EXPERIMENT 1 OBSERVATION OF MITOSIS IN A PLANT CELLData Table.docx

EXPERIMENT 1: OBSERVATION OF MITOSIS IN A PLANT
CELL
Data Tables
Table 1: Mitosis Predictions
Predictions
Supporting Evidence
Table 2: Mitosis Data
Stage
Number of Cells in Stage
Total Number of Cells
Calculated % of Time Spent in Stage
Interphase
Prophase
Metaphase
Anaphase
Telophase

Cytokinesis
Table 3: Stage DrawingsCell StageDrawing
Interphase
Prophase
Metaphase
Anaphase
Telophase
Cytokinesis
Post-Lab Questions
1. Label the arrows in the slide image with the appropriate stage
of the cell cycle.
A ___________________
B ___________________
C ___________________
D ___________________
E ___________________
F ___________________

2. In what stage were most of the onion root tip cells? Does this
make sense?
3. As a cell grows, what happens to its surface area-to-volume
ratio (hint: think of a balloon being blown up)? How does this
ratio change with respect to cell division?
4. What would happen if mitosis were uncontrolled?
5. How accurate were your time predictions for each stage of
the cell cycle?
6. Discuss one observation you found interesting while looking
at the onion root tip cells.
©eScience Labs, 2016
COUN 506
Journal Article Review Instructions
You will write aJournal Article Review, which will be based on
your choice of articles from the professional, peer-reviewed
journalarticles provided in the Assignment Instructions folder.
No outside articles will be accepted. Each Journal Article
Review must be approximately 3–5 double-spacedpages (not
including the title and reference pages) and must be created in a
Microsoft Word document. Use the following guidelines to
create your paper:
1. Provide a title page in currentAPA format including only
your name, the paper title (referring to the article title), and the
institutional affiliation (Liberty University). Keep in mind that
current APA recommends that the title length not exceed 12
words. Use the running head in the appropriate place and a page
number on every page. Divide your summary into sections with
the following Level One headings: Summary, Interaction, and
Application (review the current APA Manual for guidance on
levels of headings if needed).
2. Develop a summary of the main concepts from the article. Do

not duplicate the article’s abstract. If the article describes a
research study, include brief statements about the hypotheses,
methods, results, discussion, and implications. If any test
measures or statistical methods used are given in the article, do
not provide detailed descriptions of these. Short direct
quotations from the article are acceptable, but avoid long
quotations in a paper this size. This section is the foundation of
your Journal Article Review (at least a third of your paper).
Make sure that you include the core points from the article,
even if it means a longer section. Do not reference any
additional articles in your summary.
3. In your own words, interact (in approximately 1 page) with
the article. Appropriate comments for this part of the paper
should include, but are not limited to: your initial response to
the article, comments regarding the study’s design or
methodology (if any), insights you gained from reading the
article, your reasons for being interested in this particular
article, any other readings that you may plan to do based upon
having read the article, and other thoughts you have that might
further enhance the discussion of your article. Your subjective
comments in this section must be clearly tied to main points
from the article, not peripheral ideas. Again, do not reference
any other article.
4. In your final section (in approximately 1 page) write how you
would apply the information you have learned from this article
to a particular counseling situation. This could be in a church or
clinical session. Develop this section as if you are a pastor or
clinician and your parishioner or client has come to you with a
problem—grief, depression, substance abuse, infidelity, etc.—
and is needing your help. Adequately describe the counseling
scenario, including the presenting problem. Draw out concepts
from the article and apply the concepts to the scenario as if you
were guided only by the content of the article. Show the reader
how you are expressly drawing from the journal article in this

application section; be sure to cite correctly in current APA
format.
5. Provide the complete citation for the article being
summarized on a reference page in current APA format.
6. Additionally, consider any other information from previous
articles you may have read in previous courses, or in other
places you have encountered information relating to the themes
in the article you are reviewing. For example, does the ACA
Code of Ethics (2014) have anything to say about the themes
being discussed in your journal article? Are there passages of
Scripture that directly relate to the article? Are there ideas and
concepts from previous courses you have taken in your program
here at Liberty or elsewhere that relate to the article you have
chosen? You are encouraged to include them, and make sure
you include proper citations and references at the end of your
paper.
References:
Entwistle, D. N. (2015). Integrative approaches to psychology
and Christianity: An introduction to worldview issues,
philosophical foundations, and models of integration (3rd ed.).
Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers. ISBN:
9781498223485.
Hawkins, R., & Clinton, T. (2015). The new Christian
counselor: A fresh biblical & transformational approach.
Eugene, OR: Harvest House. ISBN: 9780736943543.
McMinn, M. R. (2011). Psychology, theology, and spirituality
in Christian counseling (Revised ed.). Carol Stream, IL:
Tyndale House. ISBN: 9780842352529.
Page 1 of 2

HALL AND FINCHAMSelf–forgiveness
SELF–FORGIVENESS:
THE STEPCHILD OF FORGIVENESS RESEARCH
JULIE H. HALL AND FRANK D. FINCHAM
University at Buffalo, The State University of New York
Although research on interpersonal forgiveness is burgeoning,
there is little con-
ceptual or empirical scholarship on self–forgiveness. To
stimulate research on this
topic, a conceptual analysis of self–forgiveness is offered in
which self–forgiveness
is defined and distinguished from interpersonal forgiveness and
pseudo self–for-
giveness. The conditions under which self–forgiveness is
appropriate also are iden-
tified. A theoretical model describing the processes involved in
self–forgiveness
following the perpetration of an interpersonal transgression is
outlined and the pro-
posed emotional, social–cognitive, and offense–related
determinants of self–for-
giveness are described. The limitations of the model and its
implications for future
research are explored.
In recent years there has been an upsurge of interest in
interpersonal for-
giveness. Prior to 1985 there were only five studies on
forgiveness
(Worthington, 1998), a number that since has increased by over
4,000%
(PsycINFO, July 2003). However, intrapersonal or self–
forgiveness has

received remarkably little attention in this burgeoning
literature. We
therefore offer a conceptual analysis of this stepchild of the
forgiveness
literature, with the goal of stimulating research on the topic.
WHAT IS SELF–FORGIVENESS?
Few definitions of self–forgiveness can be found in the social
sciences lit-
erature, but those that do exist emphasize self–love and respect
in the
face of one’s own wrongdoing. In the philosophy literature,
self–for-
giveness has been conceptualized as a show of goodwill toward
the self
while one clears the mind of the self–hatred and self–contempt
that re-
621
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 5, 2005,
pp. 621-637
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Julie Hall, Dept of Psy-
chology, Park Hall, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260;
E–mail: [email protected]
falo.edu
sult from hurting another (Horsbrugh, 1974). Similarly,
Holmgren
(1998) argues that in self–forgiveness, the offender recognizes
his/her

intrinsic worth and its independence from his/her wrongdoing.
Philos-
ophers posit that self–forgiveness involves a restoration of self–
respect
(Dillon, 2001; Holmgren, 1998) and consists of three elements
(Holmgren, 1998); first, self–forgiveness requires an objective
fault or
wrongdoing; second, negative feelings triggered by this offense
must be
overcome; and, third, an internal acceptance of oneself must be
achieved.
In the psychology literature, self–forgiveness has been defined
as “a
willingness to abandon self–resentment in the face of one’s own
ac-
knowledged objective wrong, while fostering compassion,
generosity,
and love toward oneself” (Enright, 1996, p. 115). Bauer et al.
(1992) offer
a more abstract definition, considering self–forgiveness as the
shift from
self–estrangement to a feeling of being at home with the self.
Bauer et al.
(1992) emphasize that self–forgiveness entails placing the
transgression
in a larger perspective and realizing that one is merely human.
Self–for-
giveness also can be conceptualized using a phase model, in
which an in-
dividual moves through an uncovering phase (e.g., denial, guilt,
shame), a decision phase (e.g., change of heart), a work phase
(e.g.
self–awareness, compassion), and finally an outcome phase
(e.g.,
finding meaning, new purpose; Enright, 1996).

In the relative absence of a rapprochement between writings on
in-
terpersonal forgiveness and self–forgiveness, we build upon
work on
interpersonal forgiveness in offering a conceptual analysis of
self–for-
giveness that might both integrate writings on forgiveness and
guide
future research on self–forgiveness. Paralleling McCullough,
Worthington, and Rachal’s (1997) definition of interpersonal
forgive-
ness as a process of replacing relationship–destructive
responses with
constructive behavior, we conceptualize self–forgiveness as a
set of
motivational changes whereby one becomes decreasingly
motivated to
avoid stimuli associated with the offense, decreasingly
motivated to
retaliate against the self (e.g., punish the self, engage in self–
destruc-
tive behaviors, etc.), and increasingly motivated to act
benevolently to-
ward the self. Unlike interpersonal forgiveness, however, in
self–for-
giveness avoidance is directed toward the victim and/or toward
thoughts, feelings, and situations associated with the
transgression.
This type of avoidance reduces the likelihood that painful
thoughts
and feelings about the offense will be activated. When self–
forgiveness
is achieved, such avoidance is unnecessary because the offender
is at
peace with his or her behavior and its consequences. Retaliation

and
benevolence in both self-forgiveness and interpersonal
forgiveness are
focused toward the offender.
622 HALL AND FINCHAM
The above conception of self–forgiveness is rooted in the
tradition of
cognitively oriented approaches to motivation initiated by
expec-
tancy–value theory, later exemplified in Weiner’s attributional
theory of
motivation (e.g., Weiner, 1986) and currently found in goal
theoretic ap-
proaches to motivation (e.g., Gollwitzer & Brandstatter, 1997).
COMPARING SELF-FORGIVENESS AND INTERPERSONAL
FORGIVENESS
In addition to similarities at the definitional level, interpersonal
and
intrapersonal forgiveness share other features. These two forms
of for-
giveness are both processes that unfold over time and require an
objec-
tive wrong for which the offender is not entitled to forgiveness
but is
granted forgiveness nonetheless. Self–forgiveness also parallels
inter-
personal forgiveness in that it is different from condoning or
forgetting a
transgression. To forgive oneself is not to say that one’s
behavior was ac-

ceptable or should be overlooked (Downie, 1965). In addition,
as with in-
terpersonal forgiveness, self–forgiveness is a conscious effort
that does
not occur unintentionally (Horsbrugh, 1974).
Despite these similarities, important distinctions can be drawn
be-
tween interpersonal and intrapersonal forgiveness and these are
sum-
marized in Table 1. As mentioned previously, the two forms of
forgive-
ness differ in the focus of forgiveness–related motivations. In
addition,
even though interpersonal forgiveness is unconditional, self–
forgive-
ness need not be (Horsbrugh, 1974). One may set up conditions,
such
that the self is only forgiven if he or she continues to meet these
condi-
tions (e.g., “I will forgive myself as long as I continue to make
repara-
tions to the victim”). Self–forgiveness often entails a resolution
to
change (Enright, 1996) and to behave differently in the future.
Thus, if
this resolution is broken, self–destructive motivation may re–
emerge
and overpower self–constructive motivation.
Why is it that such conditions cannot also be applied to
interpersonal
forgiveness? According to Judaism, forgiveness is contingent
upon the
offender’s teshuvah, or process of return, which entails specific
actions

on the part of the transgressor (Dorff, 1998; Rye et al., 2000).
In contrast,
the unconditional view of interpersonal forgiveness is consistent
with
Christian tradition. Philosophers argue that interpersonal
forgiveness is
necessarily unconditional, noting that because interpersonal
forgive-
ness is permanent and cannot be “undone,” the imposition of
conditions
is inappropriate (Horsbrugh, 1974). Exploration of this debate is
beyond
the scope of the current paper. Rather, we contend that while
interper-
s o n a l f o r g i v e n e s s i s m o s t o f t e n v i e w e d a s u n
c o n d i t i o n a l ,
self–forgiveness can easily be conditional or impermanent.
SELF–FORGIVENESS 623
Interpersonal forgiveness and self–forgiveness are also distinct
in that
interpersonal forgiveness does not imply reconciliation with the
of-
fender whereas reconciliation with the self is necessary in self–
forgive-
ness (Enright, 1996). As Enright (1996) points out, “Certainly
one may
mistrust oneself in particular area, but one does not remain
alienated
from the self” (p. 116). Using this framework, self–forgiveness
can be
viewed as the vehicle through which self–reconciliation occurs.
Thus,

the consequences of not forgiving the self typically may be
more severe
than those associated with a lack of interpersonal forgiveness.
In inter-
personal transgressions, the negative thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors
toward a transgressor that can occur in the absence of
forgiveness may
not be activated unless the victim is in contact with the
perpetrator.
When one harms oneself or someone else, however, the offender
must
continue to face himself/herself and his/her actions. It is
impossible to
escape the situation by avoiding the transgressor as one might
do in the
case of interpersonal transgressions. This fact has led some to
suggest
that failure to forgive the self may result in self–estrangement
or self–de-
struction (Horsbrugh, 1974).1 However, to date, there has been
no em-
pirical work that compares the consequences of self–
unforgiveness and
interpersonal unforgiveness. As such, this remains a purely
theoretical
argument. Several other distinctions between intrapersonal and
interpersonal forgiveness will be drawn throughout this paper.
Beyond the similarities and differences outlined between
interper-
sonal and intrapersonal forgiveness, how are these processes
related
temporally? Is one a necessary precondition for the other? It has
been
suggested that self–forgiveness facilitates interpersonal

forgiveness by
allowing one to identify with one’s offender (Snow, 1993).
Similarly,
Mills (1995) argues that interpersonal forgiveness is more
authentic and
meaningful when it follows self–forgiveness. If indeed we
cannot for-
give others unless we can forgive ourselves, then the role of
self–forgive-
ness extends far beyond internal, self–focused processes and
into the do-
main of interpersonal relationships. However, thus far, there is
no
evidence on the temporal relation between self–forgiveness and
inter-
personal forgiveness and there is limited evidence on the
association be-
tween the two constructs, which suggests that they are unrelated
or
weakly related (e.g., Macaskill, Maltby, & Day, 2002; Mauger
et al., 1992;
Tangney, Boone, Dearing, & Reinsmith, 2002; Thompson et al.,
2005).
1. This is not meant to imply that feelings of interpersonal
unforgiveness cannot be
chronically activated and therefore occur in the absence of
relevant external stimuli. Simi-
larly, we do not discount the possibility that failure to forgive
another can sometimes have
severe consequences. Rather, our description focuses on
prototypic cases.

FORGIVING THE INJURY TO THE SELF OR
THE INJURY TO THE OTHER?
Whereas interpersonal forgiveness focuses upon harm to the
victim that
results from the behavior of a transgressor, there are two
possible foci of
self–forgiveness (Horsbrugh, 1974). One may try to forgive the
self for a
self–imposed injury or, alternatively, for an injury to another
person.
Most commonly, these two factors are interrelated, as the reality
of
harming another person also inflicts hurt upon the self. Given
these two
forms of hurt, which is the target of self–forgiveness?
Horsbrugh (1974)
has argued that one can forgive the self only for the hurt one
has brought
to another person. The self–imposed hurt is real, but it is not the
target of
self–forgiveness. Rarely does one say, “I am sorry that I hurt
myself”—it
is more common to regret the actions that led to the self–
imposed hurt
(e.g., “I can’t believe I did X”). This position rests on the view
that actions
are not the proper target of forgiveness. Instead, forgiveness
focuses on
the hurt resulting from actions, as, without the consequential
hurt, it is
argued that there would be little or nothing to forgive. For
example, one
may be unfaithful to one’s romantic partner, but the partner’s
forgive-

ness is relevant only if the infidelity violated the norms of that
relation-
ship and hurt one’s partner. Under different conditions, such as
an open
relationship, the same actions would not require forgiveness
because
they would not result in hurt. This position can be challenged
because of
TABLE 1. Distinctions between Intrapersonal and Interpersonal
Forgiveness
Intrapersonal or
Self–forgiveness
Interpersonal
Forgiveness
Form of objective
wrongdoing
Behaviors, thoughts,
desires, feelings
Behaviors
Focus of forgiveness Harm to self or to another Harm to victim
Empathy Inhibits forgiveness Facilitates forgiveness
Limits Conditional or
unconditional
Unconditional
Reconciliation with victim Required Not required

Focus of avoidance Transgression–related
stimuli (e.g., victim,
situations, thoughts, etc.)
Offender
Focus of revenge Offender (i.e., self) Offender (i.e., other)
Focus of benevolence Offender (i.e., self) Offender (i.e., other)
Consequences of
unforgiveness
Extreme Moderate
its failure to accommodate abrogation of the moral order
(failure to be-
have in a way that one ought to behave), which is considered to
be
wrong even in the absence of hurt and therefore still might be
the proper
target of forgiveness.
An additional problem is that the above conceptualization of
self–for-
giveness neglects an entire domain in which self–forgiveness
may be rel-
evant. Although transgressions in which the offender and victim
are the
same do not meet its criteria, these offenses are nevertheless
painful.
Thus, we argue that self–forgiveness also can apply to
situations in
which the only victim of one’s behavior is the self. There are
innumera-

ble situations in which we inflict harm on ourselves (“let
ourselves
down”) and these range from academic failures (e.g., failing a
test be-
cause of lack of preparation) to social failures (e.g., failing to
be appro-
priately assertive). Although loved ones also may be affected by
these
behaviors, the primary victim is oneself. How do we forgive
ourselves
for such actions? This domain of self–forgiveness may be
especially rele-
vant to certain clinical populations, such as substance abusers
or indi-
viduals with eating disorders. These individuals may suffer
from guilt
and/or shame because of their inability to stop engaging in self–
destruc-
tive behavior. However, it is important to recognize that
injuries to the
self can occur without any overt, behavioral wrongdoing. The
self also
can be injured by wrongful thoughts, feelings, or desires
(Dillon, 2001).
Dillon (2001) provides examples of behaviors that might require
self–forgiveness, such as racist thoughts or fears, wishes for the
death of
a sick parent, or sexual excitement over violence.
Finally, we can distinguish forgiving the self for the hurt that
results
from a particular act from forgiving the self for the hurt that
results from
recognizing any character flaw underlying the act (for “being
the type of
person who acts like this”). It is hypothesized that linking the

act to a
character flaw is more likely to the extent that there is a history
of similar
behavior and that self–forgiveness is correspondingly harder to
achieve
under these conditions.
TRUE SELF–FORGIVENESS VERSUS PSEUDO SELF–
FORGIVENESS
In order to truly forgive oneself, one must either explicitly or
implicitly ac-
knowledge that one’s behavior was wrong and accept
responsibility or
blame for such behavior (Dillon, 2001; Holmgren, 1998).
Without these el-
ements, self–forgiveness is irrelevant and pseudo self–
forgiveness be-
comes likely. Pseudo self–forgiveness occurs when an offender
fails to
acknowledge wrongdoing and accept responsibility. In such a
situation,
one may indicate that one has forgiven oneself when, in fact,
one does not
believe one did anything wrong. The realization of wrongdoing
and ac-
ceptance of responsibility generally initiate feelings of guilt and
regret,
which must be fully experienced before one can move toward
self–for-
giveness. Attempts to forgive oneself without cognitively and

emotion-
ally processing the transgression and its consequences are likely
to lead to
denial, suppression, or pseudo self-forgiveness. Thus, our
definition of
self–forgiveness as motivational change rests on the assumption
that the
offender both acknowledges wrongdoing and accepts
responsibility.
Without this assumption, there can be no motivational change,
as the of-
fender already is motivated to act benevolently toward the self.
However,
this distinction rarely is made in the empirical literature. Self–
forgiveness
often is studied using a narrative method in which individuals
recall situ-
ations whereby they forgave themselves or did not forgive
themselves.
However, it is unclear whether this method measures true
forgiveness or
pseudo–forgiveness. It is not made explicit that forgiving
individuals also
accept responsibility and wrongdoing and that they fully realize
the con-
sequences of their actions. This problem is exacerbated when
self–for-
giveness is assessed using rating scales as responses to items in
such
scales appear not to distinguish genuine forgiveness from
pseudo–for-
giveness (e.g., “I hold grudges against myself for negative
things I’ve
done,” Thompson et al., 2005; “I find it hard to forgive myself
for some
things I have done,” Mauger et al., 1992). Perhaps not

surprisingly, there
is some evidence that self–forgiveness is positively related to
narcissism
and self–centeredness and negatively related to moral emotions
such as
guilt and shame (e.g., Tangney et al., 2002).
Forgiveness requires a great deal of inner strength, and thus
pseudo–for-
giveness may be an appealing alternative that (on the surface)
has the same
benefits as true self–forgiveness. The offender is absolved of
guilt and is
able to feel and act benevolently toward the self. However,
while
pseudo–forgiveness and true forgiveness may appear to have the
same re-
sults, they are drastically different. True self–forgiveness is
often a long and
arduous process that requires much self–examination and may
be very un-
comfortable. In contrast, pseudo self–forgiveness may be
achieved by
self–deception and/or rationalization, in which the offender
fails to “own
up” to his/her behavior and its consequences (Holmgren, 2002).
Given
these differences, are the end results of true forgiveness and
pseudo–for-
giveness really indistinguishable? There is little data to answer
this ques-
tion, but it is doubtful that pseudo–forgiveness yields the same
emotional,
psychological, and physical benefits as true self–forgiveness.
IS SELF–FORGIVENESS ALWAYS APPROPRIATE?

What of situations in which an individual perceives he/she is
responsi-
ble and feels guilty about an event but is not actually at fault?
This is of-
ten the case with traumatic events, such as the suicide of a
loved one.
Survivors may blame themselves and feel guilty when they are
not re-
sponsible for the event. Is self–forgiveness pertinent in these
situations?
The answer arguably is yes, but only under certain conditions.
If a per-
son is adamant in the belief that he or she is responsible for an
event,
self–forgiveness would only be appropriate provided bona fide
at-
tempts first had been made to examine the evidence, to identify
the per-
son’s wrongful behavior, and to determine accurately the degree
of
responsibility the individual should accept for the event. In
some cases
(e.g., being the victim of a rape), the person may mislabel a
normal be-
havior as wrongful (e.g., “I should not have worn that dress") or
accept
responsibility even in the absence of any wrongful behavior
(e.g., “I
should not have walked home”). In the absence of wrongful
behavior

there is nothing to forgive.
There are two other common concerns that must be addressed
when
considering the appropriateness of self–forgiveness. The first is
whether
self–forgiveness is justified when an individual has committed a
truly
heinous offense, such as rape or murder. This is a controversial
topic.
Scholars have debated whether victims of such transgressions
should
forgive their attackers (e.g., Murphy, 2002), and this debate
extends to
self–forgiveness. The issue at the core of this controversy
actually may
be the distinction between pseudo self–forgiveness and true
self– for-
giveness. Few things are more offensive than observing a
criminal who
seemingly has no remorse for his/her actions. However, it is
unlikely
that this individual has achieved true self–forgiveness. It is far
more
likely that he/she is engaging in pseudo–forgiveness. It is
probably rare
that criminals are able to reach true self–forgiveness, as the
processes in-
volved may be too painful and difficult. But for an offender
who admits
to behaving in an unspeakable manner and who is genuinely
pained by
his/her behavior and its consequences, self–forgiveness is less
contro-
versial. Holmgren (2002) takes a similar stance, arguing that
genuine

self–forgiveness is always appropriate. This is admittedly a
sensitive
issue, and there is no easy answer.
A second frequent concern related to self–forgiveness is that it
is a sign
of disrespect toward the victim, and thus is only appropriate
after the of-
fender is granted forgiveness by the victim. However, self–
forgiveness
is only disrespectful to the victim when it takes the form of
pseudo–for-
giveness, in which case the offender does not appreciate the
gravity of
his or her actions and their consequences. When an offender
acknowl-
edges and accepts responsibility for wrongdoing and is willing
to apolo-
gize or make restitution to the victim, self–forgiveness is not a
sign of
disrespect (Holmgren, 1998). Thus, receiving forgiveness from
the vic-
tim is not required for self–forgiveness to be appropriate.
DISPOSITIONAL OR OFFENSE–SPECIFIC?
Self–forgiveness need not apply only to specific transgressions
through
which one has harmed oneself or another person, it also can be
consid-
ered across time and a range of transgressions, as a personality
trait.

Trait self–forgiveness is positively associated with self–esteem
and life
satisfaction and negatively associated with neuroticism,
depression,
anxiety, and hostility (Coates, 1997; Maltby, Macaskill, & Day,
2001;
Mauger et al., 1992). It is weakly related, and in some studies
unrelated,
to forgiveness of others (Macaskill et al., 2002; Tangney et al.,
2002;
Thompson et al., 2003). Although self–forgiveness across time
and trans-
gressions is an important dispositional construct, it is also
critical to ex-
amine how self–forgiveness may vary from offense to offense
and to
consider the emotional, social–cognitive, and offense–related
factors
that may facilitate self–forgiveness following a specific
transgression.
TOWARD A MODEL OF SELF–FORGIVENESS
Having drawn several relevant conceptual distinctions, we are
now in a
position to offer an initial model of self–forgiveness. In turning
to this
task, we immediately face a choice, as the processes involved in
self–for-
giveness are likely to differ according to whether the focus is
upon inter-
personal or intrapersonal transgressions. We doubt that self-
forgiveness
related to both types of transgressions can be captured
adequately in a
single model and therefore focus our efforts on only one, self–

forgive-
ness of interpersonal transgressions. We posit that the
motivational
changes that define self–forgiveness are driven by cognitive,
affective,
and behavioral processes, which are laid out in our model.
These pro-
cesses are the means to an end; namely, motivational change
that consti-
tutes self–forgiveness. Figure 1 depicts our model of self–
forgiveness.
We first describe the components of the model before outlining
its
implications for future research.
EMOTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF SELF–FORGIVENESS
Guilt. Given the long history of the concept of guilt in the
psychologi-
cal literature, it is surprising that the relation between guilt and
self–for-
giveness has received relatively little attention (for an
exception, see
Tangney et al., 2002). Guilt can be assessed as a trait or a state,
and it in-
volves tension, remorse, and regret resulting from one’s actions
(Tangney, 1995a). Guilt is “other–oriented” in that it focuses on
one’s ef-
fect on others. Guilt fosters other–oriented empathic concern
and moti-
vates the offender to exhibit conciliatory behavior toward the
victim,

630
F
IG
U
R
E
1
.
P
ro
p
o
se
d
m
o
d
el
o
f
se
lf
-f

o
rg
iv
en
es
s.
such as apologizing, making restitution, or seeking forgiveness
(Ausubel, 1955; Tangney, 1995b). However, while there likely
is a posi-
tive association between conciliatory behaviors and self–
forgiveness,
the other–oriented empathy fostered by guilt actually may
inhibit
self–forgiveness. Zechmeister and Romero (2002) found that,
compared
to individuals who had not forgiven themselves for an offense,
those
who had reached self–forgiveness were less likely to report
guilt and
other–focused empathy. Thus, while there appears to be a
negative asso-
ciation between guilt and self–forgiveness, this association
likely is
mediated by conciliatory behavior and empathic processes.
Shame. Unlike guilt, which involves a focus on one’s behavior,
shame
is associated with a focus on the self (Lewis, 1971; Tangney,
1995a).
Lewis’s (1971) observations are useful for illustrating this
distinction:

“The experience of shame is directly about the self, which is the
focus of
evaluation. In guilt, the self is not the central object of negative
evalua-
tion, but rather the thing done or undone is the focus. In guilt,
the self is
negatively evaluated in connection with something but is not
itself the
focus of the experience.” (p. 30)
As with guilt, there likely is a negative association between
shame and
self–forgiveness. However, whereas guilt may promote
conciliatory be-
havior toward one’s victim, shame is more likely to promote the
self–de-
structive intentions associated with failure to forgive the self
because the
offender may view the offense as a reflection of his or her self–
worth.
Shame often motivates an avoidance response that is consistent
with a
lack of self–forgiveness (Tangney, 1995a). Thus, the negative
association
between shame and self–forgiveness is expected to be stronger
than the
relation between guilt and self–forgiveness.
SOCIAL–COGNITIVE DETERMINANTS OF SELF–
FORGIVENESS
Attributions. Research on interpersonal forgiveness has shown
that
benign attributions for an offender’s behavior are associated
with more

forgiveness, while maladaptive attributions are associated with
less for-
giveness (Boon & Sulsky, 1997; Bradfield & Aquino, 1999;
Darby &
Schlenker, 1982; Fincham, Paleari, & Regalia, 2002; Weiner,
Graham, Pe-
ter, & Zmuidinas, 1991). This link between attributions and
interper-
sonal forgiveness may generalize to self–forgiveness.
Zechmeister and
Romero (2002) found that offenders who had not forgiven
themselves
were more likely to maladaptively attribute their behavior to
arbitrary
or senseless motives than self–forgiving offenders. Also, self–
forgiving
individuals were more likely to adaptively attribute some of the
blame
to the victim. Given the tendency to attribute one’s own
behavior to ex-
ternal forces and attribute other’s behavior to internal forces
(i.e., the ac-
tor–observer effect; Jones & Nisbett, 1972), this process
actually may en-
hance self–forgiveness. Thus, as with interpersonal forgiveness,
external, unstable, and specific attributions for one’s own
behavior may
facilitate self–forgiveness, while internal, stable, and global
attributions
may make self–forgiveness more difficult. Weiner (1986, 1995)
argues

that causal attributions give rise to emotional reactions (e.g.,
guilt),
which then influence the offender’s behavior. For example, an
offender
who maladaptively attributes his/her own behavior may feel
excessive
guilt and be more likely to then seek forgiveness.
OFFENSE–RELATED DETERMINANTS OF SELF–
FORGIVENESS
Conciliatory Behavior. The extent to which an offender
apologizes and
seeks forgiveness for a transgression is positively associated
with the
victim’s level of interpersonal forgiveness (e.g., Darby &
Schenkler,
1982; McCullough et al., 1997; McCullough et al., 1998;
Weiner et al.,
1991). Seeking forgiveness from the victim of a transgression or
from a
Higher power also may play an important role in the offender’s
self–for-
giveness. Offenders may be indirectly motivated to seek
forgiveness by
their attributions for their own behavior or the severity of the
offense
(Sandage, Worthington, Hight, & Berry, 2000) or directly
motivated by
guilt (Ausubel, 1955; Tangney, 1995b). Apologies and other
conciliatory
behaviors toward the victim may serve the function of easing
the of-
fender’s guilt about the transgression. Goffman (1971) posits:
“An apology (and hence also a confession) is a gesture through

which
the individual splits himself into two parts, the part that is
guilty of an
offense and the part that dissociates itself from the deceit and
affirms a
belief in the offended rule” (as cited in Gold & Weiner, 2000, p.
292).
This idea is empirically supported by Zechmeister and Romero
(2002),
who found that self–forgiving offenders were more likely to
report apol-
ogizing and making amends to the victim than were offenders
who did
not forgive themselves. Similarly, Witvliet, Ludwig, and Bauer
(2002)
showed that when offenders imagined seeking forgiveness from
some-
one they had wronged, their perceptions of self–forgiveness
increased
and their basic and moral emotions improved. Thus, conciliatory
behav-
iors toward one’s victim may promote self–forgiveness by
absolving an
offender of his or her guilt.
Perceived Forgiveness from Victim or Higher Power. A r e l a t
e d f a c t o r
that may influence self–forgiveness is the extent to which an
offender be-
lieves he/she is forgiven by the victim or by a Higher power.

Witvliet et
al. (2002) found that imagining a victim’s merciful response to
one’s for-
giveness–seeking efforts resulted in physiological responses
consistent
with increases in positive emotion and decreases in negative
emotion.
Further, imagining seeking forgiveness and merciful responses
from
victims resulted in greater perceived interpersonal forgiveness
among
offenders. Thus, actual apologies and conciliatory behavior
toward a
victim also may increase a transgressor’s sense of being
forgiven by the
victim, thereby reducing guilt. However, Zechmeister and
Romero
(2002) compared self–forgiving offenders with offenders who
were not
able to forgive themselves and found no difference in reports of
being
forgiven by the victims. In light of these contradictory findings,
the rela-
tion between forgiveness by the victim and the offender’s self–
forgive-
ness requires further clarification. It is also important to
consider the role
of forgiveness from a Higher power. There is preliminary
evidence to
suggest that perceived forgiveness from God is positively
associated
with self–forgiveness. Cafaro and Exline (2003) asked
individuals to fo-
cus on an incident in which they had offended God and found
that
self–forgiveness was positively correlated with believing that

God had
forgiven the self for the transgression. Thus, we predict that
perceived
forgiveness from both the victim and a Higher power will be
positively
associated with self–forgiveness.
Severity of the Offense. The association between a
transgression’s se-
verity and interpersonal forgiveness is among the most robust
relations
in the forgiveness literature. More severe (hurtful)
transgressions are as-
sociated with less forgiveness (Boon & Sulsky, 1997; Darby &
Schenkler,
1982; Girard & Mullet, 1997). The severity of an offense, in
terms of its
consequences, also may predict an offender’s degree of self–
forgiveness.
Although self–forgiveness requires an acknowledged
wrongdoing that
negatively affects another person, it is possible that an offender
also may
realize some positive consequences of the transgression. For
example,
the offender may feel that he or she has grown from the event or
that his
or her post–offense relationship with the victim is stronger.
Offenders
who have forgiven themselves report more positive
consequences and
fewer lasting negative consequences of the transgression than
do of-
fenders who have not forgiven themselves (Zechmeister &
Romero,
2002). Thus, it is predicted that more severe transgressions will

be
associated with lower levels of self–forgiveness.
LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL
It is important to note that this model is not intended to be a
comprehen-
sive model of self–forgiveness. There are undoubtedly other
factors that
may facilitate self–forgiveness, such as relationship-level
factors (e.g.,
was the victim a loved one or a stranger?) and personality-level
factors
(e.g., neuroticism). However, in light of research on
interpersonal for-
giveness (McCullough et al., 1998), it is expected that these
variables are
more distally related to self–forgiveness than the determinants
dis-
cussed here. The proposed model also is limited in that there is
as yet no
evidence that supports causal relationships among these
variables.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Notwithstanding the limitations noted, the model outlined has
several
implications for future research. Chief among these is that it has
the po-
tential to inform self–forgiveness interventions, which have

prolifer-
ated in the popular literature (e.g., Rutledge, 1997). To date,
however,
there are no empirically validated interventions designed
specifically
to facilitate self–forgiveness, although several have been
effective in
promoting interpersonal forgiveness (see Worthington, Sandage,
&
Berry, 2000). This is a much needed area of development in the
forgive-
ness literature, as being unable to forgive oneself is associated
with
lower self–esteem and life satisfaction and higher neuroticism,
depres-
sion, anxiety, and hostility (Coates, 1997; Maltby et al., 2001;
Mauger et
al., 1992). Given the deleterious effects of self–unforgiveness,
why
have no interventions been developed to target these processes?
This
gap in the forgiveness literature is most likely due to the fact
that very
little is known about factors that may influence self–
forgiveness. Thus,
the proposed model has the potential to aid in the development
of
self–forgiveness interventions, as targeting factors such as
attributions
and guilt or increasing conciliatory behavior toward the victim
may
increase self–forgiveness.
However, in order to conduct such an intervention and evaluate
its ef-
fects, one must have a reliable method of measuring self–

forgiveness.
Although there are a few instruments to assess dispositional
self–for-
giveness (Mauger et al., 1992; Thompson et al., 2003), there are
no pub-
lished measures for self–forgiveness for a specific transgression
(see
Wahkinney, 2002, for an unpublished measure). Thus, the
definition
and model of self–forgiveness proposed here provide a
foundation for
the development of a measure of offense–specific self–
forgiveness. Such
a measure would be not only important in assessing the effects
of for-
giveness interventions but also critical to the future of self–
forgiveness
research. As mentioned, much of the literature on self–
forgiveness as-
sesses the construct dichotomously (forgave versus didn’t
forgive),
which is incompatible with the view of self–forgiveness as a
process
with many levels. A measure of self–forgiveness that assesses
the extent
of constructive and destructive motivations will enable
researchers to
differentiate complete lack of self–forgiveness from partial
self–forgive-

ness or total self–forgiveness. Such a measure also will aid in
assessing
self–forgiveness from many different perspectives, initially
through
cross–sectional and/or retrospective research and ultimately in
experimental or longitudinal studies. The current paper is
offered as a
framework from which such a measure could be developed.
Although this paper is intended to stimulate interest and
research on
self–forgiveness, it is critical that this research be founded on a
solid the-
oretical base and that this foundation be established before a
literature
on self–forgiveness begins to take shape. Thus, the most
pressing issue
for future self–forgiveness research is the empirical validation
of a theo-
retical model such as the one proposed here. It will be essential
to evalu-
ate how well this model fits actual data regarding the self–
forgiveness of
interpersonal transgressions. It also will be important to
determine
whether specific determinants are associated with constructive
(i.e. be-
nevolence) and/or destructive (i.e., avoidance, retaliation)
aspects of
self–forgiveness. Once such a model is established, more
specific
hypotheses about the nature and course of self–forgiveness can
be
explored.
CONCLUSION

Self–forgiveness has been overshadowed by research on
interpersonal
forgiveness and, as a consequence, has received little attention
in the for-
giveness literature. We believe that this dearth of research is the
result of
oversight and limited understanding of self–forgiveness and that
it does
not reflect the unimportance of self–forgiveness or a lack of
interest in
the topic. The present paper is intended to stimulate research on
the
topic by offering a much needed theoretical model of self–
forgiveness of
interpersonal transgressions. The value of the model lies not
only in the
extent to which it receives empirical support but also in its
ability to
facilitate research on self–forgiveness.
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CHRISTIAN CLIENTS' PREFERENCES REGARDING
PRAYER AS A COUNSELING INTERVENTION
Weld, Chet, EDD;Eriksen, Karen, PHD
Journal of Psychology and Theology; Winter 2007; 35, 4;
ProQuest
pg. 328

Therapists' Integration of Religion and
Spirituality in Counseiing: A Meta-Analysis
Donald F. Walker, Richard L. Gorsuch, and Siang-Yang Tan
The authors conducted a 26-study meta-analysis of 5,759
therapists and
their integration of religion and spirifuaiity in counseiing. Most
therapists
consider spirituaiity relevant to their iives but rareiy engage in
spirituai
practices or participate in organized religion. Marriage and
famiiy thera-
pists consider spirituaiity more reievant and participate in
organized
religion to a greater degree than therapists from other
professions. Across
professions, most therapists surveyed (over 80%) rareiy discuss
spirituai or
reiigious issues in training, in mixed sampies of reiigious and
secular thera-
pists, therapists' reiigious faith was associated with using
religious and
spiritual techniques in counseiing frequently, willingness to
discuss reli-
gion in therapy, and theoretical orientation.
Therapists' integration of religion and spirituality in counseling

has beenevaluated in 26 studies of 5,759 psychotherapists from
the fieldsof clinical and counseling psychology, psychiatry,
social work, and pas-
toral counseling. We suggest that it is now appropriate to
perform a meta-
analysis of the existing research. We discuss the relevance of
religion and
spirituality to counseling, review methods of integrating
religion and spiri-
tuality in coimseling, and conduct a meta-analysis of studies
concerning thera-
pists' integration of religion and spirituality into counseling.
Relevance of Religion and Spirituality to Counseling
In the area of multicultural theory, psychologists have
continued to call for
psychological treatments and interventions that are culturally
sensitive and
relevant and that integrate aspects of client culture into the
counseling pro-
cess (D. W. Sue & Sue, 1999; S. Sue, 1999). In addition,
psychologists have
increasingly recognized that religion and spirituality are
relevant aspects of
client diversity that psychologists should be able to recognize
while treat-
ing religious or spiritual clients with sensitivity (Ridley, Baker,
& Hill, 2001;
D. W. Sue, Bingham, Porche-Burke, & Vasquez, 1999).
Richards and Bergin (2000) have proposed that the integration
of religious
and spiritual culture in counseling is conceptually similar to the
dynamics of
more general multicultural counseling attitudes and skills

previously advanced
by other multicultural researchers (e.g., D. W. Sue & Sue,
1999). Richards and
Bergin (2000) further suggested that multicultural competent
attitudes and skills
regarding religion and spirituality encompass several domains.
Donald F. Walker, Richard L. Gorsuch, and Siang-Yang Tan,
Graduate School of Psychology,
Fuller Theological Seminary. A portion of this research was
presented at the 2001 annual meeting
of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco.
Correspondence concerning this article
should be addressed to Donald F. Walker, Fuller Theological
Seminary, Graduate School of Psy-
chology, 180 N. Oakland Avenue, Pasadena, CA 91101 (e-mail:
[email protected]).
Counseiing and Vaiues • October 2004 • Voiume 49 69
Among the domains of multicultiaral attitudes and skills most
pertinent to this
study are (a) an awareness of one's own cultural heritage, (b)
respect and comfort
with other cultures and values that differ from one's own, and
(c) an awareness of
one's helping style and how this style could affect clients from
other cultural back-
grounds. Hence, knowledge of religion and spirituality is an
important element of
therapists' multicviltural competency.
Religion and spirituality are important aspects of multicultural
competency for

therapists to consider given the religious culture in America.
Researchers have found
that more than 90% of Americans claim either a Protestant or
Catholic religious
affiliation (Keller, 2000), 40% of Americans attend religious
services on a weekly
basis, and more than two thirds of Americans consider personal
spiritual prac-
tices to be an important part of their daily lives (Hoge, 1996).
Thus, it is important
for counselors to understand how their own religious and
spiritual culture may
differ from that of the general populace and the clients whom
they serve.
This meta-analysis has several aims. One purpose of this study
was to examine
via meta-analysis the spiritual and religious culture and values
of counselors. We
use this information to suggest ways in which therapists'
religious cultures may
differ from those of their clients and to explore how such
differences might be con-
structively approached in counseling. A second purpose of this
study was to ex-
plore via meta-analysis links between the personal religiousness
of counselors and
therapists and several counseling-related variables. We use this
information to
understand across studies how therapists' religiousness relates
to their helping
style with clients from varying religious and spiritual
backgrounds.
Methods of Integrating Religion and Spirituality in
Counseling

One issue that has been problematic when discussing methods
of integrating reli-
gion and spirituality in counseling has been agreeing on exactly
what is being inte-
grated. Pargament (1999), for example, noted that psychologists
of religion rarely agree
on specific definitions of religion and spirituality. However, on
a broad level, religion
has typically been defined as that which is more organizational,
ritual, and ideologi-
cal, whereas spirituality has typically been defined as that
which is more personal,
affective, and experiential (Pargament, 1999; Richards &
Bergin, 1997). In this study,
the same broad definitions will be used when referring to
religion and spirituality.
Therapists have proposed several different methods of
integrating religious and
spiritual culture into counseling. According to Tan (1996),
explicit integration refers to
a more overt approach that directly and systematically deals
with spiritual or religious
issues in therapy, and uses spiritual resources like prayer,
Scripture or sacred texts, referrals
to church or other religious groups or lay counselors, and other
religious practices, (p. 368)
Tan noted that this approach to coimseling emphasizes both
therapist and cli-
ent spirituality and integrates counseling with some form of
spiritual direction.
Another approach to integrating religion and spirituality in

counseling is
the implicit integration of religion or spirituality. Implicit
integration is "a more
covert approach that does not initiate the discussion of religious
or spiritual is-
70 Counseling and Values • October 2004 • Volume 49
sues and does not openly, directly, or systematically use
spiritual resources like
prayer and Scripture or other sacred texts, in therapy" (Tan,
1996, p. 368). An ex-
ample of implicit integration is basing therapeutic values on
theistic principles from
an organized religion. Implicit integration maybe the preferred
mode of integra-
tion for therapists who profess a religious faith or engage in
spiritual practices but
who are not trained in the explicit integration of religion and
spirituality.
Shafranske (1996) conducted a review of training in explicit and
implicit inte-
gration. His review suggested that "education and training
within the area of psy-
chology and religion appears to be very limited" (p. 160) and
that the majority of
therapists never discuss religious or spiritual issues in their
clinical training. Richards
and Bergin (1997) noted that such therapists run the risk of
practicing outside the
boundaries of professional competence or imposing their own
values on religious
or spiritual clients. Shafranske (1996) suggested that most

therapists' approach to
the integration of religion and spirituality in psychotherapy was
not based on graduate
trairung in the area but centered primarily on the personal
religious and spiritual
experience of the therapist.
A third form of integration is intrapersonal integration, which
refers to the manner
in which a therapist uses his or her personal religious or
spiritual experience in
counseling (Tan, 1987). An example of intrapersonal integration
is silently pray-
ing for a client during counseling.
This study attempts to determine how therapists practice their
religion and spiri-
tuality and to determine the degree to which the personal
religious faith of thera-
pists is associated with the use of religion and spirituality in
counseling. This is
accomplished through the use of meta-analysis.
The Use of Meta-Analysis as a Statistical Technique
Although meta-analysis often involves aggregating results from
experimental studies,
it can also be used in aggregating correlational data, as was
done in this meta-analysis.
As Rosenthal (1991) explained, the only constraint in
determining the relationship
between two variables is that the relationship be of interest to
the investigator. The
investigator deterrrvines relationships between variables by
obtairung an estimate
of the effect size between two variables, which some studies do

not provide along
with their tests of significance (Rosenthal, 1991). In these
instances, the test of sig-
riificance that is provided (whether yj^, t, or F) is transformed
to an r for the purpose
of computing an overall averaged r across studies.
Hvmter and Schmidt (1990) noted that one criticism of the
meta-analysis of
correlations is that it typically provides a slightly downward
bias in the esti-
mate of population correlations. In practical terms, this is not
problematic; if
anything, such correlations are more conservative estimates of
the relationship
between two variables.
In the current meta-analysis, we considered several issues to be
relevant.
The first issue we considered was the personal religion and
spirituality of
therapists. As mentioned earlier, this information is used to
determine how differ-
ent the culture of counselors might be from their clients and,
thus, how the need for
respect for, and comfort dealing with, cultures other than one's
own might present
Counseling and Values • October 2004 • Volume 49 71
in a counseling situation. A second issue we considered
concerned therapists'
personal religiousness and their use of explicit integration of
religion and spiritu-

ality in counseling. This information is used to inform how
therapists' personal
religiousness may relate to their helping styles with religious
clients.
Finally, we made comparisons, where possible, between samples
that were iden-
tified as containing explicitly religious therapists and sample
groups that may have
contained a mix of secular and religious therapists. We also
made comparisons
between therapists from different professional backgrounds to
understand how
each of the multicultural competencies (respect for cultures
other than one's own,
one's helping style as a therapist) might be different across
professions.
Method
Literature Search
We identified studies for inclusion in the meta-analysis using
literature searches in
the PsycINFO and Dissertation Abstracts International
databases using the search
terms counseling and religion, counseling and spirituality,
psychotherapy and religion, a n d
psychotherapy and spirituality. We sought unpublished studies,
such as unpublished
doctoral dissertatior^, in order to reduce die "file drawer
problem" identified by
Rosenthal (1979), in which the meta-analysis indicates a higher
effect size than actu-
ally exists because studies with nonsigruJficant effects have not
been located.

We identified 40 studies through the literature search. Of those
studies, we elimi-
nated six dissertations because they were not empirical. We
eliminated three other
empirical dissertations because they did not contain variables of
interest. We elimi-
nated a final dissertation because it was not available, and the
author did not
respond to an e-mail message that had been sent. We eliminated
2 published studies
by explicitly Christian therapists (Ball & Goodyear, 1991;
Worthington, Dupont,
Berry, & Duncan, 1988) because they were methodologically
different from the
other studies, making it impossible to include them in the meta-
analysis. Two
studies (Bergin & Jensen, 1990; Jensen & Bergin, 1988) were of
the same sample.
We considered these to be 1 study. One study (Sorenson &
Hales, 2002) was a
new analysis of two samples already included in the total data
set, so this study
was reviewed but not included in the analyses. Thus, the final
number of studies
included in the analyses was 26.
Demographic Characteristics of the Total Sample
We aggregated the demographic characteristics of the total
sample across stud-
ies to describe the sample. Regarding professional backgrounds,
clinical and coun-
seling psychologists composed 44.15% of the total sample,
explicitly Christian
counselors 21.30%, marriage and family therapists 14%, social
workers 5.85%,

psychiatrists 4.32%, explicitly Mormon psychotherapists 3.54%,
psychotherapists
2.77%, licensed professional counselors 1.82%, and pastoral
counselors 1.71%. (Per-
centages do not total 100 due to rounding.) With respect to
gender, men composed
58.11% of the sample, and women composed 41.89% of the
sample. The sample
ranged in age from 22 to 89 years, with a mean age of 46.1.
Only five studies re-
ported the race of the therapist sample. The authors of those
five studies estimated
72 Counseling and Values • October 2004 •Volume 49
the percentage of White therapists to be 83% to 95% (Bilgrave
& Deluty, 1998,2002;
Case & McMinn, 2001; Forbes, 1995; Sheridan, Bullis, Adcock,
Berlin, & Miller, 1992).
Computation of Effect Size
First, we converted all relationships of interest to an r, and then
we calculated a
weighted overall averaged r by weighting each individual
correlation by the sample
size associated with each individual study. Second, we
calculated the overall sig-
nificance level of each correlation by the method of adding z
scores. Following the
technique proposed by Rosenthal (1991), we added z scores
from samples and then
divided the sum of the z scores by the square root of the number
of studies. Third,

we compared the significance of several correlations using
Fisher's test of signifi-
cance between independent correlations (Cohen & Cohen,
1983). We used appen-
dixes from Cohen and Cohen to transform correlations to z
scores. Then, we divided
the difference between the z equivalents by the standard error to
obtain a normal
curve deviate. We used appendixes provided in Cohen and
Cohen to obtain the p
value for the significance test. Finally, we added the raw scores
from some items of
interest (such as religious denomination) across studies.
Results
Personal Religion and Spirituality of Therapists
Religious affiliations of therapists from mixed samples were
provided in 18 studies
of 3,813 therapists. The majority of therapists in these samples
were Protestant
(34.51%), Jewish (19.61%), or Catholic (13.89%). Religious
denominations among
therapists from different professional backgrovinds are
presented in Table 1. Clinical
and counseling psychologists were more likely to be either an
agnostic (x̂ = 10.27,
p < .005) or atheist (x̂ = 27.19, p < .005) when compared with
marriage and fam-
ily therapists but were not more likely to be either an atheist or
agnostic when
compared with social workers. Clinical and counseling
psychologists were also
more likely to endorse no religion than either marriage and
family therapists

(X
̂ = 34.13, p < .0001) or social workers (x̂ = 7.98, p < .01).
Five studies (N = 1,738) of therapists from mixed samples and 2
studies
(N = 762) of explicitly religious therapists reported frequency
of therapists'
participation in organized religion or church activities. Among
therapists from
mixed samples, 21.1% reported being inactive, whereas 44.8%
reported being
active. Among explicitly religious therapists, only 8.79%
reported being inac-
tive, compared with a majority (82.54%) who reported being
active. With respect
to professional background, more marriage and family therapists
were active
(59.58%, 2 studies, N = 438) than either secular clinical and
counseling psy-
chologists (39.75%, 5 studies, N = 1,122) or psychiatrists (32%,
1 study, N = 71).
Psychiatrists also endorsed inactive (68%) more frequently than
either clini-
cal and counseling psychologists (54.63%) or marriage and
family therapists
(16.21%). Possible reasons for these findings may have been
that 15% of the
sample in Winston's (1991) study of marriage and family
therapists was com-
posed of pastoral counselors, as well as the fact that
psychiatrists were repre-
sented in only a small, single sample.

TABLE 1
Differences in Religious Denomination by Professional
Background
Affiliation
Protestant
Jewish
Catholic
Atheist
Agnostic
No religion
Other
Psychoiogists*
N
593
339
250
31
74
270
297
%
35.85
20.49
15.11
1.87
4.47
16.32

17.96
Marriage and
Famiiy Therapists"
N
433
110
126
3
6
71
117
%
50.0
12.7
14.6
0.03
0.07
8.2
13.5
Sociai Workers'
N
109
56
32
3
6

27
39
%
40.1
20.6
11.8
1.1
2.2
9.9
14.3
Note. Percentages do not total 100 due to rounding.
°Ten studies. ""Six studies. 'Three studies.
Six studies (JV = 1,678) were used to calculate frequency of
personal spiritual
practices (such as prayer or meditation). We observed large
differences between
therapists from mixed samples (4 studies, N=916) and explicitly
religious (2 stud-
ies, N = 762) therapists. Among therapists from mixed samples,
40.6% reported
engaging in personal spiritual practices on a weekly or daily
basis compared
with 78.8% of explicitly religious tiierapists. Among therapists
from mixed samples,
45.5% reported engaging in personal spiritual practices
infrequently or never
compared with orJy 9.1% of explicitly religious therapists.
Religion and Spirituality in Counseling

To determine how often therapists use religious or spiritual
techniques in
counseling, we added responses and then averaged them across
eight stud-
ies (total N = 2,253). Four studies (N = 1,102) of therapists
from mixed samples
reported on the number of therapists who had previously used a
religious
or spiritual technique in therapy. The majority of therapists
from mixed
samples (66.6%) reported using prayer in therapy; 64.1%
reported using
religious language, metaphors, and concepts in therapy; and a
minority
(44.4%) reported using scripture in therapy.
Four studies (N = 1,037) reported explicitly religious therapists'
frequency
of using spiritual or religious techniques with religious clients
rather than
the percentage of those therapists who had used a technique
before. Among
explicitly religious therapists, forgiveness was used in 42.2% of
therapy cases,
use of scripture/teaching of biblical concepts in 39.2%,
confrontation of sin
in 32.6%, and religious imagery in 18.2% of therapy cases.
Prayer is a spiritual technique that has been studied in several
ways among ex-
plicitly religious therapists. Three studies (N = 1,097) reported
that 73.6% of explic-
itly religious therapists prayed for their clients outside of
session. Five studies (N=
1,372) reported therapists' frequency of in-session prayer with

clients. In those five
studies, therapists used in-session prayer in 29.1% of therapy
cases.
We calculated separate overall averaged rs for therapists from
mixed samples
and explicitly religious therapists to determine the relationship
between thera-
pists' personal religious faith and therapists' frequency of use of
religious
and spiritual techniques in counseling. Authors of the studies
that examined
therapists' use of religious and spiritual techniques in
counseling typically
summed a list of individual religious and spiritual techniques
and then cor-
related that scale with a self-report measure of either religious
attitudes or
religious behaviors. The overall averaged r among therapists
from mixed
samples (using six studies, N = 873) was .24, p < .0002. The
correlation among
explicitly religious therapists was higher, overall averaged r =
.41, p < .0001.
We also calculated separate overall averaged rs for therapists
from different
professional backgrounds to determine the relationship between
therapists' per-
sonal religious faith and use of spiritual techniques in
counseling. The overall

averaged r for marriage and family therapists was .12, p = .005.
The correlation
among clinical psychologists was higher, overall averaged r =
.30, p < .001.
We conducted a series of tests of the difference between
correlations using
Fisher's comparison of r (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). The
correlation between
personal faith and therapists' use of spiritual techniques among
explicitly
religious therapists was significantly higher than the same
correlation among
therapists from mixed samples, p < .0001. Only one study
(Forbes, 1995) com-
puted a correlatiori between training in religious and spiritual
issues and use
of spiritual techniques in therapy (r = .38). This correlation was
not statisti-
cally significantly different from the correlation between
personal faith and
use of spiritual techniques among explicitly religious therapists
{p = .12). Fi-
nally, the correlation between personal religious faith and use
of spiritual tech-
ruques among marriage and family therapists in mixed samples
was compared
with the same correlation among clinical psychologists from
mixed samples.
This correlation was significantly higher for clinical
psychologists {p = .004).
Finally, we calculated the frequency with which therapists from
mixed
samples discussed religion and spirituality issues during
training using four

studies {N = 1,156). The majority of therapists (82%) reported
that they never
or rarely discussed religious or spiritual issues in training, 13.6
% stated that
they sometimes did, and 4.3% reported they discussed them
often.
Relationship of Personal Religion to Counseling-Related
Variables
We calculated the relationship between therapists' personal
religiousness and
opermess to discussing religious issues in counseling using an
overall aver-
aged r. The overall averaged r among therapists from mixed
samples (3 stud-
ies, N = 216) was equal to .37, p < .02, compared with an
overall averaged r of
.39, p = .007, using all 4 studies, and with .40 in the Jones,
Watson, and Wol-
fram (1992) study of religious therapists. These correlations
were not statisti-
cally different. Finally, we calculated an overall averaged r
between the personal
religious faith of the therapist and therapist theoretical
orientation among thera-
pists from mixed samples (5 studies, N = 1,474). This
correlation was equal to
.25, p < .001. (As noted earlier, Sorenson & Hales, 2002,
performed a reanalysis
of two data sets already included in the meta-analysis. As part
of an analysis
of covariance including other variables, they found that
religious therapists
trained at secular programs were significantly more likely, F[l,
396] = 19.82,

Counseling and Values • October 2004 "Volume 49 75
p < .001, to use explicit religious and spiritual interventiors
thari were reli-
gious therapists trained at explicitly religious training
programs.)
Discussion
One issue we examined in this study was the religious and
spiritual cultural
heritage of psychotherapists. The results confirm that the
religious and spiri-
tual cultural heritage of psychotherapists differs from that of
the average
American. Indeed, the majority of therapists from mixed
samples were affili-
ated with a religious denomination but were largely inactive
within organized
religion. This contrasts sharply with the general U.S.
population, because
approximately 40% of Americans attend church on a weekly
basis (Hoge, 1996).
In addition, although the majority of psychotherapists claim that
spirituality
is relevant to them, most engage in personal spiritual practices
infrequently,
whereas approximately two thirds of Americans consider
spiritual practices
such as prayer an important part of their daily lives (Hoge,
1996). Thus, if a
therapist comes from a religious and spiritual cultural heritage
that differs

from the client's, he or she should consider the potential impact
of their cul-
tural differences on the course of treatment.
Therapists' religious cultural heritage may be an especially
salient issue for
clinical and counseling psychologists, who were more likely to
endorse athe-
ism, agnosticism, or no religion than either marriage and family
therapists or
social workers. Among Americans claiming a religious
affiliation, the majority
of them (56.6%) are Protestant, followed by Catholic (37.8%),
with people from
Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, or other religious backgrounds
composing the remaining
5.5% of religious people in America (Keller, 2000). Thus,
religious cultural differ-
ences with regard to denomination (as well as the beliefs and
practices associ-
ated with being in a denomination) between client and therapist
are likely to exist,
particularly for clinical and counseling psychologists.
Clinical and counseling psychologists who find it difficult to
understand the
cultural heritage of clients who practice their spirituality within
the context of an
organized religion may wish to consult with explicitly religious
therapists on
such therapy cases. Explicitly religious therapists were more
similar to the ma-
jority of Americans, as measured by previous polls (e.g., GaUup
& Lindsay, 1999),
with respect to religious affiliations and personal spiritual
practices. Thus, ex-

plicitly religious therapists may be a particularly valuable
resource for therapy
cases with religious clients when the consulting therapist does
not have a good
understanding of the cultural heritage of the client.
It is clear from the results that personal religiousness on the
part of both explic-
itly religious therapists and therapists from mixed samples was
associated with
being able to integrate religion and spirituality into several
aspects of counseling
(e.g., the use of spirituality, being willing to discuss religious
issues, even choice
of theoretical orientation). Given the lack of training regarding
the integration of
religion and spirituality into counseling, it seems that most
integration of reli-
gion and spirituality in covmseUng occurs through intrapersonal
integration as
a result of therapists' own religious or spiritual experience. As
such, it seems that
76 Counseling and Values • October 2004 "Volume 49
explicitly religious therapists (who engage more frequently in
religious and spiri-
tual practices), rather than nonreligious therapists, would be
better equipped in
some Instances to provide religious and spiritual interventions
for clients.
One danger in providing religious and spiritual interventions is
that the

lack of formal training to supplement therapists' personal
religious or spiri-
tual experience creates a risk of therapists imposing their own
values or
applying religious and spiritual interventions inappropriately.
Given that
therapists do use their own personal religious and spiritual
experience in
integrating religion and spirituality into counseling, additional
training, when
offered, should address how to make appropriate use of one's
own reli-
gious and spiritual experience when integrating religion and
spirituality
into counseling, as well as training regarding clients' religious
backgrounds
and the appropriateness of various religious and spiritual
interventions with
clients from differing religious backgrounds.
Training need not occur solely in the classroom but could also
be effectively
provided in the context of supervision or consultation on
therapy cases involv-
ing religious and spiritual issues. There are a few explicitly
religious graduate
training programs in clinical psychology that have been
accredited by the Ameri-
can Psychological Association. It is hoped that graduates of
such programs would
be equipped to provide appropriate consultation and/or
supervision. However,
the efficacy of these training programs in helping therapists
integrate religion
and spirituality into counseling above and beyond drawing on
their own per-

sonal religious and spiritual experiences has yet to be
documented.
The results indicate that many therapists are already making use
of reUgion
and spirituality in therapy. Therapists from mixed samples
reported a much larger
percentage using religious and spiritual techniques in therapy
than the percent-
age of explicitly religious therapists reported using religious or
spiritual tech-
niques in therapy. However, studies of explicitly religious
therapists reported how
often they used a technique rather than the number of
participants in the sainple
who had ever used a technique at aU, as was done in studies
using mixed samples
of therapists. Thus, the different research questions make direct
comparisons
between therapists difficult. However, one noteworthy trend
across both groups
of therapists is that scripture and prayer were spiritual
techniques that were com-
monly used by both groups. This finding suggests that prayer
and scripture, in
particular, are religious and spiritual interventions that
therapists should receive
training on for counseling.
Limitations of the Current Study and Suggestions for
Future Research
The first limitation of the study is that we analyzed two major
variables
that had varying degrees of relatedness. Rosenthal (1991)
referred to this

common limitation of meta-analysis studies as the problem of
heterogeneity
of method. As did Glass (1978), Rosenthal also referred to this
as the "apples
and oranges issue" and suggested that they are good things to
mix when at-
tempting to generalize to fruit.
Counseling and Values • October 2004 •Volume 49 77
One variable was the diverse professional background of the
therapists in
the meta-analysis. The analyses indicated differences among
therapists in the
areas of religious denomination and organized religion and in
the relation-
ship between personal religious faith and use of spirituality in
therapy. It would
have been preferable to make explicit comparisons of therapists
from differ-
ent professional backgrounds for every analysis. This limitation
was unavoid-
able, because some major primary studies grouped therapists
together and
some analyses did not have a sufficient number of
representatives from vari-
ous professions to allow for explicit comparisons.
Other variables with varying degrees of relatedness were the
religious and
spiritual variables used in the analyses. We aggregated each of
these indi-
vidual variables to represent global religious and spiritual
constructs, but we

might have obtained larger effect sizes had there been a greater
degree of
specificity between independent and dependent variables in the
analyses.
A second limitation of the study was the possible sampling bias
of therapists
from mixed samples. Because most studies designated as being
a mixed sample
did not explicitly state whether they were sampling therapists
from explicitly
religious programs along with therapists from secular programs,
it is difficult
to know just how religious the therapists in some of these
samples were. This
was less problematic when authors reported the number of
explicitly religious
therapists in their sample (e.g., Kochems, 1983; Winston,
1991). In such cases, it
would have also been desirable to split the samples and analyze
them sepa-
rately, but the primary studies themselves have not done so.
A final limitation was the use of small subsamples of the data to
perform analy-
ses. This is a common practice when examining different
independent and
dependent variables in meta-analyses of correlations, because
not all studies
using correlations will use the same independent or dependent
variables in the
analysis. However, it would have been desirable to have more
studies available
on which to do some of the analyses, particularly when
attempting to compare
religious and secular therapists and therapists from different

professional back-
grounds. The small number of published studies is informative
because it leads
to the conclusion that the field could clearly benefit from
additional research
regarding therapists' integration of religion and spirituality in
counseling.
Most important, we suggest that studies are needed that relate
meaningful
variables to therapists' use of religion and spirituality in
counseling with a
variety of religious clients. Therapists' frequency and
competency of use of
spiritual techniques need to be assessed, rather than whether a
therapist has
used a technique, as some studies have done. Such precision
will allow fur-
ther refinement and training for therapists who see religious and
spiritual
clients. Only two studies (Forbes, 1995; Sorenson & Hales,
2002) have exam-
ined the relationship of any training variables to therapists'
ability to inte-
grate aspects of clients' religion and spirituality in therapy.
Therapist variables
associated with the integration of religion and spirituality in
counseling have
also yet to be identified. As these and other variables are
identified, clients
who participate in organized religion can look forward to
counseling services
that actively and effectively use their religious culture.

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