The document discusses the turbulent transitions experienced by the Malakand region of Pakistan, from periods under Shariah law to the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) regulation. It summarizes the establishment of the police force in Malakand after militancy challenged the state's authority, including recruitment of over 2,600 constables, improvements needed to increase the ratio of police to population, and the high morale of police despite 149 officers being martyred during the insurgency period.

1. 1

2. 2

3. 3
INTRODUCITON
Malakand Region was once an attraction for the tourists but the rise of
militancy challenged the writ of the state as a result Malakand remained a primary focus of
electronic media. The news regarding suicide attacks, kidnappings of government officials
and slaughtering of law enforcement personnel were flashed in the media as breaking news.
In order to establish the writ of the state a successful military operation was
carried out during this phase more than two million people were displaced. In fact, durable
and lasting peace can only be achieved with the presence of an efficient, capable and
transparent criminal justice system.
Creation of secure environment cannot be achieved in isolation therefore
cooperation of the community and their confidence in law enforcement agencies is of vital
importance. In post-operation phase the recruitment of Special Police Force (SPF), former
Army personnel, increase in the number of Sub-Division from 13 to 21 and Police Stations
from 45 to 61 were immediately planned and executed. Improvements in the capabilities of
police and its ability to protect the community shall be a continuous and long term agenda
to be pursued.
Soon after the operation, I twice visited all districts of the region and met the
DIG Region, all DPOs, Judges, Community elders and Jail Superintendents and tried to learn
the strengths and weaknesses of the criminal justice system. The completion of this
endeavour was not possible without the support and patronage of Malik Naveed Khan,
Provincial Police Officer, Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, DIG Idrees Khan, Mr. Asim Iman, District
Session Judge, Swat, SP Qazi Farooq, SP Mumtaz Zareen Khan, SP Abdul Rauf, SP Ejaz Khan
and SP Israr Bacha.
SSP Muhammad Ali Khan Babakhel
SSP M-2, National Highways & Motorway Police
e-mail; alibabakhel@hotmail.com
pisces.mohammad@gmail.com

4. 4
ANOTHER TURBULANT TRANSITION IN MALAKAND
MALAKAND
The Malakand Agency was one of the tribal areas of Pakistan until 1970s. It included the
princely states of Chitral, Dir, Swat and an area around the Malakand fort known as the Malakand
Protected Area. In 1970, following the abolition of the princely states, the agency became the
Malakand Division which was divided into districts one of which was the Malakand Protected Area,
known as Malakand District. In 2000 the Malakand Division was abolished. On 28th
July, 1969
princely states of Swat, Dir and Chitral were dissolved and were incorporated in Pakistan. In 1996 Dir
was divided into two administrative districts i.e. Lower Dir and Upper Dir. Today Malakand Region
consist of Dir Lower, Dir Upper, Swat, Chitral, Buner and Shangla districts.
Dir is considered one of the most sensitive areas in Pakistan in term of religious extremism.
Religio-political parties have taken root in Dir, e.g. JUI, JI and TNSM. The development indicators in
Dir have always been discouraging. Dir was ruled by a princely dynasty till 1969. There were limited
facilities for education, health, road, transportation and communication for the inhabitants of the
Dir State.
DIFFERENT PHASES OF TRANSITION:
LAWS
i. SHARIAH LAW (1895 TO 1925)
ii. Shariah Laws / Dasturul Amal (1925 to 1967)
DASTRUL AMAL
There were Jamadars and Subidars, who used to be enlisted on political basis for deciding
cases of petty nature both criminal and civil. They had lesser power than the Tehsildars. Tehsildars
were deciding all type of cases on the basis of Dastrul Amal. The Jamdars, Subidars and Tehsildars
were given full fledged authority.
FRONTIER CRIMES REGULATION (FCR) (1967 TO 1971)
A set of laws first enforced by the British Raj in the Pakhtoons inhabited tribal areas in 1848
to counter the fierce opposition of the Pakhtoons to British rule. The main objective of this
regulation was to protect the interest of British Empire in the area. The regulation was re-enacted in
1873 and again in 1876 with minor modifications. With the passage of time, the regulation was
found to be inadequate and new acts and offences were added to it to extend its scope. This was
done through promulgation of the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901.
The FCR advocates collective punishments and many human rights activists argue it is
against the fundamental human rights.
REGULAR LAW
Regular law was functional in this area upto 1976 but was repelled by “PATA” on the
announcement of the then Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Z.A Bhutto (late).

5. 5
PATA (PROVINCIALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREA)
FROM 1976 TO 1989
Regular law was implemented in this area since the merger upto 1976 on the pattern of the
rest of the country. In 1976 the government without considering the genuine feelings of people of
Malakand replaced the main parts of prevalent procedural law and promulgated the Jirga Laws
commonly known as “PATA” regulation.
It was a combination of authoritarianism, ignorance of the changing social structure of the
Swat Valley and conventions framed to appease the local elite. Judicial authority in PATA was
transferred from the regular courts to the Deputy Commissioners of the districts in Malakand
division. A Jirga, consisting of local notables, would decide cases of conflict among the people of the
area under the supervision of a Tehsildar (the revenue officer).
The Jirga members were to be selected from the existing landed gentry. Any appeal against
the jirga’s decision was to be made to the deputy commissioner and the NWFP home secretary.
The Jirga was given exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all offences under the PPC except
offences against the state or those relating to armed forces, elections etc. The Jirga could adjudicate
on all disputes of civil nature. A Niab Tehsildar could preside over the Jirga hearing a criminal case.
The promulgation of PATA regulation was widely resented, criticized and condemned by the
intelligentsia in Malakand Division on the basis of following arguments:-
i. PATA regulations I & II 1975 (amended later) lacked legislative sanctions, these laws were
not enacted by legislatures but laws made by Home Department. These laws were not
made in the interest of public, but made to facilitate the administrators.
ii. These regulations lacked judicial sanctity. Even the High Court and Supreme Court of
Pakistan have declared them to be derogatory to the fundamental rights.
iii. The regulations were discriminatory and retrogressive. The people governed by these
regulations had been deprived of judicial protection and were pushed to the mercy of
Executive Officer.
iv. The PATA regulations were promulgated in presence of highly qualified and trained judicial
officers.
v. Bureaucrats used to rule the public of this area during the old days of FCR and so many
others, having vested interest, could not tolerate the “RULE OF LAW”. They were not happy
with just decisions of the judges hence they manipulated to usurp the powers of court of
law.
Lawyers in the late 1980s submitted a petition in the Peshawar High Court pleading for the
abolition of the PATA Regulation. The Peshawar High Court gave its verdict in Feb. 1990 in favour of
the petition. The learned court held these regulations to be volatile to article 25 of the constriction
(Constitutional Guarantee of Equity of Citizens). The federal government then appealed in the
Supreme Court which ruled four years later that the PATA regulation was unconstitutional.

6. 6
By the time the Supreme Court declared the PATA regulation to be ultra vires, the TNSM had
become so powerful that it brought the entire Malakand administration to a standstill in 1994,
demanding the imposition of Sharia in the Swat valley and other districts in the division.
Maulana Fazalullah of Mam Dheri, Swat accompanied by his followers (approx. 3/4
thousands) initiated their terrorist activities in 2007 by challenging the writ of the government. They
started with targeting the government’s installations, specially belonging to LEAs, and damaged
public and private property. The situation reached to its boiling point after government’s operation
at Jamia Hafsa and Lal Masjid.
Maulana Fazalullah was a staunch supporter of Maulana Abdul Aziz. While agitating the
operation against Jamia Hafsa and Lal Masjid, Maulana Fazalullah addressed public meetings on 3rd
and 4th July 2007 wherein he urged the people to get ready for Jihad. Declared not to spare any
government employee and urged the suicide bombers to perform the task they have been assigned.
This was followed by some gory incidents including slaughtering of personnel of LEAs and display of
their beheaded bodies in the bazaars. During 2009, DPO Khurshid Khan was killed in an encounter.
DCO Upper Dir, Sub. Maj Rahim Khan, Engineer PWD and Steno DOR Muzaffar were kidnapped.
Consequently, the government had to deploy Pak Army and the security forces launched an
operation against Maulana Fazalullah and his followers on 26-10-2007. The move was widely
welcomed by the general public as they were fed up with the atrocities of the Maulana and it was a
ray of hope for them regarding restoration of peace at Swat.
NIZAM-I-ADL REGULATION 2009
The regulation-2009 replaced the Shahria Nizam-i-Adl regulation 1999. According to new
law, the conduct and character of a judicial officer and executive magistrate should conform to
Islamic principles and he should decide all cases in accordance with Sharia.
The regulation envisages two appellate forums Darul-Darul Qaza and Darul Qaza, which
would operate in Malakand Region. Darul-Darul Qaza would be equivalent to the Supreme Court and
Darul Qaza would have appellate jurisdiction similar to that of a High Court.
The Sharia Niazam-i-Adl Regulation also repeals the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Amendment) Ordinance of 2001 and revives the executive magistracy, including the district
magistrate, additional district magistrate, sub-divisional magistrate and other executive magistrates.
The system was abolished on Aug 14, 2001.
Qazis would now be bound to decide a civil case within six months and a criminal case within
four months. Any Qazi who fails to comply with the schedule would be censured and adverse
remarks will be entered in his service record if he receives three letters in a year.
According to the new law, the number of pending cases before Zila Qazi, Izafi Zilla Qazi and
district magistrate should not exceed 150. The maximum number of cases pending before Aala Ilaqa
Qazis (Senior Civil Judge), Ilaqa Qazis and executive magistrates should be 200.
If pending cases exceed the court’s capacity, the provincial government will be required to
set up new courts.
Apart from the appellate courts, there will be five categories of courts: the court of Zila Qazi
(district and sessions judge); Izafi Zila Qazi (additional district and session judge); Aala Ilaqa Qazi
(senior civil judge); Ilaqa Qazi (civil judge) and executive magistrate.

7. 7
POLICE ESTABLISHMENT
MALAKAND REGION
Malakand Region consists of six districts headed by a Deputy Inspector General. Each district
is headed by a District Police Officer. The total area of region is 28919 sq.kms having 43,69,082
population. After the creation of Pakistan, the region underwent certain legal and administrative
transitions.
Having analysis of the statistics regarding available manpower it was learnt that the average
ratio in the region between police constable and population is 01:610 (one constable for 610
citizens). According to Police Rules 2.2(2) the ratio of police strength compared to its demographic
strength in towns shall be 01:450 (one constable for 450 inhabitants). In the light of this provision,
the required strength for the region is 9709 constables.
MANPOWER
OPERATIONS
OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND
SWAT
SHANGLA
District SP/SSP DSP DSP/L IP SI ASI HC C DVR Total Population
Area (sq.
Kms)
Constables.
&
Population
ratio
Swat 1+1 7 1 24 67 132 361 2376 31 3001 16,74,613 5337 705
Shangla 1 3 0 5 20 37 108 592 12 778 4, 34, 563 1,586 734
Buner 1 3 0 5 23 43 131 713 18 937 5,06,048 1, 865 710
Dir Lower 1 4 0 8 52 79 263 1624 7 2038 8,00,000 1, 582 493
Upper Dir 1 3 0 5 34 50 120 943 12 1168 5,75,858 3,699 611
Chitral 1 1 0 5 22 22 165 916 27 1159 3,78,000 14,850 413
G. Total 7 21 1 52 218 363 1148 7164 107 9081 43,69,082 28919 610

8. 8
BUNER
DIR LOWER
UPPER DIR
CHITRAL
SSP
(1)
DSP
(1)
IP
(05)
SI
(22)
ASI
(22)
HC
(165)
Const.
(916)
(Driver)
(27)

9. 9
RECRUITEMENT
In 2009, recruitment campaign was launched to enroll 2654 constables in six districts. The
candidates expressed keen interest to get themselves enrolled in Malakand Police. 7811 applicants’
submitted applications, finally 2654( 2634 Male+ 20 Female) constables were recruited. Its strongly
recommended that recruitment and promotion in other ranks also be carried out in proportion to
the available strength of constabulary.
RECRUITMENT YEAR 2009
District Cadre
No. of vacancy Applications Received Selected Total
selectedMale Female Male Female Male Female
Swat Const 1058 9 1324 7 1058 7 1065
Dir Lower Const 581 20 2553 0 581 0 581
Upper Dir Const 286 17 830 4 286 3 289
Bunir Const 280 0 800 2 280 0 280
Shangla Const 217 5 1188 4 217 4 221
Chitral Const. 212 6
1116 (both
Male+Female)
212 6 218
G. Total 2634 57 7811 2634 20 2654
MORALE
During the wave of militancy, 149 officers and Jawans of Malakand Police embraced
martyrdom and 220 officers and Jawans were injured. A large number of police men also deserted.
Almost 75% desertion was reported in Buner District alone. During that period, even the senior
police officers also avoided posting in these areas. Twelve officers have been posted as DPO Swat in
21 months, out of which three officers even refused to assume the charge. The rest served for some
weeks before getting a better posting in other parts of the province. Those days the morale was at
lowest ebb as even the Elite Police Force (EPF) refused to be deployed in these areas. However,
during my visit of these areas, the morale of the constabulary was observed high. It’s worth
appreciation that National Flag was found hoisted on all police establishments. The public developed
faith and confidence in Police, they admire the scarifies rendered by the Malakand Police. One can
observe the painted flags on the shutters of shops and wall-chalking having patriotic slogans on the
walls of Swat.
A number of Police establishments and roads have been named after with the names of the
police martyred e.g Irshad Ali Khan Shaheed Chowk Swat, Farooq Shaheed Chowk, Swat, Javed Iqbal
Shaheed Police Lines, Swat , Taj Malook Shaheed Chowk, Swat, PS Khursheed Khan (old PS
Khawzekhela), Swat, Khursheed Shaheed Police Lines, Dir Lower, PS Said Muhammad Shaheed
Daggar (old PS Daggar), Buner. This opportunity shall not be wasted but rather a lasting relationship
between public and police shall be developed. For this partnership it is essential to devise a long
term strategy.

10. 10
POLICE SHUHADA
District
2006 TO 2009
SSP DSP IP SI ASI HC FC CLASS-IV TOTAL
Swat 1 3 7 4 16 56 1 88
Buner - 1 - - 2 3 11 - 17
Dir Lower 1 - 1 1 2 7 7 - 19
Upper Dir - - - 1 1 1 7 - 10
Shangla - - - 1 1 1 9 - 12
Chitral - - - 1 1 1 - - 3
G.Total 1 2 4 11 11 29 90 1 149
POLICE OFFICERS INJURED
District SSP/SP DSP IP SI ASI HC FC CLASS-IV TOTAL
Swat 2 2 5 9 9 27 103 1 158
Buner - - - - - 2 6 - 8
Dir Lower - 2 1 3 4 5 9 - 24
Upper Dir - - - - 1 1 12 - 14
Shangla - - - - 1 1 14 - 16
Chitral - - - - - - - - 0
G.Total 2 4 6 12 15 36 144 1 220
CRIME (2008-2009)
Having analysis of crime statistics of five affected districts of Malakand Region, following are
the findings:-
i. In year 2009 the crime against person (Murder, attempt to Murder, Hurt,
Zina/Sodomy) witnessed downward trend. During 2008, 1603 cases and in 2009,
1137 cases were registered (showing a decline of 447). It indicates that the period
was of extreme fear and depression consequently, people even forgot their
enmities.
ii. The incidents of kidnappings for ransom show an increase of 16%. It was learnt that
the terrorists and criminals were earning huge revenue from kidnapping for
ransom.
iii. In year 2009, the crime against property shows upward trend. During 2008, 146
cases while in 2009, 170 cases were registered. Sharp increase in the incidents of
Dacoity and Burglary has been recorded.
iv. Eighteen percent (18%) reduction in the recovery of illegal arms reflects the poor
performance of police as police was reluctant to recover such weapons.

11. 11
CRIME AGAINST PERSON
District Murder A.Murder Hurt Zina/Sodemy
Kidnapping
/Ransom
Child Lifting
/Abduction
Total
Year 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
Swat 260 123 197 50 134 36 13 3 24 37 28 21 656 270
Shangla 34 48 28 32 38 32 7 1 0 1 3 8 110 122
Bunir 52 59 37 39 94 69 3 1 1 4 6 12 193 184
Dir Lower 94 72 67 58 133 118 3 2 8 16 5 6 310 272
Dir Upper 83 99 99 95 225 200 0 0 24 21 10 16 441 431
TOTAL
523 401 428 274 624 455 26 7 57 79 52 63 1710 1279
-122 -154 -169 -19 +22 +11 -431
57%
43%
Cases of Murder
2008
2009
61%
39%
Cases of attempt to Murder
2008
2009
58%
42%
Cases of Hurt
2008
2009
79%
21%
Cases of Zina/Sodemy
2008
2009
42%
58%
Cases of Kidnapping/Ransom
2008
2009
45%
55%
Cases of Child Lifting / Abducitiion
2008
2009

12. 12
CRIME AGAINST PROPERTY
District Dacoity Robbery Burglary
Vehicle
Theft/snatching
M.cycle
theft/snatching
Total
Year 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
Swat 12 17 1 4 50 61 19 14 2 3 84 99
Shangla 1 0 2 0 9 11 0 0 0 0 12 11
Bunir 0 11 0 1 9 14 4 7 0 0 13 33
Dir Lower 0 2 4 2 0 0 15 15 3 1 22 20
Dir Upper 2 1 2 0 0 0 11 6 0 0 15 7
TOTAL
15 31 9 7 68 86 49 42 5 4 146 170
+16 -2 +18 -7 +1 +24
33%
67%
Cases of Dacoity (Highway, Bank &
others
2008
2009
56%
44%
Cases of Robbery (Highway, Bank &
others)
2008
2009
44%
56%
Cases of Burglary
2008
2009
54%
46%
Cases of Vehicles Theft/Snatching
2008
2009
56%
44%
Cases of M. Cycle Theft/Snatching
2008
2009

13. 13
ARMS RECOVERY
TERRORISM
During the phase of Militancy (2006 to 2009) 581 civilians and 146 Policemen lost their lives.
The innocent civil population was badly affected as 82% loss incurred by public and 18% by the
Policemen. Regarding intensity years 2008 & 2009 can be termed worst in the history of Malakand
Region.
HUMAN LOSSES IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
District
2006 2007 2008 2009
Police
Killed
Civilian
Killed
Police
Killed
Civilian
Killed
Police
Killed
Civilian
Killed
Police
Killed
Civilian
Killed
Swat 0 0 18 81 43 194 27 128
Shangla 0 0 4 0 0 1 8 46
Buner 0 0 0 0 11 33 6 6
Dir Upper 0 0 0 0 2 10 8 35
Dir Lower 6 0 0 0 4 9 9 38
Total 6 0 22 81 60 247 58 253
HUMAN LOSSES
59%
41%
Arms Recoverd
2008
2009
District Arms recovered Difference
Year 2008 2009
Swat 278 70 -208
Shangla 93 110 17
Bunir 275 144 -131
Dir Lower 667 532 -135
Dir Upper 46 87 41
TOTAL 1359 943 -416

14. 14
INVESTIGATION
Apart from improvement in visibility of police the prime task of Malakand police is to
complete the investigation of 1128 pending cases especially of the cases of terrorism. All six districts
have sanctioned posts of SP Investigations but on ground situation is that only district Swat has SP
Investigation. District Buner is being looked after by an Acting SP. Dir Lower and Dir Upper are being
supervised by Acting DSsP and Chitral & Shangla are without SP investigation. Surprisingly no DSP
Investigation is posted in the whole region which reflects either the lack of interest in investigation
or the acute shortage of officers in the rank of DSP.
In Article 110 of PO 2002 the head of investigation has been assigned the responsibility of
Secretary of CJCC. The absence of Superintendents of Police as incharge of investigation not only
affects the quality and disposal but also hampers the coordination within Criminal Justice System.
STRENGTH OF INVESTIGATION WING
INVESTIGATION WING
CHAIN OF COMMAND
SWAT
18%
82%
Police Killed
Civilian Killed
District SP/SSP DSP IP SI ASI HC FC Total
Swat 1 0 7 22 40 59 164 293
Shangla 0 0 2 5 8 16 33 4
Buner 1 0 3 11 20 36 78 149
Dir Lower 1 0 5 10 34 33 83 166
Upper Dir 1 0 3 8 19 24 64 119
Chitral 0 0 2 7 6 15 46 76
G. Total 4 0 22 63 127 183 468 807

15. 15
SHANGLA
BUNER
DIR LOWER
DIR UPPER

16. 16
CASES IN 2009
Having an overview of the cases registered in the year-2009, total 15906 cases were
registered (in 05 affected districts). Whereas the strength of upper subordinates (ASI, SI & IP) is 197.
In the light of these figures, an IO has to investigate 80.74 cases per annum. According to the
essence of CrPc a case has to be challaned within 14 days. Keeping in view the present strength and
number of cases to be investigated an IO has to complete the investigation of one case in 2.25 days
which seems not realistic.
INVESTIGATION PROGRESS -2009
DISTRICT
TRACED UNTRACED CHALLANED PENDING TOTAL
ATA
Other
PPC
ATA
Other
PPC
ATA ATA
Other
PPC
Other
PPC
ATA ATA
Other
PPC
Other
PPC ATA
Other
PPC
Traced Untraced Traced untraced Traced Untraced Traced Untraced
Swat 468 787 327 299 82 145 549 131 386 182 238 168 795 1086
Buner 39 293 5 14 14 1 281 12 25 4 12 2 44 307
Shangla 10 139 4 17 10 3 135 17 - 1 4 - 14 156
Dir Lower 51 415 7 61 11 4 390 38 40 3 25 23 58 476
Upper Dir 9 591 2 51 4 2 586 46 5 - 5 5 11 642
G.Total 577 2225 345 442 121 155 1941 244 456 190 284 198 922 2667
AFGHAN REFUGEES
The presence of Afghan Refugees in these districts badly affected the situation. The camps
and their colonies are regarded safe heavens for criminals and terrorists. The law enforcement
officers strongly recommended deportation of refugees.
S# District Camp Population
1 Buner Koga 10722
2 Malakand Zangal Patai` 7247
3 Dir/Chitral Barawal 1904
4 Chakdar 29, 326
5 Toor 11,410
6 Kalkatak (Chitral) 3925
G. Total 15,335
(Office of the Commissioner Afghan Refugees)
District
No.of cases
registered in 2009
Upper Sub-
Ordinates
Cases per officer (Avg.)
Swat 3195 69 46.30
Shangla 1092 15 72.8
Buner 1647 34 48.44
Dir Lower 7850 49 160.20
Upper Dir 2122 30 70.73
Total 15906 197 80.74

17. 17
Following is the involvement of Afghan Refugees in different crime in District Dir Lower since
1978 to 30-06-2007:-
S.No. Name of Police Station Number of cases
1 PS Ouch 1094
2 PS Timergara 934
3 PS Balambat 325
4 PS Lalqilla 30
5 PS Khall 27
6 PS Munda 1180
7 PS Samarbagh 358
Total 3948
(Record SP Office Dir Lower)
NON-CUSTOM PAID (NCP) VEHICLES
According to an estimate more than 50, 000 NCP vehicles are plying in Malakand Region. The
presence of such vehicles is a source of stress for police. In case of any involvement in a criminal or
terrorist activity, it’s almost impossible for the investigators to trace the owner of the car. In a recent
suicide attack registered vide FIR # 478 dated 18-12-2009, PS Balambut District Dir Lower, a double
cabin pickup driven by a suicide bomber hit the Police Lines consequently 15 persons were killed and
45 were injured. While having discussion with the investigators of the case, i learnt that Forensic
experts determined the engine and chassis numbers but so far they failed to trace the registration
number and owner of the vehicle. Probability regarding use of NCP vehicle in this incident seems
high.
2. Earlier these vehicles were temporarily registered in union councils but during post-
operations phase in Swat it’s being registered in police stations.
ARRESTED ACCUSED MILITANTS
(2007-09)
HARD MILITANTS WANTED IN TERRORISM CASES
NAME OF MILITANT NO. OF CASES
Mulana Fazal Hayat alias Fazlullah 90
Anwar Ullah 48
Muslim Khan 45
Bakht Farzand 41
Haroon Rashid alias Romai 29
Iqbal Hussain 28
DISTRICT NO. OF ACCUSED ARRESTED
SWAT 354
BUNER 102
DIR LOWER 35
UPPER DIR 26
SHANGLA 3
G. TOTAL 520

18. 18
Mehboob ur Rehman 24
Shah Dawrab 23
Qari Mushtaq 23
Seraj-ud-din 22
Ahmed Jan 20
Abdur Rehman 20
Naeem 16
Fazal Rehman 15
Amir Sahib 14
Yousaf alias Babo 14
Qari Suhail 13
Ikram-ud-Din 12
Saif-ul-Malook 11
Ibni Amin 11
Ibni Aqil 11
Sher Muhammad Qasab 11
Sofi Muhammad Amir TNSM 11
Sadiq Ahmed 10
Ahmad Ali 10
(Investigation Wing Swat)
INVESTIGATION PROGRESS OF SELECTED CASES OF TERRORISM
DISTRICT SWAT
i. FIR # 34 PS Rahimabad, dated 03-05-2009 unknown militants attacked the Police
Station with Rocket Launchers. Police retaliated but keeping in view the increased
threats and low morale of Police the high-ups ordered to vacate the premises. The
PS staff was shifted to the Grid Station where FC was already stationed. Later on, a
case was registered against unknown militants. Case is still under investigation.
ii. FIR # 36 PS Rahimabad, dated 04-05-2009 (the registration of case was made on 27th
of June, 2009) the Police Station was destroyed; the militants kidnapped two
Frontier Reserve Police Constables namely Shah Pasand and Pervaiz and looted the
Government property. The whereabouts of kidnapped officials is not yet known.
In the same FIR another incident was also incorporated. According to brief details,
the militants killed FC Subidar Awal Khan and Sephy Shafiq.
The ineffectiveness of police and chaos in the area can be estimated by the fact
that FIR # 36 was registered after a delay of 52 days. Apart from destruction of PS,
they killed FC officials and also kidnapped FRP personnel.
iii. FIR# 162 PS Mingora City, dated 30-08-2009 U/S 302/324/353/120B/121/124A/109
PPC, 3/4 Explosive Act, 7 ATA. This police station was attacked thrice, two were car
bomb explosions and one was suicide attack. It was learnt that its mastermind
namely Anwar Khaliq managed to enroll himself in Special Police Force (SPF).
However, on next day (31-08-2009) he was killed in an encounter with Law
Enforcement Agencies. As a result of this attack 16 under training SPF officials and
one instructor lost their lives. In this case proceedings U/S 87 CrPc has been
completed. So far no arrest has been made. Case is still under investigation.

19. 19
DIR LOWER
i. FIR# 393 PS Ouch, dated 08-05-2009 U/S 3/4 Explosive Act, 7 ATA, 148/149/427 PPC.
According to the brief facts of the case, the building of PS Ouch was completely
destroyed by the militants. The building was already abandoned by police in April,
2009. A case against 72 accused was registered, 20 were arrested and 8 released by
court on bail. In this case, police is the complainant and the witness. The record &
case properties were completely destroyed. Case is still under investigation as
according to the procedure laid down for the investigation of the terrorism cases
(Section 19(10) ATA 1997), it is mandatory to publish the names of wanted accused
in three National Dailies. Owing to the limited budget, the information department
so far failed to advertise these advertisements which is a major obstacle in further
progress of the investigation.
ii. Attack on Malakand University. FIR # 339 dated 18-03-2009 U/S 17(iv) Haraba,
324/353/436/427/148/149/109 PPC, 3/4 Explosive Act, 7 ATA. During midnight
militants armed with heavy weaponry attacked the University. A contingent of PS
Ouch reached the spot. Police Mobile was hit with a rocket launcher, consequently,
01 ASI, 01 HC, 02 Constables, 01 Driver and 01 Security Guard of University were
killed. All 12 accused are absconders. Case is still under investigation.
FLAWS & PROBLEMS IN INVESTIGATION
i. NON-COOPERATIVE PUBLIC
In cases where the suspects or accused are militants the public has been found very
reluctant to be witness. With such attitude police cannot make these cases success
against the terrorists in courts.
ii. RECOVERY MEMOS ARE NOT SIGNED BY THE PUBLIC WITNESSES
According to section 103 CrPc the Police officer/IO are required to get signatures of
two witnesses on recovery memo. But either police do not follow or the public do
not cooperate. Consequently Police is doing it in isolation.
iii. FIRs AGAINST UNKNOWN SUSPECTS
Public seems afraid to name terrorists in FIRs. Therefore, it’s a challenge for the
police to trace a case registered against unknown criminals.
iv. SHORTAGE OF MANPOWER
Due to the shortage of manpower in investigation wing, the pace of the disposal is
very slow. For example Adenzai circle (Dir Lower) having 03 Police Stations staffed
with 01 IP, 03 SIs, 02 ASIs, 04 HCs and 06 Constables.
v. RELUCTANCE OF INVESTIGATORS
It was learnt that IOs avoid to investigate high profile cases as they were threatened
by certain militant groups. SHO Habib Zaman was killed in a funeral prayer of DSP
Javed Iqbal for investigating certain high profile cases. Furthermore, the

20. 20
investigation staff was not found enthusiastic regarding the disposal of pending
cases of terrorism.
vi. INVESTIGATION KITS
Majority of the police stations have the Investigation kits but the staff was found
reluctant to use these kits.
vii. LACK OF KNOWLEDGE REGARDING EXPLOSIVES
The majority of investigators and Moharrar staff are not trained regarding the
storage of explosive and IEDs as case properties.
viii. DATA OF STOLEN/SNATCHED VEHICLES
Non-availability of data regarding stolen and snatched vehicles hampers the pace of
investigation.
ix. SHANAKHT PARADE (IDENTITIFICATION PARADE)
While going through the files of investigation, it was observed that initially the cases
of terrorism were registered against unknown accused but later in certain cases the
IOs traced the names of accused. According to article 22 of Qanoon-e-Shahadat,
1984 and 26-32 of Police Rules, 1934 identification is an important procedure which
is not being carried out by the IOs.
x. COLLECTION & PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE
Its observed that majority of investigation officers had the experience of
investigation of cases like murder, theft, robbery and hurt etc. therefore majority of
them do not realize:
a) The importance of evidence in cases of terrorism
b) Timely collection, preservation & dispatch of evidence
xi. COST OF DNA TEST
The investigators revealed that they are confronting shortage of money. As the Lab
management demands advance payment of Rs 12000/- for each test.
xii. NON AVAILABILITY OF FORENSIC LABORTARY AT DIVISIONAL LEVEL
The non-availability of forensic lab at divisional level hampers the pace and disposal
of the cases.
xiii. LESS NUMBER OF ANTI TERRORIST COURTS
In January-2010, the Provincial Government increased the number of Anti-Terrorism
Courts from one to three. It’s worth mentioning that one ATC had been functional
since July-2002 in Swat. One ATC for District Swat and another for District Malakand

21. 21
have been notified but not yet functional. Recently, advertisement has been
published in the dailies to recruit staff for the remaining Anti Terrorism Courts.
xiv. PROSECUTION
At provincial level, prosecution service is being headed by a Director General. Earlier
prosecution service was working under the Law Department but now functioning
under the Home Department. The shortage of prosecution staff can be estimated
with the fact that in District Swat alone total 28 courts are functional but only 08
Public Prosecutors are posted. Presently only one Public Prosecutor is posted at ATC,
Swat.
xv. SECURITY OF ACCUSED /TERRORISTS
As the anti-terrorist courts are located in Swat and Malakand Districts. Therefore,
the accused in these cases have to be transported from Dir Upper, Dir Lower,
Chitral, Shangla & Buner to Malakand and Swat. Such exercise is not only costly but
also a risky affair.
xvi. INSUFFICIENT FUND FOR ADVERTIZEMENTS WITH INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
The majority of Investigation Officers (of terrorism cases) expressed that they have
completed their process but that is subject to the publication of advertisements in
the Newspapers known as “ISHTIHAR ROPOSHI”. The IOs stated that the
administration of information department justifies non-publication due to the non-
availability of funds. Therefore, the cases cannot be challaned without publication.
xvii. FREQUENT TRANSFER OF INVESTIGATORS
In majority of criminal cases police officers are summoned by the courts to appear as
witness but frequent transfers and postings have profound impact on the delay of
the judicial process.
In case of retirement of police officer they are also summoned and they face
problem regarding payment of TA/DA. It’s suggested that funds for such purpose be
made available at the disposal of court who will disburse the amount.
xviii. TENURE OF NAIB COURTS
In newly introduced Judicial Policy the tenure of Naib courts has been reduced up to
3 months. Naib Court is actually a facilitator and coordinator. Reduced tenure also
affected the working of the courts. Minimum suggested tenure may be one year.
xix. SHORTAGE OF TRANSPORT
The investigation wing is facing acute shortage of vehicles at their disposal. For
example, the investigation wing of District Buner has only four mobiles for 09 Police
Stations.
xx. NON-AVAILABILITY OF LOCKUPS
The investigation staff suggested the provision of lockups at the disposal of
Investigation staff.

22. 22
SPECIAL BRANCH
The prime job of the special branch is to collect, communicate and share information with
concerned quarters but according to the impression derived from conversation with senior officers,
special branch was found reluctant to share information during militancy .Theoretically, it shall play
an effective proactive role but it failed to fetch authentic information to the district police.
Even after the operations there is lack of coordination between these two units which can
be understood from the fact that during employment drive of Special Police Force there was some
communication gap needs to be plugged immediately. It was learnt that the master mind of attack
on the under training officials at Mingora police station namely Anwer Khaliq got himself enrolled as
member of Special Police Force. This speaks about the flaws in the system as the need for security
clearance was compromised.
The special branch in Malakand Region is understaffed. Presently in different ranks
sanctioned posts are 61 while posted personnel are 70. Furthermore, in Special Branch Malakand
Region there is no sanctioned post of Inspector.
MANPOWR OF SPECIAL BRANCH
District
DSP IP SI ASI HC FC TOTAL
S P S P S P S P S P S P S P D/E
Swat - 1 - 1 1 5 1 - 11 5 - 4 13 16 +3
Dir Lower - - - 1 1 2 - - 8 5 - 1 9 9 0
Dir Upper 1 1 - 1 2 3 - - 6 8 2 1 11 14 +3
Buner - - - 1 2 3 1 - 6 5 1 2 10 11 +1
Shangla - - - - 1 1 - - 3 3 3 3 7 7 0
Chitral - - - 1 1 1 - 2 10 9 - - 11 13 +2
Total 1 2 0 5 8 15 2 2 44 35 6 11 61 70 +9
 D Deficiency (-)
 E Excess (+)
BOMB DISPOSAL SQUAD
It’s surprising that the BDS unit of entire region is having only 14 personnel. District Shangla
even does not have BDS unit. Upper Dir, Buner and Shangla are without Walk-Through gates. On the
other hand Buner, Dir Lower and Shangla are also functioning without explosive detectors.
District Staff Walk-
Through
gate
Explosive detector
+ Exploner GT 200
Metal
detector
Bomb
Suit
Mine
detector
Water canon
gun
x-ray
machine
Swat 3 4 2 + 1 50 1 4
1 (cartridge
not available)
1
Buner 4 - - 3 - - - -
Dir Lower 3 1 - 38 - - - -
Upper Dir 4 - 1 7 - - - -
Shangla - - - - - - - -
G. Total 14 14 4 32 1 4 1 1

23. 23
WOMEN POLICE
Capacity building of women police is need of the hour as their presence during Nakabandi,
search and interrogation is mandatory. During recent recruitment, 57 vacancies were advertised. In
response, only 27 applicants expressed their interest. Finally only 20 were selected.
District
DSP IP SI ASI HC Const Total
S P D S P D S P D S P D S P D S P D S P D
Swat - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 30 21 9 30 21 9
Dir
Lower
- - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - 21 1 20 22 2 20
Upper
Dir
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 20 3 17 20 3 17
Bunir - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 6 6 0 6 +6
Shangla - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9 4 5 9 4 5
Chitral - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 22 22 0 22 22 0
G.Total (Present) 2 1 1 103 58
* S – sanctioned * P- Present * D- Deficiency
In Malakand Region there are 103 sanctioned posts for female police officers while on
ground only 58 are available. Regarding senior ranks there is no sanctioned post in the ranks of DSP,
IP, SI and ASI. Having comparison of gender representation (in rank of constable) in Malakand
Region, male represents 99.24% and female presence is merely 0.76 %.
CAPACITY BUILDING & PROVISION OF MODERN GEDGETS
Presently Malakand Region has no training institution/school. Recently 2436 police
constables and 5215 SPF have been enlisted in different districts of Malakand Region. Merely
recruitment or increase in the manpower may enhance the visibility on the road but it will not serve
the real purpose of prevention and detection of crime and terrorism. The on ground situation is very
challenging as militants have dedicated, highly trained people having access to modern means of
communication and transportation. Until & unless we build the capacity and equip the available
strength, it will be difficult to curb the menace of terrorism for good.

24. 24
BUILDINGS
Malakand Region consists of 61 police stations and 73 police posts. Before operations there
were 45 police stations but in the post-operations phase 16 new police stations have been added.
51 police stations are functioning in official buildings while 10 are operational in rented facilities.
During militancy 06 police stations were totally destroyed. Twenty-three (23) police stations are in
poor condition which need expansion or reconstruction. Surprisingly, 10 police stations are without
Lockups. Out of 51 police stations the lockups of 09 police stations were found in poor conditions.
Police Lines is regarded the nucleus of police establishment in a district. Police Lines Swat
and Dir Lower are old establishments need expansion specially the construction of new barracks.
Police Lines in Upper Dir is functional in old building of the hostels of Govt. Degree College and in
Shangla it’s functional in an old building of a factory. The Police Lines Buner is temporarily working in
two rooms while Police Lines Chitral also needs reconstruction and expansion.
POLICE STATIONS & POLICE POSTS
S# DISTRICT
NAME OF
POLICE STATION
BUILDING
TELEPHONIC
FACILITY
LOCKUP POLICE POST
1
UPPER DIR
Wari
Functional in old building of sub-
jail
New building is under
construction
Yes Yes Akhgram
2 Jagam
Rented building. Established as PS
in Nov. 2009
Yes Yes -
3 Gandigar
Rented building (insecure).
During militancy the militants
attacked the PS.The construction
of new building was included in
ADP of 2007 but later it was
dropped from the plan.
Yes Yes -
4 Dir Functional in C & W building. Yes Yes Chukian / Miana
5 Barawal
Functional in a fort of Former
Nawab of Dir.
The accommodation is not
enough for constabulary;
however two new rooms have
been constructed recently.
Yes
Yes (Poor
condition)
Shahikot
6 Sheringal
Newly constructed but not based
on the approved map provided
by the Central Police Office.
Yes Yes -
7 Kalkot
Functional in the part of the fort
of former Nawab of Dir.
Recently two rooms &
accommodation for the SHO has
been constructed.
Yes No Thall/Patrak
8 Police Lines
Housed in an old building of
college hostels.
The construction of boundary
wall is in progress.
No -

25. 25
1
BUNER
Said
Muhammad
Shaheed Daggar
Govt. Building Yes Yes
PP Bagra
PP Budial
PP Torwarsak
PP Gokand
PP Daggar Kali
2 PIr Baba
Govt. Building (partially
destroyed)
Yes Yes -
3 Totalai Old state building (Govt.) Yes Yes -
4 Nawagai Old state building (Govt.) Yes Yes -
5 Gagra
It was newly constructed
building not yet occupied by the
police. Completely destroyed by
the militants.
Presently functioning in two
quarters of BHU Gagra
No No PP Sawrai
6 Jowar
It was functional in an old Govt.
Building, also destroyed during
the wave of militancy. Presently
functional in a rented building
No No
PP Leganai
PP Nansair
PP Katkala
7
Batara
(Non-
Functional)
Rented No No PP Shahidasar
8
Chinglai
(Non-functional)
Demolished during insurgency.
Now it has been planned to be
made operational in the building
of education department.
No No -
9
Nagral (Non-
functional)
Ex-State Tehsil Building No No PP Charorai
10 Police Lines
Functional in two rooms
temporarily
Yes - -
1
SHANGLA
Alpuri
Housed in an old building of Ex-
state (Wali-i-Swat)
02 rooms have been recently
constructed.
Yes Yes
PP Karora
PP Olandar
2 Bisham
Constructed by Kohistan
Development Board (KDB) in
1974
Yes Yes -
3 Chakisar
Govt. Building without boundary
wall (insecure)
Yes Yes -
4 Aloch Newly constructed Govt. Building Yes Yes -
5 Martung
Presently functional in old two
rooms of Ex-state.
Its without boundary wall (highly
insecure)
NO
(Wireless
Comm. Is
weak)
NO
(accused
are kept in
the Lockup
of PS Aloch)
-
6
Karora (not
functional yet)
Old Govt. Building of Police Post NO No -

26. 26
7 Police Lines
Functional in an old building of a
factory. Construction of new
barracks is need of the hour.
Yes -
1
DIR
LOWER
PS Ouch
Building was destroyed during
the wave of militancy.
Presently functional in the
building of PP Kharkani
Yes Yes -
2 PS Chakdara Newly constructed. Govt. Building Yes Yes
PP Khadagzai
PP Batwan
3 PS Asbanr
Functional in the building of a
Police Post.
Yes Yes PP Sarbala
4 PS Talash Newly constructed Govt. Building Yes Yes -
5 PS Timargara Govt. Building Yes Yes -
6 PS Balambut Govt. Building Yes Yes
PP Hayasari
PP Lajbuk (Not
functional yet)
7 PS Lal Qila Govt. Building Yes Yes -
8 PS Zaimdara Functional in a BHU Building NO
NO
(accused
are kept in
Lockup of
PS Lal Qila)
PP Gal
9 PS Khal Govt. Building Yes Yes PP Rabat
10 PS Munda Govt. Building Yes Yes PP Munda Bazar
11 PS Mayar Newly constructed Govt. Building Yes Yes PP Sangi Para
12 PS Samar bagh Newly constructed Govt. Building Yes Yes
PP Shahi (Not
functional)
Police Lines
Construction of new barracks is
recommended
Yes -
1
SWAT
PS Ghaligay Govt. Building Yes Yes
PP Landakay
PP Gammon
Bridge
PP Karakar
2 PS Shamozo Rented building NO
Yes
Temporary
-
3 PS Kabal Govt. Building Yes Yes PP Dewli
4 PS Kanju Rented building NO
Yes
Temporary
PP Mamdhari
5 PS Kalam Govt. Building NO Yes -
6
PS Khursheed
Khan Shaheed
Govt. Building Yes Yes
PP Miandam
PP Upper Topsin
PP Chamtali
7 PS Madyan Govt. Building Yes Yes -
8 PS Bahrain Govt. Building. Needs expansion NO Yes PP Kolalai
9 PS Matta Govt. Building Yes Yes
PP Shakar Darra
PP Shawar
10 PS Chuprial Rented NO
Yes
Temporary
-

27. 27
11 PS Mingora
As a result of two car bomb
blasts and one suicide attack the
building was completely
demolished. Presently functional
in a primary school.
Yes
Yes
(Temporary)
PP Malookabad
PP Sangota
PP Shingrai
PP Yakh Tangi
PP Shah Darra
PP Banr
PP Labour Colony
PP Panr
PP Kokari
12 PS Rahimabad
Demolished by the militants.
Temporarily housed in a Grid
Station.
Yes
Yes
Temporary
PP Balogram
PP Ingaro Dherai
13 PS Saidu Sharif Govt. Building Yes Yes
PP Kokrai
PP Afsarabad
14 PS Charbagh Rented NO
Yes
Temporary
PP Golibagh
15 PS Malamjabba Rented NO
Yes
Temporary
-
16 PS Kalakot Rented NO
Yes
Temporary
-
17 Police Lines
It has the capacity to accommodate approx. 200 people. Presently, these
barracks are occupied by the officers and Jawans of FRP and FC. The recently,
recruited recruits (approx. 700) are housed in 85 tents. There are 24 bath
rooms, which reflects that at the avg. 38 officials have access to 01 bath
room.
1
CHITRAL
PS Chitral
Official (old building)
Accommodation is not enough
Yes Yes -
2 PS Ayun
Official (old building)
Accommodation is not enough
Yes Yes
PP Bamburate
PP Gahirate
3 PS Drosh Official (old building) Yes Yes
PP Asharait
PP Ursoon
PP Jinjratekoh
PP Kalash
PP Lawari Tunnel
4 PS Arandu Newly constructed. Yes Yes PP Arandu Gool
5 PS Lotkoh Newly constructed Yes Yes
PP Begusht
PP Parabag
6 PS Koghozi
Functional in the building of
PP. Needs expansion.
NO
NO
(accused
are kept in
PS Chitral)
PP Barnais
7 PS Shahgoor
Functional in the building of
PP. Needs expansion.
NO
NO
(accused
are kept in
PS Lotkoh)
PP Sufait Arkari
8 PS Boni Newly constructed Yes Yes
PP Sonoghor
PP Reshum

28. 28
VEHICLES
During militancy 19 vehicles were damaged and 16 snatched. After the operations, 117
new vehicles have been provided to the region. Presently, 262 vehicles and 93 Motor Cycles are
available. There is an acute shortage of drivers as presently only 107 drivers are serving in the
region. The rest of shortage has been managed but such stop gap arrangements will deteriorate the
newly purchased fleet of vehicles.
Description Car Jeep Van
Pick-
up
Bus/
Truck
P/
Van
Amb: APC
Water
Tanker
Fire
Tender
Total
M/
Cycle
Grand
Total
Before Military
operation
3 16 1 124 14 5 8 0 0 0 171 82 253
Vehicles issued
after military
operation
0 2 0 78 16 0 3 15 1 2 117 20 137
Total 3 18 1 202 30 5 11 15 1 2 288 102 390
Snatched - 1 - 9 - - 1 - - - 11 5 16
Damaged - - - 15 - - - - - - 15 4 19
Present Total 3 17 1 178 30 5 10 15 1 2 262 93 355
(Telecommunication wing Frontier Police)
9 PS Mastuj
The building of PS Mastuj was
cracked in earth quack of Oct.
2008 which was declared
dangerous therefore,
demolished. Housed in a
portion of another Govt.
Building.
Yes Yes
PP Herchine
PP Mera Garam
No.2
PP Yarkhoon Lasht
10 PS Mulkoh Newly constructed Yes Yes
PP Oveer
PP Terich
11 PS Torkoh Newly constructed Yes Yes
PP Khot
PP Rech
12 Police Lines
Constructed Kacha on self help
basis. It developed cracks in
Oct. 2008 earthquake.
Strength stationed in tents &
rented quarters.
Yes

29. 29
FLEET OF VEHICLES
District Car Jeep Van
Pick-
up
Bus/
Truck
P/Van Amb: APC
Water
Tanker
Fire
Tender
Total M/Cycle
Grand
Total
Swat
Before operation 3 5 1 36 2 2 3 0 0 0 52 24 76
After operation 0 2 0 32 4 0 1 8 1 1 49 18 67
Dir
Lower
Before operation 0 3 0 19 2 1 2 0 0 0 27 17 44
After operation 0 0 0 9 3 0 0 1 1 0 14 0 14
Upper
Dir
Before operation 0 2 0 19 2 1 1 0 0 0 25 11 36
After operation 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 1 0 0 7 0 7
Chitral
Before operation 0 5 0 19 5 0 1 0 0 0 30 13 43
After operation 0 0 0 10 2 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 12
Buner
Before operation 0 1 0 17 2 1 2 0 0 0 23 12 35
After operation 0 0 0 16 2 0 0 5 0 0 23 1 24
Shangla
Before operation 0 0 0 16 1 0 0 0 0 0 17 6 23
After operation 0 0 0 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 11
(Telecommunication wing Frontier Police)
ARMS
After having a look on the quantity of available pistols, it was learnt that 505 pistols of
different bore are available for 584 posted Upper Subordinates in the five affected districts. The
militants are armed with sophisticated weapons but Malakand police still possesses 2953 rifles
303 Bore. The weapons of obsolete bore shall be replaced with latest weapons.
Type of Arms Swat L/Dir U/Dir Buner Shangla Total
Pistol 30 Bore 36 23 7 3 4 73
Pistol 9 MM 75 70 47 37 28 257
Pistol 9MM Glock 17 80 30 20 15 10 155
Pistol P7 0 8 7 5 0 20
Rifle 303 Bore All Marks 1546 1374 0 0 0 2920
303 B Bren Gun 13 13 7 0 0 33
Bullet proof jackets 1650 429 381 362 205 3027
Ballistic helmet 1450 850 750 700 470 4220
Rifle 7.62 B China 3076 781 558 760 743 5918
Rifle G3 A3 143 93 87 87 50 460
SMG 7.62 Bore 2250 1322 857 871 649 5949
SMG 7.62 Confisc ated 160 581 124 138 33 1036
MP 5 A2.9 MM 111 115 105 90 28 449
MP 5 A3 9 MM 5 0 0 0 5 10
9 MM Sten Gun 40 18 6 4 6 74
LMG 7.62 China 50 20 16 11 9 106
(Logistics wing Frontier Police)
COMMUNICATION
During the wave of militancy 93 base sets, 69 Mobile sets, 149 Pocket Phone, 04 HF sets,
66 Batteries (12 volt) , 29 Generators and 05 Repeaters were destroyed or looted by the terrorists

30. 30
and criminals. Such incidents badly affected the communication network. 42 police stations have
telephonic connection while 19 police stations are functional without telephonic facility. During my
visit the following were observed:-
i. The mobile of PS Ouch District Dir Lower was found without wireless set.
ii. The wireless communication is not secure as the frequency had been
intercepted by the terrorists.
iii. The connectivity of wireless communication was found weak particularly in
the areas of Gokand, Gulbandai, Kingargali, Nagrai & Chinglai of District
Buner. It was also observed that 16 vehicles were without mobile wireless
sets.
Description
District
Base
Set
Mobile
Set
Pocket
Phone
(PP)
HF Set
Battery
12 Volt
Generator Repeater
Communication
Equipments held before
militancy
Swat 45 76 168 2 43 14 1
Buner 30 21 75 1 18 8 1
Dir Lower 20 37 73 1 27 7 1
Dir Upper 17 40 54 1 11 6 1
Shangla 21 27 50 1 22 6 1
Communication
Equipments destroyed/
Misplaced during militancy
Swat 27 32 82 1 23 10 1
Buner 29 10 38 1 12 2 1
Dir Lower 6 12 15 0 15 5 1
Dir Upper 13 8 2 1 0 6 1
Shangla 18 7 12 1 16 6 1
Communication
Equipments provided after
the operation
Swat 13 40 110 1 13 5 0
Buner 4 2 28 0 29 0 0
Dir Lower 0 5 8 0 8 0 0
Dir Upper 0 4 5 0 3 0 0
Shangla 0 3 16 0 3 0 0
G. Total 243 324 736 11 243 75 10
(Telecommunication department Frontier Police)

31. 31
COMMUNITY POLICING
JIRGA
The local people have emotional attachment with the institution of Jirga. They have little
faith in procedural formalities of the prevailing criminal justice system. They regard police station as
a place where a Jirga can effectively decide certain disputes. They believe in quick disposal of their
problems and issues and do not have the capacity to pay the fee of advocates.
2. Jirga is a judicial institution in Pakhtoons based on customs & traditions which has far
reaching effects on Pakhtoons community. It’s an assembly of elders likely Khans, Malaks and Tribal
Chiefs. In other words it’s an essence of real democracy in Pakhtoons where every individual has the
authority of self expression. Sitting in a circle, the Jirga has no chairman, convener, speaker &
secretary. All are equal and have equal right of saying. Generally, Jirga is not convened but rather is
called for when issue or dispute arises.
3. All types of cases, criminal, civil disputes, conflict between groups, tribes and individuals are
being decided in Jirga. At the start “Waak” (authority) is entrusted by both the parties to decide the
case according to its best judgement. While passing the judgement of a case, the Jirga also keeping
in view the Narkh (precedence). The aggrieved party has the right of “Maraka” (appeal) For
ceasefire between the worried parties “Tiga” literally a stone, is being placed, on which both the
parties are forced to abide by the decision. In case of violation by any party, punishments likely
confiscation, burning of house and imposing of heavy fines etc. are being awarded in accordance
with the nature, significance and sensitivity of the case. There is a saying that “what is not resolved
in Jirga will be decided in carnage”.
4. The people believe in speedy justice which they considered is to be possible only through
Jirga. The essence of the concept of conciliatory committees is based upon the practice and
institution of Jirga.
i. CONCILIATORY (MUSALIHATEE) COMMITTEES IN DIR LOWER
It’s worth appreciation that such committees are effectively contributing for quick disposal
of petty disputes between two parties. This act improves the image of police. While constituting
these committees, following criteria has been adopted:-
a. Minimum age 35 years
b. Member shall not be a convict from any court.
c. Member shall be literate/educated.
d. Enjoys good repute.
e. No political affiliation.
2. The head of the committee is coordinator assisted by Deputy Coordinator. No member can
present his name for the head of the committee. The Coordinators are elected by secret vote. His
election is for three months.
3. During the visits of different police stations the police officials and the public appreciated
the formation of these committees. In all police stations a separate room has been designated as
office of these committees.
4. Its worth appreciation that retired officers from different departments like SP (Rtd.) Haq
Nawaz Khan, DSP (Rtd.) Raheem Khan, Mr. Qadir Khan, former Principal, SP (Rtd.) Alamzeb Khan,

32. 32
DSP (Rtd.) Muhammad Rafiq, Mr. Hanif Ullah, Press reporter, Mr. Anwar-ud-Din, Press reporter and
Mr. Abdul Rehman, retired Director Education are playing very effective role to bridge the gap
between public and police.
5. However, Its matter of grave concern that female folk is totally found absent in its
composition.
SPECIAL POLICE FORCE (SPF)
In 2008, IGP NWFP introduced the concept of Community Police named as Special Police
Force. This is the first ever experience after the promulgation of Police Order 2002. In fact its
essence has been derived from PO 2002.The talent has been hired from the same community. Hiring
of local talent to provide security to neighbourhoods, towns, and villages sends a positive signal to
the local population. Article 29 of PO 2002 highlighted the importance and need of the appointment
of Special Police. Article 133 of PO 2002 empowered DPOs to have control over village watchmen
and special police officers.
2. The recruitment of SPF is for 2 years contract, each constable receives fixed salary of
Rs. 10,000/- per month.
RECRUITMENT CRITERIA:-
a. Age 22- 44 years
b. Education : Not essential, may be literate
c. Physical standard: Medically fit
d. Domicile Local District
UNIFORM
Black Shilwar Qameez.
MANDATE
To assist the police in operations (watch & ward duties), they cannot function
independently.
SECRUITY VETTING & TRAINING OF SPF
The enlistment of SPF was made in limited time. Therefore, the probability of the enlistment
of bad characters or criminals was also there. However, after the death of the mastermind of
Mingora Police Station suicide case in an encounter with law enforcement agency the police
administration is paying serious attention towards security vetting. It was learnt that the criteria of
local domicile was not followed religiously while enlisting the SPF constables (in one of the districts
of Malakand Region).
2. The enlistment of SPF tremendously improved the visibility of police in these affected areas
consequently enhanced the public trust and confidence in police. The management of Malakand
police tried its level best to build the capacity of SPF but more attention is needed in this regard.

33. 33
STRENGTH OF SPF
District Sanctioned Present Deficiency
Swat 3225 2604 -621
Buner 800 597 -203
Shangla 800 664 -136
Dir Lower 1050 750 -300
Upper Dir 650 600 -50
Total 6525 5215 -1310
DISTRICT PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISSIONS
In 2003, the Provincial Government constituted DPCs in Dir Lower , Dir Upper, Buner, Swat
and Shangla. After the completion of the tenure of District Governments, these bodies are no more
functional.
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OR DE-WEAPONIZATION
During the visit of village Bandai, Maidan, Dir Lower, it was observed that community was
apprehensive as they had the impression that probably the government wants to collect weapons
from the common people. On the other hand, community suggested that government shall
encourage the common people to devise self defence mechanism for this goal they need more
weapons. Such move will enhance proliferation of weapons in the society. The positive aspect of the
visit of the area was that people were found very enthusiastic regarding self defence of their areas.

34. 34
PRISONS
DISTRICT PRISON DIR LOWER
This prison was established on 1st
of November, 1990. Prisoners from Upper Dir, Shangla,
Bunir and Malakand Districts are also kept here. During the visit it was observed that 63 militants are
being confined in this jail. During the insurgency Maulana Khalid and his followers established their
own administration within the jail. They did not allow the prison staff to move inside the barracks.
After the posting of new jail Superintendent, a search operation was carried out during the search
two pistols, 13 grenades and 13 mobile telephones were recovered. Before this operation, a Public
Call Office (PCO) was functional with prime objective to provide facility to the inmates. This facility
was misused by the confined terrorists therefore, it was also closed down. The juvenile section of
the jail was found well disciplined, having the facilities of a small TV set and indoor games.
Capacity Present Over crowded
Male Female Juvenile Male Female Juvenile Male Female Juvenile
240 10 20 382 12 16 +142 +2 -4
PRISON STAFF DIR LOWER
OBSERVATOINS
a. The district jail Dir Lower is located on the main road. Therefore, there are certain
security threats. Furthermore, from another side the hill tops are nearby that
exposes the inmates to the external threats. During the visit, I learnt that in year
1996 a rival of an inmate targeted him from the hill top consequently, the inmate
was seriously injured.
b. Surprisingly, the prison security staff was still found equipped with 303 bore (Mark4)
rifle on the other hand the terrorists/criminals are equipped with sophisticated
weapons.
c. District jail Dir Lower having deficiency of 22 security guards.
d. For district jail Dir Lower only Rs. 67000/- has been allocated under the head of
Medical. If we assume the average number of inmates as 410, the per head
allocation is approximately Rs. 163/- per annum. Therefore, it is recommended that
realistic allocation be made.
TITLE STRENGTH
Superintendent Jail 1
Deputy Superintendent Jail 1
Assistant Superintendent Jail 2
Senior Clerk 1
Junior Clerk 2
Dispenser 1

35. 35
SUB JAIL DAGAR BUNER
This jail was established on 01-07-1992. Like district jail Dir Lower, it was also found over
crowded. Security of this facility is also a major concern.
Capacity 145
Present 284
Over crowded +139
DISTRICT JAIL SAIDU SHARIF (SWAT)
The building was erected during the era of Wali-i-Swat. The building has been declared as
condemned. After the earthquake of October-2005 C & W declared it dangerous consequently, the
prisoners were shifted to jails of Dir Lower and Buner. In order to create convenience for the
appearance in the courts, three barracks were repaired. Again in 2007, C & W declared it dangerous.
In 2008, its building material was auctioned for Rs. 35, 00000/-. Presently, prisoners from Swat are
being kept in other districts.
AVERAGE DAILY PRODUCTION & NEW ADMISSION
Detail Daily Average
Production of inmates in courts 35
New Admission 15 ( Dir Lower & Buner)
OBSERVATIONS
i. According to the plan it will be reconstruction. It means it will be constructed on the same
old pattern and design. It is recommended that a Juvenile section and enhanced security
features be incorporated in the reconstruction plan.
ii. The non-availability of a functional jail is a source of greater inconvenience for the relatives
of inmates as they have to travel from Swat to Dir Lower or Buner.
iii. To transport inmates from other districts to the courts of Swat is a costly affair, it increases
the POL cost of district police.
iv. Such frequent transportation is very risky.
v. Sometimes the courts order immediate production of prisoners on ZAMEMA-B but owing to
the physical distances the production on the same day is not possible that is another source
of delay in the hearings of the cases.
vi. The release orders of the courts also reach with delay. Consequently, the release of
prisoners is also delayed.

36. 36
DISTRICT JAIL UPPER DIR
District Jail Upper Dir is a small jail. It’s not over crowded but is insecure as :-
a. Its without boundary wall
b. from hill tops everything is visible within the jail
Following is the detail regarding capacity and presence of inmates:-
Capacity Present
Male Female Juvenile Male Female Juvenile
60 Nil 6 9 - -
PRISON STAFF UPPER DIR
TITLE STRENGTH
Superintendent Jail 1
Assistant Superintendent Jail 1
Head Warden 2
Female Warden 2
Clerk 1
Teacher 1
Dispenser 1
Sweeper 2

37. 37
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. A police training school be established in Malakand Region.
2. A forensic facility be planned and established at divisional level. However, a mobile
forensic lab be immediately provided.
3. Organizational revamping of special branch is strongly recommended. At divisional level
it shall be headed by Superintendent of Police or its operational control be given to the
DIG Region. A software be designed and updated information data bank to be
maintained.
4. BDS Swat was found well equipped but expansion in this unit is strongly suggested.
Establishment of BDS at Shangla and capacity building of BDS staff is recommended on
war footings.
5. Protective kits to be provided to all officials working in BDS.
6. Capacity building of Investigation and Moharrar staff regarding storage and handling of
explosives and IEDs is essential.
7. Capacity building regarding the use of gadgets like Walk-through gates, explosive
detectors, metal detectors, Investigation kits, gas guns, use of digital and video cameras,
use of grenades and preventive techniques to avoid damages in suicide attacks are
suggested to be planned and imparted.
8. Annual Practice Fire to be carried out religiously.
9. More dedicated talent be posted in investigation.
10. Tenure for the posting in investigation wing be fixed and respected.
11. In Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) their performance regarding quality, disposal and
progress of the investigation be made the assessment criteria.
12. The induction of specialized talent in the field of investigation be encouraged. For this
purpose, the services of the lawyers, Doctors, Computer & Forensic experts be hired.
13. It is suggested that section 19(10) of ATA, 1997 relating to publication of proclamation
of offenders in national dallies for absconding accused in terrorism cases may be relaxed
; or more funds may be allocated under this head.
14. Updated data of stolen/snatched vehicles may be made available at sub-divisional level.
15. In order to register the NCP vehicles, the government may announce the amnesty
scheme. It will not only provide convenience to the law enforcement agencies but also
be a source of huge revenue for the government. Temporarily NCP vehicles be
registered in all Police Stations of Malakand Region and a complete data bank be
maintained.
16. Monthly coordination meeting of Criminal Justice Coordination Committee (CJCC) shall
be carried out regularly.
17. Owing to present security threats, it is need of the hour to mount CCTV Cameras at the
main entrance, boundary wall and barracks of the prisons.
18. The provision of metal detectors and walk-through gates will ensure the safety and
security of inmates.
19. The possession of arms and mobile telephones speaks either of inefficiency or the
involvement of jail staff in corrupt practices. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that
an inquiry is to be carried out to dig out the actual facts regarding any involvement.
Phase wise transfer of staff and inmates to other jails is strongly recommended.
20. Keeping in view the presence of the dozens of militants in this jail, it is strongly
recommended that they shall be transferred to different jails in the province.
21. In order to improve the living of juvenile and to enhance their educational and technical
capacity, a plan be worked out with reputed NGOs and Government Departments.
22. As per essence of Pakistan Prison Rules (PPR), a central jail shall be established at
Divisional level. Therefore, establishment of a central jail is strongly recommended.

38. 38
23. The procurement and installation of CCTV Cameras, metal detectors, walk-through gates
for all prisons is strongly recommended.
24. The installation of search lights on the boundary walls will enhance the security level.
25. Often due to load-shedding electricity is off even for days, darkness in the barracks can
be a source of embarrassment for the administration of jail. Therefore, facility of
generators in prisons is strongly recommended.
26. Only one Dispenser and a weekly visit of Doctor is not enough. Therefore, creation of a
post of a Medical Officer and a functional dispensary at all prisons is strongly
recommended.
27. The establishment of separate Juvenile section is recommended for sub jail Buner.
28. Two more prisoners vans be provided to district Swat for the transportation of accused
arrested in the cases of terrorism.
29. Establishment of Public Call Office (PCO) in Jails shall not be permitted.
30. In order to improve the gender balance in Malakand, it is imperative that the Police
administration shall create conducive working environment for the female. Fresh
female recruitment campaign in different ranks may be launched. In this regard support
of the community particularly of elected representatives, NGOs and educational
institutions be attained. Posts of female police officers in the ranks of DSP, IP, SI & ASI
be sanctioned.
31. Representation of female in conciliatory committees be considered.
32. Capacity building of drivers is strongly recommended for this purpose the frontier police
shall arrange drivers training courses at PTC Hangu and also seek the cooperation of
NH & MP.
33. For the enrolment of SPF the minimum education standard shall be middle pass.
34. The recruitment on 1310 vacant posts of SPF be completed at earliest.
35. Security clearance /vetting of newly recruited police officials and SPF be immediately
referred to special branch, IB and other intelligence agencies.
36. Disciplinary Rules for SPF be drafted.
37. Police Stations defence mechanism is to be designed keeping in view the geographical
situation and the security threats.
38. Standardization of Police Lines buildings is also recommended.
39. The law enforcement agencies shall adopt zero tolerance policy towards petty crime and
traffic violations.
40. In the light of recent losses incurred by Malakand Police, the NWFP police welfare rules
be revised as the DPOs do not have amount at their disposal to look after the injured
officials. Therefore, it is suggested that at least Rs. 50,000 be made available at the
disposal of each DPO.
41. After the operation Malakand police received 117 vehicles therefore, enhancement of
fuel ceiling is strongly recommended.
42. Standardization and quality of Uniform articles is strongly suggested. The model of
National Highways & Motorway Police may be followed.
43. Capacity building of the Levis Force in Malakand District is also suggested.

39. 39
LEGAL REFERENCES CONSULTED
i. Pakistan Penal Code, 1860
ii. Criminal Procedure Code, 1898
iii. Police Rules, 1934
iv. Qanoon-e-Shahadat, 1984
iv. Anti Terrorist Act, 1997
vi. Pakistan Prison Rules
vii. Standing Order No. 16/2009, Issued by PPO, NWFP.

40. 40
ABBREVATIONS
NWFP North West Frontier Province
IGP Inspector General of Police
PPO Provincial Police Officer
DIG Deputy Inspector General
AIG Assistant Inspector General
DPO District Police Officer
SSP Senior Superintendent of Police
SP Superintendent of Police
DSP Deputy Superintendent of Police
DSP/L Deputy Superintendent of Police Legal
IP Inspector Police
SI Sub-Inspector
ASI Assistant Sub-Inspector
HC Head Constable
DVR Driver
C Constable
NH & MP National Highways & Motorway Police
SPF Special Police Force
FC Frontier Constabulary
FRP Frontier Reserve Police
IB Intelligence Bureau
EPF Elite Police Force
PS Police Station
PP Police Post
PTC Police Training Centre
IO Investigation Officer
SHO Station House Officer
LEA Law Enforcement Agency
ATA Anti Terrorist Act, 1997
ATC Anti Terrorist Court
PO-2002 Police Order-2002
DPCs District Public Safety Commissions
Cr.Pc Criminal Procedure Code, 1898
PPC Pakistan Penal Code, 1860
PPR Pakistan Prison Rules
FIR First Information Report
U/S Under Section
DG Director General
DCO District Coordination Officer
Eng. Engineer
Sub.Maj Subidar Major
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
JUI Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam
JI Jamait-i-Islami
TNSM Tahreek Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi
Avg. Average
Sq.Km2
Square Kilometre
TA Travelling Allowance
DA Daily Allowance

41. 41
ACR Annual Confidential Report
NCP Non-Custom Paid
Amb. Ambulance
POL Petrol Oil Liquid
HF High Frequency
BDS Bomb Disposal Squad
PATA Provincially Administered Tribal Areas
FCR Frontier Crime Regulation
PWD Public Works Department
C & W Communications & Works
DNA Deoxeribo Nucleic Acid
PCO Public Calls Office
CJCC Criminal Justice Coordination Committee
BHU Basic Health Unit
ADP Annual Development Programme
KDB Kohistan Development Board
DOR District Officer Revenue
IED Improvised Explosive Device
CCTV Close Circuit Television

42. 42
Meetings
Mr. Ibrahim Khan, Session Judge, Buner
Mr. Idrees Khan, DIG Malakand Region
Mr. Waqar Maroof, Additional Commissioner (Hqrs) Afghan Refugees Commissionerate, NWFP
Mr.Mumtaz Zareen, DPO Dir Lower
Mr. Ijaz Khan, SP Investigation, Swat
Qazi Ghulam Farooq, DPO, Swat
Mr. Falak Naz, DPO Buner
Mr. Israr Bacha, SP Investigation Buner
Mr Altaf Khan, Senior Civil Judge, Dir Lower
Mr. Manzoor Qadir, Senior Civil judge, Buner
Mr. Sahibzada Shah Jehan, Jail Superintendent, Dir Lower
Mr. Saud Khan, Jail Superintendent, Buner
Mr.Habib-ur-Rehman, DSP/HQ, Swat
Mr.Mohammad Nawaz , DSP Shangla
DSP Chakdara, Dir Lower
Mr. Bakhat Raj (IP) Circle officer Investigation, Dir lower
Mr. Wakeel Khan SHO PS Chakdara, Dir Lower
Mr. Badshah, SHO PS Ouch, Dir Lower
Mr. Taza Gul, Office Superintendent, DIG Malakand Region
Telephonic Interviews
Mr. Asim Imam, District & Session Judge, Anti Terrorist Court, Swat
Mr. Akbar Khan, DG, Prosecution Service, NWFP
Mr. Rauf Khan, DPO Dir Upper
Mr. Qasim, SP/MT, Frontier Police
Mr. Sakhi Khan, SP/Telecommunication, Frontier Police
Mr. Jamsheed Khan, Public Prosecutor, ATC Court Swat.
Mr. Bakht Akbar, Reader Judge, ATC, Swat.