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Tor – The Onion Router

               Presented By
                    Ashly Liza Philip
                    S5 MCA
                    Roll No. 06
                    MACE
Privacy in public networks

   Internet is designed as a public network.


   Routing information is public.


   Encryption does not hide identities.


   Prone to „traffic analysis‟
Contd..

          Internet data packet



      Header               Data
                          payload

          Source,
                          Whatever being sent
      destination, time

      Encryption can‟t           Hidden by
           hide                  encryption
What is Anonymity?

   State of being not identifiable within a set of
    subjects.

   Unlink-ability of action and identity


   Unobserve-ability (hard to achieve)
Applications of Anonymity
           Privacy


           Untraceable electronic mail

           Law enforcement and
           intelligence

           Anonymous electronic voting

           Censorship-resistant
           publishing
Anonymous networks
     PipeNet

     Garlic Routing

     Onion Routing

     Anonymizer

     Crowds

     Java Anon Proxy
Onion Routing
  By David Goldschlag, Michael Reed, Paul Syverson


  ONION; special data structure.


  Uses public key cryptography


  Hides source and destination


  Anonymize TCP-based applications


  Protects anonymity of a user over network


  Resistant to eavesdropping and traffic analysis
Working of Onion Routing

 Uses an Onion Proxy


 Routes data randomly


 A router knows only its predecessor and successor


 No correspondence between data layers


 Different onion at each hop
R                                          R4     R
                           R
                                       R3
               R1                                                R
                                                    R
 Alice                       R2
                   R                                       Bob


 Sender chooses a random sequence of routers
   -Some routers are honest, some controlled by attacker
   -Sender controls the length of the path



                                                                 slide 9
Decrypting an Onion
Contd..
Tor – Implementation of Onion Routing
    TOR stands for „The Onion Router.‟


    Second generation onion router.


    Low-latency anonymous network


    By Paul Syverson, Nick Mathewson, Roger
    Dingledine in 2004

    Maintained by Free Haven Project


    Hundreds of nodes on all continents
Contd..

   “Easy-to-use” client proxy


   Freely available


   Supports only TCP


   Uses SOCKS interface


   No observer can tell where data comes from/going
Advancements over Onion Routing
    Perfect forward secrecy

    Variable exit policies

    Directory servers

    Leaky-pipe circuit topology

    End-to-end integrity checking

    SOCKS interface
How Tor works?
 Same as Onion Routing


 Uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange


 Distributes data over several places


 Takes random pathway


 Used with Privoxy
Tor Circuit
 Each circuit shared by multiple TCP streams


 Circuit created preemptively


 Can recover from failure
Circuit setup
     Built from entry point one step at a time


          Circuit ID is chosen randomly


         Diffie-Hellman process initiated


       Negotiate a symmetric session key


       Circuit extension and Relay packet
Tor Circuit setup(1)




  Client proxy establish a symmetric session key and circuit with
  Onion Router #1
Tor Circuit setup(2)




       Circuit extension
Tor Circuit setup(3)




      Client proxy extends the circuit by establishing a symmetric
      session key with Onion Router #3
Using circuit
Cells in Tor

               Cell (512bytes)


           Header                Payload


          CircID                     Data

         Command
Contd..
 Based on commands in cells:-

    Control cells               Relay cells


                      Cells
Commands in cells


     Control cells
                                 Relay Cells
   • -padding          •   - relay data
   • -create/created   •   -relay begin
   • -destroy          •   -relay end
                       •   -relay connected
                       •   -relay teardown
                       •   -relay connected
                       •   -relay extend/extended
                       •   -relay truncate/truncated
E.g. Fetching a webpage
Congestion control
OR keeps track of PACKAGE WINDOW &
DELIVERY WINDOW

                        • Window initialized to 1000cells
                        • Decremented accordingly
   Circuit throttling   • Forward nothing on reaching 0




                        • Window initialized to 500cells
                        • Use relay sendme cells
   Stream throttling    • Incremented on receiving relay
                          sendme
Hidden services
 Allow location hidden services


 Both end-points remain anonymous


 Both parties connect via a third party, the rendezvous
  point

 Introduction points act as contact points


 Server can be operated from inside a firewall
Creating and connecting to a
Location hidden service
Attacks on Tor
      Passive attacks


      Active attacks


      Attacks against Rendezvous
      points


      Directory attacks
Users of Tor

                      Law
     Militaries   enforcement     Bloggers
                    officers


                   Journalists   High profile
      Activists
                  and audience     people



                     NGO‟s
Weaknesses




   End-to-end
                 Slow network   Illegal use
   correlation
Real world deployment




   The Tor download page.
The Tor/Privoxy installer.




Tor in the Windows system tray.
Setting up a proxy for
                   Internet Explorer




The Tor detector
Future enhancements

 Usability and Integration


 Scalability


 Caching at exit nodes
Conclusion
 Tor becomes most widely used anonymous network
  with its speed

 Tor supports mutual anonymity with the help of
  Rendezvous Point

 Tor resists local adversary effectively


 Tor anonymizes TCP streams, providing a high-
  throughput and low-latency network compared to the
  onion routing
Tor  the onion router
Tor  the onion router

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Tor the onion router

  • 1. Tor – The Onion Router Presented By Ashly Liza Philip S5 MCA Roll No. 06 MACE
  • 2. Privacy in public networks  Internet is designed as a public network.  Routing information is public.  Encryption does not hide identities.  Prone to „traffic analysis‟
  • 3. Contd.. Internet data packet Header Data payload Source, Whatever being sent destination, time Encryption can‟t Hidden by hide encryption
  • 4. What is Anonymity?  State of being not identifiable within a set of subjects.  Unlink-ability of action and identity  Unobserve-ability (hard to achieve)
  • 5. Applications of Anonymity Privacy Untraceable electronic mail Law enforcement and intelligence Anonymous electronic voting Censorship-resistant publishing
  • 6. Anonymous networks PipeNet Garlic Routing Onion Routing Anonymizer Crowds Java Anon Proxy
  • 7. Onion Routing  By David Goldschlag, Michael Reed, Paul Syverson  ONION; special data structure.  Uses public key cryptography  Hides source and destination  Anonymize TCP-based applications  Protects anonymity of a user over network  Resistant to eavesdropping and traffic analysis
  • 8. Working of Onion Routing  Uses an Onion Proxy  Routes data randomly  A router knows only its predecessor and successor  No correspondence between data layers  Different onion at each hop
  • 9. R R4 R R R3 R1 R R Alice R2 R Bob  Sender chooses a random sequence of routers -Some routers are honest, some controlled by attacker -Sender controls the length of the path slide 9
  • 12. Tor – Implementation of Onion Routing  TOR stands for „The Onion Router.‟  Second generation onion router.  Low-latency anonymous network  By Paul Syverson, Nick Mathewson, Roger Dingledine in 2004  Maintained by Free Haven Project  Hundreds of nodes on all continents
  • 13. Contd..  “Easy-to-use” client proxy  Freely available  Supports only TCP  Uses SOCKS interface  No observer can tell where data comes from/going
  • 14. Advancements over Onion Routing Perfect forward secrecy Variable exit policies Directory servers Leaky-pipe circuit topology End-to-end integrity checking SOCKS interface
  • 15. How Tor works?  Same as Onion Routing  Uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange  Distributes data over several places  Takes random pathway  Used with Privoxy
  • 16. Tor Circuit  Each circuit shared by multiple TCP streams  Circuit created preemptively  Can recover from failure
  • 17. Circuit setup Built from entry point one step at a time Circuit ID is chosen randomly Diffie-Hellman process initiated Negotiate a symmetric session key Circuit extension and Relay packet
  • 18. Tor Circuit setup(1) Client proxy establish a symmetric session key and circuit with Onion Router #1
  • 19. Tor Circuit setup(2) Circuit extension
  • 20. Tor Circuit setup(3) Client proxy extends the circuit by establishing a symmetric session key with Onion Router #3
  • 22. Cells in Tor Cell (512bytes) Header Payload CircID Data Command
  • 23. Contd.. Based on commands in cells:- Control cells Relay cells Cells
  • 24. Commands in cells Control cells Relay Cells • -padding • - relay data • -create/created • -relay begin • -destroy • -relay end • -relay connected • -relay teardown • -relay connected • -relay extend/extended • -relay truncate/truncated
  • 25. E.g. Fetching a webpage
  • 26. Congestion control OR keeps track of PACKAGE WINDOW & DELIVERY WINDOW • Window initialized to 1000cells • Decremented accordingly Circuit throttling • Forward nothing on reaching 0 • Window initialized to 500cells • Use relay sendme cells Stream throttling • Incremented on receiving relay sendme
  • 27. Hidden services  Allow location hidden services  Both end-points remain anonymous  Both parties connect via a third party, the rendezvous point  Introduction points act as contact points  Server can be operated from inside a firewall
  • 28. Creating and connecting to a Location hidden service
  • 29. Attacks on Tor Passive attacks Active attacks Attacks against Rendezvous points Directory attacks
  • 30. Users of Tor Law Militaries enforcement Bloggers officers Journalists High profile Activists and audience people NGO‟s
  • 31. Weaknesses End-to-end Slow network Illegal use correlation
  • 32. Real world deployment The Tor download page.
  • 33. The Tor/Privoxy installer. Tor in the Windows system tray.
  • 34. Setting up a proxy for Internet Explorer The Tor detector
  • 35. Future enhancements  Usability and Integration  Scalability  Caching at exit nodes
  • 36. Conclusion  Tor becomes most widely used anonymous network with its speed  Tor supports mutual anonymity with the help of Rendezvous Point  Tor resists local adversary effectively  Tor anonymizes TCP streams, providing a high- throughput and low-latency network compared to the onion routing