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WILEY TRADING SERIES
The Psychology of Finance, revised edition
The Elliott Wave Principle: Key to Market Behavior
Robert R. Prechter
International Commodity Trading
Ephraim Clark, Jean-Baptiste Lesourd and Rene Thieblemont
Dynamic Technical Analysis
Encyclopedia of Chart Patterns
Thomas N. Bulkowski
Integrated Technical Analysis
Financial Markets Tick by Tick: Insights in Financial Markets Microstructure
Technical Market Indicators: Analysis and Performance
Richard J. Bauer and Julie R. Dahlquist
Trading to Win: The Psychology of Mastering the Markets
Pricing Convertible Bonds
At the Crest of the Tidal Wave: A Forecast for the Great Bear Market
Robert R. Prechter
Harry D. Schultz
Copyright # 2002 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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This book is printed on acid-free paper responsibly manufactured from sustainable forestry,
in which at least two trees are planted for each one used for paper production.
1 Introduction 1
Part I THE BEAR BACKGROUND 7
2 Overview 9
3 History of Bear Markets 17
Part II ECONOMIC SETTING FOR BEAR MARKETS 29
4 Guideposts for Bear Markets 31
5 Globalization, Terrorism, and Foreign Investment 39
Part III STRUCTURE OF BEAR MARKETS 43
6 Secondary Reactions 45
7 Bear Market Legs 52
Part IV TOOLS FOR MEASURING BEAR MARKETS 57
8 Tools to Help You Recognize and Survive a Bear Market 59
9 Tools that ‘‘Change Shape’’ in Bear Markets 74
10 Cycles Study: A Useful Market Tool? 78
11 Chart Reading and Interpretation 83
Part V MONEY-MAKING TACTICS 89
12 Preservation of Capital during a Bear Market 91
13 Short Selling 101 98
14 Strategies for Making Money Even If You Guess Wrong 108
15 Rules for Being a Flexible Investor 115
16 Defensive Investments that Allow You to Sleep Nights 119
Part VI THE EMOTIONAL ASPECT 127
17 Human Psychology in the Marketplace 129
18 Contrary Opinion 137
Part VII PREDICTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 143
19 The Past is Prologue 145
20 Epilogue 155
Glossary of Terms and Tactics for Market Mastery 159
Resources/Recommended books, newsletters, data suppliers, 168
‘‘History never looks like history when you are living through it. It always
looks confusing and messy, and it always feels uncomfortable.’’
John W. Gardner, 1968
Over the last 20 years, investors have increasingly come to regard investing in
stocks about the same as putting money in the bank—except they got a higher
return. This belief became so pervasive that, as recently as 2000, the govern-
ment in Washington was still talking about putting part of the Social Security
account into securities in order to earn a higher return. After the Nasdaq crash,
that plan was quietly dropped. Even investors who researched stocks before
buying them either mostly used computer programs that rely on past action
repeating more or less exactly in order to predict future buy or sell points, or
they used Internet advice which in many cases was nothing more than thinly
disguised sales pitches.
There is an old adage which says that knowledge can be communicated but
wisdom has to be self-taught. I hope that, by the end of this book, you will have
enough knowledge to evolve your own market wisdom.
With the coming of the Internet, investors were so focused on acquiring the
latest information on securities that many never bothered to learn how that
information could be best used.
And just as many of us have lost the ability to spell correctly or do simple
arithmetic because we rely on spell checks and computer calculators, so
investors who rely only on the Internet for investment know-how have never
had to learn the basic signals to judge where markets will go next. Even more
dangerous is the assumption that prediction is a scientiﬁc process, whereby if
2 Bear Market Investing Strategies
you have the right piece of software that correctly predicted market turning
points in the recent past, it would certainly be able to predict the future.
But market analysis is not a science; it is an art, using intuition and experi-
ence to make sense of evolving data. Past patterns may at times not have their
usual relevance for future predictions.
I have been writing an investment newsletter for 38 years, and I seem to be
on virtually every investment mailing list there is.
During the last 5 years of the 1990s, I was inundated with junk mail from
software companies claiming to have the key to future market success, based
only on their program having called turning points for a few prior years. These
software packages used such phrases as: ‘‘fully automated trading software,’’
and ‘‘built-in portfolio,’’ implying that all you needed to make money in the
stock market was knowledge of how to operate their software.
Until the mid-1990s, analysts on ﬁnancial news programs did useful research
and oﬀered informed opinions of where markets in general and speciﬁc stocks
were likely to go. But increasingly over the subsequent years those same
analysts concentrated ever more on being entertainers, as all business news
programs became little more than infomercials for their advertisers. The
focus became less to seriously inform and more on keeping the viewer
watching so the advertisers would have an audience.
But then markets topped out, Nasdaq crashed, and the war on terrorism
gave the media permission to use the word ‘‘recession,’’ without being accused
of ‘‘talking down the market.’’ Investors were left wondering what to do with
stocks that in many cases had already lost a substantial portion of their value
in the prior 2 years. Their ‘‘magic bullet’’ software programs failed them, and
they lacked basic market know-how, or how to invest in what appears to be the
early stages of a protracted bear market.
This book is designed to upgrade investors’ knowledge with the basics of
how to make investment decisions, with particular reference to bear markets,
bull market corrections and recessions. But simply knowing how to make
respectable buy and sell decisions is not enough.
Nobody in the history of Wall Street has ever guessed right all the time. It’s
therefore necessary not only to decide how to predict market direction, but
what strategies to use to minimize losses when you guess wrong, and maximize
your proﬁts when you are right.
The ultimate decision for your investments is made by you. Over the nearly 4
decades I have been advising clients, there have been many times when I would
give the same advice to three people, and one would make money, one would
break even, and one would lose money.
However good the advice we receive, we always inject our own judgment
into the equation. In this book, we will discuss how best to make your own
A key principle of technical analysis is that there are certain recurring
patterns of investing behavior that can be charted. But no technical tool works
all the time. Though history does seem to repeat itself in a general sense, it
never repeats exactly, so no one model of past action, be it a war, inﬂation, civil
unrest, or a bear market, is suﬃcient to ascertain what the future will bring.
After the September 11, 2001 attack on New York and the Pentagon,
advisors rushed to predict future markets, based on what the Dow Jones
Averages did in the Gulf War, or the Vietnam War. But the war on
terrorism is unlike any war in the past. The recession of 2000 seems likely to
have variations from a number of past recessions.
The best way to use the past for future projections is to have as much history
as possible of past events: market averages, individual stock groups, technical
indicators such as Conﬁdence Index or advance/decline lines, wars, govern-
ment monetary intervention, etc. Then check for similarities to what is
happening today. With this data, we can then build a mental big picture for
possible future market direction based on elements of as much history as
possible, which taken together form a totally new paradigm.
This book discusses past models based on technical analysis and chart
reading, plus similar economic, political, war, and social conditions.
Hopefully, by the end of this book, you will have enough information to
construct your own market vision for the next several years.
Any composite model view of possible future action is never static. As events
change and unfold, your predictive model should be modiﬁed. This book is
written at a speciﬁc point in time. Even if the visions I oﬀer in the later chapters
are correct in a general sense, I cannot possibly be correct about the details. It
is up to you to update and ﬁne-tune your model as things evolve.
WHAT YOU WILL LEARN
This book oﬀers both the novice and the seasoned investor perspectives on
investment theory and strategies, with particular reference to recessionary
Chapter 2 deﬁnes exactly what a bear market is and how it is diﬀerent from
corrective reactions in a bull market. Wars, terrorism, politics, and social
events in the main only aﬀect markets indirectly. What ultimately moves
stocks and therefore markets is the underlying value of the companies that
those stocks represent. Only inasmuch as those non-market factors aﬀect the
underlying economics are they relevant. But the mass media would have you
believe otherwise, because with daily air time to ﬁll they report daily trivia.
4 Bear Market Investing Strategies
Economic trends are slow to build and slow to change directions, as are major
bull or bear markets, which doesn’t make sexy TV talky talk.
Chapter 3 describes past bear markets, as measured by the Dow Jones
Industrial Average. The purpose is to create models of what past bear
markets looked like, to be used as context when you construct your own
view of possible future action.
Chapter 4 lists economic and other general signs that suggest a bull market is
ending and a bear market is beginning.
Chapter 5 discusses foreign investment and whether one should put money
abroad in a bear market.
Chapter 6 discusses the diﬀerence between a bear market rally (secondary
reaction) and the beginning of a new bull market.
Chapter 7 is the mirror image of Chapter 6. It discusses down-legs in a bear
market and how they diﬀer from reactions in a bull market.
Chapter 8 lists speciﬁc technical indicators that you can use for measuring
both bull and bear markets (tools which act consistently in both bull and bear
Chapter 9 lists those technical indicators that behave very diﬀerently in bear
markets to bull markets, so you need to decide which is occurring before you
use these indicators.
Chapter 10 discusses the usefulness of Cycles study. Cycles have their modest
place in your toolbox of past models of markets, but the past never repeats
exactly—as many cycles aﬁcionados would have you believe.
Chapter 11 teaches you about chart reading and chart interpretation. For
most people, data in the form of a chart is more meaningful. ‘‘A picture speaks
a thousand words.’’
Chapter 12 gives basic rules of investment in a bear market, when preserving
capital is more important than risk taking.
Chapter 13 teaches you all you ever wanted to know about short selling.
Chapter 14 is perhaps the most important chapter in the book. No matter
how savvy an investor you are, there will be times when you will be quite wrong
about the direction of the market. This chapter gives you strategies to enable
you to make money, even if you are wrong about market direction sometimes.
Chapter 15 shows no matter whether you are a short-, medium- or long-term
trader or investor, you really must develop a more ﬂexible approach to buying
and selling in a bear market than in boom times. Bear markets are a lot more
volatile than bull markets, so they have to be watched more closely.
Chapter 16 oﬀers you some defensive investments that enable you to sleep
nights, some of which you can hold long term. The trick is deciding what sort
of bear market we are in, before you decide which defensive investments to
Chapters 17 and 18 discuss how human emotions, particularly your emotions
aﬀect your investment decisions.
By the time you reach Chapter 19, if I have done my job well, you should
already have a strong sense of where we might be headed, economically, in
securities markets and on a social and governmental level over the next few
Chapters 19 and 20 oﬀer my personal overview of the next few years, to give
you another context for your decision making.
BE NOT AN OPTIMIST, NOR A PESSIMIST, BUT A REALIST
The hardest part of developing a portfolio in a bear market is human nature’s
natural optimism. There is a saying that man can live 30 days without food, 7
days without water, but only a few hours without hope. However much your
intellect might believe that economic and technical factors point to a protracted
bear market, your heart will inject the hope that the data is wrong. The hardest
part of making money in a bear market is facing the fact that we are in one, and
that, at least for a while, there will be few concrete signals that a critical
turnaround is in sight.
But, by the time you reach Chapter 20, you will know enough about bear
markets to also know approximately how they end.
BUY WHEN THE BLOOD IS RUNNING IN THE STREETS
On July 8, 1932, the Dow hit a record low of 41, down 90% from its all-time
high. It felt as if the disaster would never end. Yet, just a few weeks later, a new
bull market began that, for those who bought, saw their investment more than
quadruple over the next 5 years.
In 1942, 4 months after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, the Dow
crashed to 92. The war loomed large into the future, and buying stocks was
the last thing on most people’s minds. Yet those ‘‘realistic optimists’’ who
bought, in the Spring of 1942, experienced a steady climb in values until the
Dow hit 212 in 1946.
In a sense, a bear is more of an optimist than a permanent bull. A permanent
bull wants the past to continue forever, and, when it doesn’t, he becomes
disoriented and/or depressed. But bulls who become bears when markets
turn are bigger optimists because they know the downturn will not be
permanent and after current problems a better future awaits, one where you
can enjoy the fruits of your realistic investment strategies. They never forget
that, in spite of setbacks, the history of human societies shows that the super
long-term trend is up, and that even a huge bear market is only a multi-year
setback in the grand scheme of things.
6 Bear Market Investing Strategies
If you can remind yourself daily that ‘‘this too will pass,’’ when most
investors are still fearful of buying securities and economic data continue to
be negative, but your composite picture of future market action indicates it is
time to begin cautiously buying, then you will be buying at the beginning of the
next great bull market.
THE BEAR BACKGROUND
[ ] ]
[Quote not available in this electronic edition.]
James Collins, quoted in The Internet Bubble, by
Anthony B. Perkins and Michael C. Perkins, Harper Collins, 1999
(the 500 auto makers were reduced to 3)
‘‘Every man takes the limits of his own ﬁeld of vision for the limits of the
Arthur Schopenhauer, 1851
In the late 1950s, when I ﬁrst started serious stock market investment/analysis,
it was only necessary to put your assets into blue chips and watch them
appreciate year after year. But, by the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s,
the key to making money in markets was not just buying sound companies, but
understanding Vietnam War-induced inﬂation, as government tried to supply
both ‘‘guns and butter.’’ (Just as the US is doing today.)
By the early 1970s, it was also necessary to have some understanding of
foreign markets and international aﬀairs, when OPEC, seeing their pound
and dollar assets already eroding because of ﬁscal irresponsibility in both the
US and Britain, temporarily cut oﬀ the West’s oil supply using the 1967 Arab–
Israeli Six Day War as the excuse.
And, as the value of the dollar declined, the value of the Swiss franc and the
German mark rose sharply, so it was possible to make a great deal of money
simply by moving out of US dollars and into Euro currencies and bonds.
THE BEAR AND HIS MARKET
Since this book is largely about bear markets, it seems necessary to give a
dependable deﬁnition of both a bear and bear markets.
A bear is an investor or trader who believes the trend of stock prices is down
and trades or invests with that trend by selling his stock and/or selling short.
10 Bear Market Investing Strategies
A bear market is a depressed or declining market. One can have a bear
market in real estate, advertising, automobiles, art, commodities, bonds, or
anything else—including the stock market.
A bear market in stocks is usually deﬁned in ways that equate the mini-bear
markets of 1983, 1987, and 1990 with the more prolonged bear markets we saw
in the 1970s or even with the great bear market that began in 1929. I prefer to
deﬁne bear markets in three categories:
1. Baby bears such as those we have seen during the last 20 years, which
were little more than secondary reactions within a papa bull trend.
2. Mama bear markets such as we saw in 1973–74.
3. Papa bear markets such as the one from 1929 to 1942 and, in constant
dollar terms, from 1966 to 1981. (See Constant Dollar Dow chart in
Chapter 19.) Within these major bear markets, it is possible to have
mini and medium size bull markets (more on this in the next chapter),
but what makes them still a bear market, in spite of huge up-moves, is
that the original damage to market and economic infrastructure is not
solved until the end of the cycle. For example, it was not until the mini-
bear of 1981 that the problem of inﬂation was solved, enabling the stock
market and business to begin a major new bull market.
During the last 20 years, many analysts have forgotten that, although when
you buy or sell a stock you are at that moment simply making a bet with
another investor on the future direction of that stock, you are not just
buying a lottery ticket. You are buying a piece of a company. Therefore, it
matters over the medium and longer term whether that company will succeed
or fail. Today, it seems fashionable to divorce the value of a stock from its
price. That was almost valid during the late great bubble, but may not be so
again in our lifetime. New bubbles arise only when the last one is forgotten,
usually in a new generation.
BE NOT A BULL, NOR A BEAR, BUT A REALIST
A bear is not (at least should not be) a permanent pessimist. Nor should a
bull always be an optimist if he is wise. Both should try hard to be realists.
You should be able to change from a bull to a bear or a bear to a bull, as
conditions change, and not be the least inconsistent. Some people are
permanent bears, and give the symbol a bad name. Permanent bears often
have a puritan ideology that sees prosperity and bullishness as some kind of
Likewise, many people are always bullish, obviously without suﬃcient
justiﬁcation. The almost continual bull market from 1982 to March 2000 has
made most people permanent bulls. It has been impossible for them to accept
that any downturn is more than a short-term correction. But, in any market,
the ﬂexible realist is the winner—the man or woman who can switch directions
So, let it be crystal clear that a proper bear is someone who used to be a bull
but became a bear as conditions changed.
SHORT SELLING—IT’S NOT UNPATRIOTIC
Before going further, let me give a deﬁnition of short selling because it’s vital to
what follows, and I don’t take up the subject in detail until much later. Short
selling is the opposite of normal (long) stock positions. If you buy a stock
hoping it will go up, you are ‘‘long’’ of the stock. But if you think the stock
will go down, you can sell it ﬁrst, and buy it anytime you please. This ‘‘short
selling’’ is a simple borrowing-of-stock process that is handled by your broker
with no need for you to understand how.
Now, let me clear the air on another common fallacy that some people hold
with regard to bears. Some think being a bear and/or selling short is in some
way unpatriotic or negative. They believe that to invest your money in the
industry of your country and lose it is more patriotic than to ‘‘sell those
industries short’’ by selling their stock short—or simply selling out completely
because you feel we have entered a bear market.
Many TV market commentators, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attack, urged investors to hold on to their stocks regardless of what
the markets would do. At the beginning of G.W. Bush’s presidency, when he
suggested that there were signs of weakness in the US economy, there was a cry
of outrage from those who accused him of talking down the stock market and
the economy—as if the health of our entire capitalist system is so fragile that it
can be talked into changing directions.
Even advisors claiming to help you recession-proof your portfolio cite
people like Warren Buﬀet who made his fortune by buying and holding,
regardless of short- and medium-term ﬂuctuations. Most advise all non-
professional investors to do the same, unless they are getting near retirement
age, when switching into ‘‘bonds might be safer.’’ What these advisors fail to
mention is that it is only since 1982 that buying and holding has paid oﬀ over
the longer term. But Joseph Kennedy, father of JFK, for example, made his
family’s fortune by short selling in the bear market that began in 1929. And
many lesser known tycoons of the roaring twenties simply sold all their stocks
and took a multi-year vacation, beginning around 1928. Nor did any of these
men do the country or the stock market any harm. They stayed solvent and
provided the capital for the next economic upturn.
12 Bear Market Investing Strategies
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
If anyone is still not convinced, the facts are these:
(1) If there was anything unethical, immoral, illegal, or un-American about
it, the Securities and Exchange Commission wouldn’t allow it.
(2) The country cannot beneﬁt from having all its investing citizens lose
money. Therefore, if some are able to make money in a declining
market, this is all to the good. A free society needs solvent citizens, in
order to remain free. One might also say it’s a patriotic duty to stay
solvent. And, if short selling does that in a bear market, it can hardly be
evil. You can’t help your family, country, or self if you lose your money.
(3) Stock prices are merely people’s opinions of their value. And, since
stocks once sold by the company are no longer the property of the
company, the shorting of those shares is not shorting the company
but rather shorting the opinion of the company as held by other
investors or traders. Microsoft doesn’t get your money if you buy its
shares, neither does it lose money if you sell its shares short and they
drop in price and you make a proﬁt thereby. You merely won a bet with
a fellow investor. He thought they would go up. You thought not. You
won. I’ll have more to say in defense of short selling in Chapter 13. It
has been misunderstood for decades.
(4) The short seller contributes mightily to the creation of more orderly and
stabilized security markets through the demand for and the supply of
securities he creates. In bull markets and bear, he is selling short, and he
is eventually ‘‘covering’’ (i.e., buying), which demand puts a cushion
under market declines. Without the short seller, our markets would be
bottomless—those times when panic prevails and bulls rush for the exits
while the short seller is calmly buying stock to cover his shorts and
taking a proﬁt.
BEAR MARKETS ARE INEVITABLE
It’s only reasonable to ask why we have bear markets. Many think we should
have progressed far enough in social structure, in government guarantees,
ﬂoors, and protection that we should have no more depressions, recessions,
or bear markets. But to so think is to say we have changed human nature and
repealed the law of supply and demand and stopped the pendulum that swings
from surplus to insuﬃciency. Usually when government tries to manipulate
prosperity, instead of allowing the business cycle to take its course, they make
matters worse. For they destroy the price mechanism that lies at the heart of
our free markets’ system.
It’s what Nobel Laureate F.A. Hayek refers to as the special information we
all have that causes us to buy or sell at certain prices, but to regard products as
too expensive or too cheap at others, which causes shortages or surpluses
before the system adjusts.
The business cycle simply reﬂects evolving markets. But, except in limited
situations where liquidity is needed to prevent panic spreading, most govern-
ment intervention is of little help and over the long term usually makes a
situation worse. There are always ‘‘unintended consequences’’ to all govern-
ment interference in an economy or market.
For hundreds of years, people have been saying, at certain levels of the
business cycle, that they were in a ‘‘new era of permanent prosperity.’’ Even
in ancient Rome, they were under the impression they had a ﬁxed state of
aﬀairs—an aﬄuent society—as masters of the world. And, during the 1920s,
so convinced was everybody that their new technology had ushered in a New
Era that, just weeks before the 1929 crash began a decade-long depression, it
was publicly stated that America had entered a permanent plateau of pros-
perity. ‘‘The more things change, the more they remain the same.’’
No matter what a legislature does, no matter what a President, Prime
Minister or Federal Reserve Chairman says, no matter what new concepts
are around, the natural cycles of rise and fall take their toll—be it in stock
markets, coﬀee prices, gold, land values, or whatever.
GOING TO EXTREMES
Simply put, a bear market in stocks comes about because the prices get too
high in relation to their value. This is caused by public enthusiasm that
gradually becomes excessive, appraising stocks out of proportion to their
It is the nature of such things to go to extremes in both directions. So, as a
bull market often goes too high, so too does a bear market go too low. The
excesses are caused by human emotions, about which we have more to say in
the chapters on human psychology.
THE FALSE PROPHETS
One of the aspects of depressions, recessions, and bear markets that is most
diﬃcult to understand is the ‘‘false leadership’’ or false prophets that are
prevalent during these times. In part, it’s intentionally false, as in the case of
most political parties when in oﬃce. If they suspect (from government data) the
business future is grim, they will rarely reveal this if they can avoid it. And
14 Bear Market Investing Strategies
what must be revealed to the public is distorted or delayed or colored. This is
only human. Nobody wants to lose his or her job, and recessions and depres-
sions usually cause politicians to lose the next election.
The talking heads on television have a vested interest in talking markets up
to maintain their station’s advertising revenue, and their jobs. Vested interest is
knee-deep in the TV and mass media worlds.
False prophets often speak with great sincerity when they say they foresee
great prosperity ahead. Or if that statement seems less than realistic, then it’s a
combination of wishful thinking and self-interest that cause them to announce
we will have a ‘‘soft landing,’’ that we should be looking for new buying
opportunities, that we’ve made a bottom. Most honestly can’t see around the
corner. This is no crime. But if one wants to preserve his capital (and perhaps
even dare to dream of increasing it) during a sick economy or market period,
one must try to see around the corner. An important requirement for investment
success is to think ‘‘contra.’’ If the Secretary of the Treasury in any nation says
he looks for next year to be better than this year, one should form the habit of
automatically being skeptical. It may be meant as a statement of fact, but the
odds are that it isn’t. And by doubting it, you prepare yourself for preserving
your capital. As Diogenes (325 BC) advises: ‘‘Be a cynic.’’
Likewise, in bad times, the chairman of some board may forecast that
software sales will be rather miserable again next year. This should be greeted
with the same reaction. It’s probably a time to buy shares in software
companies. They may be right, but get into the habit of thinking they are
wrong, because they probably are. The majority usually are. Even the
majority of board chairmen, or Treasury Secretaries and Exchequers!
The main focus of this book is help you to think your way to prosperity. I’ll
oﬀer some formulas, indicators, and strategies. But tools are of limited use if
you don’t accompany them with logical, nonconformist, contrary thinking—an
increasingly lost art in these days of computers and the Internet. Contrary to a
computer? Yes, at times.
WHAT CAUSES A DEPRESSION?
Depressions or recessions are caused by basic economic changes of supply or
demand or credit. What leaders say about circumstances cannot in itself help or
hurt the situation, except perhaps for a few days.
Talk just doesn’t matter. If an apple is rotten, the act of saying so will not
make it ripe. If it’s ripe and someone calls it rotten, it will not turn rotten on the
spot just because of this characterization.
RECOGNIZING THE BEAR
The ﬁnal section of this chapter must deal with the recognition of a bear
market. How do you know when you are in one? While we will go into
more detail in later chapters, one basic approach was deﬁned by Charles H.
Dow in a Wall Street Journal editorial of July 7, 1900. This premise still holds
today. He called it: ‘‘The Great Law of Action and Reaction.’’ Today, it is
generally known as ‘‘the 50% principle.’’
The sum of what Dow said so many years ago was:
‘‘It is a remarkable fact in speculation that both the average price of
a number of stocks and the price of individual stocks show strong
tendencies, both in rallies and relapses, to reach one half of all the
primary movement. When a stock falls ten points in a comparatively
direct move, it is extremely likely to rally as much as ﬁve points from
the lowest. It often rallies or relapses more than half of the original
swing, but it is generally safe to wait for about half.
‘‘A Comparison of the Averages . . . shows how regularly this
movement occurs. When a recovery does not come near being one
half of a decline, it generally means that the primary movement has
not been completed and that a new low quotation will be made.’’
In Figure 2.1, we see the principle behind Dow’s words. If the left end of the
beam (marked A) is forced up from its resting position, the beam will approach
the horizontal position or 50% level (dotted position B). If the upward thrust
has been great enough, the beam will swing all the way up to the high position
(dotted position C). But if the upward thrust from A was insuﬃcient, the beam
may approach or touch the 50% level (B), falter, and then sink back to the
original position at A.
16 Bear Market Investing Strategies
TO SUM UP
Thus we might draw these conclusions, based on Dow’s idea:
1. Following a major market advance, if, on the subsequent correction, the
(Industrial) Average holds persistently above the halfway (50%) level,
the odds favor the highs again being approached (or bettered).
2. Conversely, following a major advance, if the subsequent retracement
or correction goes below the 50% level, the primary direction can be
considered to have turned down. The preceding lows may then be
approached (or passed).
3. Following a bear market, if a bull move succeeds in retracing 50% or
more of the previous bear market decline, the odds then favor a new
bull market’s approaching or bettering the old bull market high.
4. Following a bull market, if the next bear market succeeds in erasing
more than 50% of the total bull market gains, the odds then favor the
bear market’s testing the old bull market low.
This principle applies in many ﬁelds, not just the stock market. If what I say in
this book applied only to the stock market, it might be valueless because the
market is made up of nothing more than people’s opinions. What they think
and do makes prices move. So, to understand the market, we must also try to
understand people and their motivations. We must also factor in social,
political, and cultural aspects of human behavior when making a market
decision. One must act contrary to the majority view—at the proper time
and in the proper way.
This book is necessarily written at one place in time, and looking ahead is still
an inexact science, indeed an art more than a science. You, dear reader, must
adjust your thinking as I will adjust mine, day by day, using the methods
outlined in these pages.
History of Bear Markets
‘‘To be ignorant of what occurred before you were born is to remain
forever a child. For what is the worth of human life, unless it is woven into
the life of our ancestors by the records of history?’’
Cicero, 46 BC
THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY
History never repeats exactly. When we look to history for indicators of what
the future might bring, we need to take a ‘‘little of this model and a little of
that’’ in order to create a new composite model that is unlike anything that has
happened before. This lesson has been forgotten after 20 years of an almost
unbroken bull market.
The possibility that we could get a protracted multi-year global bear market
and recession is outside the comprehension of most investors.
Most ﬂoor traders and fund managers today began their careers after 1980,
so have no personal experience of the massive inﬂationary bear market of the
1970s. And when it began in 1966, many of them were not yet born.
TECHNOLOGY FOSTERS LAZY THINKING
Since the introduction of stock market software, it has become increasingly
fashionable to compare today’s stock market patterns with past models,
without taking into consideration that what created those particular patterns
were not just market related but caused by cultural and political factors as well.
18 Bear Market Investing Strategies
Technology has made our lives inﬁnitely more comfortable. But it is a double-
edged sword. The more we rely on technology, the less we think for ourselves.
And making informed judgments on the future of securities markets, based on
an inner sense that comes from working with market data over many years, has
become a lost art. Yet, there are so many factors that aﬀect market behavior
that cannot be reduced to a software package or a computer-generated
In this chapter, we list all bear markets for the last 100 years. But it is up to
you, dear reader, to apply the models of history to current and future con-
ditions, using not just market history, but the history of social, political, and
economic events for the 20th century.
An in-depth discussion of how these non-market historical events interacted
with market action is outside the scope of this book. I therefore suggest you
obtain a good year-by-year social history book of the last 100 years, to use in
conjunction with this list of past bear markets. You’ll ﬁnd it fun.
TAKING A VIEW
In Europe, where capital preservation is of a higher priority than a quick
proﬁt, they are in the habit of ‘‘taking a view.’’ While they may trade the
intermediate and short-term swings of the market, they do it within the
context of a multi-year concept of where the world in general economic
terms is heading. This creates a diﬀerence between the two continents in how
bear markets are deﬁned.
In America, all bear markets tend to be given equal ranking, with no
consideration to the bigger picture. But that limited view is not particularly
helpful for the longer term investor, particularly in today’s investment climate.
I will elaborate on how ‘‘taking a view’’ applies to the next few years in
Chapter 19. But, in this chapter on bear market history, let us concentrate
only on the past.
In the last 70 years, there have been two major occasions when taking a view
enabled you to see a diﬀerent, more accurate picture of events, than simply
treating every uptrend in the market as a bull market, and every down-leg as a
These periods are 1929 to 1942, and from 1966 to 1982. Both periods were
times when there were major economic and monetary problems that took well
over a decade to resolve. Both periods were mirror images of what we have
experienced between 1982 and 2000.
On an economic and ﬁnancial level, those 18 years have been a time of
considerable growth. This gave rise to an almost continuous bull market.
The mini-bear markets of 1987 and 1990 were almost exclusively Wall Street
History of Bear Markets 19
phenomena, in that little or no damage was done to the economic and ﬁnancial
health of the companies, which stocks represent. The major uptrend remained
intact. But the long-term investor, who did not sell out before August 1987,
found himself with major losses just 2 months later. And, by October, there
was a lot of panic selling. But the investor who ‘‘took a view’’ would have
known that October 1987 was not the time to sell.
However, if that same long-term investor had looked at the underlying
ﬁnancial and economic structure in the late 1960s, he would have seen that
not only was there a ‘‘bubble’’ mentality in electronics stocks, but that there
were profound ﬁscal problems which were eating away at the economic health
of American companies. This ultimately led to double-digit inﬂation. A new
major bull market did not begin until the inﬂation was squeezed out of the
Between 1929 and 1932, the economy sustained tremendous economic
damage. Even though the Dow rose 268% over the next 5 years, the damage
caused to the economy and the dollar was not resolved until 1942. Thereafter, a
sustained bull market began, which did not end until 1966.
My point is that the simplistic conventional deﬁnitions of bear markets, that
simply measure the extent of the drop in the various Averages in some sort of
ratio to the time it takes for the drop to occur, are not very helpful to an
investor deciding whether to unload his stocks at a loss, or hold on in hopes
they will go back to their old highs.
This doesn’t mean that one should have gotten out of stocks in early 1929
or 1966 and taken a holiday from the stock market for the next decade or
so, although some people did. Instead, it means that when your ‘‘taking a
view’’ indicators tell you that there are major economic and monetary
problems that are likely to take a year or more to be resolved, you no longer
can buy and hold, but should become a more watchful and ﬂexible investor,
playing the major upmoves, but doing so with one hand on the exit all the
I belabor this point because as of this writing, in early 2002, some analysts
are predicting the beginning of a new bull market. I do not necessarily disagree
with them. The Dow Jones Industrial Average or S&P Average could retrace
much of their losses since 2000. If they do, they will do so with little regard for
the global economic and monetary problems that began long before the
September 11 attack, and will be there for some time to come.
The cry of those proclaiming a new bull market is that the market generally
leads the economy by 3–6 months. So, if we are in a new bull market, that must
mean economic problems will be solved in 2002. That displays a faulty
knowledge of history. The major bull market in the 1930s, and the two
major bull markets during the 1970s, did not herald an end to the underlying
monetary problems. Quite the reverse. In all cases, it was the lack of solution to
the underlying health of the economy that pulled the markets back down.
20 Bear Market Investing Strategies
Why should we take a view and not treat all bear markets as equal?
An example of this wrong thinking is the comparison of 1987 to the crash
phase of 1929. Many people believe the Federal Reserve single-handedly
prevented 1987 from becoming another 1929. Ergo, we now know enough to
prevent another major bear market and depression of the 1930s magnitude.
But if Fed intervention, which worked so well in 1987, is the way to prevent all
future bear markets, why is it that since 2000, after more aggressive cutting of
the discount rate by the Fed than at any time in history, there has been no 1987
1987 AND 1929 COMPARED
. After a 6-year bull market, beginning in 1923, the DJIA more than
quadrupled, reaching an all-time high on September 3, 1929. The
DJIA lost 40% during the next 55 days. In a selling climax on
October 28 and 29, 1929, the DJIA lost 20% in just 2 days.
. After sustained growth which began in 1984, the DJIA had almost
tripled its low point of 3 years earlier. The Dow reached its peak of
2,722.42 on August 25, 1987.
. The 1987 crash phase, as with 1929, began 55 days after the late summer
. From peak to trough, the 1987 market lost 36.1% of its value,
compared to 39.6% on the ﬁrst leg in 1929.
For somebody who did not ‘‘take a view’’ but looked only at the numbers, it
appeared that 1929 and 1987 were similar bear markets. Those investors who,
in 1987, believed they were seeing a rerun of 1929 came to two diﬀerent and
equally wrong conclusions. One group believed that 1987 was the beginning of
a 1930s-style bear market, so missed out on much of the bull market which
followed. The other group saw the Federal Reserve as a kind of latter-day
Merlin, capable of creating permanent prosperity out of a potential 1929
situation. This latter group are still wondering why the recent, most aggressive
rate cutting in history didn’t pull the same rabbit out of the hat that it did in
As Mark Twain said: ‘‘There are lies, damn lies, and statistics.’’
The ability of computers to crunch numbers faster and better than ever
before is a wonderful advance. But it has its drawbacks.
The good side is that computers can process numbers and ﬁnd connections
that previously was impossible. The bad side is that ever more reliance on
computers causes people to think ever less. And investing requires thinking.
It is not a lazy man’s hobby.
History of Bear Markets 21
THE BEAR’S RECORD BOOK
The ﬁrst step to creating that composite model to see what the future may look
like is to glance over past bear markets. You’ll ﬁnd this of great help as
reference material in the years to come (and especially for all the bear
No single past model exactly applies to today.
My list begins in 1900, because this was the ﬁrst bear market after Dow
created the DJIA in 1897. Panics and crashes from earlier times also have
things they can teach us, but prior to 1897 market statistics are vague, so
anything earlier can only be referred to in a general sense:
1900 DJIA declined 31.8%. Duration of bear market: 12 months. Crash came
in December 1899. Bear market low in June 1900.
1903 DJIA declined 37.7%. Duration: 10 months. Crash occurred in
November 1902. Bear market low in September 1903.
1907 DJIA declined 45.0%. Duration: 10 months. Had two crash phases, the
ﬁrst in February (DJIA fell 21.8% in this ﬁrst phase); rallied in March
The second crash was July to November, a 4-month fall known historically as
the ‘‘Panic of 1907.’’ A bull market started at once after the second crash.
Stocks lost almost 50% (many much more) from the bull peak. A further
fall was prohibited by the fact that business did not fall much further after
the October economic collapse. Business coasted in a top area for 8 months
after the start of the ﬁrst market crash, then, suddenly and without an alarm,
plunged down almost vertically in the midst of the second market crash.
Business indicators hit bottom 3 months later, stayed there for 4 months,
then began a healthy recovery:
1909 DJIA declined 26.2%. Started in November 1909, with the crash phase
in February 1910. The bear market low came in July 1910. Duration: 8
1912 DJIA declined 23.5%. Duration of bear market: 26 months. Crash came
in June 1913, but bear had started in November 1912. Bear low came in
December 1914. Since the stock market was closed for 4 months in 1914
by the war, a true picture of the decline here is impossible. One source
says it was 36.3%. But I’ll take the more conservative published DJIA
ﬁgures as my base.
1917 DJIA declined 40.1%. Duration of bear market: 13 months. Crash
phase came in December 1916. Hit bear market low in December 1917.
1919 DJIA declined 46.6%. Duration: 21 months. Three crash phases. Initial
crash November 1919 to February 1920 (DJIA fell 25% in this ﬁrst
22 Bear Market Investing Strategies
phase). Second crash in late 1920. Final crash in summer of 1921. Hit
low in June.
Business topped out slowly during the ﬁrst market crash, then coasted rather
indecisively just below its top area for 6 months after the crash. Then it plunged
sharply, right after Labor Day, 1920. A depression lasting 1 year followed.
Business then recovered simultaneously with the stock market. The year 1921
was notable for a downswing that lasted 6 months nonstop, the second longest
downswing in bear market history.
1923 DJIA declined 18.6%. Duration of this baby bear market: 7 months.
1926 DJIA declined 16.6%. Duration of baby bear market: 2 months.
1929 DJIA declined 90.0%. Duration 34 months. Six successive market
crashes comprised this famed bear: (1) September to November 1929
(DJIA fell 40% in this ﬁrst phase). (2) April to June 1930. (3) September
to December 1930. (4) March to May 1931. (5) July to January 1932.
(6) March to July 1932. A new bull market then started immediately, as
did a business recovery.
Business had topped out mildly, a month before the ﬁrst crash; a gradual mild
decline continued to April 1930, then fell sharply into a depression simul-
taneously with the end of the 1930 stock market rally. The business decline
halted in December 1930, stayed level for 6 months, then plunged again in
steep economic decline that didn’t lose its downward momentum for a full
year, until July 1932. Business improved intermittently thereafter but still
remained at depression levels through most of the 1930s except for a short
recovery in 1936–37.
1934 Rarely included among bear markets. But a fall of 24.1% in the DJIA
gives it a deserved berth here. Duration: 9 months. Then the market
took seven more months to get back up to where 1934 began.
1937 DJIA declined 51.8%. Duration: 56 months. Five crash phases: (1)
August to November (DJIA fell 40% in this ﬁrst phase). (2) February
to March 1938. (3) January to April 1939. (4) May 1940. (5) October
1941 to April 1942. Business peaked out and fell violently, simul-
taneously with stocks. Economic indicators bottomed out 9 months
later (May 1938). The recovery began mildly at ﬁrst, but was later
boosted by the World War II production boom which eventually
lifted the country out of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
The period 1941–42 contained the longest bear market nonstop downswing (71 2
months) in history. Certain analysts call this two separate bear markets, one
from September 1937 to March 1938, and the second from May 1940 to April
1942. If you are simply looking at market action this view may be correct. But
History of Bear Markets 23
if you take a wider view within the context of the depressed mood of the times,
then it can be viewed as all part of a single bear market.
1946 DJIA declined 24.6%. Duration: 37 months. There was only one crash
phase (August–September 1946), and the bottom was hit within 4
months. But the market moved sideways for almost three years and
tested the 1946 low area three times. The ﬁnal time was in 1949, after
which the market rose almost without interruption for the next 12 years
(160 to 741 in 1961).
1953 This was a very small bear market, but, as it was caused by war (Korea)
uncertainty, I include it here. DJIA declined 13.9% (295 to 254).
Duration of this quasi-bear market: 9 months.
1957 DJIA plummeted 106 points (522 to 416) for a 20.3% fall. Duration: 6
1960 Opinions diﬀer on whether this was a real bear market. But Dow
Theory signals were given, so it is included here. DJIA declined
18.0%. Points lost: 124. Duration: 10 months.
1962 DJIA declined 29% in 6 months. Extent of 1962 damage: the ﬁrst crash
phase of 1929 lost 40 billion dollars. The 1962 crash lost over 100 billion
dollars. Even if we adjust those values in terms of 1929 purchasing
power, the 1962 crash still lost one and a quarter times as much as in
1966 Market plunged from 1001 to 735 in just over 8 months. This was the
end of the postwar super-bull market. At this point, the whole atmos-
phere of the stock market changed. A new factor entered the investor’s
reasoning. Not only must he now assess the direction of the economy,
he must also consider government monetary intervention, which might
make him think he was making a proﬁt, when in fact, in real value
terms, he was not. We will discuss this at greater length in Chapter 19.
1968 This was a long, drawn-out bear market. The DJIA declined from a
high in December 1968 of 994, down to a low of 627 in May 1970. This
was the ﬁrst of the new-era bear markets, caused not so much by a
simple downturn in business but by currency woes.
1973 This one was scary! From a high of 1067 in January 1973, the market
slid relentlessly down to its ﬁnal low of 570 in December 1974. Its
catalyst was the oil crisis. For the ﬁrst time in American stock market
history, a foreign power, or group of powers, were able to precipitate an
economic slowdown. We had entered a new level of globalization after
which the world would never be the same.
1977 DJIA fell fairly gradually, though gathering some momentum as it went
from just over 1000 in January 1977 to a low of 736 in March 1978.
Nothing dramatic caused it; rather more of the same of the past decade:
increasing oil prices with dollar stability problems steadily worsening.
24 Bear Market Investing Strategies
1981 This bear snuck up on people. DJIA made a rare quadruple top that
convinced most investors it was building strength to break through.
DJIA fell from 1025 in April 1981 to a low of 770 in August 1982, or
255 points. A mere 17-month-long bear, it led to a recession which was
more severe than the stock market fall would indicate.
1984 Though this is not even considered a bear market by most, it scared a
lot of investors because it broke below a giant support area and
appeared to be heading back to the 1000 level, whence the bull
market of late 1982 and all of 1983 had come. It fell 16%, from 1295
to 1080 in 7 months.
1987 This was a heart-stopper for the very reason that there was no apparent
economic reason for it to occur. There were two catastrophic days of
multi-hundred point drops, with one of those days being the largest
one-day point drop in history. It came about because of computer
programming (explained earlier), computer insurance schemes, and
the globalization of markets. It was history’s ﬁrst simultaneous global
bear market where all major world markets were hit badly at the same
time. Australia was among the hardest hit, Japan among the least, but
all had considerable damage. DJIA fell from 2747 to 1616 (i.e., 36.1%),
in less than 2 months. It took nearly 2 years to surpass its prior high.
1990 This was the direct result of Iraq invading Kuwait, and was halted when
the US launched Desert Storm. DJIA declined 17%. Duration: 4
months. This bear market, along with that of 1987 are the shortest
bear markets in history.
2000 By October 2001, the Nasdaq was down a whopping 72% though the
DJIA was only down around 25%. But most worrying, well before the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, was that the underlying economic
health of the US and most world economies showed increasing signs of
weakness. It is already clear that this bear market has damaged the
broader economic health of all major economies, more than any other
bear market in the last 60 years. But more of this later in our predictions
BEAR MARKET FREQUENCY RATIO
So, there you have the bear markets of the 20th century, and the ﬁrst one of the
21st century. There has been a bear market every 4 years on average. The
longest time span between bear markets has been the most recent bull
market, which was 10 years if you regard 1990 as a major bear market; 20
years if you ‘‘take a view.’’
This is the powerful message, then, of this chapter: that even if you weight all
bear markets as equal, and don’t think in terms of multi-decade papa bear
History of Bear Markets 25
markets within which mama and baby bull markets are possible, bear markets
are frequent enough to make it impossible to ignore them, even in major boom
times, or to avoid their losses.
The decade of the 1990s was unique and, like the bear markets of 1987 and
1990, occurred because of a unique set of circumstances that are unlikely to
repeat, let alone be considered a new paradigm for bull markets in the future—
at least not in our lifetimes.
Thus, the investor must try to understand bear markets better. Otherwise,
the proﬁts from the previous bull market are usually wiped out.
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF VALUE LOSSES
You have also seen that the percentage of decline in bear markets ranges from
as little as 13.9% up to 90%. The total of all these percentage losses is
phenomenal. The losses represented by all these declines are staggering, but
when you realize that the blue-chip averages never fall as far as the great mass
of small cap stocks, the damage to your wealth during a bear market can be
more than most people can deal with. The averages mask a greater percentage
fall by the majority of stocks not in the averages.
Add to that the economic and ﬁscal damage that often accompanies a bear
market. Say you lose your job, and that small stock portfolio was your ‘‘safety
net.’’ Or you needed that extra money for the kid’s college fund, or an
unexpected illness. You can be sure that the kid’s education or sickness in
the family won’t only occur when your stocks have recovered any losses they
might have suﬀered in the prior bear market.
Unfortunately, during the 1990s, people came to regard investing in stocks
as like putting their money in the bank, except that many were making 30% per
year instead of bank interest of 5%.
LENGTH OF BEAR MARKETS
Bear markets have been as short as 2 months and as long as 5 years, the
average being about 18 months. This current bear is already the longest in
60 years, which of itself suggests that although we may see what many
analysts call a new bull market, it will more likely resemble those baby bulls
of the 1930s and 1970s than the major bull market of the 1990s.
Also, it should be noted that, in the 20th century, markets were in a bear
phase for 341 months (i.e., 28 years of bear markets), and, in the last 90 years,
we have been in bear markets 35% of the time. If that statistic doesn’t change
your belief in a buy and hold investment strategy, nothing will.
26 Bear Market Investing Strategies
Clearly, this makes the stock market a dangerous place—with a pitfall
hidden under every third stepping stone.
Not only does it mean the permanently bullish investor only has two chances
in three at best, but when you consider that the depressed psychological climate
at bear market bottoms prevents the majority from investing at the best time, it
means that, by the time the majority of investors recognize a bull market is
present, it is half-gone.
But by showing you how to face bear markets with conﬁdence, and make
money in them, I hope that, by the end of this book, you will be among the ﬁrst
people to invest in the next great bull market.
TRUE RISKS ARE STAGGERING
The situation is made worse by the fact that the average investor (90% of
investors) can’t be expected to spot the exact top of bull markets and sell
out in time. This means he loses much of the prior rise before he does sell. A
professional man, a physician, who throughout the late 1990s prided himself
on his ability to trade online, admitted to me a few months ago that: ‘‘I haven’t
sold anything because what would I do with the money?’’
Then, a month after the September 11 attack, he remarked that it was only
on October 1 (i.e., 3 weeks after the attack) that he had the courage to switch
on his computer to check the prices of his stocks! His reactions, which I am
sure were echoed by millions of investors across America, surely explode the
myth that you can just invest and sit and wait.
Everybody needs a plan, one that includes strategies for selling as well as
buying—and (once understood) for selling short when that seems to be the
prudent course of action. Without a plan of action, when the unexpected
occurs, when markets suddenly fall, or terrorist attacks strike, that is not the
time to think up an investment strategy. It is a time to act on realistic strategies
for both bull and bear markets that you had already decided upon, when you
were feeling less stressed.
PERIOD OF READJUSTMENT
For those who still believe that if they hold on they will do better than if they
sell at a loss, let me reveal another statistic. After each of the 21 bear markets
prior to 1987, prices did not immediately zoom back to new high ground. This
‘‘V’’ bottom, that analysts always tell you they are expecting shortly, has
absolutely no history in prior bear markets that have gone on over 18
months, as this one has. Most of those 21 bear markets took many months
or even years to get back to where they were before the fall.
History of Bear Markets 27
After the 1929 bear, it took 26 years to recover. If that is too extreme or too
much like ancient history to you, it took 14 years after the 1937 crash, and the
1966 peak of 995.15 was not decisively breached on the upside until 1982 (i.e.,
16 years later). And, along the way, there were some pretty wild swings to the
downside including the 1974 low when the DJIA lost nearly 50% of its value,
and in ever more inﬂated (depreciating) dollars. So to buy and hold, you not
only need lots of patience, lots of spare cash (so you won’t need to draw on
your investments to pay bills), but you also need nerves of steel to sit through
LEARNING FROM THE PAST
‘‘I saw a new heaven and a new earth . . . and the former things were
This seems to be true of every age. In 1929, they had had seven prior bear
markets, just since 1900, on which to build their knowledge. But it was to no
avail. People, by nature, almost defy learning from the past. They contend that
having had depressions, man acts to prevent their recurrence. But the evidence
doesn’t support this.
Militaries usually focus on better ways to ﬁght the last war, that’s why when
terrorists used a passenger plane as a megaton bomb, not only was the military
totally unprepared to deal with such an attack, but Intelligence (which is
supposed to ﬁnd out about these things before they happen) had no idea
such an attack was imminent. Both military and Intelligence were focused on
possible terrorist use of smart bombs a la the Gulf War, or nuclear devices.
So too with many economists and market analysts, who compile the data
from past bear markets, and then search current market conditions for an exact
match with past models. Any future bear market will be suﬃciently unique and
there will be suﬃcient ‘‘proof ’’ that this bear does not ﬁt any prior model, to
enable people to deny that it is happening all the way into bankruptcy.
If a conclusion is possible, it is probably that the only way to avoid odds that
are little diﬀerent from red and black in roulette, is to play both sides of the
wheel (i.e., be willing to hold stocks long or short (or both) as circumstances
warrant). You should have contingency plans in place if markets don’t act as
you expected, and use what economists call ‘‘unarticulated knowledge,’’ but
28 Bear Market Investing Strategies
which the rest of us call intuition: that inner judgment that takes into account
social, political, and cultural conditions, often without bringing it to your
conscious attention except in the form of an uneasy feeling. Be ﬂexible and
trust your instincts.
ECONOMIC SETTING FOR
‘‘Ultimately, in a free society, we cannot protect people from all the
consequences of their own errors. We cannot protect people completely
without denying them the possibility of achieving their own fulﬁllment.
We cannot completely protect society from the effects of waves of
irrational exuberance or irrational pessimism—emotional reactions that
are themselves part of the human condition.’’
Irrational Exuberance, by Robert J. Shiller,
Princeton University Press, 2000
Guideposts for Bear Markets
‘‘It requires a great deal of boldness and a great deal of caution to make a
great fortune, and when you have got it, it requires ten times as much wit
to keep it.’’
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–82)
Lists of data abound, showing signs to look for to tip you oﬀ as to whether
we’re heading for business improvement or slump, or for a bull or bear market.
During the latter part of the 1990s, these data was used selectively by ﬁnancial
commentators. Analysts fought to get air time or print space for self-serving
reasons. And Wall Street became part of the entertainment industry.
Thoughtful judgment calls, based on extensive research, were no longer
expected of TV or print media analysts. Instead, they were and are expected
to entertain viewers and readers, and to put a positive spin on all economic and
ﬁnancial data, no matter how dire it is in reality.
Market terminology is being twisted into the new language of Street-Speak,
where nothing is ever what it seems, and the need for news has disappeared in
favor of the need to be reassured that, no matter what happens, the bull market
will resume next week or next month.
Symbols have taken over from substance. And after years of the Clinton-
induced culture of ‘‘feeling your pain,’’ a major reaction in the US to the
September 11, 2001 attack was to go out and buy a ﬂag and wallow in the
emotions of grief, instead of learning about crisis management for their port-
folios, responsible citizenship, and for their daily lives.
My ﬁrst book in 1964 was also on bear markets. In it, I published a list of
‘‘bear market signs’’ for the responsible investor to watch, to alert them when a
bear market was imminent. Though many of those signs are still valid for a
32 Bear Market Investing Strategies
medium and long-term investor, and I will get to them in a moment, the way
many of them now operate has changed drastically in the last 5 years. Until
about 1995, technical indicators usually had a few weeks lag time before the
data manifested themselves in the markets. And the connection between
economic conditions and stock market direction was still accepted as fact.
But, from about 1995 on, the media and governments have manipulated all
data so much that the average investor today believes that, provided the
Federal Reserve and US government cut interest rates or create bail-out
packages, it won’t be long before the late great bull market of the 1990s
Even the language has changed. In the 1980s, when it was necessary to
subsidize the Savings and Loan industry to prevent it from collapsing, it was
called a ‘‘bail-out.’’ And, though it did not cause a full-blown bear market, it
was considered bearish enough to create a sizable correction in the DJIA. In
late 2001, with the airline industry on the verge of collapse and production at
new lows, the bail-out was called ‘‘an economic stimulus package,’’ and
investors’ reaction to the news has been to push the market back up!
In the past, increased government spending and, at the same time, massive
increases in the money supply were regarded as ﬁscally irresponsible and a
harbinger of inﬂation. Today, investors turn to government with the same
naive gratitude a small boy might show a parent who replaced the pocket
money he lost.
The media has created a culture of victim investors: when the news is
negative but not ‘‘our fault.’’ The media admits there are problems but
blame it on terrorists or whoever. But when the news is positive it is the
government who claims the credit for creating that success.
This causes far more volatility in markets than ever before because, when the
only factors admitted to be causing a business turndown are claimed to come
from outside, markets seem totally unpredictable and people will panic more.
But none of this has changed the laws of economics, or stock markets. And
companies ‘‘patriotically’’ and foolishly buying back their own stock or
investors watching their retirement accounts diminish while they wave the
ﬂag won’t change long-term trends, nor do a thing to solve the very real
problems that the economy had long before September 11, 2001.
During the near vertical fall in 1930, John D. Rockefeller consumed a
considerable portion of his enormous fortune buying back his stock in
Standard Oil, then a DJIA company. He managed to stall the market fall
for a few days. But he was no more able to reverse the laws of economics
than today’s ‘‘patriotic’’ investors can.
What has been totally forgotten in the last several years is that when Charles
Dow created his Average, he saw it, not as a stock market indicator, but as an
indicator of economic health. He understood that stocks are no better or worse
than the companies they represent. It is the economy that drives the stock
Guideposts for Bear Markets 33
market, not the other way round. Yet today, the only time commentators
admit the connection between the price of stocks and the companies they
represent is when there is a technical rally in stocks, and they remind us that
stocks rise before a recession is ended. Ergo, if stocks rise, the economic
recovery must be just a few weeks away.
SIGNS A BULL MARKET IS ENDING
No matter what Washington or the media claim, bull markets cannot be
sustained if the economy is faltering. Neither can a bear market suddenly
become a new bull market, with a ‘‘V’’ bottom (media-speak) while
economic indicators are getting weaker:
1. The most important indicator that a downturn still has a long way to go
is when investor sentiment is still bullish while the underlying economic
structure continues to weaken.
2. Price earnings ratios. In recent years, even rational analysts have
puzzled over why they no longer seem to ‘‘work.’’ This is all part of
the separation of stocks from the values of the companies they
represent. In his book Irrational Exuberance, Yale professor Robert
Shiller points out that, since 1870, price earnings ratios for big
companies have averaged just under 13 for a yield of 7.75%. In late
2001, that ratio was between 25 and 35, for a yield of about 2–4%,
depending which biased source you read. To return to a more trad-
itional price earnings ratio, the DJIA would have to fall to at least
5000. I will discuss that in more detail in a later chapter, but suﬃce it
to say here that it suggests that this bear market has further to fall.
3. The Federal Reserve. Fed action has been the most closely watched
indicator in the last 5 years. But, with the most aggressive rate reduc-
tions in history, driving US interest rates down to a level not seen since
the 1960s and with no result, it is increasingly clear that when the US
economy goes south, there is little government can do to stop it.
4. Consumer and Investor Conﬁdence. There is always an abundance of
conﬁdence in the future of business and the market, at peaks. Even after
markets turn down, as long as that conﬁdence remains high the bear
market has further to go. Markets traditionally turn around on low
volume in the middle of widespread gloom about the future. Those
who buy at the very beginning of major bull markets or sell at the
beginning of bear markets are regarded as equally unhinged, as I was
regarded in the Spring of 2000 when I suggested, in my newsletter, the
Nasdaq was a sell.
34 Bear Market Investing Strategies
5. Gold. In times of uncertainty, the interest in gold and gold shares picks
6. Real Estate. It is normal for real estate prices to rise with stock market
prices. There is usually a lot of public speculation in real estate at bull
market tops. Whether real estate turns down in a bear market depends
on how much inﬂation there is. In inﬂationary bear markets, real estate
is seen as a haven and prices rise. In bear markets where inﬂation is low
and the currency ﬁrm, real estate prices will usually stay ﬁrm in the early
stages, but will decline as the bear market deepens.
7. Stock market action. At tops, there is what is commonly classiﬁed as
‘‘churning’’ (i.e., high volume but not much change in prices, or great
irregularity in prices [some up sharply, some down sharply], plus a lot of
volatility day to day).
8. Unanimity of bullish forecasts. Business leaders, brokers, advisory
services, columnists and broadcasters are, in the main, bullish. Any
downturn is dismissed as temporary.
9. Sharp rise in debt. At the top of a bull market, the pervasive mood is
that one can make a proﬁt in markets, without risk. Consumer debt,
household debt service payments, losses by credit card issuers, bank-
ruptcy ﬁlings and mortgage delinquencies all rise sharply.
This list is not complete and, with government playing an ever bigger role in
our ﬁnancial and economic lives, this list changes constantly. But I oﬀer this list
to stimulate your own thinking, as an antidote to the pap coming from the
media and government trying to convince you that if you just buy and hold,
consume like crazy, and put your trust in government, the economy will roll as
it did in the 1990s.
I encourage you to be ever mindful of how free markets work, and that the
basis of prosperity is responsible citizens willing to assume risk, who never lose
sight of the fact that all monetary decisions involve risk. Our system relies on
solvent citizens who are self-reliant, not on government’s ability to manipulate
interest rates or create ‘‘stimulus packages.’’
FADS AS A LEADING INDICATOR FOR THE END OF A BULL MARKET
All major bull markets of the last 100 years were fueled by new technology.
But, in most instances, the genuine advances that the technology created were
exaggerated into what became an almost religious belief in technology for its
own sake. New Eras and New Economies became fads.
Toward the end of bull markets, fads increase and give us a hint of our
nearness to the next bear market. Both fads and new technological advances
Guideposts for Bear Markets 35
look much the same on the surface. Experience brings the ability to tell the
diﬀerence between ‘‘the sizzle and the steak.’’
Thus, in the 17th century, when the big tulip craze hit, a savvy investor with
a modicum of common sense should have suspected that, however full of
limitless possibilities the new globalization that enabled the Dutch to enjoy
this exotic ﬂower was, a single tulip bulb could not possibly be worth the price
of an Amsterdam house. But hundreds of experienced investors bought tulips
as symbols of the new shipping technology, rather than buying tulips on their
own merits. They bought into a fad. So it was in the 1920 Florida land craze.
There was nothing wrong with either Holland’s tulips or Florida’s land. But
one needs to look at them as business propositions, instead of getting caught
up in an abstract idea.
Investment trusts (we call them Mutual Funds now) were a fad before the
1929 crash. In the late 1960s, it was electronics companies, many of which by
1970 had lost 80% of their earlier value, and some had gone out of business
entirely. We saw a similar fad in the late 1990s in the form of dot.coms. Both
electronics and the Internet have been magniﬁcent technological advances, and
we will enjoy their beneﬁts for years to come. But they became fads because
they represented such spectacular advances that investors ignored such
mundane considerations of whether the companies using the technology were
viable businesses. Fads are a major indicator that a bull market is reaching a
SIGNS A BEAR MARKET IS ENDING
1. Bad news abundant. The stock market always seems to start up before
the bad news (about lower industrial production, unemployment, lack
of consumer conﬁdence, etc.) stops. At that point, the market will be
acting ‘‘contrary to the obvious,’’ which is usually a good sign that the
market is right in whatever it does.
2. Credit. Still tight. But credit balances in brokerage accounts usually are
considerable. Large holdings in bonds and other cash-related invest-
ments. This latent buying power is what will give a new bull market
3. Stock Market. Volume low, not much interest. Stocks selling at low
price earnings ratios, high yields. But then new lows in the DJIA and
S&P occur on even lower volumes. Some key stocks begin to show good
rally potential. Volume tends to increase on rallies, decrease on dips.
Charts are the way to spot this.
4. Conﬁdence. Nil. Pessimistic forecasts made for the market and for
36 Bear Market Investing Strategies
5. Real Estate. Unless it has been an inﬂationary bear market, real estate
prices will be down. It is hard to sell property. Lots of empty commer-
cial buildings. Rents reduced. Foreclosures rise.
6. Bonds. Government bond buying is popular. Corporate bonds are high,
THREE BEAR PHASES
It may shed further light here to quote from Robert Rhea, who was a hugely
successful investment advisor during the 1930s. I will quote a number of
market researchers from the 1930s and 1940s in this book because they saw
things a lot more clearly than many do today. Government and media spin was
not in vogue, then.
Today, in our highly complex world, we tend to lose sight of the forest
because we are too busy avoiding the trees and the undergrowth. Writers
from a simpler time had the luxury of being able to see the big picture with
less distractions from ‘‘clutter.’’ Today, TV sound bites appeal and deceive
simultaneously. Said Rhea:
‘‘Bear markets seem to be divided into three phases: the ﬁrst being
the abandonment of hopes upon which the uprush of the preceding
bull market was predicated; the second being the reﬂection of the
decreased earning power and reduction of dividends; and the third
representing distress liquidation of securities which must be sold to
meet living expenses. Each of these phases seems to be divided by a
secondary reaction which is often erroneously assumed to be the
beginning of a bull market.’’
WATCH YOUR EMOTIONS
Logan Pearsal Smith, in 1931, said: ‘‘Solvency is entirely a matter of tempera-
ment and not of income.’’
My greatest caution in this entire signs-of-the-times section is to urge that
you hold a strong rein on yourself, otherwise your emotions or prejudices of
the moment (be they bullish or bearish) will cause you to read the total
situation as bullish or bearish on the basis of selective evidence. Or, you will
be too demanding and expect too many signs of the times to be convinced the
climate has changed.
Guideposts for Bear Markets 37
The great advantage of being aware of these potential signs of coming events is
that, when you read or hear data of the changing economy, you are able to
interpret it immediately and, if necessary, act on it. You know what to look for
and you recognize it before it is fully reﬂected in stock market prices.
If the signs of the times were easily interpreted, the future would be plain for
all to see. They aren’t, and it isn’t.
Don’t expect to see too many signs occur at once. They show up over a
period of perhaps many months, as the giant economy slowly rolls over, or
yawns and slowly comes back to life.
In this respect, we see again that the stock market is non-accommodating. It
isn’t going to conveniently ﬂash all its red or green lights at once so everyone
can see at a glance what direction is next. Remember the old Wall Street adage:
‘‘Don’t confuse brains with a bull market.’’ And don’t imagine that markets
turn on dimes and change direction overnight, as the mass media would have
Many of the ‘‘signs’’ given earlier in this chapter are business indicators. But
the lists are by no means complete. I encourage you to add new signs to your
personal list, things which you feel oﬀer keys to a change in market direction.
Many accepted leading indicators are lagging or coincident indicators, so, if
you want to stay ahead of the crowd, you need take note of those indicators as
soon as the facts are known.
The best way to use these indicators is not to create some mathematical
model on your computer (though that’s OK as a reminder and checklist) but
to develop an internal model in your head. Ideally, make lists of the facts as
soon as you know them, with a note of what they will do to what economic
indicator and when that indicator will be released, and then forget about it.
Slowly, a pattern will emerge without you being conscious of it. Suddenly, you
will ﬁnd yourself muttering ‘‘meaningless’’ when somebody tries to point out
the signiﬁcance of a minor rise in retail sales, or a fall in commodity prices,
because of the overall ‘‘index’’ you keep in your head.
To separate wheat from chaﬀ is a vital function amid the signs of the times.
It is a fact that no two bear or bull markets are exactly the same in their
manifestations. This is why a single investment software package is of limited
use. Software, unlike the human mind, can only compare present models to
those in the past, usually almost exactly. And, though we may have a future
bear market as inﬂationary as those in the 1970s, or as economically devastat-
ing as the 1930s, or any in-between, the only certainty is that any future bear
38 Bear Market Investing Strategies
market will not look exactly like any in the past, though it will doubtless have
elements of past markets.
However, software that records and keeps technical indicators for you can
be of tremendous value, and saves you the tedium of having to calculate the
indicators on a daily or weekly basis.
The type of lateral thinking needed to use the past to construct a plausible
future is something that only a human mind can do, and for the foreseeable
future no computer can.
THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION
Today, the world is so interconnected that the economic problems of any
nation spills over to every other nation. Everybody exports to everybody
else, so when one economy contracts, all those who do business with the
problem economy are aﬀected.
You may have no interest in investing outside your own country. But you
cannot aﬀord to ignore what is happening in other countries. Economic
problems abroad can be a leading indicator of possible problems at home.
Even if you never plan to invest in another country, I urge US readers to
watch European news on television, and take a subscription to the Financial
Times and The Economist. European media give international coverage of the
sort that US media do not. Likewise, non-US readers should read the New
York Herald Tribune and/or the Wall Street Journal for a US insight.
THE HOUSE OF CARDS EFFECT
In our interdependent world, it’s a house of cards no matter how you stack it.
We stand together or fall together.
For those still not convinced, let me oﬀer an example.
Envisage a major city with several thousand businesses. In a depression, can
you imagine that the depression would aﬀect only half of them? Would you
expect to ﬁnd 1,000 prospering as never before while the rest were losing
business? Or is it more logical that all would feel the pinch, in varying
degrees, of the national slowdown in business?
Today, the global economy functions much like a major city. ‘‘Pockets of
prosperity’’ amidst adversity, be they cities, neighborhoods or entire nations,
have become rare.
Globalization, Terrorism, and
‘‘A traveler without knowledge is a bird without wings.’’
Sa’di, Gulistan (1258)
In the last 20 years, a number of foreign funds came into being, and conven-
tional wisdom was that a portion of a well-diversiﬁed portfolio should be
invested in other countries.
Has terrorism changed this idea?
Will the world now revert to a 1930s’ mentality of barriers against trade?
Answer: globalization is too far advanced to be reversed by terrorism. Europe
has lived with terrorism for over 40 years without it unduly aﬀecting their
securities and bond markets. It is likely that Wall Street will be the same.
Though events like September 11, 2001 directly aﬀect markets over the short
term, what moves markets over the medium and long term are the underlying
economics. Those economics may indeed be aﬀected by political actions, ideol-
ogies, or acts of terrorism and war. But these non-economic factors will only
modify or amplify economic trends already in progress. They will not, unless
they are exceptionally severe, reverse them.
During the late great bull market, many American analysts suggested that a
well-diversiﬁed portfolio should be as much as 50% in foreign investments and
50% in American securities.
In today’s highly unstable world, 40–60% would be wiser. There are some
foreign investments that come into their own in bear markets. And, in some
kinds of bear market, you can make more money investing abroad than you
can make investing domestically.
40 Bear Market Investing Strategies
But you should take very seriously the quote at the start of this chapter. If
you have little knowledge of a country, study their market charts. Charts are
Buying and selling foreign stock directly is a bit complicated until you get
familiar with the way the issuing country operates. You can check if the shares
are available via American Depository Receipts (ADRs). Or use a country
fund (e.g., all Japan shares, or all Europe, etc.).
An American Depository Receipt is a receipt for shares of a foreign company,
deposited in an American bank. Once the initial transaction has been made, a
bank issues the ADR, and thereafter those foreign shares trade in much the
same way as any American shares do. ADRs are traded only in the US and not
on the exchange of the country in which the shares are issued.
For this reason, although the price of an ADR closely follows that of the
stock it represents in its country of origin, there is sometimes a fraction of a
point diﬀerence between the two, which very sophisticated traders use for
Only major non-US companies are available in the form of ADRs. But for
the average bear market investor who wants to buy non-US gold mining
shares, or shares in any major foreign corporation, ADRs are a handy way
to do so.
GOLD MINING SHARES
Some of the best gold mining companies are not American, but Canadian,
Australian, or South African. In times of instability, gold mining companies
tend to rise ahead of gold bullion, so gold mining shares are often a more
attractive buy in the early stages of a bear market, particularly an inﬂationary
bear market. Most major foreign gold mining companies have ADRs.
Another reason to invest abroad during a bear market is if you fear inﬂation
will erode the value of your own currency. The late 1970s was such a time. If
you simply want to put money abroad in a foreign currency at interest, the
easiest way to do that is via a Swiss or Dutch bank. Swiss and Dutch banks are
more internationally minded than most and cater to English-speaking foreign
investors. They can set you up with time deposits or bonds for any major
Globalization, Terrorism, and Foreign Investment 41
currency in the world. How do you open a foreign bank account? Answer: in
exactly the same way you open a local account. You either mail your bank of
choice a check with instructions to open an account for you, or you make a
direct bank transfer. Some major Swiss banks require a minimum deposit in at
least six ﬁgures, and a few private banks require at least a million dollars. So,
check out the bank of your choice before you decide to open an account with
them. But the majority will take a minimum $25,000 deposit.
There are US branches of many major foreign banks where you can open
your account in person. But, if you seek privacy, avoid them and deal direct.
In any future inﬂationary bear market of the kind we saw during the 1970s
then a Dutch or Swiss bank account would be a good investment move. Will
inﬂation get as bad as it did in the 1970s in the foreseeable future? You will
have to wait till Chapter 19 to ﬁnd out!
You can also trade currency futures on the International Monetary Market
(IMM) in Chicago. Futures of any kind are for nimble traders. But it’s a skill
like all others. It also demands time to monitor, more so than stocks or bonds.
Margin requirements for futures are much lower than for stocks, so when you
buy a future (in anything, not just a currency future), you are much more
leveraged than when you buy a stock, even if you buy a stock on margin.
This means if you are correct on the direction of a particular currency, then
your proﬁts are multiplied because of the leverage. But if you are wrong, you
can lose dramatically. And because bear markets tend to be more volatile than
bull markets, currency futures are not considered by many a bear market
trading vehicle, even if your domestic currency is inﬂated. The leverage
factor, plus the fact that all markets, including currency markets, are more
volatile in bear times than in bull, make futures seem risky. But if you obey
disciplines and use stop loss orders, they are useful. Yet, for the majority, it’s
easier to open a foreign bank account, with a time deposit, if you want to hedge
your own currency, than to trade currencies in the futures market.
GLOBAL INVESTING IN MAJOR BEAR MARKETS
Terrorism will dampen global investing somewhat, but will not eliminate it.
Even if terrorism did not exist, the natural tendency of most investors is to seek
higher risk during a bull market than in a bear. Unless domestic inﬂation
becomes a major issue, as it was during the 1970s in both the US and
Europe, during a bear market, less people are willing to invest globally,
either directly or via a mutual fund.
In addition, if a bear market bites hard, multinational companies will need to
cut back. The ﬁrst places they are likely to cut are the last places they invested
in. It is likely that some multinationals will become less global in their reach
over the next few years, for practical economic reasons. The international
42 Bear Market Investing Strategies
markets for new technology have, in the main, reached saturation point, even
though there are, for example, billions of Chinese and Indians without
computers. But high tech needs a basic infrastructure which many non-
industrialized nations do not yet have. Until that infrastructure is created,
there are, in many cases, not even the roads to truck the computers to
consumers, let alone electrical outlets to plug them into.
A bear market is a time when companies regroup and consolidate rather
than build new plants and try to nurture new business in foreign countries. And
in this interconnected world, as America goes into a recession, most of the rest
of the world follows.
In any future major bear market, with the exception of gold mining shares,
there will probably be fewer foreign companies worth investing in, just as in the
As with multinational companies, a bear market is a time for the average
investor to regroup and concentrate more on preserving capital, than taking
risks in bull markets.
STRUCTURE OF BEAR
‘‘Many a healthy reaction has proved fatal.’’
‘‘One of the greatest pieces of economic wisdom is to know what you do
In bear markets, we must turn our thinking upside down in many respects. For
example, a ‘‘reaction’’ is now an up-move, because it is against the main trend.
Every leg-down in a bear market is interrupted by a secondary reaction,
which may come in two or three phases.
These reactions are lifesavers for those who failed to take action when the
bull market ended and are now stuck with giant losses. The secondary reaction
gives us a chance to ‘‘bail out’’ at higher prices. It also gives an opportunity for
shorting. Failure to sell out on this rally means you risk ‘‘taking a bath’’ when
the next leg of the bear market comes into play at the end of the secondary
Of course, the possibility is ever present in any bear market that the rally will
turn out to be a primary reversal. To distinguish between a true secondary and
a primary reversal, I can probably do no better than to turn to the words of
William Peter Hamilton, the successor of Charles Dow, who developed Dow’s
ideas into the Dow Theory we know today, and Robert Rhea, who further
reﬁned Dow Theory during the 1930s.
‘‘An understanding of a secondary reaction,’’ wrote Robert Rhea, ‘‘is needed
by traders to about the same extent as a growing cotton crop requires