This document discusses social justice issues in the context of political transitions in the Middle East following the 2011 uprisings. It addresses the role of social justice in driving the uprisings, the impact of political transitions on social justice, and the interplay between politics and social justice. The document analyzes experiences in different countries, finding that while some transitions led to democracy, others deteriorated into civil war or a reversion to autocracy. Across cases, socioeconomic indicators declined and social justice issues took a back seat to political and security concerns in the transitional period. The document argues successful leaders will be those who can articulate a vision and build coalitions to address persistent social justice demands.
2. To what degree Social Justice (SJ) issues
drivers of uprisings?
What was understanding of SJ issues?
How have uprisings and transitions impacted
SJ?
What is interplay between Politics and SJ?
Prospects for SJ 3 years after uprisings?
3. Politics is who gets what, when and how
(Lasswell); direct link to SJ
Politics is about who has power and whose
interests are served
Transitions presumably should lead to
Democracy
In Theory, democracy should improve SJ
In Practice, it might and it might not
And transitions could lead to state failure or
renewal of autocracy, as well as democracy
4. Repressive rentier crony capitalist states
Limited economic growth with persistent
unemployment, poverty and perceived
growing inequality
Large public sector and constrained private
sector
Declining public services and welfare
programs
Youth bulge
5. Closing of political space
Decline of political parties
Decline of labor and leftist movements
Islamic religious and social movements
occupy social space
6. Socialist contract abandoned
Revolutionary leader/regime promises of
‘transitional’ period toward future of
prosperity and freedom abandoned
Regimes settle back into dynastic security
states
Adopt rhetoric and façade of democracy as
alternative false legitimacy
Adopt neo liberal economics and advertise
GDP growth
7. Regional power had shifted to conservative
Gulf countries
West mired in financial and economic
problems
No external support structure for transitions
◦ Central and eastern Europe had EU; even Turkey
had EU accession talks.
Rather, regional and international proxy
competition; without the old social issues of
the Soviet-Western cold war.
8. Solgan of: “اجتماعية عدالة ،حرية ،”عيش
◦ Bread, Freedom, Social Justice
SJ as equal opportunity and fairness (Rawls?)
◦ Against cronyism and corruption that creates
skewed and unfair outcomes
SJ as Outcomes
◦ bread, jobs, housing, health care.
9. Achieving SJ as fairness implies emphasis on
governance structure, anti-corruption, lifting
repression, reforming power relations etc.
◦ i.e. requires movement toward democracy
Achieving SJ as outcomes implies better
management of resources and policy from
state;
◦ i.e. can theoretically be achieved within
authoritarian framework.
10. Spearheaded by urban middle class youth
Joined by other classes and sectors of society
◦ Middle class
◦ Working and underclass
◦ Youth
◦ Women
◦ Rural marginalized
In some cases enabled by disgruntled
members within the regime and economic
elites
11. Consensus on removal of dictator
But conflict of visions and interests on other
aspects of transition
no vision of a new social contract or the
necessary socio-economic restructuring
Unlike ‘revolutions’ of 1950s which also
called for bread and social justice but had a
comprehensive alternative socio-economic
vision
Socio-economic vision of 2011 ‘revolutions’
still un-enunciated
12. Uprisings without parties and without leaders
Did not generate new parties or leaders to
build on the uprisings and carry their
‘message’ into power
Older parties and leaders picked up the
pieces after the uprisings
13. Some led toward glimmers of democracy,
others deteriorated into civil war
Elements of Divergence:
◦ National cohesion
◦ Regime cohesion and decisions
◦ Strength and leadership of political parties
◦ Strength of civil society
◦ External environment
14. Demands for political change and social
justice met with full repression
Protest movement turns into armed conflict.
With External intervention, leads to collapse
of regime and state
Post-uprising reality: no central state
institutions to address SJ issues
15. Issues of SJ aggravated by
◦ Shift from old socialist commitments to neo liberal
policies.
◦ Marginalization and repression of old rural power bases
◦ Rising corruption, inequality and repression
Regime response to protests turns into civil war
Issues of SJ sidelined by inflamed sectarian and
ethnic atavisms,
and by regional and international proxy conflict
Socio-economic indicators in downward free fall.
16. SJ and political grievances become entangled
in sectarian and regional tensions.
External support enables quick repression
Reversion to status quo ante
17. SJ issues of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment,
water scarcity turn into elite conflict among
tribal and regional leaders
Transition and national dialogue essentially a
reshuffle among elites
Horizontal not vertical negotiations
Yet, Yemen avoids collapse or disintegration
SJ issues still on the table, but Yemen does
not have the resources or governance
capacity to address them
18. Islamist party wins elections
More moderate and pragmatic leadership as
compared to Egyptian MB; Strong labor movement
and civil society
Islamists take path of inclusion and negotiation
Parties arrive at consensus over constitution and
way forward.
Some success in managing public finances and
beginning subsidy reform
Reasonably placed to address SJ issues
Some political consensus, manageable finances,
governance capacity and relatively small population
19. Islamists choose exclusion and consolidation
Alienate other parties and elements of regime
Reproduced patterns of corruption and
repression
No coalitions or will to undertake needed
fiscal and economic measures
Deterioration of national unity and security
Deterioration of socio-economic indicators
20. Emphasis on security and stability
New constitution includes much on SJ and
promises large public outlays
Technocratic government manages transition
But unable to undertake transformative
decisions
21. Has current popularity to consider
transformative decisions
So far no clear or new socio-economic vision
Not clear what alliances and ruling coalition
he will assemble: relations with business
class, regime elements, middle class, lower
class, youth?
Egypt in difficult position to address SJ
issues:
◦ Stretched public finances, large population,
sluggish governance, no clear coalition for reform
22. Transitions always difficult and take time
Economic decline on average five years
Arab transitions rougher than most
In some cases led to complete state collapse
or civil war
SJ has taken a back seat to political,
ideological, and in some cases sectarian
issues
SJ indicators have regressed in all cases to
different degrees
23. Absence of a clear vision, even among
thinkers, as to necessary way forward.
Absence of significant party or coalition that
can carry SJ issues forward
But SJ issues will remain fundamental drivers
of political demand and pressures
Successful leaders and parties will be those
that can enunciate vision and build coalitions
to address SJ issues
Rulers that ignore them, do so at their own
peril
Role of ERF and groups like it to develop the
required vision and necessary policies to
address these issues.
