PD embraces only one subject.

HELD: The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include
the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and
every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute
are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance
of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." The rule also
is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction.
In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the
VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject
and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered
throughout the PD. The express purpose of the PD to include taxation of the video industry in order to
regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5 of
the said PD which explain the motives of the lawmakers in presenting the measure. The title of the PD,
which is the creation of the VRB, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its
Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the
title or that the latter be an index to the body of the PD.
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected
by Presidential Decree No. 1987, “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers
to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal
Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."
"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as
the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any
motion picture or audiovisual program.”

“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty
percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in
Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the
Metropolitan Manila Commission.”
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of
videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or
variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated
circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a
tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby
resulting in substantial lossesestimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and
disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie
industry.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.
Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a
public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly
because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the

proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the
movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree
No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the
moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment,
considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the
viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing
pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to
the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are
virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to
engage in business."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
PEOPLE VS. MACEREN
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of thelaw, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect itsgeneral
provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot beextended. An administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress.
FACTS:
The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes
electro fishing in freshwater fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the
Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly
prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On
appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?
HELD: NO.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their
authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro
fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body
intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the
old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what

acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the
penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative
officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of
administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority
granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power
People vs. Maceren
G.R No. 32166, October 18, 1977
Aquino J.
Facts:
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito
del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with
having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five
accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo
Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any
aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal
court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old
Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid.
Held:
No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84
and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No.
3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in
penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have
been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute.

PHILIPPINECONSUMERSFOUNDATION,INC. VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION,CULTURE AND SPORTS
If the rates prescribed by an administrative agency is in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers, prior
notice and hearing is not essential tothe validity of its issuance.
FACTS:
The Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report recommending an
increase in school fees. DECS took note of the report and issued an Order authorizing a 15% to
20%increase as recommended. Petitioner sought for reconsideration on the ground that the increases
were too high. Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to
15%.Petitioner still protested the increases and filed a petition for prohibition, seeking to declare the
questioned Department Order unconstitutional for it was issued without any legal basis and for violation of
the due process clause for lack of due notice and hearing before issuance.
ISSUE:
Whether the Department Order is valid?
HELD:
YES. The power of the DECS, as granted by law, to regulate school fees includes the power to prescribe
school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as
such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge
its functions and duties under the law. As to the issue of due process, there is no such violation. The
function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative
function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not
a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the
rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given
kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates
imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-
judicial in character. In this case, the Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be
charged by all private schools in the country for the school year 1987 to 1988. Hence, it applies to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the country and the issuance of the department order is in the
exercise of DEC’s quasi-legislative power. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the
validity of its issuance.
INDUSTRIALENTERPRISES, INC VS. CA
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes
into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of anadministrative body, in such
case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its
view.
FACTS: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the
Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED). It was also granted a coal operating
contract in the so-called Giporlos Area. IEI was later advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing
the country’s coal supply-demand balance, the logical coal operator in the area would be Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC its rights in the area but
later filed an action for rescission with damages against MMIC for failure of the latter to comply with its

obligations. IEI prayed that the Energy Minister approve the return of the contract from MMIC to IEI.
Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC. Trial Court ordered the
rescission and declared the continued efficacy of the coal contract in favor of IEI and ordered the BED to
issue its written affirmation of the contract and to give due course to IEI’s application. CA reversed the
decision and ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that under PD1206, it
is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and
development of coal blocks.
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply in this case?
HELD: YES. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many
cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that
the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is
also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or
intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a
court. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what
coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating
contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in
possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The application of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until
after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined.
US VS. ANG TANG HO
Delegation of Power – Admin Bodies
On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868
entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under
extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the
GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice
should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a
ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that
prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was
charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the
publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order
fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to
provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a

uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its
terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to
the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Ynot vs IAC - A case Digest
RESTITUTO YNOT -petitioner; an owner of carabaos
Station Commander, Integrated National Police, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo & the Regional Director, Bureau of
Animal Industry, Region IV- respondents
Type of petition filed: petition FOR CERTIORARI
ISSUE:
Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional or not.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00.
Petitioner raised the issue of EO’s constituitonality and filed case in the lower court. However, the court
sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as
raised by the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner appealed the decsion to IAC with the following contentions:
1. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright
2. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court.
3. Measure should have not been presumed
4. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President.

HELD:
Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications:
1. Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as there’s no exigency showing to justify
the exercise of this extraordinary power of the President
2. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require theirinstant destrcution
3. Case involved ‘roving commission’ and invalid delegation of powers and invalid exercise of police
power
4. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to be heard in his defense and was
immedeiately condemned and punish
YNOT VS. IAC [148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one
province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-
A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the
exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.
Issue: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.
Held: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably
necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting
the transferof carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after
the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either.
Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen
the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces
but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority
provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The
lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote
general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the
other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend
himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC
found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people
power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of
his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms
dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
1. accumulated foreign debt
2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in
the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned
the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and
health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due
process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which
according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article
VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article
it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the
president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the
Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect
the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution).
Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is
not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the
President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of
emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely
of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the
present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for
the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the
Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that
happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-
preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
Fernan, Concurring
1. The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of events and not
on abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be
answerable by the President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger. Thus, it’s the
executive’s responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety from arising.
3. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains to give in to
Marcos’ wish to die in the country. Compassion must give way to the other state interests.
Cruz, Dissenting
1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in his own country. It is a right
guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.

2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose a threat to national
security. Fears were mere conjectures.
3. Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit her powers & not expand.
Paras, Dissenting
1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos’ right to return to the
Philippines. .
2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she should be buried
w/in 10 days.
3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is powerless to restrict it.
It’s w/in police power of the state to restrict this right if national security, public safety/health
demands that such be restricted. It can’t be absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be arbitrary &
irrational.
4. No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or public safety. Fears are
speculative & military admits that it’s under control. Filipinos would know how to handle Marcos’
return.
Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting
1. President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten national security should be
agreed upon by the court. Such threat must be clear & present.
G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition,
after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who will
take the death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of
the state and society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments:
1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country of
birth and all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.
2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had
exercised it arbitrarily.
3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be
granted.
Decision:
No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack of
merit.
Ratio:
1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.
2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to
the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect,
have not been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal” claiming
that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president.
3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations
are merely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from
general grant that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton).
Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not
forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment
No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with
implied powers.

4. It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to
comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily
Facts: Former President Ferdinand Marcos petitions the SC for mandamus and prohibition asking to order
respondents to issue travel documents to him and his immediate family and to enjoin the implementation
of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Issue: WON the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, in the exercise of
the powers granted in her by the Constitution.
Ruling: Affirmative. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers
of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive
power”. The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated
in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has
to be executive. Even the members of the Legislature has recognized that indeed Mrs. Aquino has the
power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning, as per House Resolution No. 1342.
Marcos v Manglapus, et. al.
Facts: Same as above, except that Ferdinand has died.
Held: Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of
office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of
the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present
circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had
acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not
enjoin the implementation of this decision.
204 SCRA 546
• Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the power to investigate
FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to protest the alleged failure of
public authorities to act upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their
classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of
Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to
heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively
charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced.
An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a
walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed
dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In
the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers’
to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the
respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while
they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers,
allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier,
upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing
its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should not have
been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;” there had been violation of their
civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.”
ISSUE:
• Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved
HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant
by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less
take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals
or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Power to Investigate
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or
on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may
adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In
the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in
extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-
judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical

sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
“Investigate” vs. “Adjudicate”
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research
on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into
systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an
official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy
involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find
out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make
an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of
which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or
otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the
parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as
judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,
settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of
a judgment."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and
should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC
Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in
the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the
Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass
concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law;
(b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of theteachers to
discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of
Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary
sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts
done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or
omissions.
Who has Power to Adjudicate?
These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction
of the CSC.

Manner of Appeal
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in
disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the
proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and
whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil
and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for
reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict,
may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
Carino vs CHR
Adjudicatory Power of the CHR
On 17 Sept 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage
rallies in order for their grievances to be heard. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from
work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on 17 Dec 1990, Secretary Carino ordered the
dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to
the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari
regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial
and issued a subpoena to Secretary Carino.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such
as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
HELD: The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all
forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and
decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with
the trial.
Rizal Empire Insurance Group v NLRC
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited.
Xie xie!
LABOR CODE, ARTICLE 5: RULES AND REGULATIONS
RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and
ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 73140
May 29, 1987

Facts:
In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire
Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made
a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a
permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office
Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-designation,
he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a month. In 1980,
he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus
cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he
was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other
benefits.
On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the
grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor
Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with
the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp.
31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the
instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
dismissing petitioner’s appeal on a technicality.
Held:
Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides:
SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. — Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
notice thereof.
SECTION 6. No extension of period. — No motion or request for extension of the period within which to
perfect an appeal shall be entertained.
The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11,
1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the
National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution
dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room
for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations
and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce,
have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration,
137 SCRA 314 [1985]).
Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case
has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.
Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank
and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be
retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be
demanded.

WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Araneta vs. Gatmaitan
GR Nos. L-8895, L-9191, April 30, 1957
Felix, J.
The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of
Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of
trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San
Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban the
operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22
prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer
to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing
during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22.
Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive
order and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative
enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22
and 66 are invalid.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80
2. W/N the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated
to the President
HELD:
1. YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing
from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its
functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the
President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations,
decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs
22,66 and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by
authority of law.

2. YES. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the
promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl
nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as
he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President,
in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80
absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel
Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal
province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict
conformity with the law.
Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board
GR Nos. 95203-05, December 18, 1990
Sarmiento, J.
The petitioners pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB from implementing its Order mandating a
provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products. The Order, which was in
pursuance to EO 172, was a response to the separate applications of Caltex, Pilipinas Shell and Petron
Corporation for the Board to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products. Petitioners
submit that the Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and
without proper notice and hearing.
ISSUE: W/N the ERB committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD: NO. While under EO 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from
ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: 1) to
make it permanent;2) to reduce or increase it further; or 3) to deny the application. The Board has
jurisdiction to decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that,
however, it may order, under Section 8 of EO 172, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of
a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding.
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation
GR No. L-59234, September 30, 1982
Melencio-Herrera, J.

Petitioner is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators. They filed the petition seeking to
declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 of the Bureau of Land Transportation. The assailed
memorandum order provides for the phasing out and discontinuance in the operation of dilapidated taxis
or taxis of Model 1971 and earlier. Pursuant to the said memorandum, the Bureau of Land Transportation
issued Implementing Circular No. 52 instructing Regional Directors, the MV Registrars and other
personnel of the BLT, all within the National Capital Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a
schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.
ISSUES: W/N the assailed memorandum orders were invalid exercise of police power
HELD: NO. Section 2 of Presidential Decree 101 grants the Board of Transportation the power to fix just
and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be
furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. As enunciated in
the BOT circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health…,safety and general welfare of the people.
Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission
Private respondent Antonio Arnaiz sent a message to Maria Diaz in Spain through the telegraph office of
the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumagete and was transmitted to Manila. The message, however,
was not delivered to the addressee. After being informed of said fact, Arnaiz sent a complaint to the
Public Service Commissioner a letter-complaint. In its answer, petitioner denied liability but questioned
PSC’s jurisdiction over the subject matter. After hearing, the PSC found petitioner responsible for the
unsatisfactory service complained of and ordered it to pay a fine.
ISSUE: W/N PSC has jurisdiction to discipline and impose fine upon petitioner
HELD: NO. The Public Service Act vested in the PSC jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public
services and their franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of RA 4630, the
legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission’s jurisdiction
over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public. The negligence imputed to public
respondent had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of very limited jurisdiction of the
Commission over petitioner.
Philippine Lawyer’s Association vs. Agrava
Respondent Director of the Philippine Patent Office issued a circular announcing an examination
schedule for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippine Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of
practice before said office. According to said circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified. Petitioners contend that one who has

passed the bar exams and licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is duly
qualified to practice before the said office.
On the other hand, respondent Director maintains that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve
entirely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training.
ISSUE: W/N the appearance before the Philippine Patent Office is included in the practice of law
HELD: YES. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. The practice before the Patent
Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles.
Furthermore, the Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is
reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be
allowed to practice before the said office, without further examination or other qualification.
GUEVARA vs. COMELEC
Petitioner was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for
having published in the Sunday Times an article which tended to interfere with and influence the
COMELEC and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending. The article pertained to
the contracts entered into by COMELEC regarding the requisitioning and preparation of ballot boxes to be
used in the elections. Petitioner appeared and filed a motion to quash upon the ground, among others,
that the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged
contemptuous article. The COMELEC denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of 15
days within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC has the power to jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings
HELD: NO. Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between
several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in
its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In
proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function.
Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for
such power is inherently judicial in nature.
G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931
MAURICIO CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG
Ostrand, J
Topic: Contingent regulation (page 50)
FACTS:

This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of
mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and
for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present
prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.
The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared
unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No.
3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit
prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.
The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the
petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent as cause of action
HELD:
Yes. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the
development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power.
The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was
promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded
its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon
constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that
might have been adopted.
GSIS vs. CSC
According to Asuncion Salazar’s service record filed with the CSCS, she was employed by the GSIS as a
casual laborer. She became permanent with a designation of stenographer. Thereafter, she was
promoted to Confidential Technical Assistant Aide.
Salazar's GSIS Service Record however, revealed that she was appointed to the position of Confidential
Executive Assistant in the office of then GSIS President and General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. on a
permanent status. She was then promoted to Technical Assistant III, the position she held when her
services were terminated by the newly appointed President and General Manager of the GSIS for the
reason that her position was co-terminous with the term of the appointing authority.
Salazar filed a petition for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees, but reconsideration was
denied. Thereafter, she filed a petition for reconsideration of the denial with the Review Committee, which
referred the same to the Merit Systems Promotion Board and the CSC.
In a resolution, the CSC directed the immediate reinstatement of Salazar with back salaries. The Board
however affirmed her termination. Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board's order and
manifested that the Commission already resolved her petition on July 22, 1987. On June 30, 1988. the
Board set aside its previous Order affirming Salazar's dismissal in view of the Commission's prior
resolution of the case. The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the board and
stated that the CSC is a higher administrative appellate body on matters concerning the removal of
officers and employees from the service. Hence, the Board cannot in any manner modify or alter the

determinations and actions of the Civil Service Commission. The GSIS appealed but the CSC denied the
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: No. Presidential Decree No. 1409, creating the Merit Systems Board provides that the Merit
Systems Board has the function to “Hear and decide cases brought before it by officers and employees
who feel aggrieved by the determination of appointing authorities involving appointment, promotion,
transfer, detail, reassignment and other personnel actions, as well as complaints against any officers in
the government arising from abuses arising from personnel actions of the these officers or from violations
of the merit system.”
When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving
specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another
body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction
over the matter. Presidential Decree No. 1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board shall take
cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving personnel
action. The Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of the cases specified under Section 5
of P.D. 1409, except in the case specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which directly
gives it such power, to wit:
SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administer the Civil
Service Commission and shall have the following powers and functions:
j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section
37 or brought to it on appeal;
In the case at bar, the appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the Review Committee to both the Merit
Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission. In the absence of a decision from the Merit Systems
Board, the Commission cannot legally assume jurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, its decision in favor of
Salazar and all subsequent resolutions of the Commission in this case are void. Likewise, the Order of the
Board setting aside its previous order upholding the termination of Salazar in deference to the
Commission's final appellate jurisdiction over the matter, is null and void. Jurisdiction is vested by law and
is not lost nor be legally transferred by voluntary surrender in favor of a body not vested by law with such
jurisdiction.
Arrow Transportation Corp. vs. Board of Transportation
GR No. L-39655, March 21, 1975
Fernando, J.
FACTS:
Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic corporations. The former has in
his favor a certificate of public convenience to operate a public utility auto-truck service from Cebu city to

Mactan Interantional Airport and vice versa. Private respondent filed a petition with the respondent Board
for the issuance of a certificate of private respondent filed a petition with the respondent Board for the
issuance of a certificate of public convenience to operate a similar service on the same line. Without the
required publication, the Board issued on order granting it provisional permit to operte on the line applied
for. A motion for reconsideration was filed and for the cancellation of such provisional permit but without
awaiting final action, this petition was filed on the ground that the issuance of provisional permit was
patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the controversy is ripe for judicial determination
HELD: YES. It is undeniable that at the time the petition was filed, there was pending with respondent
Board a motion for reconsideration. Ordinarily, its resolution should be awaited. The Court was impelled
to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only because of the importance of the issue
raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter
Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr.
GR No. L-17860, March 30, 1962
De Leon, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank. He was
charged in an administrative case resulting in his suspension by the Monetary Board and the creation of a
three-man committee to investigate him. After conducting hearings, the committee recommended
petitioner’s reinstatement. The Monetary Board, however, adopted a resolution stating that petitioner is
deemed resigned as of the date of his suspension. Subsequently, respondent Mariano Marcos was
appointed to replace petitioner. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto.
After several hearings, the court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner did not exhaust all
administrative remedies. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should have exhausted all administrative remedies
HELD: NO. The doctrine of administrative remedies does not apply where, by the terms or implications of
the statute authorizing an administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only, warranting the
conclusion that the legislative intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative
remedy has not been exhausted.
KBMBPM vs. Dominguez
GR No. 91927, January 13,1992

Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS: The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, thru its Mayor Santiago Carlos, entered into a contract
with petitioner for the latter’s management and operation of its New Muntinlupa public Market. The
contract provides for a 25 year term renewable for a like period unless sooner terminated and/or
rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties. Subsequently, Mayor Ignacio Bunye, Mayor Carlos’
successor, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the 50-year term of the agreement, contrary to the
provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, and the patently inequitable rental,
directed the review of the contract. Consequently, the Municipal Council approved a Resolution
abrogating the contract.
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for breach of contract, specific performance with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers. The writ applied for was
denied, the KBMBPM officers resisted the attempts of Bunye and company to complete the take-over.
The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court but it was remanded to the Court of Appeals.
Thereafter, Amado Perez, Gerneral Manager of KBMBPM, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint
charging Bunye and his co-petitioners of harassment, oppression, abuse of authority and violation of the
Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for taking over the management of the public market.
On October 1998, respondent Madriaga and Coronado, accompanied by the Bunye and the latters’
heavily armed men forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners purportedly to serve upon
petitioners the Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the same by taking over
and disbanding the incumbent Board of Directors of KBMBPM. Petitioners claim that the Order served on
them was not written on the stationary of the Department, does not bear its seal and is a mere Xerox
copy. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition praying that respondents refrain, cease and desist from
enforcing the questioned Order and that the order be declared null and void.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issued Order was valid
2. Whether or not the petitioners needed to exhaust administrative remedies available
HELD:
1. NO. There is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It
is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express provision on the
opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision , petitioners cannot be deprived of that
right. The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated
himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the
petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under PD 175 which grants him the
authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. An administrative officer has only such
powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just
and reasonable execution.
NO. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless
actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the
courts when most needed. There was no need to appeal the decision to the Office of the President;
recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the

instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of
petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA G.R. No. 124043, October 14, 1998
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Facts: Private respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs
and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious,
educational and charitable objectives. YMCA earned an income from leasing out a portion of its premises
to small shop owners and from parking fees collected from non-members. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes
on rentals and professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. YMCA protested the
assessment.
Issue: Whether or not the income of private respondent YMCA from rentals of small shops and parking
fees is exempt from taxation
Held: YMCA argues that Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution exempts charitable institutions from the
payment not only of property taxes but also of income tax from any source. The Court is not persuaded.
The debates, interpellations and expressions of opinion of the framers of the Constitution reveal their
intent. Justice Hilario Davide Jr., a former constitutional commissioner, stressed during the Concom
debate that what is exempted is not the institution itself; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands,
buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational
purposes. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, an eminent authority on the Constitution and also a member of the
Concom, adhered to the same view that the exemption created by said provision pertained only to
property taxes. In his treatise on taxation, Justice Jose Vitug concurs, stating that the tax exemption
covers property taxes only. Indeed, the income tax exemption claimed by YMCA finds no basis in Art. VI,
Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution.
YMCA also invokes Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution claiming that YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit

educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income. The Court reiterates that
YMCA is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income tax on the rentals from its property.
The bare allegation alone that it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its
exemption from the payment of income tax. Laws allowing tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris.
Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the aforecited provision, it must prove
with substantial evidence that: 1. it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational
institution; and 2. the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes. However, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was
submitted by YMCA to prove that it met the said requisites.
YMCA is not an educational institution within the purview of Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution. The
term “educational institution,” when used in laws granting tax exemptions, refers to a school, seminary,
college or educational establishment. Therefore, YMCA cannot be deemed one of the educational
institutions covered by the said constitutional provision. Moreover, the Court notes that YMCA did not
submit proof of the proportionate amount of the subject income that was actually, directly and exclusively
used for educational purposes.
Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)
Issue: Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid.
F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in view of the
energy crisis. It excepted, however, those classified as S (Service), T (Truck), DPL (Diplomatic), CC
(Consular Corps), and TC (Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works, Transportation, issued
memo. providing penalties for viol. of the LOI, namely, fine, confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of
registration. The petitioners brought suit questioning the validity of the LOI on the ground that it was
discriminatory and a denial of due process. The resps. denied the petitioner''''s allegations and argued
that the suit amounted to a request for advisory opinion.
HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy''''s Kaiser Jeep.
The enforcement of the LOI to them would deprive them of prop. They, therefore, have standing to
challenge the validity of the LOI. (2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face.
It has behind it the presumption of validity. The necessity for evidence to rebut such presumption
is unavoidable. As underlying the questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of
legislation the presumption of validity must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record overthrowing the statute. The LOI is an energy conservation
measure; it is an apporpriate response to a problem. (3) Nor does the LOI deny equal
protection to the petitioners. W/in the class to w/c the petitioner belongs the LOI operate

equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not include others does not render it invalid. The
govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none." (4) To the extent that the Land
Transpo. Code does not authorize the impounding of vehicles as a penalty, to that extent
the memo. of the resps. would be ultra vires.
Bautista vs. Juinio
GR L-50908, 31 January 1984
En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 7 concur, 2 took no part
FACTS: The President of the Philippines issued a Letter of Instruction No. 869 on May 31, 1979 in
response to the protracted oil crisis that dated back to 1974. Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L.
Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and respondent Romeo P.
Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 39, which
imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the
specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. Spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and
Enrique Bautista questioned the validity of the energy conservation measure through a prohibition
proceeding with the Supreme Court. It was alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance
of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use private motor
vehicles with H and EH plates is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus
in contravention of the equal protection clause. Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of
due process, more specifically,” of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom
to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays." It would follow, so
they contend that Memorandum Circular No. 39 imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and
cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation
of legislative power."
ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is
violative of certain constitutional rights.
HELD: The petition was dismissed because of the "presumption of constitutionality" or in slightly different
words "a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations." There is need then for a
factual foundation of invalidity. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case
of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court summed up
the matter thus: 'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police
power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may
condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' "
In fact, the recital of the whereas clauses of the Letter of Instruction makes it clear that the substantive
due process, which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, was not ignored, much less infringed.
Furthermore, in the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the
assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway.
Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To
hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does 'to all
the great public needs.' It would be to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or
allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and
the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.' "
Furthermore, the Court observed that there was no violation of equal protection. There was a situation
that called for a corrective measure and LOI was the solution which for the President expressing a power
validly lodged in him, recommended itself. He decided that what was issued by him would do just that or,
at the very least, help in easing the situation. If it did not cover other matters which could very well have
been regulated does not call for a declaration of nullity. The President "is not required by the Constitution

to adhere to the policy of all or none" (Lutz v. Araneta).
Absent, therefore, of the alleged infringement of constitutional rights, more precisely the due process and
equal protection guarantees, the Court cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No. 869 as tainted by
unconstitutionality. The Memorandum Circular No. 39 was likewise considered valid for as long as it is
limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment and it relates solely to carrying into effect the
provisions of the law.
Ople vs Torres
Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz:
one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and
January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the
Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8,
1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Issue: Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE
SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION
OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A
SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."
Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of
a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being
unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code
of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a
System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national
security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies,

etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important
freedom of thought.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no
right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot
transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid
dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty
exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives
no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO
HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA,
TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of
the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz:
(1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and
(2) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January
23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308
Ruling: YES
Rationale:

As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to
sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that
petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our
Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that
the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4
As taxpayer and member of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules
of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as
infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal
defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without
waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent
Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have
completed the guidelines for the national identification system.
All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not
wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters
insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to
throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
1. US VS. PANLILIO
The orders (rules and regulations) of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a statute
have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not an offense
punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation.
FACTS:
The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering
from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. It is alleged that the
accused illegally and without being authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said
carabaos exposed to rinder pest was still in effect, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken
from the corral in which they were quarantined and drove them from one place to another. The

accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a
violation of Act No. 1760
ISSUE:
Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?
HELD:
NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made
unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No.
1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be
punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful
are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of the
Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are
statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense
unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in
Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is
such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, ¶2 of the Penal
Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic
disease among animals.
Syquia vs. Board of Power and Waterworks
74 SCRA 212
FACTS:
Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging
Syquia as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments with the offense of selling electricity without
permit or franchise and alleging that Syquia billed them for their electricity consumption in excess of the
Meralco rates.
In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board, saying that she is not engaged in the sale
of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric
current bills in accordance with their lease contracts.
ISSUE:
• Whether or not the Board has jurisdiction
HELD:

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