LTG (Ret) Richard Zahner delivers the lunch keynote titled: Removing the "Fog" from the Cloud-Generating Clarity in an Age of Government Austerity.

1. REMOVING THE “FOG” FROM
THE CLOUD – GENERATING
CLARITY IN AN AGE OF
GOVERNMENT AUSTERITY
January 30, 2013

2. So What is the Message?
Your Only Task: Remember these
two photos and their message to
the CLOUD technical community.

3. Let’s Start with the Easy One…

4. Engineers or Magicians?
¨ Only humorous until you realize the author is the guy
who “grades your paper” on future funding
approvals by the SECDEF…and no bucks, no “Buck
Rogers”
¨ “Speaking in Tongues” originally alluded to
conveying the message in a form native to the
user…today it more accurately reflects contrived
confusion that reduces leadership confidence
¨ It’s less the technical jargon than the Task/Purpose

5. Creating CLOUDs without Fog…
¨ So why is the Intelligence Community doing CLOUD?
¤ Computing as a Commodity?
¤ Data-Intensive Processing?
¤ Delivering better Security post-WikiLeaks?
¤ Eliminating Analytic Stovepipes?
¤ Reducing the IT costs to sustain IC core mission?
¤ All the “Best Folks in Industry” are doing it…
¤ All/Some/None of the above..
¨ If you don’t know your objective, any path will work!

6. Which Path Taken for Fog Removal?

7. IC CLOUD CONOPS Shifts Focus to Mission
The mission-based cloud CONOP will be a stand alone deck that defines a
mission vision and statements of need

8. If Mission is the Focus of the CLOUD, whose
Mission Needs does it Address?
The CONOP will elaborate the vision into definitions and descriptions of user needs

9. CLOUD USER?
More about HIM later, but…
• Is our focus the analyst “user”?
• The greater IC analytic
workforce?
• Decision-makers in the IC?
• Decision-makers at all
echelons, tactical to National-
Strategic?
Who is ultimately accountable for
Mission Success? Can that
individual(s) express how CLOUD
enables that success?

10. Fog Reduction: Some Initial Conclusions
¨ So why is the Intelligence Community doing CLOUD?
¤ EliminatingAnalytic Stovepipes
¤ Delivering better Security post-WikiLeaks
¤ Reducing the IT costs to sustain IC core mission
n Computing as a Commodity
¤ Data-Intensive Processing
¤ All the “Best Folks in Industry” are doing it…
¤ All of the above…
¨ But is that all to the CLOUD story, or is there more?

11. FUTURE INSTABILITY & THREAT
ANALYSIS – SOLVING A “BIG
DATA” PROBLEM
January 30, 2013

12. In today’s environment, understanding instability, the groups
driving instability and projecting the future accurately is key
¨ How do we better understand and anticipate instability in
foreign countries?
¨ How do we structure ongoing analysis and monitoring of
potential instability around the world?
¨ How do we bring the best thinking to all problems and avoid
being hostage to the “Captain on the account?”
¨ How do we leverage technology to enable this new approach
both regarding ongoing monitoring as well as the in-depth
production needed in crises?

13. Defense Intelligence (and the larger IC) needs an analytical
framework and strategy to better understand threats/problems
¨ Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, we still lack a
unified, predictive approach to the analysis of instability and
future threats
¨ Identifying that there will be challenges in anticipating crises may
be realistic but ultimately unsatisfying to policy makers and
customers
¨ Recognizing that there will be persistent competition that can
lead to strife or conflict is not nearly so important as driving an
effective way to better anticipate and understand it
¨ While presenting a very complex problem, it is not impossible to
frame a new, compelling approach to the intelligence problem
that brings more structure and quality to IC activities

14. Defense and the IC need a new framework suitable for the years
ahead to drive collection and analysis globally
Broad Framework that Defined Defense Intel 1950s-90s
Pre-Conflict Conflict
Indications and Warning Tactical Warning
Capability Assessments/
Intelligence Prep of Battlefield
Special Studies
AOB EOB GOB MOB NOB Tracking / OOB Development
Structured data bases and assessments Leveraging military science and the
measured relative to our own practical realities of deploying large,
capabilities combined arms forces
• The global database and delegated production performed by Service and
Theater Intel Centers under DIA’s direction was foundational during the Cold
War and remains relevant for select advanced countries
• For large portions of the world, however, this legacy approach is no longer
as vibrant—the critical issue in many areas of the world is understanding
and predicting the degree of instability along with relevant para-military
capabilities or irregular warfare capabilities the nation must counter

15. In the last decade, three books may be especially important in
creating a theoretical foundation for a new approach
Title/Author Key Thinking
The Shield of A sweeping look over the past 500 years at the crucial
Achilles, by Phillip interaction of strategy (military especially) and law (structure
Bobbit, 2002 of nations). Five “epochal wars” successively reshaped
government with the most recent ending in 1990. We are in a
new era in which competition is increasingly economic.
Why Nations Fail, A similarly comprehensive history, but focused on why some
by James nations prosper often carries by a virtuous cycle, while others
Robinson and languish or decline into poverty. Plumbs historical answers and
Daron Acemoglu, lays out a strong case that the core analytical issue is the
2012 degree of politically and economically openness of nations.
Governing the Beginning in the 19th century, a series of international
World, by Mark arrangements emerged to govern or stabilize the relations
Mazower, 2012 among nations. Since the 1980s, the prominence of the United
Nations has declined while the IMF and World Bank (along
with various central bankers) have risen in prominence. This
reflects the increasing emphasis on economics.

16. A simple but compelling model at the high level breaks the
problem into two major facets for any state or state-like entity
¨ A state’s strategy (use of force) is
tightly linked to its constitutional
Strategy - Surviving
external conflict structure (exercise of governance/
social compact)
¨ Changes on the part of
Internal – Drive adversaries, disruptive
for legitimacy -- technologies and economic
constitutional development drive adaptation
structure as key
¨ Over time, changes in military
arena prompt successive changes
in how states organize, exercise
governance, and raise revenues

17. Advances in military technology have changed the costs and the
manner in which states organize and vice versa
¨ States have taken various forms in order to raise the revenue required to
equip, train and operate forces that ensure survival
¨ Changes in technology have prompted major adjustments in military forces as
well as the organization/focus of states
¤ Fielding mobile artillery made early forts vulnerable, prompting major
changes in raising armies and taxes
¤ The French Revolution (change in the state) opened the way to broad
conscription and lower-cost mass armies that redefined Europe
¤ A series of technologies (WMD, Internet/social media, Cyber) & strategies
(insurgency/terrorism) over time have made the “weaker party” able to
outlast and outmaneuver the “stronger”
¨ These dynamics play out in discrete cycles marked by “pol-mil phase
transitions” that fundamentally recast the nature of the state; in turn leads to
“epochal conflicts” that define the “winning” form of the recast state

18. Through technological advancement, economic development and
conflict the world is progressing unevenly toward modernity
¨ Historian, lawyer and former NSC staffer Philip Bobbit defines the evolution of states and
conflict in “The Shield of Achilles” with the assertion we are now in a new era
Princely Kingly Territorial State- Nation- Market-
State State State Nation State State
1515-1555 1618-1648 1667-1713 1792-1815 1914-1990
1 2 3 4 5 6
Hapsburg- Thirty Years’ Wars of Wars of the The Long The New Era,
Valois Wars Louis XIV French War (Conflict will likely
Wars Revolution take on new
forms)
Each of five epochal wars brought a particular constitutional order to primacy

19. Decision-making in an Era of Transition
• Classic product of the “State-Nation” era, but
unique in his insights into the struggle for
supremacy among “Nation-State” forms
• Political outlook reflected (and often
directed) transformative currents that created
what we would recognize as the modern UK
nation-state, even if he rejected aspects
• Spent 1930’s in political wilderness, rejected
in 1945…insights often at odds with
accepted policy, failed to sway at key
junctures but ultimately proved correct
Can’t always count on a Churchill
being present; can we create an
analytic framework that informs
leaders of an evolving reality?

20. Arguably, in the current era the dominant competition will be
economic and social/cultural—with the potential for military conflict
¨ The battle between parliamentarian, communist and fascist versions of the
“nation-state” has given way to competing market-state models
¨ One can posit that three market models now vie for dominance/survival
¤ Entrepreneurial
¤ Mercantilist
¤ Managerial
¨ Economies become even more important as targets to be attacked and
defended—knowing these will bring down nations and potentially cultures
¨ While states may continue to field conventional forces, we should expect rising
prominence in other forms
¤ Insurgency-Terrorism
¤ WMD or various forms of strategic levers with potential global reach

21. We will continue to deal with residual nation-state strategies
while seeing emergent forms leveraging market-state capabilities
¨ Countries may persist in conventional strategies, but Western
precision strike/dominant maneuver complex is clear
¤ The capability difference is so stark as to make victory in a strictly
conventional nation-state war seen utterly implausible for most
¤ Yet, many countries maintain conventional forces both for internal
security and regional problems (which can escalate quickly)
¨ So, a three pronged set of major threats emerges for the U.S.
¤ State-based forces also employing asymmetric and mass destruction
capabilities—cyber, nuclear, biological, counter-space
¤ The transnational groups using irregular warfare and terrorist
techniques to outlast our will to remain engaged
¤ The state-based irregular force, combining a “denial mechanism”
that precludes rapid success to the air-ground complex and a
strategic lever that compels actions that culminate short of “victory”

22. A list of realistic global threats (today) is relatively short
¨ Islamic terrorism (Al Qaeda and affiliates)
¨ War with China (very remote possibility and even only with
global potential if inclusive of irregular, asymmetric, and even
terrorist capabilities)
¨ War with Iran (uncertain possibility and even only with global
potential if inclusive of irregular, asymmetric, and even terrorist
capabilities)
¨ Conflict with other leading countries that centers on asymmetric
capabilities
The issue here is identifying those threats (countries and groups) with a specific desire
and set of capabilities to strike at the US/Western interests globally

23. Numerous regional problems need to be screened and prioritized
for analytical attention in light of a market-state regime
¨ Organized crime and insurgency in Latin America/Mexico
¨ Piracy, terrorism, and regional conflict in East Africa
¨ Insurgency, terrorism and unrest in North Africa
¨ Regional conflict: Arab-Israeli
¨ Regional conflict: Iran-Arab/Gulf States
¨ Regional conflict: Turkey-Syria, Iraq
¨ Afghanistan-Pakistan-India
¨ Former Soviet States
¨ East Asia-China Sea
Conflict could break out in any or multiple of these regions creating substantial global
economic problems as well as crises for US/Western Allies

24. Several principals should drive the structure of the new approach
or framework
¨ Instability must be framed broadly
¨ The framework should clearly articulate key issues and
products for each of the major facets of instability from the
global to local (most detailed) level
¨ The Framework must permit drill-down on specific facets of the
problem akin to levels of Digital Terrain Elevation Data - DTED)
¨ Open Source should play a primary foundational role as well
as being leveraged to inform products in crisis
¨ Other intelligence disciplines integrated tightly to elaborate
OSINT
¨ The framework should allow for delegated production, as in
the old order of battle model

25. Assessing stability and threats uniformly requires putting structure
to the model so all are on the same yard stick
¨ Four tensions will be present in
Terrorism every country/entity
¤ Social make-up, immigration,
castes, tribes, etc
¤ The legal environment
¤ Political representation
¤ Economic opportunity
Conventional
Insurgency
All Countries
Moving ¨ Countries/entities might take
Toward any of four (or combinations)
Modernity of strategies
¤ Conventional
¤ Irregular-insurgency
¤ Terrorism
¤ WMD
¨ Capabilities and status in each
WMD element of the model can be
assessed

26. Let the process guide us to a structure for evaluating three levels
of potential instability and threat
¨ Global
¤ Between states or between transnational groups and states
¤ Most likely spawned by economic, social competition
¤ Very limited options for global conflict as it requires global
alliances or transnational groups versus a nation/alliance
¨ Regional
¤ A primary area for conflict that could draw in outside countries/UN
¤ Economics, ethnic and social issues as well as politics are operative
and can drive unrest or conflict in an area of the world
¤ Could manifest any or all of the conflict forms, many regions
potentially vulnerable
¨ Internal Country-Level
¤ Unrest with partner countries, the most violent being waves of
insurgency or terrorism
¤ Threat to American citizens, companies, and government activities

27. We should be able to effectively categorize countries into major
segments that represent degrees of potential instability/threat
Affinity with the west
Oppositional Tacit-Tenuous Strong
Russia, ROK, More likely able to
Large
China Germany, raise a large, modern
Economy
France military force
Iran, Able to raise a force
Rising, Spain, and keep it trained,
DPRK Egypt
Middle Morocco maybe with special
Venezuela
Economy weapons (WMD).
Minimal conventional
Modest, military potential, likely
Small Somalia Kenya
a weak government
Economy creating safe havens
for others

28. Against the common frame, families of analysis activities should
occur on both regularized and ad hoc bases
Same Frame I&W Issue Group Capability Targeting
Three Levels Analytics Analytics Analytics
Which What drives Who, how What Where are
Global threats are the organized, capability the key
really likelihood of vibrancy, and elements we
global conflict resilience limitations can strike
What What drives Which For specific Where are
Regional regional the groups, and scenarios, the key
problems likelihood of all of the net elements we
present risk conflict above capabilities can strike
What issues What are Political, What Where are
Country- are the under- social and government the key
Level indicating lying ethnic and non-gov elements we
crisis dynamics capabilities can strike
The future framework should identify (and adjust over time) the key global and
regional contexts to be monitored for potential crises engagement

29. The Open Source-based Failed States Index is an excellent
example of an approach to the country-level problem
The IC can potentially leverage this effort, but clearly needs to add in multiple dimensions

30. The Failed States Index is built around 12 elements used to
create a relative ranking for every country
This ranking system is populated using software to score open source reporting and roll up
numeric values annually

31. The Failed States Index provides a fascinating start, but lacks
components crucial to the solution to the analytic challenge
Failed States Index Comment
Instability framed broadly 5
Excellent descriptive start.
Missing important categories.
Structured approach to drill 0
Not intended to address this
down (like DTED) need
Founded on OSINT 10
Exemplary effort to harness
the power of open sources
Integrates other disciplines This is an unclassified effort
to elaborate/test and 0 and lacking the “drill down”
provide necessary detail structure would limit
Delegates production 0
Not part of the design
Maps issues and products Not part of the design
0
as user drill down in the
framework

32. A new approach to characterizing stability and threats could
unfold in phases
¨ Phase I – Try it
¤ Like the district-level assessments in Afghanistan, characterize uniformly
the global environment engaging IC analytic centers along with COCOMs
¤ Let the first round be governed but messy
¤ In parallel, work on the theoretical underpinning as well as evaluating the
feedback from the analytic community
¨ Phase II – Improve it
¤ Blend learning from the first round, plus the theoretical and requirements
work to flesh out a mid-term approach
¤ Engage other elements in the community
¤ Develop systems requirements for the long-term technology
¨ Phase III – Routinize It
¤ Put the long-term solution into place: process, technology, partnerships

33. Fog Reduction: Some Final Conclusions
¨ So why should the Intel Community pursue CLOUD?
¤ Data-Intensive Processing (Data & Analytics at Global
Scale) to underpin critical decisions in uncertainty
¤ Eliminating Analytic Stovepipes, foster “best athletes”
¤ Reducing the IT costs to sustain IC core mission
n Computing as a Commodity
¤ Delivering better Security post-WikiLeaks
¤ All the “Best Folks in Industry” are doing it, thus allows
Government to focus on challenge of analytics
¤ All of the above…combined makes a compelling story

34. So Just What was the Message?
IC CLOUD is all about Mission,
supporting complex national security
decisions in an era of uncertainty.
Key challenge now is analytics, not IT.