Community Antiterrorism Training Institute (CAT Eyes) Quarterly Security Meeting, main topic - Shelter in Place. Presentation includes an update on TSA security grant funding program for buses, and other topics.
17. Risk-Based Security Strategy
• Aligned with TSA Principles of Risk-Based Security across all modes
of Surface Transportation
• Focuses resources at higher relative risk locations and assets
• Completely responsive to risk
• Intelligence driven Implementation of Risk Reduction Programs
• Levels of unpredictable operational deterrence and response measures
driven by intelligence-based threat scenarios and levels
• Measures include:
• Unpredictable operational deterrence
• Preparedness and response exercises
• Improve critical infrastructure resilience
• Front employee training
• Public Awareness “If you see something, say something”
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18. Achieving Desired Outcomes
The privacy and civil
Strategic Overall casualties
The general public People and goods liberties of individuals
perceives surface move freely within and entities that own,
Outcomes from terrorist attacks
transportation to be surface transportation operate or use
are limited
safe and secure modes transportation
systems are protected
Approaches
DETERRENCE
DETECTION
RESILIENCE
(to meet these
outcomes)
Respond to all
Proxy Create a minimum
emergency related
Limit disruption and
25% perceived restore normal or
Measures of likelihood of
events within 10 min,
alternative operations
non-emergency within
within 12 hours
Effectiveness interdiction 20 min 18
19. Objective: Effective Deterrence
Target: Create a minimum 25% perceived likelihood of
interdiction at high risk locations and critical assets
Achieving this standard requires LIKELIHOOD OF INTERDICTION
presence and credibility 100%
• Presence of visible security measures
— Security and Canine Patrols are randomly present at high
risk locations and critical assets in system for at least 25%
of operating hours (120 minutes/8 hours). Standard
— CCTV Cameras cover of 100% of the high risk locations threshold if
and critical assets in system. interdiction
results in
• Credibility of security measures 25%
detain and
arrest
— For the purposes of this analysis, credibility of security
measures—the likelihood that a given security measure
Minimum
would achieve its objective—was assumed to be 100% 2% threshold if
(anything less would require more presence) interdiction
results in detain
and arrest
0%
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20. Objective: Effective Detection & Response
Target: Respond to all emergency related events within 10 min,
non-emergency within 20 min
SECURITY PERSONNEL
Resolution involves having the ability to RESPONSE TIME
detect a threat and respond appropriately Respond to at
least 80% of
• Detect 100% of suspicious activity that matters immediate
incidents in 20
— The travelling public, frontline employees, and security 20 min. mins. (British
,
Transport
personnel are sufficiently informed and motivated to Police
detect suspicious activity and make relevant and timely standard)⁴
reports. Mid-range
average
• Ability to respond appropriately within 10 10 response time
min.
minutes to identified suspicious activity Average
Emergency
Response Time
— Within 20 minutes, reporting of suspicious activity must be 5 min. Goal (BART)⁵
communicated, analyzed, and, as appropriate, security
Emergency
personnel dispatched and arrive on scene. 3 min. response time
to Oklahoma
0 min.
City bombing⁶
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21. Objective: Effective Resilience
Target: Limit service disruption and restore to 90%
normal or alternative operations within 12 hours
Achieving this standard requires limited direct SYSTEM RESTORATION TIME
consequences, robust transportation
Re-opening of
alternatives, and 12 hour restoration time. affected track
after June 2009
WMATA Red
• Limited direct consequences of incidents 5 days Line crash⁸
— Infrastructure hardening and incident response activities Mid-range
average system
limit immediate casualties and damage to infrastructure. restoration
12 time
• Robust transport alternatives to reroute flows hours Restoration
— System redundancy and individual resilience efforts after 1995
6 hours Paris metro
create alternative transportation routes & alternatives to attack⁹
transportation. Conclude
police activity
• 12 hours to restoration of full system service which disrupts
1.5 train service
— Recovery capabilities ensure timely restoration of hours (British Trans.
system to full operating status. Police
0 hours standard)¹⁰
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22. QUESTIONS?
Doyle Raines Ron Masciana
Division Director Technical Counselor
Surface Division Surface Division
Office of Security Policy Office of Security Policy and
and Industry Engagement Industry Engagement
571-227-3982 571-227-5672
Christopher T. McKay Fred Goodine
Branch Manager Section Chief
Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Mass Transit and Passenger Rail
Surface Division Surface Division
Office of Security Policy and Office of Security Policy and Industry
Industry Engagement Engagement
571-227-2160 571-227-1725
This Strategy was developed in coordination with the Mass Transit Sector Coordinating Council
(Transit Security Peer Advisory Group) Chief Paul McMillan, Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority,
Chairman.
22
23. Peer
BISC Project Updates Advisory
Group
• Cyber Security
• Human Trafficking
• Active Shooter Protocols in a Moving or Stationary
Bus
9 April 2013 Bus Industry Peer Advisory Group (PAG) 23
24. Peer
Collaborative Projects Going Forward Advisory
Group
• Convert “Mass Transit Security Strategy” to
Motorcoaches
• OTRB TRIAD Reports
Motorcoach Transportation
Security Strategy
9 April 2013 Bus Industry Peer Advisory Group (PAG) 24
43. “I h e a r d
TSA
r e c e i v e d
$189 m i l l i o n
i n
d i s c r e t i o
n a r y f u n d s .
Pl e a s e
c o n t a c t
t h e TSA
A d mi n i s t r
a t o r a n d
l e t h i m
k n o w we
c a n u s e
t h i s f o r
Conduct an exercise (see the Multiyear Exercise Plan in your SEP, which is also listed on Slide 2 of this presentation). Quarterly exercises are a very practical way to ensure your company is prepared for a security issue.Security Topic: comb through the various resources you now have at your disposal, such as HSIN, TRIAD Reports, info from the FBI InfraGard website (www.infragard.net), and other resources. Discuss this with the group.Update on latest threats.Security trends: with the ALERT Team assembled, discuss any security trends or problems within the company. Suggestion – invite local law enforcement, fire, EMS, to brief the ALERT Team on this topic.Exercise Plans and After Action Reports are to be filed in your SEP, Appendix J. This will demonstrate to auditors that you are putting ‘shoe leather’ to the plans contained in your SEP, taking an active approach to security issues.
Discuss:“Bring everyone into the room(s)” – who knows where the room is?“Shut and lock the doors” – what are the procedures to do this? Ask customers … to stay” – why is this important?Call emergency contacts – all involved should call
1. “Call forwarding” – use the Call Forwarding feature on your phone to receive important calls.“Change business phone announcement …” - Turn on call-forwarding or alternative telephone answering systems or services. If the business has voice mail or an automated attendant, change the recording to indicate that the business is closed, and that staff and visitors are remaining in the building until authorities advise it is safe to leave.“Turn off HVAC system …” – Have employees familiar with your building’s mechanical systems turn off all fans, heating and air conditioning systems. Some systems automatically provide for exchange of inside air with outside air – these systems, in particular, need to be turned off, sealed, or disabled. Water – fill a sink with water, fast.
1. “Avoid overcrowding” - Select interior room(s) above the ground floor, with the fewest windows or vents. The room(s) should have adequate space for everyone to be able to sit in. Avoid overcrowding by selecting several rooms if necessary. Large storage closets,utility rooms, pantries, copy and conference rooms without exterior windows will work well. Avoid selecting a room withmechanical equipment like ventilation blowers or pipes, because this equipment may not be able to be sealed from theoutdoors.Ideal … hard wired telephone” – cell phone lines may be congested. Also, you can use your GETS account on a land line.“Evac Kit and disaster supplies” - Gather essential disaster supplies, such as nonperishable food, bottled water, battery-powered radios, first aid supplies, flashlights, batteries, duct tape, plastic sheeting, and plastic garbage bags.
There may be a poster associated with what we are discussing or the poster may be totally unrelated and just be an interesting security topic
Speaker would speak about Homeland Security Programs in the local area or just plain security programs or exercises or training or do they need any buses for any disasters or exercises. SWAT Teams have practiced on buses. If no speaker available, ask ALERT Team members for contacts to talk about InfraGard meetings, something they heard at BISC, or at a local security meeting for state or city.Also any robberies, threats, new security purchased. Any trespassing. Fence was cut, no one is wearing security badges, rash of robberies in the local area, doors being left unlocked, etc.
SGT Dustin Davis(Santa Clara Sheriffs RATTF) stated the device was a functional M116A1 grenade simulator (picture attached) found inside a small shaving kit type bag. There were no suspects or witnesses and the item did not deploy. If it did deploy the risk to public safety would be minimal. The bag was found on last bench at the stop, seated on top of the bench, toward the edge. He also mentioned a person would have to dig into the bag to see the device. SGT Davis did not feel the scene provided any indication the device of intentionally left, more likely it fell out of someone's bag, NFI. The NY incident has been closed and there is no additional information to pass on. However, they may still be able to provide a picture of the device. As soon as it comes in I will pass it on.