Cascao Hydropolitics TWM Lake Victoria 2009 (I)
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Cascao Hydropolitics TWM Lake Victoria 2009 (I)
- 1. Ana Elisa Cascão Presentation to TWM Lake Victoria Kigali, Rwanda – 26 October 2009 Hydropolitics: Water, Power and Cooperation (I)
- 3. Hydropolitics: is there a definition? What can you see in this picture? Power Water Control Merowe Dam, Sudan
- 4. Hydropolitics: POWER ‘ who gets what water , when, where and how?’ Who? Users: Upstream/downstream/midstream riparians Uses: Agriculture, Industry and Services sectors What? Blue water, Groundwater, Green water Water quality When? Constant or variable supply and control Where? Tributaries, flows and infrastructures How? Political and economic processes influencing water control, utilisation and allocation of water resources
- 5. Water: a multifaceted resource (1) Political resource Natural resource Social resource Economic resource Cultural resource
- 6. Water: a multifaceted resource (2)
- 7. Water: a transboundary political resource
- 9. Asymmetric Power Relations: explanatory factor Geography Material power Bargaining power Ideational power 4 PILLARS OF POWER Framework of Hydro-Hegemony Zeitoun and Warner 2006
- 11. MATERIAL POWER Economic development Military power Political stability and influence
- 12. BARGANING POWER: in interstate relations and negotiations WHO CONTROLS THE NEGOTIATIONS? WHO CONTROLS THE AGREEMENTS? WHO CONTROLS THE NUMBERS? WHO CONTROLS THE AGENDA? WHO CONTROLS THE LEGITIMACY? WHO PLAYS BETTER WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW? WHO HAS ACCESS TO INVESTMENT?
- 13. IDEATIONAL POWER: Power to influence perceptions Asymmetric Knowledge Sanctioned Discourse Incentives Playing with time Silent Diplomacy/ Cooperation
- 16. By the end of the 1st session, participants should be aware: * What is Hydropolitics * Water is a multifaceted resource * Water is a political resource * Transboundary ≠ Shared * Power in transboundary basins matters!
- 17. Next session: * Hydropolitical Conflict and Cooperation * Case-studies * Financing cooperation * Water-Sharing and Benefit-Sharing Power
Notas do Editor
- Before going to power, let’s look at the water itself
- Majority of water bodies in the world are transboundary 263 transboundary water resources Africa: 60 (second in terms of total number of basins.... Firt is Europe with 71)
- The terms are often used interchangeably, but imply quite different reactions. It was suggested that “transboundary water resources” should maintain a strict geography-based definition. Water bodies that cross the administrative borders between two or more countries should be considered transboundary. ”Shared water resources”, on the other hand, should be defined by a political interpretation. Shared water resources would take into account how water is in fact allocated or used between the states (the ‘who/what/when/where/how’ question again).
- Second dimension of power – Bargaining/negotiational power – GOAL: MAINTAIN STATUS QUO NUMBERS – Israel, Egypt and Turkey have access to all the data at all time (freshwater, groundwater, aquifers), and make use of it.... There is a case of “war on numbers” AGENDA – What can be discussed or not – examples: Israel does not want to talk about the ammount of water taken from the Lake Tiberias, or Egypt dos not want to talk about the surplus of water used for megaloman projects outside their quota NEGOTIATIONS – what can or not be negotiated – Turkey does not want to negotiate with his partners, and uses threats, did not ask any permission for the Anatolia Project; Egypt refuses a new agreement with the 10 Nile Basin countries, and continue to defend a bilateral treaty from 1959 that allocate ALL the water to Egypt and Sudan AGREEMENTS – They are often used to control the other – 1995 Agreement with Jordan; 1959 Agreement with Sudan – the wording of the agreements is favourable to he hydro-hegemons; and refuse to negotiate new agreements when it is not in their favour LEGITIMACY – it is a very important detail: priori use, acquired and historical rrights – the hydro-hegemons assume hegemony over it, and it is out of discussion anything that is considered not leigitimate INTERNATIONAL LAW – Contradictory positions in different law playfiedls – all hydro-hegemons voted against the 1997 Convention on International Watercourses, but thn ask for international princiles of no-harm INVESTMENT – Not all the countries have the same access to international fundins, and any of the three countries have a special position inside thes instiutions, a lot of experts with strong capacity to influence the donors, and the international organisations
- Ideational Power – thrid dimension of power – influencing and controlling the perceptions, discourses, ideas, and at the end, the negotiations GOAL: MAINTAIN STATUS QUO ASYMMETRIC KNOWLEDGE – countries do not have the same level of expertise, capacity to develop new knowledge, and this influnces the negotiations in all stages SANCTIONED DISCOURSE – what can and cannot be said – they downplay certain realities, and overexpose certain other INCENTIVES – Carrots and sticks strategies toc o-opt certain neighbours – for example economic and political incentives such as support to political regimes, economic integration, trde, etc PALYING WITH TIME – Delay all decision that can affect vested interests SILENCE – Not to talk about what is not wanted – example Wall in Israel prevents Palestinian acess to certain groundtwaer resources CO-OPTION – similar to incentives – Israel did this with Jordan, and Egypt did this with Sudan AMBUIGUITY – sign agreements and treaties that are vague and not precise, to play with time and to avoid commitment – e.g. 1995 Agreement between Israel and Jordan DIPLOMACY – pretending to be diplomatic and cooperative prevents too much pressure from international community, prevents ripairan neighbours to complain too much or even silent them... It is a much sucessful strategy than the conflictive one