27. Different countries and different regions different approaches Indonesia Yogyakarta profit sharing with the ultra poor Aceh – group system with women entrepreneurs Bangladesh – group system 20% ultra poor no charge, 60% moderate poor 7.5% service charge with any excess returned to borrowers 20% mini entrepreneurs with Islamic financing modes Pakistan individual system using Islamic financing modes
28. 11 Heterogeneity The idea of heterogeneity and exclusion from/by existing models [non deliberate, via design and logic, unassailable] have been powerful concepts to draw policy attention and create urgency for action Microfinance discourse [‘poorest of the poor’ as landless, non agriculture, women] The hard core poor/ ultra poor [microfinance left outs, and throw outs. Not only poorer than the poor but differently so]
29. What about heterogeneity among the poorest? Work harder, especially women Earn less Weak asset base 12
30. What about heterogeneity among the poorest? Informal safety nets as important as formal ones The poorest lose out even in informal safety nets 13
31. 14 Education and housing situation of the ultra-poor What about heterogeneity among the poorest? The education opportunity divide The living environment divide
32. Is there a spatial heterogeneity? Vulnerable labour market engagement Weak asset base 15
37. BRAC two-step model In 1985 BRAC realised its microfinance programmes were unlikely to meet the needs of the ultra poor. Food donations provided a ‘breathing space’ for the poorest these would not remove chronic poverty. Attempt to combine food relief with skills training program, to create a basis for enhanced household income in the future. Regular compulsory savings of a few cents during the period of their food relief to build up a lump sum for investment. Training on poultry and vegetable production for female VGF cardholders was given and they were able to access microcredit At the end of the 24-month programme the ultra poor were eligible for microcredit
38. Poverty reduction as a 'two-step' process of livelihood protection and promotion
39. Results mixed About 80% of the IGVGD beneficiaries joined BRAC’s regular microfinance programme But only 70% continued beyond three years i.e. over 40% of the IGVGD beneficiaries fail to start the process of graduation. Those who dropped had fragile socio-demographic structures – the female headed households who do not having a working adult male in the household and/or suffer from chronic illness, etc 21
43. 24 Problems facing Islamic MFIs 1. Dilution in the Application of Islamic Modes of Financing Main mode- murabahah or bai-muajjal. It is difficult to go out with the clients and buy the goods/assets from faraway markets IMFIs delegates someone else (and inspects later) Alternative is to use Profit-sharing modes Problem is the moral hazard problem--No book-keeping and difficult to monitor
44. Conclusion There are strong economic reasons for establishing Islamic alternatives to poverty-focused micro financing. Traditional institutions of waqf, zakat, and qardhassan are important means of financing IMFIs 25
45. Thank You CENTER OF ISLAMIC BANKING & ECNOMICS Head Office: 192- Ahmad Block, New Garden Town , Lahore, Pakistan Ph: +92-42-35913096-8, 35858990, 38407850 Fax: +92 -42-35913056E-mail : info@alhudacibe.com Web: http://www.alhudacibe.com