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SESSION ID:
#RSAC
Hart Rossman
DevSecOps in Baby Steps
CSV-F03
Amazon Web Services Global
Practice Manager- Security, Risk,
and Compliance
@HartDanger
#RSAC
The Journey: Baby Steps to Parkour
2
Getting to DevOps
DevOps to DevSecOps
Planning your Epics & Sprints
Use Cases & Examples
#RSAC
In The Beginning There Was NoOps
3
#RSAC
Security program – Ownership as part of DNA
• Promotes culture of “everyone is an owner” for security
• Makes security stakeholder in business success
• Enables easier and smoother communication
Distributed Embedded
#RSAC
Responsibility & Accountability
Own it.
Govern it.
Not my monkeys; not my circus.
Operating with Shared Responsibility
How do I know?
Do I carry a pager for this service?
Do I make the rules?
Should I be consulted or
informed?
#RSAC
Security as code
1. Use the cloud to protect the cloud
2. Security infrastructure should be cloud aware
3. Expose security features as services via API
4. Automate everything so everything scales
#RSAC
Security as code: Innovation, stability, & security
Business
Development Operations
Build it faster Keep it stable
Security
Protect it
#RSAC
Security as code: A shorter path to the customer
Requirements
Gathering
Release
Automated
Build and
Deploy
Some learning
Minimal learning
Lots of learning
#RSAC
Security as code: Deploying more frequently lowers risk
Smaller effort
“Minimized risk”
Frequent release events:
“Agile methodology”
Time
Change
Rare release events:
“Waterfall methodology”
Larger effort
“Increased risk”
Time
Change
#RSAC
Version
Control
CI Server
Package
Builder
Commit to
Git/master
Dev
Get /
Pull
Code
Send Build Report to Dev
Stop everything if build failed
Distributed Builds
Run Tests in parallel
Code
Config
Tests
Push
Config
Repo
Continuous Integration
#RSAC
Confidence that our code changes will build successfully
Increasing velocity of feedback cycle through iterative change
Bugs are detected quickly
Automated testing reduces size of testing effort
Very fast feedback on the things we can test immediately
What does CI give us?
#RSAC
Continuous Delivery
Version
Control
CI Server
Package
Builder
Deploy
ServerCommit to
Git/master
Dev
Get /
Pull
Code
AMIs
Send Build Report to Dev
Stop everything if build failed
Distributed Builds
Run Tests in parallel
Staging Env
Test Env
Code
Config
Tests
Prod Env
Push
Config
Install
Create
Repo
CloudFormation
Templates for Env
Generate
#RSAC
Automated, repeatable process to push changes to production
Hardens, de-risks the deployment process
Allows detection of failure as quickly as possible in the build
process
Supports A/B testing or “We test customer reactions to features
in production”
Gives us a breadth of data points across our applications
What does CD give us?
#RSAC
Continuous Delivery System
#RSAC
DevOps
Continuous
Delivery
Technology change that
enables
culture change
DevOps
Culture change that
enables technology
change
#RSAC
DevOps to DevSecOps
#RSAC
DevSecOps: Core Principles
1. Secure the toolchain
2. Armor up the workloads
3. Deploy your security infrastructure through the toolchain
#RSAC
DevOps DevSecOps
Version
Control
CI Server
Package
Builder
Deploy
ServerCommit to
repoDev
Pull
Code
AMIs
Send build report to dev and
stop everything if build failed
Staging Env
Test Env
Code
Config
Tests
Prod Env
Push
Config Install
Create
Repo
AWS CloudFormation
templates for Env
Generate
Security
Repository
Vulnerability
and pen
testing
•Security Infrastructure tests
•Security unit tests in app
#RSAC
CI/CD and automation for security infrastructure
Version Control
Build/
compile
code
Dev
Unit test
app code
IT Ops
DR Env
Test Env
Prod Env
Dev Env
Application
Write
app code
Infrastructure
CloudFormation
tar, war, zip
yum, rpmDeploy
app
Package
application
Deploy application
only
Deploy infrastructure
only AMI
Build
AMIs
Validate
templates
Write
infra code
Deploy
infras
Automate
deployment
Artifact Repository
#RSAC
Building DevSecOps teams
• Make DevOps the security team’s job.
• No siloed/walled off DevOps teams.
• Encourage {security} developers to participate openly in the
automation of operations code.
• Embolden {security} operations participation in testing and
automation of application code.
• Take pride in how fast and frequently you deploy.
#RSAC
Planetary Scale from Day 1
Build Security Services
Expose features as API
Plan for Scale
Know your Customers
Utilize customer feedback to Iterate
Internalize your Metrics, let them guide you
#RSAC
Planning your Epics & Sprints
#RSAC
Security as code: Agile user stories
1. Epics vs. stories
An epic is delivered over many sprints; a user story is delivered in
one sprint or less.
Icebox backlog  sprint
2. Product owner
The product owner decides the priority of each story, is responsible
for accepting the story, and is responsible for defining the detailed
requirements and detailed acceptance criteria for the story.
#RSAC
Security as code: Agile user stories
3. Persona (or role)
A persona/role is a fictitious user or actor within or of the system.
4. Acceptance criteria
What does good look like? How will we know?
5. Summary format
Every story should have the same summary format:
As a (persona/role) I want (function) so that (benefit).
#RSAC
Security as code: Security Epics
Shared
Responsibility
Model
Identity and
Access
Control
Logging and
Monitoring
Infrastructure
Security
Data
Protection
Incident
Response &
Forensics
Configuration
and
Vulnerability
Analysis
Big Data and
Predictive
Analytics
#RSAC
Getting Started: IAM
Story: As a IAM administrator I want to continually reduce the
scope of access for humans even as our platform grows. Passwords
and access keys that have not been used recently might be good
candidates for removal.
Sprint 1: Get credential reports and flag credentials not used in last
45 days.
Other sprint ideas can be found at:
http://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-
practices.html
#RSAC
Getting Started: Logging & Monitoring
Story: As a security analyst I want to monitor interactions with AWS
API so that we can baseline user behavior
Sprint 1: Enable AWS CloudTrail globally
Story: As a security operations team member I want to take action
on AWS CloudWatch alarms so that we respond responsibly
Sprint 2: Integrate alerting into security workflow & ticketing
#RSAC
Use Cases & Examples
#RSAC
Building a “Lambda Responder”
AWS CloudTrail Amazon S3 Amazon SNS
#RSAC
Reading events in Lambda
exports.handler = function(event,context) {
var snsMsgString = JSON.stringify(event.Records[0].Sns.Message);
var snsMsgObject = getSNSMessageObject(snsMsgString);
var srcBucket = snsMsgObject.Records[0].s3.bucket.name;
var srcKey = snsMsgObject.Records[0].s3.object.key;
...
function getSNSMessageObject(msgString) {
var x = msgString.replace(//g,’’);
var y = x.substring(1,x.length-1);
var z = JSON.parse(y);
return z;
}
#RSAC
Detecting events in Lambda
…
var EVENT_SOURCE_TO_TRACK = /cloudtrail.amazonaws.com/;
var EVENT_NAME_TO_TRACK = /StopLogging/;
var matchingRecords = records
.Records
.filter(function(record) {
return record.eventSource.match(EVENT_SOURCE_TO_TRACK)
&& record.eventName.match(EVENT_NAME_TO_TRACK);
});
…
#RSAC
Responding to events in Lambda
...
if (matchingRecords.length >= 1) {
console.log('StopLogging detected! Reverting...');
cloudtrail.startLogging(cloudtrailParams, function(err, data) {
...
#RSAC
Responding to events in Lambda
#RSAC
What you do in any IT Environment
• Firewall rules
• Network ACLs
• Network time pointers
• Internal and external subnets
• NAT rules
• Gold OS images
• Encryption algorithms for data in transit and at rest
http://docs.aws.amazon.com/quickstart/latest/accelerat
or-nist/welcome.html
Golden Code: Security Translation to AWS
AWS JSON translation
Gold Image, NTP
and NAT
Network ACLs,
Subnets, FW rules
#RSAC
Security As Code: Using AWS CodeDeploy
Imaging instance memory:
LiME - https://github.com/504ensicslabs/lime
AWS CodeDeploy:
#RSAC
Now What?
#RSAC
“Apply” Slide
37
Make DevOps the security team’s job
Harden your toolchain
Plan your Security Epics
Write your first Security User Story
Sprint!

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DevSecOps in Baby Steps

  • 1. SESSION ID: #RSAC Hart Rossman DevSecOps in Baby Steps CSV-F03 Amazon Web Services Global Practice Manager- Security, Risk, and Compliance @HartDanger
  • 2. #RSAC The Journey: Baby Steps to Parkour 2 Getting to DevOps DevOps to DevSecOps Planning your Epics & Sprints Use Cases & Examples
  • 3. #RSAC In The Beginning There Was NoOps 3
  • 4. #RSAC Security program – Ownership as part of DNA • Promotes culture of “everyone is an owner” for security • Makes security stakeholder in business success • Enables easier and smoother communication Distributed Embedded
  • 5. #RSAC Responsibility & Accountability Own it. Govern it. Not my monkeys; not my circus. Operating with Shared Responsibility How do I know? Do I carry a pager for this service? Do I make the rules? Should I be consulted or informed?
  • 6. #RSAC Security as code 1. Use the cloud to protect the cloud 2. Security infrastructure should be cloud aware 3. Expose security features as services via API 4. Automate everything so everything scales
  • 7. #RSAC Security as code: Innovation, stability, & security Business Development Operations Build it faster Keep it stable Security Protect it
  • 8. #RSAC Security as code: A shorter path to the customer Requirements Gathering Release Automated Build and Deploy Some learning Minimal learning Lots of learning
  • 9. #RSAC Security as code: Deploying more frequently lowers risk Smaller effort “Minimized risk” Frequent release events: “Agile methodology” Time Change Rare release events: “Waterfall methodology” Larger effort “Increased risk” Time Change
  • 10. #RSAC Version Control CI Server Package Builder Commit to Git/master Dev Get / Pull Code Send Build Report to Dev Stop everything if build failed Distributed Builds Run Tests in parallel Code Config Tests Push Config Repo Continuous Integration
  • 11. #RSAC Confidence that our code changes will build successfully Increasing velocity of feedback cycle through iterative change Bugs are detected quickly Automated testing reduces size of testing effort Very fast feedback on the things we can test immediately What does CI give us?
  • 12. #RSAC Continuous Delivery Version Control CI Server Package Builder Deploy ServerCommit to Git/master Dev Get / Pull Code AMIs Send Build Report to Dev Stop everything if build failed Distributed Builds Run Tests in parallel Staging Env Test Env Code Config Tests Prod Env Push Config Install Create Repo CloudFormation Templates for Env Generate
  • 13. #RSAC Automated, repeatable process to push changes to production Hardens, de-risks the deployment process Allows detection of failure as quickly as possible in the build process Supports A/B testing or “We test customer reactions to features in production” Gives us a breadth of data points across our applications What does CD give us?
  • 15. #RSAC DevOps Continuous Delivery Technology change that enables culture change DevOps Culture change that enables technology change
  • 17. #RSAC DevSecOps: Core Principles 1. Secure the toolchain 2. Armor up the workloads 3. Deploy your security infrastructure through the toolchain
  • 18. #RSAC DevOps DevSecOps Version Control CI Server Package Builder Deploy ServerCommit to repoDev Pull Code AMIs Send build report to dev and stop everything if build failed Staging Env Test Env Code Config Tests Prod Env Push Config Install Create Repo AWS CloudFormation templates for Env Generate Security Repository Vulnerability and pen testing •Security Infrastructure tests •Security unit tests in app
  • 19. #RSAC CI/CD and automation for security infrastructure Version Control Build/ compile code Dev Unit test app code IT Ops DR Env Test Env Prod Env Dev Env Application Write app code Infrastructure CloudFormation tar, war, zip yum, rpmDeploy app Package application Deploy application only Deploy infrastructure only AMI Build AMIs Validate templates Write infra code Deploy infras Automate deployment Artifact Repository
  • 20. #RSAC Building DevSecOps teams • Make DevOps the security team’s job. • No siloed/walled off DevOps teams. • Encourage {security} developers to participate openly in the automation of operations code. • Embolden {security} operations participation in testing and automation of application code. • Take pride in how fast and frequently you deploy.
  • 21. #RSAC Planetary Scale from Day 1 Build Security Services Expose features as API Plan for Scale Know your Customers Utilize customer feedback to Iterate Internalize your Metrics, let them guide you
  • 23. #RSAC Security as code: Agile user stories 1. Epics vs. stories An epic is delivered over many sprints; a user story is delivered in one sprint or less. Icebox backlog  sprint 2. Product owner The product owner decides the priority of each story, is responsible for accepting the story, and is responsible for defining the detailed requirements and detailed acceptance criteria for the story.
  • 24. #RSAC Security as code: Agile user stories 3. Persona (or role) A persona/role is a fictitious user or actor within or of the system. 4. Acceptance criteria What does good look like? How will we know? 5. Summary format Every story should have the same summary format: As a (persona/role) I want (function) so that (benefit).
  • 25. #RSAC Security as code: Security Epics Shared Responsibility Model Identity and Access Control Logging and Monitoring Infrastructure Security Data Protection Incident Response & Forensics Configuration and Vulnerability Analysis Big Data and Predictive Analytics
  • 26. #RSAC Getting Started: IAM Story: As a IAM administrator I want to continually reduce the scope of access for humans even as our platform grows. Passwords and access keys that have not been used recently might be good candidates for removal. Sprint 1: Get credential reports and flag credentials not used in last 45 days. Other sprint ideas can be found at: http://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best- practices.html
  • 27. #RSAC Getting Started: Logging & Monitoring Story: As a security analyst I want to monitor interactions with AWS API so that we can baseline user behavior Sprint 1: Enable AWS CloudTrail globally Story: As a security operations team member I want to take action on AWS CloudWatch alarms so that we respond responsibly Sprint 2: Integrate alerting into security workflow & ticketing
  • 28. #RSAC Use Cases & Examples
  • 29. #RSAC Building a “Lambda Responder” AWS CloudTrail Amazon S3 Amazon SNS
  • 30. #RSAC Reading events in Lambda exports.handler = function(event,context) { var snsMsgString = JSON.stringify(event.Records[0].Sns.Message); var snsMsgObject = getSNSMessageObject(snsMsgString); var srcBucket = snsMsgObject.Records[0].s3.bucket.name; var srcKey = snsMsgObject.Records[0].s3.object.key; ... function getSNSMessageObject(msgString) { var x = msgString.replace(//g,’’); var y = x.substring(1,x.length-1); var z = JSON.parse(y); return z; }
  • 31. #RSAC Detecting events in Lambda … var EVENT_SOURCE_TO_TRACK = /cloudtrail.amazonaws.com/; var EVENT_NAME_TO_TRACK = /StopLogging/; var matchingRecords = records .Records .filter(function(record) { return record.eventSource.match(EVENT_SOURCE_TO_TRACK) && record.eventName.match(EVENT_NAME_TO_TRACK); }); …
  • 32. #RSAC Responding to events in Lambda ... if (matchingRecords.length >= 1) { console.log('StopLogging detected! Reverting...'); cloudtrail.startLogging(cloudtrailParams, function(err, data) { ...
  • 34. #RSAC What you do in any IT Environment • Firewall rules • Network ACLs • Network time pointers • Internal and external subnets • NAT rules • Gold OS images • Encryption algorithms for data in transit and at rest http://docs.aws.amazon.com/quickstart/latest/accelerat or-nist/welcome.html Golden Code: Security Translation to AWS AWS JSON translation Gold Image, NTP and NAT Network ACLs, Subnets, FW rules
  • 35. #RSAC Security As Code: Using AWS CodeDeploy Imaging instance memory: LiME - https://github.com/504ensicslabs/lime AWS CodeDeploy:
  • 37. #RSAC “Apply” Slide 37 Make DevOps the security team’s job Harden your toolchain Plan your Security Epics Write your first Security User Story Sprint!