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THE COLLEGE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Student Name: Commander Wayne Davey, United States of America
South and Central Asia Program Class of 2015
Thesis Title: Sub-regional Organizations: Next Drivers of a Security Regime in the
Middle East?
Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies
DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE
VIEWS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD
INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.
ABSTRACT
In a world of complex interdependence, wicked problems, and seemingly
insurmountable challenges, the United States can no longer go it alone, nor can it
completely disengage from the Middle East. Although a region-wide security regime is
unlikely in the near future, sub-regional organizations have shown promise in addressing
some regional security issues in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Sub-regional
organizations can be agents of action, bridging the gap between regional actors and
regional organizations, and merging legitimacy of action with the legality of the United
Nations Security Council. The regional actions of the United States, as an external
hegemon, have directly contributed to the underdevelopment of regional institutions and
mechanisms, resulting in an incapacity to address regional security problems. As part of
its emerging strategy in the Middle East, the United States must exercise smart leadership
in it application of smart power to facilitate and support: capacity-building efforts of sub-
regional organizations and institutions; partnerships between global hegemonic orders
and regional hegemonic orders; and advancement of the Middle East Peace Process.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................................... i
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW........................................................................................ 6
CHAPTER 3: REASONS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION ................................................. 14
CHAPTER 4: BARRIERS TO REGIONAL COOPERATION................................................... 22
CHAPTER 5: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST................................ 29
CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL SECURITY
STRUCTURE AND UNITED STATES POLICY ...................................................................... 41
BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................................................................................... 46
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................................. 55
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Leadership is influence. That’s it. Nothing more; nothing less.
‒ John C. Maxwell
Definition of the Problem
“Leading from behind” is the unfortunate description of the regional strategy of
the United States in the Middle East. Borrowed from a series of quotes in the 1994
autobiography of Nelson Mandela, New Yorker journalist Ryan Lizza put the phrase into
foreign policy discussion in early 2011 (Lizza 2011b). Although it is an awful foreign
policy slogan, some argue the approach has merit (Gelb 2013). Others argue that the
approach causes instability in the region and puts the security interests of the U.S. at risk
(Krauthammer 2011; Cook 2015, 1; Dueck 2015, 7). Dr. Barry Posen, author and
professor of political science at MIT, argues that the U.S. has pursued a grand strategy of
“Liberal Hegemony” over the past two decades, but needs to pursue a new grand strategy
of “Restraint” (Posen 2014, xi). How will the United States, under its new and evolving
regional strategy in the Middle East, address peace and security challenges? Because of
the seemingly insurmountable barriers to implement a region-wide security regime and
the advantages of operating at the sub-regional level, the key to peace and security is a
regional approach driven by sub-regional organizations and sub-regional orders. Under
its emerging engagement policy in the Middle East, the United States should focus more
on sub-regional organizations, by facilitating capacity-building efforts of sub-regional
organizations and institutions, partnerships between global hegemonic orders and
regional hegemonic orders, and advancement of the Middle East Peace Process.
2
In the Middle East, a complex storm of wicked problems is forming at an
accelerated pace, bringing together a convergence of old, new, and emerging threats. Past
and future problems are seemingly being pulled into the vortex of current problems and
overwhelming state and regional systems. Problems emanating from the Middle East are
rapidly spilling into nearby regions: failing states cannot provide basic services to their
inhabitants; ISIS is holding land in two countries, directly operating in seven other
countries, and has affiliates operating in four more countries (Gambhir 2015); refugee
populations are crossing into Europe and other regions not seen since World War II;
human suffering is expanding; rapidly decreasing oil revenues are destroying economic
systems; and a new nuclear and conventional arms race is emerging. A new wave of
popular uprisings is on the cusp of explosion in countries and territories such as Egypt,
Jordan, Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and Greece. Regional states, non-state
actors, extra-regional states, and multinational organizations will be forced to better
address security issues by changing the model of international cooperation.
Since the phenomenon of the Arab Spring began in December 2010, regional and
sub-regional organizations in the Middle East have undertaken activities which show
promise for a future of increased regional cooperation to solve present and emerging
problems. As the predominant external hegemon, the United States, disengages from the
region and state and non-state actors rush in to take advantage of ungoverned and
alternatively governed spaces, an opportunity has emerged for sub-regional organizations
to become central and take the next steps toward regional peace and security. The
international community, the United Nations, and regional institutions must support the
action of sub-regional organizations and cooperative efforts which contribute to the
3
development of sub-regional institution-building that enables regional governance and
regional peace and security. Sub-regional solutions for regional problems should be the
new focus for conflict management in the Middle East.
Among scholars, practitioners, and policy officials, there is a growing discussion
on the importance of regions and regionalism in international politics (Lake and Morgan
1997, 5; Buzan and Wæver 2003, 10; Harders and Legrenzi 2008, 1; Legrenzi 2011,
149). After the Cold War, regional organizations have become more relevant and more
instrumental in affecting peace and security (Aris and Wenger 2014, 1). Intervening
actors and organizations which lack ties to states and regions in which they operate are
viewed as outsiders and lack legitimacy, even though they may have the ability and
resources to assist nation-states solve problems. Regional organizations, and in particular
regional security organizations, have been successful in Europe, the Americas, and
Africa. Leading scholars have identified South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East as
the regions having the lowest levels of institutionalization and regional integration in the
world (Beck 2015, 191; Fawcett 2013c, 368; Wallensteen 2015, 18). Furthermore, “the
Middle East is one of the least regionally integrated and most under-institutionalized
world areas” (Beck 2015, 191). David Lake and Patrick Morgan, in their groundbreaking
book advocating a regional lens for scholarly analysis and international diplomacy,
declared “the world has now changed. The regional level stands more clearly on its own
as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars
seeking to explore contemporary security affairs (Lake and Morgan 1997, 6). Despite the
calls for a new focus on regions and sub-regions to solve security issues, “there is little
talk of Middle Eastern solutions to Middle Eastern problems” (Fawcett 2015b, 146).
4
Regions, Regionalization, and Regionalism
The Middle East is one of the most socially interconnected, interdependent and
complex regions. Yet, it is described as a “region without regionalism” (Aarts 1999, 911).
Just what is a region? What is regionalization? And, what is regionalism? Like many
terms, a region is a contested concept. Traditionally, a region is a spatial term grouping
“territorial units in geographical proximity, constituting a spatially bound and contiguous
area” (Börzel et al. 2012, 3). In thought and in practice, a region can be defined by other
characteristics than adjoining territorial space which go beyond spatial bounds: political,
economic, religious, socio-cultural, or qawm. Some dimensions may be more prominent
and important than others. Regardless of the individual qualities of a region, it must
exhibit a certain level of interdependence (Nye 1968, vii). A region can be inside,
outside, or crossing nation-state boundaries. It may be defined differently by different
peoples, or it may not exist at all, especially if the concept is not institutionalized within a
particular social consciousness. Thus, regions are thought of as being socially constructed
conceptions of community and society, and are contested concepts.
According to Pinar Bilgin, the “Middle East” is a geopolitical-spatial term used
by external actors to describe a part of the world with certain security and concerns and
interests (Bilgin 2005, 12). Today, it most commonly refers to all Arab states, plus
Turkey, Israel, and Iran (Monier 2014, 423), which this paper recognizes for simplicity of
analysis. Some argue narrowing the term to exclude the Arab states west of Egypt, using
the terms Middle East and North Africa (MENA) or Greater Middle East. Others argue
the inclusion of the Muslim republics of Central Asia. Although this definition is
problematic, the Middle East region has several common characteristics which can
5
describe overlapping sub-regions. Politically, it has high levels of authoritarianism and
low levels of democratization; economically, it is dominated by rentier economies and
low economic liberalization; culturally, it is predominantly Arab and Islamic. These sub-
regions do not imply cohesion or uniform behavior (Fawcett 2013a, 4).
Regionalization “refers broadly to processes (as opposed to a deliberate policy)
encompassing an increase in regionally-based interaction and activity” (Fawcett 2013b,
191). It describes the degree of interconnectivity between elements, such as objects,
systems, businesses, people and societies. Regionalization is akin to globalization with a
regional scope. These processes include economic, societal, and security activities and
interactions involving flows of objects, people, ideas, information, data, etc. crossing
state, national, and societal boundaries and connecting regions.
Regionalism (as opposed to regionalization), according to one of the foremost
scholars on the topic, Dr. Louise Fawcett, professor of international relations at St.
Catherine’s College (Oxford, UK), is a “policy-driven process in which states (and other
actors) pursue common goals and policies in any given region” (Fawcett 2013b 191). It is
viewed as a “state-led project based on intergovernmental negotiations and treaties”
(Goltermann et al. 2012, 4). At the most basic end of the spectrum, it is the promotion of
an awareness of a regional society; at the most developed end, it is manifested as a formal
institution or organization. Regionalism is institutionalized regionalization with
cooperative responses in which individual elements work together to avoid the minimalist
effects of the prisoner’s dilemma and to maximize collective benefits. Although
traditional thought has framed the concept around states, non-state actors operating
within a state or between states have roles within regionalism (Fawcett 2013b, 191).
6
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Concepts for a Middle East Regional Security Structure
Based on the successes of regional peace and security institutions in Europe, Asia,
and Africa, and the inability of the international community at large and individual states
to address domestic and regional security threats, regional organizations and regional
security arrangements are more commonly being viewed as the key to stability in the
Middle East. In a review of the scholarly literature with regions as the level of analysis, a
number of regional approaches to security have been proposed characterized by the level
of governance at which peace and security measures are implemented, or stated another
way, the level of governance at which action occurs. These approaches are based on the
history of the region and the possibility for future success. The four most common
regional security mechanisms or regimes are: institutionalized regional cooperation,
institutionalized sub-regional cooperation, ad-hoc and informal cooperation, and a
hegemon or hegemonic order which implements the security order. Derivations of these
four basic regimes exist, including approaches with varying degrees of scope and
importance of the issues to be solved.
Regional Organizations Implement the Security Order
One concept of a regional security order in the Middle East is one that is driven at
the regional level by a regional organization and its supporting institutions (Dakhlallah
2012, 393; Dessouki 2015, 101). This institutional approach, shared and promoted by the
United Nations, makes regional organizations and regional cooperation forums the
drivers of peace and security. By connecting the international legality established by the
7
UN to the regional legitimacy of regional organizations, regional organizations have the
potential to mobilize regional action to address peace and security problems (United
Nations 2015).
The League of Arab States (LAS), with 22 members, has been the recognized
regional unifier of the Middle East and North Africa, but has defined the region based on
an Arab identity, excluding the powerful non-Arab states of Israel, Iran, and Turkey, and
other trans-regional actors. Other important regional organizations and cooperation
agreements which have members in the Middle East include the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC), the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and the sub-regional
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In discourses of a region-wide approach to security,
scholars are in agreement that the status quo will not work for the future, and a region-
wide organization such as the LAS would have to evolve to be more effective. Although
the LAS was known for much talk and not much action prior to 2011, the response of the
LAS to the Arab Spring shows some promise for expanded action in the future.
For the regional system to be effective, the LAS would have to make significant
reforms, such as re-defining common threats that go beyond the traditional barriers to
Arab solidarity, allowing for a greater role of inter-regional organizations within the
LAS, developing institutions and sub-regional organizations within the LAS, and
permitting small blocs of Arab states to organize and suppress internal domestic revolts
that threaten to spill over into adjoining states (Dessouki 2015, 101). Additional reforms
include the creation of an Arab Peace and Security Council modeled after the United
Nations Security Council, and allowing a small group of strong Arab states to lead
multilateral security intervention efforts across the region (Dakhlallah 2012, 412). Even
8
more comprehensive reforms have been suggested, including a departure from an Arab
identity to a more inclusive and multinational identity that includes non-Arab states, and
the transition to a regional union, with economic and military cooperation modeled after
the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) (Dessouki 2015, 102-103).
Sub-regional Organizations Implement the Regional Security Order
According to Egyptian diplomats and authors Nabil Fahmy and Karim Haggag,
“the history of the Middle East shows that successful conflict management and resolution
processes are not dependent on region-wide frameworks” (Fahmy and Haggag 2014, 57).
Because region-wide approaches to security in the Middle East have been plagued by
collective inaction, sub-regional organizations and sub-regional cooperation have
recently received major attention because of the ability to actually get things done (Aarts
1999, 921; Harders and Legrenzi 2008, 3; Legrenzi 2011, 150; Brock 2012, 2). The Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) is the best example of a formal, multifunctional sub-regional
organization in the Middle East, although other sub-regional arrangements exist, such as
the trade-focused Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Agadir Agreement, and the trans-
regional Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (Ehteshami 2011, 175-179).
Because of the inability to create a region-wide security order, some scholars
suggest that a regional security order in the Middle East could be built around the sub-
regional level of cooperation. One model of future cooperation is based on the GCC,
which is built on a pragmatic approach to legitimacy instead of the pan-Arab consensus
which restricts a larger regional organization (Harders and Legrenzi 2008, 3). More
informal types of sub-regional cooperation, such as a union of states or an agreement
9
among state leaders, could be a sub-regional mechanism for action. Outside of a regional
security focus, “new economic cooperation efforts like the Agadir Agreement indicate
that sub-regional economic cooperation of smaller groups might be the future model of
Arab regional cooperation” (Harders and Legrenzi 2008, 5). Over time, a regional
economic cooperation model could be expanded to include conflict resolution and peace
and security elements.
Going one step further in a sub-regional cooperative model, some scholars argue
that the key to success of a sub-regional order is dependent on a regional hegemon
(Kamrava 2012, 103; Beck 2015, 193). In the case of the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia has
acted as the regional hegemon within the GCC and the LAS, working with other regional
organizations and other regional and global actors. In response to the Arab Spring
uprisings, Saudi Arabia acted within the GCC to implement security measures, led the
GCC within the greater LAS to legitimize GCC actions, and enabled the LAS to legalize
actions within the United Nations. The weight of Saudi Arabia allowed the GCC to
intervene in the Bahraini uprising, to manage the uprisings in Yemen, and launch an
initiative to expand membership to Jordan and Morocco (Beck 2015, 200). The GCC has
signaled for a number of years its desire to include Jordan and Morocco. Two scenarios
could evolve from a GCC expansion: a stronger GCC which could supplant the LAS
(Kamrava 2012, 100), or the beginnings of a second sub-regional organization outside the
Gulf region which would be highly aligned with the GCC (Beck 2015, 200). These
activities show that the combination of a regional hegemon within a sub-regional
organization can produce notable peace and security outcomes in the Middle East.
10
Ad-Hoc Regional Cooperation Implements the Security Order
Based on a very long history and the realistic expectations for cooperation in the
future, a popular idea for a regional security mechanism in the Middle East is one that is
informal, ad-hoc, and flexible (Kodmani 2011, 223; Jones 2011, 19; Müller 2014, 464) .
In his analysis of the regional security space surrounding Afghanistan, Stephen Aris
concludes that a comprehensive regional framework is not feasible, and “cooperation will
instead continue to function most vibrantly within more informal and ad hoc smaller
coalitions and fora” (Aris 2013, 209). Ad-hoc cooperation, compared to a regional or sub-
regional institutional approach, offers advantages such as simplicity, speed of response,
and tailored approaches towards specific security tasks (Müller 2014, 464). Another
advantage of an informal approach to security is that it serves as a present baseline to
address current security issues, which can incrementally evolve into a more structured
security regime.
Accepting the present ad-hoc nature of the security structure, the significant
impediments to multilateral cooperation, and the low expectations for future change,
several ad-hoc security models exist, which could advance the security regime toward a
more cooperative mechanism. The first model is to further develop cooperative
frameworks across the wider region based on economic collaboration with less
controversial interstate trade, transportation, common markets, and energy exchanges
(Aris 2013, 209). Examples include expanding the non-contiguous Agadir Agreement
(Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia), or forming counterbalancing micro-regional free
trade agreements between the trio of Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, and the trio of Morocco,
Algeria, and Tunisia (Gylfason, Martínez-Zarzoso, and Wijkman 2015, 261). The second
11
model is to emphasize Track II efforts with informal political arrangements and create
specific sub-regional or micro-regional institutions on an as needed basis. One example
would be the creation of a modest regional security center to service select security
coordination efforts between a block of states (Jones 2011, 19). The third model is to
involve an extra-region state, group of states, or hegemonic order to partner with a
regional ad-hoc coalition. One example is the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP),
which is a current partnership between the EU and states in the Southern and Eastern
Mediterranean to promote economic growth, political reform, and conflict resolution
(Gylfason, Martínez-Zarzoso, and Wijkman 2015, 247).
Regional or Extra-Regional Hegemonic Order Implements the Security Order
In the absence of regional collective action, a hegemonic order such as the Middle
East Quartet—the UN, U.S., EU, and Russia—could be the driver for collective action in
the Middle East. Currently, the Quartet functions as a contact group operating in an
informal diplomatic manner to facilitate coordination and mediation of certain regional
issues (Müller 2015, 464). Another idea is for a regional hegemonic order of regional
powers to lead regional cooperation, such as Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Because regional cooperation is unlikely without extra-regional support, a likely
partnership would be one with the United States, the EU, or another rising world power.
A more comprehensive partnership could combine key regional actors with key global
actors, such as the 4-element bloc of the EU, U.S., Russia and China, the Quartet, the
Quartet plus China, or the P5+1 members of the U.S., UK, France, China, Russia plus
Germany (Harrison 2015, 16). Building on the recent diplomatic success of the P5+1
countries and the UN in negotiating a nuclear agreement with Iran, and the rising
12
instability in the Middle East, the United Nations, since July 2015, has pushed for
advancing the Middle East Peace Process by the Middle East Quartet in combination with
the Arab Peace Initiative (United Nations 2015).
Closing the Gap: U.S. Policy and Regional Organizations in the Middle East
In the most recent National Security Strategy, there is an emphasis on the
leadership of the United States in the world to address security challenges. The mandate
is to lead with purpose, with strength, by example, with capable partners, with all
instruments of national power, and with a long-term perspective (The White House 2015,
2-5). The stated ways to increase cooperation with international institutions, including
regional organizations, are to share burdens and uphold international norms (The White
House 2015, 3). For conflict prevention within and among states, the United States is to
“continue to bolster the capacity of the U.N. and regional organizations to help resolve
disputes, build resilience to crisis and shocks, strengthen governance, end extreme
poverty, and increase prosperity” (The White House 2015, 11). In a review of the
literature regarding the activities of the United States toward increasing the capacity of
regional organizations in the Middle East, there appears to be a large say-do gap. Even
though there is a strategy which clearly involves institution-building of regional
organizations, especially to resolve conflict, the United States clearly engages almost
exclusively in bilateral and multilateral methods on a state-to-state level, with minimal
involvement of regional organizations.
The policies and actions of the United States toward regional organizations have
been sorely lacking for nearly half of a century. Referring to the Johnson
Administration’s “ad-hoc” and “neglecting” approach to regional organizations in the
13
1960s, “a number of critics…have echoed a more consistent policy of support for
autonomous regional organizations without direct United States membership as a means
to a structure of world order” (Nye 1969, 723). With the exception of NATO, the African
Union (AU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the
Organization of American States (OAS), and the League of Arab States (LAS), “little
attention is placed in Washington on the myriad of regional bodies that exist” (Kingah
2012, 5). Along with lackluster policies and activities between the United States and
regional organizations in the Middle East, there is a lack of literature to advocate for
increased engagement and capacity-building efforts which would improve the efforts of
regional organizations to address regional security problems and resolve conflicts. This
paper will attempt to close that literature gap.
14
CHAPTER 3
REASONS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION
Overview of Middle East Insecurity
The sources of insecurity in the Middle East have been traditionally identified using
the main schools of theoretical thought—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—with
the emerging perspective of regionalism, providing constructive additions to
understanding the complex nature of the region, and contributing factors to domestic,
regional, and global insecurity. Using regions as the level of analysis, vice global or
national levels, different analytical perspectives are brought together to explain the
complex insecurity of the region. The broad and lasting issues that affect peace and
security in the Middle East region all contribute to the reasons for cooperation and non-
cooperation. These issues are well-known and define the region: the Arab-Israeli conflict;
the Shiite-Sunni divide; Saudi Arabia and Iran contesting to be the voice of Islam; and
the large disparities among groups of people regarding power, influence, human capital,
and resources.
Conflict and cooperation are shaped by the historical and overarching forces of
conflict within the Middle East. These forces include: the Westphalian borders drawn
from the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 which are at odds with how the regional nations
view their own community and are the cause of border clashes; regional fragmentation of
weak states, artificial states, and non-state groups which are incongruent with the supra-
state identities of Arabism and Islam, causing state legitimacy deficits; the
marginalization of minority groups, namely the Palestinians and Kurds who struggle for
recognition and statehood; and the hyper-sensitivity of states, such as Israel and Iraq, to
15
maintain their own security by launching several wars with their neighbors. Outside
intervention by extra-regional powers and hegemons have substantially compounded the
sources of instability, caused further divisions between regional states, eroded state
sovereignty, and hindered regional cooperation. Outside hegemons, therefore, have
further caused the instability in the region that they tried to reduce in the first place by
accelerating the security dilemma (Hinnebusch 2014, 122-123).
The United Nations and Regional Organizations
During formation of the United Nations in 1945, the founders clearly had a concept
for the relationship between the UN and regional arrangements and an expectation of the
role of regional organizations towards peace and security. In fact, the League of Arab
States (LAS) was founded six months prior to the UN, and in light of the potential for a
regional organization contributing to peace in the Middle East, Article VIII of the UN
charter was established to recognize the connection between the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) and regional arrangements and agencies, and the contributions of
regional organizations towards international peace and security. The charter explicitly
designated the UNSC with the responsibility of international peace and security, giving it
power to authorize and enforce regional actions contributing to peace and security.
Recognizing its own limits and the advantages of regional bodies, the UN had a concept
that “regional agencies” would be central to implementing peace and security measures
within the borders of established states, between states, and among regions.
In 2006, the United Nations recognized the increasing need for regional
organizations and issued a report from the Secretary-General that described the
framework of a regional-global security partnership concept based on the legality of the
16
United Nations and the legitimacy of regional organizations, which could contribute to
international peace and security (Söderbaum and Tavares 2011, 6). Although the UN did
not specifically define a regional or sub-regional organizations, it did declare that
“regions” were difficult to describe and had many different characteristics. The report
made clear that sub-regional organizations were an extension of regional organizations
under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In addition, the report defined seven functions of
regional and sub-regional organizations which could contribute to international peace and
security: conflict prevention; peacemaking; peacekeeping; peacebuilding; disarmament
and non-proliferation; protection of civilians; and natural disaster relief. The updated
2006 concept of regional arrangements with the UN was based on a resolution issued in
2005 which placed importance on regional and sub-regional organizations that could
enter into standby arrangements with the UN and be rapidly deployable for specific UN-
mandated missions, including counter-terrorism, countering the illicit trade of small arms
and light weapons, and assisting in capacity-building efforts (United Nations 2006, 1-14).
The relationship between the UN and regional institutions is important because it creates
the legality-legitimacy nexus. The UN and UNSC, when authorizing intervention in a
region or within a state’s borders, bring international legality for action. Regional and
sub-regional institutions and orders bring regional and local legitimacy for action.
Reasons for Regional Cooperation and Regional Organizations
Nation-states cooperate within bilateral, multilateral, and international institutional
mechanisms, such as informal agreements, coalitions, formal alliances, and treaties with
neighboring and distant states, regional organizations, and international organizations for
many reasons. With respect to regional cooperation, and more broadly international
17
relations, there is no one theory adequate to understand, analyze, and explain why states
and other important actors cooperate. There are many reasons for regional cooperation.
Some reasons are broad, while other reasons are very specific. Some reasons are
characterized as being more important, while other reasons are viewed as less important.
Regionalism and Realism: Power, Peace, and Security
Generally-speaking from a realist perspective, states conduct activities in their
own self-interest to maximize their power and security. They cooperate to enhance their
strength, influence, and relative position vis-à-vis other states and actors. Strong states,
including hegemons, integrate into regional institutions and systems to project their
power and influence (Fawcett 2015b, 133), while weaker states integrate to maximize
their collective strengths and to balance an opposing power. On the domestic or sub-
national level, regimes and groups seek to balance an opposing power or threat,
originating both from inside and outside its borders. On the regional level, regimes and
transnational groups seek to balance an opposing power or threat, both from inside and
outside the region. States enter into regional cooperation to reduce instability at the
domestic, regional, and international levels. Because regional organizations exist at the
crossroads of the domestic and international realms, they are regarded as the gateway to
address insecurity and resolve conflict (Fawcett 2013b, 186-187).
Crossing the political and economic stratifications of regional cooperation,
collective defense and collective security are primary reasons for states to enter into
regional arrangements. In collective defense, states have a common perception of a
threat, and cooperate to prepare for, and respond to, a threat emanating from an outside
state or group of states. Such an action is permitted under provisions of the United
18
Nations Charter, but must be approved by the United Nations Security Council.
Collective security is a much broader concept, and is undefined by the UN. It refers to
“collective action in response to a collectively identified threat” (Orakhelashvili 2011, 4),
from both external states and internal member-states. Collective security involves formal
arrangements between states, usually via treaties, which are binding and delineate certain
rights and responsibilities of the signatories. Collective defense and collective security
arrangements are similar, involving “long-term relationships among the members, formal
decision-making structures, and an expectation that action under the arrangement could
be activated by a variety of threats” (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2014, 4).
Another reason for regional cooperation is collective conflict management
(CCM), which is different from, but related to, collective defense and collective security.
It involves four main elements: ending or reducing violent conflict; mediating or assisting
in a negotiation process; helping to resolve social, economic, or political issues resulting
from the conflict; and providing monitoring services, guarantees, or other measures to
sustain a long-term peace settlement (Croker, Hamson, and Aall 2014, 4). Examples of
CCM include intervening in a state-on-state war, a civil war within the borders of a state,
cross-border insurgencies, and border disputes. The UN often refers to peacekeeping,
conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding as elements of
conflict management. This regional cooperative action is recognized by the UN under
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter as a just cause for a regional organization or a
regional actor to intervene to resolve disputes affecting international peace and security.
Regional organizations are becoming more involved in CCM because of an increase in
the cases of regional conflict, a declining interest by the world’s great powers to
19
intervene, and the limitations of an overstretched and under-resourced UN (Croker,
Hamson, and Aall 2014, 4). The UN and regional actors need regional organizations.
Regionalism: Political and Economic
The factors which drive regionalism, and hence the formation and transformation
of regional organizations, can be characterized as falling into two main groupings:
political factors and economic factors (Karns and Mingst 2010, 148; Kirchner and
Dominguez 2014, 170; Fawcett 2015a, 44). Political factors driving regionalism, and the
actions of regional organizations, include power dynamics, identity and ideology, internal
and external threats, domestic politics, and leadership (Karns and Mingst 2010, 148-150).
Power dynamics are at play when hegemonic or rising regional or global powers attempt
to influence regional orders and create a perceived imbalance. The rise of Egypt and
Israel in the Middle East has been contested many times, both by regional powers and
external powers. External hegemons, namely the United States, have also been resisted.
Today, as the United States withdraws from the region, a rising Iran, Russia, and China
are being resisted in the Middle East, not only by states, but by non-state actors as well.
The power vacuum left by the withdrawal of external powers and the weakening of
regional states, has allowed ISIS to establish space to operate.
Identity and shared perceptions of what defines a region, and a common ideology,
contribute to regional cooperation and the formation of a regional organization. The
League of Arab States was formed around the Arab linguistic-cultural identity; the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation is formed around the Islamic religious-cultural
identity; NATO and the EU are based on a liberal and democratic ideology; the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU) formed based on non-
20
interference and anti-colonialism. Shared threats are powerful drivers of organizations.
NATO formed to halt Soviet aggression and the expansion of communism; the GCC
formed because of the external threats of Iran and Iraq, and the internal threats of
domestic economic crisis.
Similar domestic politics, in the form of regime types and economic governance,
make agreements among members of a regional organization easier to attain. All
members of the EU are democracies and all members of the GCC are authoritarian,
making cooperation easier. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
especially since the 1990s, has had difficulty in reaching agreements because of the wide
variation of political systems between its members. Leadership, in the form of aggressive
leaders and regional powers, provides the impetus to form collective policies and
collective actions. The United States has consistently exercised leadership in NATO and
Organization of American States (OAS), while Japan and Australia have led efforts in the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
Economic factors at the local/domestic, regional, and global levels drive
cooperation between states, regionalism, and the activities of regional organizations. A
regional marketplace connects the global market to domestic markets, as well as adjacent
regional markets. The economic health of a nation-state, especially a small and relatively
weak state, depends on the regional economy. Larger, more developed states depend on
both regional and global markets for their economic health. Economic cooperation allows
consumers and producers to benefit from economies of scale, reduced transaction costs
and trade barriers, and more efficient movement of goods and labor. The cooperative
economy attracts foreign direct investment and allows a state to have more economic
21
power within international markets and more political power within international
institutions (Börzel 2012, 258). Economic cooperation facilitates movement of people
and goods across state borders, the development of regional infrastructure, and
connections to the global marketplace. Some regional organizations, such as the EU,
Mecrosur in South America, and members of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), prefer a “closed regionalism” which grants trade advantages to its members.
Other states and regional organizations, especially in Asia, practice an “open
regionalism” to take advantage of the benefits with trading partners which are not part of
their region (Karns and Mingst 2010, 151-152).
The Balance Sheet: Primary Reasons for Regional Organizations in the Middle East
Nowhere in the world is the security dilemma amongst a state of anarchy more
pronounced than the Middle East. Although the constructivist concept of cooperation
leading to a higher level of security is understood at the local level, the realist concept of
a fight for power prevails at the regional and international level. From a review of the
scholarly literature, the three main reasons in rank order for regional cooperation and
regional organizations emerge in the Middle East: first, protecting a state’s regime from
internal threats; second, protecting a state’s regime from external threats; and third,
maintaining a state’s perceived borders. These reasons for regional cooperation in the
Middle East are hyper-inflated compared to other regions of the world. The focus of
security is on the regime and ruling elites, which comes at the expense of the well-being
of the general population. The domestic security dilemma and the regional security
dilemma combine to create large disparities in power, resources, and the public goods
resulting in a political security mechanism in which nobody wins.
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CHAPTER 4
BARRIERS TO REGIONAL COOPERATION
The Security Dilemma, Self-determination, and Non-intervention
Barriers to international cooperation have distinct regional flavors, while at the
same time, are affected by global, transnational, and domestic causal factors. In a very
broad sense, the main challenges to the formation, existence, and effectiveness of
regional organizations in addressing security threats in every region of the world are the
principles of self-determination and non-intervention established by the Westphalian state
system, which cause a reluctance of member states to cooperate and cross boundaries
both in a physical and functional sense. These international normative principles,
combined with the minimalist outcome of the combined security and prisoner’s
dilemmas, cause collective action problems and diminish the ability for regional
organizations to collectively and effectively deal with security threats. Regional
organizations which have a declared emphasis on security and collective defense, are
impeded by the barriers to regional cooperation, and tend to issue declarations that are
out of balance with the actions taken to support collective security (Kirchner and
Dominguez 2014, 175-176). The disparity between the overuse of rhetoric by regional
organizations and member states, and the under-delivery of public goods, is often called
the “say-do gap.” The disconnect between what is said and what is delivered causes trust
and legitimacy problems between governing regimes and the governed populations, as
well as between states. In the Middle East, the “say-do gap” looms large.
The principles of self-determination and non-intervention as barriers to regional
cooperation are especially pronounced in the Middle East, with its lengthy historical
23
legacy of maintaining the status quo in the interest of stability in three areas: regime
survival, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty (Snetkov and Aris 2013, 10).
However, in recent times, states have permitted exceptions to the principle of non-
interference and have allowed outside intervention. From a collective action perspective,
member states of regional organizations have established just cause to intervene inside
the boundaries of another state, under the auspices of the responsibility to protect (R2P)
within the UN system (Paris 2014, 569), and the newly-developed concept of the
responsibility while protecting (RwP) introduced by Brazil in 2011 (Powers 2015, 5).
Barriers to regional cooperation can be understood from different perspectives,
considering different referent objects (state, region, non-state actors). From a realism-
realist perspective framed on the self-interested desire for power and the distrust of other
actors, the role of regional organizations is greatly hindered by power plays and
competition between existing and rising regional hegemons, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran
and Egypt; between global hegemons, such as the United States, Russia, and China, for
regional penetration; and between regional hegemons and global penetrators which all
aspire to be major players in the region. Furthermore, the persistence of identity markers,
such as Islam, religious sects, the concept of pan-Arabism or “Arabness,” or other ethno-
linguistic identifiers serve to preserve social cohesion at the expense of improving
security and reducing common threats (Aris and Wenger 2014, 249).
Hegemons, Identity, and Threat Perceptions
Across the scholarly literature, the most identified barriers to regional cooperation in
the Middle East are competition between hegemonic states, overlapping and contested
socio-cultural identities, and differing threat perceptions. One of the most identified
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barriers to regional cooperation, and reasons for instability in the Middle East, is the
influence of a hegemon in the region, and the counter-response by regional actors to
diminish the influence of the hegemon (Hinnebusch 2003, 239; Harders and Legrenzi
2008, 1; Snetkov and Aris 2013, 271; Fawcett 2013b, 200; Aris and Wenger 2014, 249).
After the Cold War, the Middle East was deeply penetrated by external powers, mainly
via two wars in Iraq and the War on Terror. Unable to compete with overwhelming hard
power, many states chose to bandwagon with the U.S. hegemon, using soft power
approaches to provide some counterbalance. This era of instability shows that an external
hegemon with an overbalance of hard power is disruptive to regional security and inhibits
the development of regional security institutions (Hinnebusch 2013, 87).
A hegemon can come from two separate regions. A hegemon from inside the
region, such as Egypt, Iraq, or Iran, exerts influence, is opposed by other regional powers,
and is forced back into a quasi-hegemonic or middle-power role. A hegemon from
outside the region, such as the U.S. or a Western-aligned security order, further
intensifies the regional power-balancing effects. The hegemonic influence from outside
the region is more disruptive than an internal hegemon, as some regional powers will
align with the external hegemon, in order to maintain state-regime integrity, border
controls, and prestige vis-à-vis other regional states and their regimes. When more than
one external hegemon enters the region, regimes will either align with one particular
external power, or will hedge their bets by aligning with both in some fashion that
maximizes regime integrity. Many states in the region, as a matter of foreign policy, will
leverage interdependence with more than one external power. For example, wealthy
states in the Gulf region will purchase military equipment and training from a number of
25
states across the globe who act as peer competitors, thereby ensuring the survival of the
regime and the well-being of its political and economic system.
The Middle East has been characterized by many scholars as a “uniquely
penetrated region” (Hinnebusch 2013, 78), partly because of the failure of regional rival
powers to achieve any lasting hegemony, the actions of regional powers to prevent the
rise of any single regional power, and the ability of regional powers to entice external
powers into the region as an allied force. External hegemons, assisted by other extra-
regional powers, have penetrated into the region for a number of reasons, including
preventing the rise of regional hegemons, securing control over energy resources, and
conducting a war on terrorism (Hinnebusch 2013, 78). The effect of the external
hegemon in the region over time has been to prohibit the development of regional
institutions and regional cooperation in the Middle East, causing the very instability in
the long-term that the hegemon was actually trying to limit in the short-term.
Transnational and trans-regional identities which shape political, societal, and
individual contexts also create barriers to regional cooperation. Often referred to as
“social consciousness” (Monier 2014, 430), a region goes beyond the spatial concept and
into other regional identifiers such as language, culture, religion, ethnicity, and socio-
economic groupings. Terms such as the Middle East, the West, Arab, and Islamic are
highly contested, have many segmented divisions, are overlapping, and are often
opposing. Some states compete regarding their rights to be the voice of a group of people,
such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, which compete to be the voice of Islam. These groupings
also have the power to exclude other groups of people. Turkey, Iran, and Israel are not
considered Arab, yet they are important powers in the Middle East region. Sunni and Shia
26
sects compete for legitimacy and to define what it means to be Islamic. All these
intertwined, complementing, and opposing regional groupings face different threats, and
they have different priorities regarding those threats.
A regional consciousness shapes identification of threats, enemies, and allies.
Stated another way, who you think you are defines who you think your friends and
enemies are, and what your threats are. In a circular fashion, the regional consciousness
shapes the regional order, and the regional order continuously attempts to shape the
regional consciousness. Without one dominating regional consciousness, many regional
orders create a fragmented social structure and state system, which then become barriers
to regional cooperation. Even when trying to solve major international problems, there is
disagreement on defining the threat and hence, developing solutions that lead to an
improved security order. The security dilemma further spirals out of control.
The third major barrier to regional cooperation in the Middle East is differing
threat perceptions, which are deeply rooted in the history of conflict. Across the region,
there is a lack of agreement on the major threats to security and how those threats are
prioritized, all leading to collective inaction and exacerbation of the security dilemma
(Hinnebusch 2014, 122-124; Kodmani 2011, 228). On the domestic level, state regimes
perceive security threats from within their own borders and citizenry as the primary threat
to regime existence. Citizens of a state may view the primary threat to its people to be the
regime itself (i.e. Syria) or other sub-national or trans-national groups, resulting in
regional and domestic sectarian conflict or an inability of a state to provide basic
governance and provision of collective goods, such as food, water, electricity, rule of law,
and employment. To counter this threat, regimes rely heavily on domestic intelligence
27
services and military actions to protect the ruling regime, creating a securitized approach
to internal security. Thus, there is disagreement between the government of a state and
the citizens of the state on the threats to security within the state’s borders, which has
been called the “state-society gap” (Kodmani 2011, 223).
State regimes perceive transnational and cross-border subversion from regional
rivals—state and non-state actors—as the secondary threat to regime existence. To
counter such threats, regimes will obtain protection from one or more external powers
from outside the region, bandwagon with one or more regional power, or balance against
the threat itself, usually through subversion tactics and non-military counter-methods.
Regional consciousness, or how individual people and groups of people view their
identity, comes into play when attempting collective action and identifying threats.
Nothing embodies the character of the Middle East region and the barriers to
regional cooperation more than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Born from the Balfour
Declaration and the mandate for Palestine in 1917, through the declaration of Israel as a
state in 1948 and the wars of conflict, to the current regional and global complexities of
insecurity today, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict displays how the aforementioned main
barriers to regional cooperation in the Middle East come together and play out. Although
intense Israeli-Arab fault lines exist, the most prominent fault lines are within Arab-Arab
alignments. Since the 1950s, Arab states have chosen alignment and non-alignment
strategies in the combined context of the Arab-Palestinian divide and the influence of
extra-regional and hegemonic actors. (Smith 2013, 246). Of the three prominent
organizations in the Middle East—OIC, LAS, and GCC—all have strong mandates
supporting a Palestinian state and resolution of the Middle East Peace Process. The result
28
has been major friction between Arab powers, and Arab powers and the United States,
creating Arab distrust towards the West (Mousavian and Saberi 2015) and inhibiting
institutional development of regional cooperation against common threats.
Because of repeated failures by international efforts to obtain significant progress
toward an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement and the acknowledgement of the
importance of a region-led solution to the conflict, the king of Saudi Arabia put forward
the Arab Peace Initiative (API) in 2002 at the annual summit of the League of Arab
States (LAS), calling for a two-state solution and Arab normalization with Israel. It has
broad support in the Arab world and received renewed attention as recent as July, 2015 in
a revitalized UN-led peace initiative (United Nations 2015). The API is significant,
because is the first time Arab states have publically endorsed a mechanism which could
lead to recognition of the state of Israel. Although the API is viewed by Israel as an
ambiguous all-or-nothing proposal which Israel has countered with its own Israeli Peace
Initiative in 2011, it is viewed as the only regionally legitimate foundation in the Middle
East Peace Process (Baskin and Siniora 2015, 153-157).
The three main regions to regional cooperation—hegemons, identity, and threat
perceptions—all come together within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to this day.
Although some scholars and policy officials identify the Israeli-Palestinian issue as being
the main barrier to regional cooperation, many others identify it as a result of other
barriers to cooperation. Regardless, the issue reigns supreme. Thus, many experts argue
that regional security in the Middle East cannot progress without seriously addressing the
enduring Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, the United States is not listening and Middle East
insecurity continues (Fahmy and Haggag 2015, 66).
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CHAPTER 5
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Regional organizations in the Middle East have been very slow to form and
evolve and are only marginally effective in addressing conflict and other regional
problems. There are only three prominent regional institutions representing the Middle
East, each having a peace and security mandate: the trans-regional Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the regional League of Arab States (LAS), and the sub-
regional Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, only the LAS and GCC have had
an effect on peace and security matters. Although only slightly effective prior to the Arab
Spring uprisings in 2010-2011, the LAS and GCC have had an “awakening” of their own,
addressing some factors affecting peace and security inside the borders of their members,
and to a lesser extent, outside their borders (Beck 2015, 190; Beck 2014, 1).
League of Arab States
The League of Arab States, often called the Arab League, was founded in 1945,
six months before the formation of the United Nations, by seven states: Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Yemen. It is headquartered in Cairo, Egypt and
is the second oldest regional organization in the world, behind the Organization of
American States (OAS). Today, it has 22 members stretching from the Arabian Peninsula
to North Africa, including Somalia in East Africa and Comoros, an island just north of
Madagascar. Palestine is a member, and is recognized by the LAS as a state. Syria, is a
member, but in a suspended status. The LAS promotes general interests among its
members regarding the economy, finance, culture, social welfare, and health. It has a
strong non-interference policy regarding the sovereignty of member states, and peace and
30
security matters are addressed only in a general sense. As such, the LAS is ineffectual in
direct actions to regional security. However, it is influential as a voice of the majority of
Arab states, especially in its relationship with the 57 members of the Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC) and within the United Nations. The LAS has had observer
status in the United Nations since 1950 (Masters and Sergie 2014, 1-2).
Table 1: League of Arab States Membership
Founding Members (7) Current Membership (22) Observer States (4)
Egypt Egypt Qatar (GCC) Eritrea
Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia (GCC) Palestine Brazil
Iraq Iraq Mauritania Venezuela
Lebanon Lebanon Morocco India
Transjordan Jordan Algeria
Yemen Yemen Tunisia
Syria Syria (suspended) Libya
Bahrain (GCC) Sudan
Kuwait (GCC) Djibouti
UAE (GCC) Somalia
Oman (GCC) Comoros
Source: (Love 2013, 1348, 1359; Masters and Sergie 2014, 1)
Figure 1: Map of the League of Arab States (BBC 2015).
31
The LAS has played a role in a number of defining issues which have helped
solidify Pan-Arab nationalism but have also hindered it from acting in a cohesive manner.
Arab unity took shape in the 19th
century in opposition to Ottoman (Turkish) rule. During
World War I, Arabs united in opposition to Ottoman and British aggression, culminating
when the British betrayed an agreement to establish an independent Arab state, and
endorsed the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, which divided the Arab region and set
boundaries contrary to Arab logic. Soon after the LAS was formed, Arabs further united
in opposition to the declared state of Israel in 1948, and simultaneously in support of an
established state of Palestine. To this day, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the greatest
defining issue of the region. The LAS initially rallied behind a rising Egypt and President
Nasser’s popular Pan-Arab movement in the 1950s and 1960s, but opposed Egypt when it
began peace negotiations with Israel in 1979. The civil war in Yemen from 1962-1970
put two of its founding members, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, on opposing sides in a proxy
war. The LAS tried to assert control over the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
when it emerged and gained what was seen as too much power in the region. There was
considerable disunity within the LAS during the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq
War (Masters and Sergie 2014, 2-3).
Gulf Cooperation Council
The GCC was founded in 1981, is headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and has
six member states (see Figure 2 and Table 1), all of which are members of the League of
Arab States. In contrast to the regional aspect of the Arab League, the GCC is a sub-
regional organization. It was originally formed as a security response to counter Shiite
Iran’s threats to Sunni Islam as Iran emerged from its Islamic revolution of 1979, as well
32
as responding to the overall weakness of the League of Arab States. The Gulf States were
also alarmed by the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The GCC feared the
rise of a powerful Iraq, as displayed during Iraq’s involvement in the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran
war, and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Figure 2: Gulf Cooperation Council Member States (Role of the GCC 2014)
Although the GCC charter states the basic objective of the GCC is “to effect
coordination, integration, and inter-connection between member states in all fields in
order to achieve unity between them” (GCC Charter 2015), the focus of the GCC is
clearly related to security, sovereignty of its borders, and regime stability of each
member. The GCC has not developed a formal collective security framework, which
gives the GCC flexibility responding to security concerns, with the restriction that
“substantive matters shall be carried out by unanimous vote” (GCC Charter 2015). For
GCC external actions, such as the response to the Arab Spring uprisings, unanimous
consent has been followed. Since the Arab Spring, three examples show a remarkable
33
shift in the GCC’s regional policies regarding Bahrain, Yemen, and possible GCC
expansion.
League of Arab States and Gulf Cooperation Council since the Arab Spring
Post Arab Spring: LAS Role in Tunisia and Egypt
Responding to the revolts in Tunisia in December 2010, Amr Moussa, secretary-
general of the LAS, acknowledged in January 2011 that the uprising was caused by poor
economic conditions in the greater Arab world, as a signal to encourage other Arab
leaders to respond to public outcries before such protests could arise in other Arab states.
At the same time, the LAS announced a $2 billion program to assist Arab economies in
relieving the unrest caused by economic pressures. The LAS refrained from declaring
support for the protesters to avoid inciting further violence in Tunisia. One week later, the
uprisings in Egypt began, and the LAS took a similar passive role but expanded its
rhetoric in another signal to Arab leaders to take action. After President Hosni Mubarak
of Egypt re-shuffled his cabinet, Secretary-General Moussa stated that a deeper change
was needed in Egypt and in other countries across the region. As Tunisia, and to a greater
extent Egypt, retaliated with brute force against protesters, the LAS was split on the
degree of brutality being used by individual regimes, and issued very cautious, but
critical statements against regime actions. Regarding Tunisia and Egypt, the LAS took
the role of regional facilitator and maintained its policy of non-interference, even though
the United Nations pushed the League to take a more active role (Schulz 2015, 210).
Post Arab Spring: LAS Role in Libya
After the uprisings in Libya and the extreme brutality used against protesters, the
LAS suspended Libya’s membership in February 2011, and acted within the UN as the
34
“Arab voice” to convince the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to vote in favor
of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) mandate of action towards Libya, which led to
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the strong support of the LAS for
establishing a no-fly zone. This was notable because it was the first time that the LAS
intervened because of the internal affairs of a member state, going against its non-
interference policy. Even though the LAS endorsed R2P for the initial intervention in
Libya, it later opposed expanded NATO action in Libya, reasoning that the R2P mandate
went well beyond action to protect civilians when NATO took action to cause regime
change, protect oil reserves, conduct counter-terrorism, and limit weapons proliferation
(Eriksson 2015, 223-225).
Post Arab Spring: LAS Role in Syria
In the wake of the Libyan uprisings, the LAS became very active in Syria. The
newly elected secretary-general of the LAS, Nabil El-Araby, in August 2011, voiced
concern over the public uprising in Syria and the extreme brutality of the Syrian military
forces against its citizens. The LAS and GCC worked together to pressure Syrian
President Assad to accept a political solution and institute political reforms. The LAS
brought the Syrian peace plan to the UNSC, but it was rejected by the vetoes of Russia
and China in October 2011, February 2012, and July 2012. The LAS, along with the
GCC, continued to work with the Syrian regime, getting it to agree to a temporary cease
fire in November 2011 and a roadmap to reform. During intense UN peace negotiations
with Syria from December 2011 until January 2012, the LAS took the lead in the peace
talks and sent observers to Syria to report on the implementation of a “protocol”
arrangement (Schulz 2015, 212-213). The observer mission was suspended in late
35
January 2012 because of escalating violence and direct threats to the observer group
(Samir and Soloman 2012).
During the peace negotiations, the League continued its show of strength. It
suspended the membership of Syria in November 2011 and transferred the seat to the
Syrian opposition. The League also imposed economic sanctions on Syria. Because of
Assad’s resistance to reform and the UN’s inability to agree on a peace plan for Syria, the
situation continued to deteriorate, as Russia and Iran supplied the Syrian regime with
military hardware, while Saudi Arabia and other GCC states supported the Syrian
opposition. The proxy war in Syria has split the LAS. Within the LAS, support of the
Assad regime is led by Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon; and support of the Syrian opposition
is led by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (Schulz 2015, 212-213).
Post Arab Spring: GCC Role in Bahrain
In response to the popular uprisings in Bahrain, February 14-19, 2011, which
called for a transition to a constitutional monarchy and created opposition forces, the
GCC took two very unusual and forceful steps against what they perceived as threats to
their sovereignty and unity. First, it displayed an aggressive use of its public rhetoric to
condemn Iran, which supported domestic opposition groups and Hezbollah within
Bahrain. Second, in response to a failed action by Bahraini security forces to quell an
uprising in Manama on March 13, the GCC sent 1,000 Saudi troops of the joint Peninsula
Shield Force from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain to support the ruling al-Khalifa family. This
force augmented 500 police officers from UAE and a small number of security forces
from Qatar (Pinto 2014, 168).
36
Post Arab Spring: GCC Role in Yemen
The uprisings in Yemen beginning in January 2011 and the escalation of force by
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) quickly triggered the possibility of a full-
scale civil war and threatened to spread instability to other Gulf countries. By November
2011, Saudi Arabia led GCC efforts and forcefully brokered a deal with the Yemeni
government, which was approved by the LAS. The deal led to the uncontested
resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, along with his guaranteed immunity. The
ensuing stability in Yemen allowed Saudi Arabia to get on firmer footing after being
jolted by the string of 2010-2011 Arab uprisings, until the conflict escalated again in
Yemen in late March 2015 (Beck 2015, 201). Saudi Arabia then led a ten-coalition
response called Operation Determination Storm with nine Arab Nations and the United
States beginning on March 26 that consisted primarily of airstrikes against Shia rebels
known as Houthis and their allies. On April 21, operations shifted to Operation Restore
Hope, with the goals of facilitating a political solution, protecting civilians, enabling
humanitarian assistance and international cooperation, and conducting anti-terrorism
operations (SUSRIS 2015).
Post Arab Spring: Possible Expansion of GCC Membership
As early as 2000, the idea of extending GCC membership beyond the six member
states to Jordan and Morocco first developed. The idea gained traction again in May 2011
and in April 2014 (Beck 2015, 201). Collaboration between the Gulf States and the two
monarchies of Jordan and Morocco have increased since 2011, and the increased public
debate on the possible expansion shows the GCC wants to become a more influential sub-
regional force in the Middle East.
37
Compared to the conditions which led to GCC creation in 1981, there are four
striking similarities affecting current considerations for GCC expansion (Al Tamamy
2015). First, the decline of Egypt has removed its current and potential contributions to
regional stability. Second, Iran’s renewed involvement in the region and expansionist
actions threaten the Gulf States and their Sunni allies, with the added concern of Iran
being much closer to being a nuclear power and the ensuing regional nuclear arms race.
Third, outside of diplomatic efforts, the League of Arab States has been ineffective in
direct contribution to regional security. Fourth, regional confidence in the ability of the
United States to contribute to regional stability is on the decline after the Iraq and
Afghanistan disengagement, as it was after the Vietnam disengagement.
With the increasing hegemonic influence of Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent
Qatar, the GCC is better-positioned to be the premier regional organization in the Middle
East. The GCC’s present focus is to quell domestic uprisings within the borders of its
members and adjacent countries and to counter increasing Iranian and Russian activities
in the region. Although the membership of the GCC has not formally expanded beyond
its original six members, Yemen and Iraq have a quasi-observer status and benefit from
inclusion in committees associated with culture, health, and sports.
Other Regional Organizations and Regional Cooperation Agreements
In addition to the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council, there
are other regional organizations and regional cooperative arrangements in the Middle
East. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is a transregional organization,
formed in 1972, second in size only to the United Nations, representing 57 members,
including all 22 LAS members, promoting Islamic solidarity and social, cultural,
38
scientific, economic, and political cooperation (Lansford 2015, 1742). Although the
organization has international peace and security as part of its mandate, the OIC acts
more as an Islamic caucus within and among other international and regional bodies
using its summits to issue supporting or opposing declarations of international and
regional issues. Recent declarations have supported eliminating weapons of mass
destruction, Iran-IAEA nuclear negotiations, establishing a no-fly zone in Libya, and
resolution of the civil war in Syria, while condemning acts of terrorism and the ISIS
attacks in Syria and Iraq. The OIC has consistently supported the recognition of Palestine
and an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in 2014 it established a ministerial
contact group to mobilize OIC assistance and support to the Palestinians in efforts to
negotiate a peace settlement (Lansford 2015, 1742-1744).
There are two noteworthy transregional organizations in the Middle East. The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional
security organization in the world, having 57 members from Europe, Central Asia and
North America. Turkey is the only member in the Middle East (OSCE 2015a). Of the
eleven partners for cooperation recognized by the OSCE, three are from the Middle
East—Egypt, Israel, and Jordan—and three are from the Southern Mediterranean—
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia (OSCE 2015b). The twelve-member Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has six members that are in the Middle East—
Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait—and two members that are in North
Africa—Libya and Algeria (OPEC 2015).
Regional trade agreements and regional economic cooperation forums exist in the
Middle East. Unfortunately, they have been ineffective in producing any notable
39
economic and trade advantages and have not contributed to significant institution-
building. The five-member Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria,
Libya, and Mauritania formed in 1989, and the four-member Agadir Agreement between
Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia formed in 2004 were established to facilitate
economic integration and decrease trade barriers, but despite repeated conferences and
rhetoric, they have shown meager results (Abdmoulah 2011, 39).
Figure 3: Regional Trade Agreements in MENA (Arab-EU Business Facilitation Network 2015, 22).
Note: Modified by author; Syria is suspended from the LAS and OIC
The larger Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement (PAFTA), sometimes referred to as
the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), is an 18-member economic bloc. When
created in 1997, the goal was to phase in tariff reductions by 2005 and compete with
other regional economic orders. Today, only partial implementation has been realized,
40
with no noticeable increase in trade benefits. Reasons for failure of a free trade area
include high transportation costs, violent conflicts, inefficient and corrupt public
economic sectors, and external trade agreements with economic powers such as the U.S.
and the EU (Youngs 2012, 26-27).
Within its bilateral European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and multilateral Union
for the Mediterranean (UfM), the EU works with is Mediterranean neighbors to promote
economic integration and democratic reform, including financial support and increased
access to EU markets. These neighbors include Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine,
Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Turkey (European Union 2015a; European Union 2015b).
Although still in early development, these relationships offer a method to foster increased
institution-building in the region towards improving prosperity, security, and stability.
41
CHAPTER 6
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL SECURITY
STRUCTURE AND UNITED STATES POLICY
Some regions of the world have been more successful attaining and maintaining
stability than other regions. However, the mere presence of established regional
organizations does not always result in a stable region. Europe has a strong regional
institutional system and a high level of stability. Africa has well-developed regional
institutions but suffers from a high level of instability. The Middle East has a weak
regional institutional system and a high level of instability. Clearly, there is no one-size-
fits-all approach to a regional institutional system that can deliver peace and security to a
particular region; security regimes must be tailored to each region and sub-region.
The future of peace and security in the Middle East depends on sub-regional
organizations and sub-regional cooperation. An effective region-wide security
mechanism is not in place, and a regional, comprehensive security regime is a bridge too
far. Sub-regional orders are where international action really takes place to address
regional security problems, such as resolving conflict, delivering humanitarian assistance,
and preventing human rights violations. Sub-regional orders, whether formal, informal, or
ad-hoc, can bring together the legality for action of the United Nations and the legitimacy
for action of region-wide authoritative structures. They can also facilitate action and
intervention by states and non-state actors and overcome collective action problems.
Although sub-regional organizations and sub-regional cooperation are
underdeveloped in the Middle East, sub-regional approaches to security problems have
shown some promise since the Arab Spring. Actions by the GCC, when combined with
diplomacy by the LAS, have been somewhat effective. Regional economic cooperation
42
also shows some promise. Sub-regional cooperation mechanisms and cooperative forums,
where the primary drivers to cooperation exist, should be the focus of diplomatic and
capacity-building efforts to further develop sub-regional security institutions in the
Middle East. As part of the next iteration towards peace and security in the Middle East,
regional and international states and actors should incorporate three basic lines of effort
towards development of a regional security regime: increase the capability and capacity
of sub-regional organizations and agreements; partner external hegemonic orders with
regional hegemonic orders; and move aggressively to solve the Middle East Peace
Process regarding the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.
Develop More Robust Sub-regional Organizations and Institutions
At the core of a regional security regime is the engine for action: sub-regional
organizations. Individual states and actors do not have the capacity to resolve regional
conflict, and a region-wide approach suffers from cooperative inaction. Although
individual states and regional organizations are important, sub-regional orders and
institutions will have the most impact on regional peace and security. A number of steps
should be taken at the sub-regional level.
First, the GCC should be immediately expanded to include Jordan and Morocco.
Although the GCC will unlikely give full membership to additional states, the first
iteration would be to formalize an institutional partnership between the GCC and Jordan
and Morocco since they would be the easiest fit with the Gulf monarchies. The second
iteration would be to formalize institutional partnerships with Egypt, Lebanon, and
Turkey. The third iteration could include Israel. At some point, the GCC would have
options to further develop sub-regional organizations such as extending full membership
43
beyond the current six GCC members or spinning off a second sub-regional organization,
such as Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and Israel to make it easier to solve sub-
regional and micro-regional problems. In this case, the GCC could act as a sponsor.
Second, existing regional economic agreements should become further
institutionalized, adding peace and security interests to their current mandates. For
example, the four-member Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) could become an economic and
security agreement, and additional members could be added such as Mauritania and
Algeria to cover the North Africa region. Libya, with its current instability, would be
difficult to add as a full member unless global powers such as the U.S. and EU get
involved with facilitation efforts. Another example would be to form a sub-regional
organization with the six southern Mediterranean members of the OSCE—Algeria,
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Overlap of members within multiple sub-
regional organizations should not be avoided because of the unique nature of the region
and the advantages of interdependence. In this case, the OSCE and EU could act as
sponsors, incorporating EU efforts into its existing European Neighborhood Policy.
External Hegemonic Orders Must Partner with a Regional Hegemonic Orders
A regional hegemonic order, instead of a single hegemonic power, could provide
the impetus for regional action. When partnered with an external hegemonic order, the
combination could be a very powerful driver for action. History shows that the Middle
East will not accept a sole hegemon, whether from inside or outside the region. Thus, a
hybrid approach is necessary. An example of a regional hegemonic order could be the
four states of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel working together. An example of
an external order with regional ties could either be the existing Quartet of the UN, U.S.,
44
EU, and Russia or a derivation of the P5+1 states which negotiated the Iran nuclear
deal—U.S., UK, France, China, Russia, and Germany. The external hegemonic order
would support the regional hegemonic body and let it lead the Middle East security order.
The challenge to this security regime would be to identify common threats. The
threat of ISIS could be used as the primary unifying threat to the region. After all, ISIS
poses direct threats to individual regime stability. The side-effects of the conflict in Iraq
and Syria could be handled first, such as refugee flows, humanitarian interventions,
establishing safe havens, and the responsibility to protect (R2P). Directly addressing the
threat of ISIS would need to immediately follow, and the U.S.-led global coalition to
counter ISIS could be transferred to the partnered hegemonic order. This may seem a tall
order, and it is, but getting two hegemonic orders together to solve regional problems
would be a big step in the right direction. Diplomatic efforts of world powers, especially
the EU, U.S., and Russia would be critical.
Move the Middle East Peace Process Forward: Solve the Israeli-Palestinian Problem
Because the Arab-Israeli conflict is the greatest barrier to regional cooperation,
the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) needs to be aggressively pursued. Resolution of
this issue can no longer be put off, even with the more immediate threat posed by ISIS
and other regional security threats. The United Nations has renewed efforts in mid-2015
toward resolution, and a global hegemonic order, such as the Quartet or P5+1, must come
together to solve this enduring problem. An aggressive approach to resolving the Israeli-
Palestinian dispute must be a shared process between external and regional hegemonic
orders and regional organizations. Without a solution that targets the enduring Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, regional security in the Middle East will not improve.
45
U.S. Policy Recommendations
As the United States disengages from the region and attempts to focus more on
the Asia-Pacific region, a storm of complex instability is quickly forming at an
accelerated pace which could overwhelm existing regional states. Major regional threats
are synchronizing: ISIS expansion; civil wars in Syria, Iraq and Yemen; massive refugee
flows into Europe; a rising Russia; an invigorated Iran; and an escalating conventional
and nuclear arms race. The region is on the verge of a third Palestinian intifada and a
second Arab Spring.
The United States must rebalance its approach to the Middle East by emphasizing
international relations and capacity building efforts at the sub-regional level for long-term
benefits. First, the United States must be a regional partner instead of a regional leader.
Recalibrating its smart power approach must include being part of an external multi-polar
hegemonic order which engages with an internal regional multi-polar hegemonic order.
Second, the United should act as lead facilitator by putting together a small international
contact team and aggressively pushing the Middle East Peace Process forward. Third, the
United States must take action to increase the capacity of sub-regional institutions and
arrangements in the Middle East by facilitating bilateral, multilateral, and international
institutional mechanisms. Fourth, and most importantly, the United States must re-define
its core interests in the region based on security pragmatism, so that its strategy can be
recalibrated to better apply smart power by using smart leadership.
46
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Copy of Davey, Wayne_Thesis Deposit Copy_SCAP II_2015 Dec

  • 1. THE COLLEGE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY Student Name: Commander Wayne Davey, United States of America South and Central Asia Program Class of 2015 Thesis Title: Sub-regional Organizations: Next Drivers of a Security Regime in the Middle East? Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies
  • 2. DISCLAIMER THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.
  • 3. ABSTRACT In a world of complex interdependence, wicked problems, and seemingly insurmountable challenges, the United States can no longer go it alone, nor can it completely disengage from the Middle East. Although a region-wide security regime is unlikely in the near future, sub-regional organizations have shown promise in addressing some regional security issues in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Sub-regional organizations can be agents of action, bridging the gap between regional actors and regional organizations, and merging legitimacy of action with the legality of the United Nations Security Council. The regional actions of the United States, as an external hegemon, have directly contributed to the underdevelopment of regional institutions and mechanisms, resulting in an incapacity to address regional security problems. As part of its emerging strategy in the Middle East, the United States must exercise smart leadership in it application of smart power to facilitate and support: capacity-building efforts of sub- regional organizations and institutions; partnerships between global hegemonic orders and regional hegemonic orders; and advancement of the Middle East Peace Process.
  • 4. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................................... i CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW........................................................................................ 6 CHAPTER 3: REASONS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION ................................................. 14 CHAPTER 4: BARRIERS TO REGIONAL COOPERATION................................................... 22 CHAPTER 5: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST................................ 29 CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE AND UNITED STATES POLICY ...................................................................... 41 BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................................................................................... 46 GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................................. 55
  • 5. 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Leadership is influence. That’s it. Nothing more; nothing less. ‒ John C. Maxwell Definition of the Problem “Leading from behind” is the unfortunate description of the regional strategy of the United States in the Middle East. Borrowed from a series of quotes in the 1994 autobiography of Nelson Mandela, New Yorker journalist Ryan Lizza put the phrase into foreign policy discussion in early 2011 (Lizza 2011b). Although it is an awful foreign policy slogan, some argue the approach has merit (Gelb 2013). Others argue that the approach causes instability in the region and puts the security interests of the U.S. at risk (Krauthammer 2011; Cook 2015, 1; Dueck 2015, 7). Dr. Barry Posen, author and professor of political science at MIT, argues that the U.S. has pursued a grand strategy of “Liberal Hegemony” over the past two decades, but needs to pursue a new grand strategy of “Restraint” (Posen 2014, xi). How will the United States, under its new and evolving regional strategy in the Middle East, address peace and security challenges? Because of the seemingly insurmountable barriers to implement a region-wide security regime and the advantages of operating at the sub-regional level, the key to peace and security is a regional approach driven by sub-regional organizations and sub-regional orders. Under its emerging engagement policy in the Middle East, the United States should focus more on sub-regional organizations, by facilitating capacity-building efforts of sub-regional organizations and institutions, partnerships between global hegemonic orders and regional hegemonic orders, and advancement of the Middle East Peace Process.
  • 6. 2 In the Middle East, a complex storm of wicked problems is forming at an accelerated pace, bringing together a convergence of old, new, and emerging threats. Past and future problems are seemingly being pulled into the vortex of current problems and overwhelming state and regional systems. Problems emanating from the Middle East are rapidly spilling into nearby regions: failing states cannot provide basic services to their inhabitants; ISIS is holding land in two countries, directly operating in seven other countries, and has affiliates operating in four more countries (Gambhir 2015); refugee populations are crossing into Europe and other regions not seen since World War II; human suffering is expanding; rapidly decreasing oil revenues are destroying economic systems; and a new nuclear and conventional arms race is emerging. A new wave of popular uprisings is on the cusp of explosion in countries and territories such as Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and Greece. Regional states, non-state actors, extra-regional states, and multinational organizations will be forced to better address security issues by changing the model of international cooperation. Since the phenomenon of the Arab Spring began in December 2010, regional and sub-regional organizations in the Middle East have undertaken activities which show promise for a future of increased regional cooperation to solve present and emerging problems. As the predominant external hegemon, the United States, disengages from the region and state and non-state actors rush in to take advantage of ungoverned and alternatively governed spaces, an opportunity has emerged for sub-regional organizations to become central and take the next steps toward regional peace and security. The international community, the United Nations, and regional institutions must support the action of sub-regional organizations and cooperative efforts which contribute to the
  • 7. 3 development of sub-regional institution-building that enables regional governance and regional peace and security. Sub-regional solutions for regional problems should be the new focus for conflict management in the Middle East. Among scholars, practitioners, and policy officials, there is a growing discussion on the importance of regions and regionalism in international politics (Lake and Morgan 1997, 5; Buzan and Wæver 2003, 10; Harders and Legrenzi 2008, 1; Legrenzi 2011, 149). After the Cold War, regional organizations have become more relevant and more instrumental in affecting peace and security (Aris and Wenger 2014, 1). Intervening actors and organizations which lack ties to states and regions in which they operate are viewed as outsiders and lack legitimacy, even though they may have the ability and resources to assist nation-states solve problems. Regional organizations, and in particular regional security organizations, have been successful in Europe, the Americas, and Africa. Leading scholars have identified South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East as the regions having the lowest levels of institutionalization and regional integration in the world (Beck 2015, 191; Fawcett 2013c, 368; Wallensteen 2015, 18). Furthermore, “the Middle East is one of the least regionally integrated and most under-institutionalized world areas” (Beck 2015, 191). David Lake and Patrick Morgan, in their groundbreaking book advocating a regional lens for scholarly analysis and international diplomacy, declared “the world has now changed. The regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs (Lake and Morgan 1997, 6). Despite the calls for a new focus on regions and sub-regions to solve security issues, “there is little talk of Middle Eastern solutions to Middle Eastern problems” (Fawcett 2015b, 146).
  • 8. 4 Regions, Regionalization, and Regionalism The Middle East is one of the most socially interconnected, interdependent and complex regions. Yet, it is described as a “region without regionalism” (Aarts 1999, 911). Just what is a region? What is regionalization? And, what is regionalism? Like many terms, a region is a contested concept. Traditionally, a region is a spatial term grouping “territorial units in geographical proximity, constituting a spatially bound and contiguous area” (Börzel et al. 2012, 3). In thought and in practice, a region can be defined by other characteristics than adjoining territorial space which go beyond spatial bounds: political, economic, religious, socio-cultural, or qawm. Some dimensions may be more prominent and important than others. Regardless of the individual qualities of a region, it must exhibit a certain level of interdependence (Nye 1968, vii). A region can be inside, outside, or crossing nation-state boundaries. It may be defined differently by different peoples, or it may not exist at all, especially if the concept is not institutionalized within a particular social consciousness. Thus, regions are thought of as being socially constructed conceptions of community and society, and are contested concepts. According to Pinar Bilgin, the “Middle East” is a geopolitical-spatial term used by external actors to describe a part of the world with certain security and concerns and interests (Bilgin 2005, 12). Today, it most commonly refers to all Arab states, plus Turkey, Israel, and Iran (Monier 2014, 423), which this paper recognizes for simplicity of analysis. Some argue narrowing the term to exclude the Arab states west of Egypt, using the terms Middle East and North Africa (MENA) or Greater Middle East. Others argue the inclusion of the Muslim republics of Central Asia. Although this definition is problematic, the Middle East region has several common characteristics which can
  • 9. 5 describe overlapping sub-regions. Politically, it has high levels of authoritarianism and low levels of democratization; economically, it is dominated by rentier economies and low economic liberalization; culturally, it is predominantly Arab and Islamic. These sub- regions do not imply cohesion or uniform behavior (Fawcett 2013a, 4). Regionalization “refers broadly to processes (as opposed to a deliberate policy) encompassing an increase in regionally-based interaction and activity” (Fawcett 2013b, 191). It describes the degree of interconnectivity between elements, such as objects, systems, businesses, people and societies. Regionalization is akin to globalization with a regional scope. These processes include economic, societal, and security activities and interactions involving flows of objects, people, ideas, information, data, etc. crossing state, national, and societal boundaries and connecting regions. Regionalism (as opposed to regionalization), according to one of the foremost scholars on the topic, Dr. Louise Fawcett, professor of international relations at St. Catherine’s College (Oxford, UK), is a “policy-driven process in which states (and other actors) pursue common goals and policies in any given region” (Fawcett 2013b 191). It is viewed as a “state-led project based on intergovernmental negotiations and treaties” (Goltermann et al. 2012, 4). At the most basic end of the spectrum, it is the promotion of an awareness of a regional society; at the most developed end, it is manifested as a formal institution or organization. Regionalism is institutionalized regionalization with cooperative responses in which individual elements work together to avoid the minimalist effects of the prisoner’s dilemma and to maximize collective benefits. Although traditional thought has framed the concept around states, non-state actors operating within a state or between states have roles within regionalism (Fawcett 2013b, 191).
  • 10. 6 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW Concepts for a Middle East Regional Security Structure Based on the successes of regional peace and security institutions in Europe, Asia, and Africa, and the inability of the international community at large and individual states to address domestic and regional security threats, regional organizations and regional security arrangements are more commonly being viewed as the key to stability in the Middle East. In a review of the scholarly literature with regions as the level of analysis, a number of regional approaches to security have been proposed characterized by the level of governance at which peace and security measures are implemented, or stated another way, the level of governance at which action occurs. These approaches are based on the history of the region and the possibility for future success. The four most common regional security mechanisms or regimes are: institutionalized regional cooperation, institutionalized sub-regional cooperation, ad-hoc and informal cooperation, and a hegemon or hegemonic order which implements the security order. Derivations of these four basic regimes exist, including approaches with varying degrees of scope and importance of the issues to be solved. Regional Organizations Implement the Security Order One concept of a regional security order in the Middle East is one that is driven at the regional level by a regional organization and its supporting institutions (Dakhlallah 2012, 393; Dessouki 2015, 101). This institutional approach, shared and promoted by the United Nations, makes regional organizations and regional cooperation forums the drivers of peace and security. By connecting the international legality established by the
  • 11. 7 UN to the regional legitimacy of regional organizations, regional organizations have the potential to mobilize regional action to address peace and security problems (United Nations 2015). The League of Arab States (LAS), with 22 members, has been the recognized regional unifier of the Middle East and North Africa, but has defined the region based on an Arab identity, excluding the powerful non-Arab states of Israel, Iran, and Turkey, and other trans-regional actors. Other important regional organizations and cooperation agreements which have members in the Middle East include the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and the sub-regional Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In discourses of a region-wide approach to security, scholars are in agreement that the status quo will not work for the future, and a region- wide organization such as the LAS would have to evolve to be more effective. Although the LAS was known for much talk and not much action prior to 2011, the response of the LAS to the Arab Spring shows some promise for expanded action in the future. For the regional system to be effective, the LAS would have to make significant reforms, such as re-defining common threats that go beyond the traditional barriers to Arab solidarity, allowing for a greater role of inter-regional organizations within the LAS, developing institutions and sub-regional organizations within the LAS, and permitting small blocs of Arab states to organize and suppress internal domestic revolts that threaten to spill over into adjoining states (Dessouki 2015, 101). Additional reforms include the creation of an Arab Peace and Security Council modeled after the United Nations Security Council, and allowing a small group of strong Arab states to lead multilateral security intervention efforts across the region (Dakhlallah 2012, 412). Even
  • 12. 8 more comprehensive reforms have been suggested, including a departure from an Arab identity to a more inclusive and multinational identity that includes non-Arab states, and the transition to a regional union, with economic and military cooperation modeled after the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Dessouki 2015, 102-103). Sub-regional Organizations Implement the Regional Security Order According to Egyptian diplomats and authors Nabil Fahmy and Karim Haggag, “the history of the Middle East shows that successful conflict management and resolution processes are not dependent on region-wide frameworks” (Fahmy and Haggag 2014, 57). Because region-wide approaches to security in the Middle East have been plagued by collective inaction, sub-regional organizations and sub-regional cooperation have recently received major attention because of the ability to actually get things done (Aarts 1999, 921; Harders and Legrenzi 2008, 3; Legrenzi 2011, 150; Brock 2012, 2). The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is the best example of a formal, multifunctional sub-regional organization in the Middle East, although other sub-regional arrangements exist, such as the trade-focused Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Agadir Agreement, and the trans- regional Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (Ehteshami 2011, 175-179). Because of the inability to create a region-wide security order, some scholars suggest that a regional security order in the Middle East could be built around the sub- regional level of cooperation. One model of future cooperation is based on the GCC, which is built on a pragmatic approach to legitimacy instead of the pan-Arab consensus which restricts a larger regional organization (Harders and Legrenzi 2008, 3). More informal types of sub-regional cooperation, such as a union of states or an agreement
  • 13. 9 among state leaders, could be a sub-regional mechanism for action. Outside of a regional security focus, “new economic cooperation efforts like the Agadir Agreement indicate that sub-regional economic cooperation of smaller groups might be the future model of Arab regional cooperation” (Harders and Legrenzi 2008, 5). Over time, a regional economic cooperation model could be expanded to include conflict resolution and peace and security elements. Going one step further in a sub-regional cooperative model, some scholars argue that the key to success of a sub-regional order is dependent on a regional hegemon (Kamrava 2012, 103; Beck 2015, 193). In the case of the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia has acted as the regional hegemon within the GCC and the LAS, working with other regional organizations and other regional and global actors. In response to the Arab Spring uprisings, Saudi Arabia acted within the GCC to implement security measures, led the GCC within the greater LAS to legitimize GCC actions, and enabled the LAS to legalize actions within the United Nations. The weight of Saudi Arabia allowed the GCC to intervene in the Bahraini uprising, to manage the uprisings in Yemen, and launch an initiative to expand membership to Jordan and Morocco (Beck 2015, 200). The GCC has signaled for a number of years its desire to include Jordan and Morocco. Two scenarios could evolve from a GCC expansion: a stronger GCC which could supplant the LAS (Kamrava 2012, 100), or the beginnings of a second sub-regional organization outside the Gulf region which would be highly aligned with the GCC (Beck 2015, 200). These activities show that the combination of a regional hegemon within a sub-regional organization can produce notable peace and security outcomes in the Middle East.
  • 14. 10 Ad-Hoc Regional Cooperation Implements the Security Order Based on a very long history and the realistic expectations for cooperation in the future, a popular idea for a regional security mechanism in the Middle East is one that is informal, ad-hoc, and flexible (Kodmani 2011, 223; Jones 2011, 19; Müller 2014, 464) . In his analysis of the regional security space surrounding Afghanistan, Stephen Aris concludes that a comprehensive regional framework is not feasible, and “cooperation will instead continue to function most vibrantly within more informal and ad hoc smaller coalitions and fora” (Aris 2013, 209). Ad-hoc cooperation, compared to a regional or sub- regional institutional approach, offers advantages such as simplicity, speed of response, and tailored approaches towards specific security tasks (Müller 2014, 464). Another advantage of an informal approach to security is that it serves as a present baseline to address current security issues, which can incrementally evolve into a more structured security regime. Accepting the present ad-hoc nature of the security structure, the significant impediments to multilateral cooperation, and the low expectations for future change, several ad-hoc security models exist, which could advance the security regime toward a more cooperative mechanism. The first model is to further develop cooperative frameworks across the wider region based on economic collaboration with less controversial interstate trade, transportation, common markets, and energy exchanges (Aris 2013, 209). Examples include expanding the non-contiguous Agadir Agreement (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia), or forming counterbalancing micro-regional free trade agreements between the trio of Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, and the trio of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia (Gylfason, Martínez-Zarzoso, and Wijkman 2015, 261). The second
  • 15. 11 model is to emphasize Track II efforts with informal political arrangements and create specific sub-regional or micro-regional institutions on an as needed basis. One example would be the creation of a modest regional security center to service select security coordination efforts between a block of states (Jones 2011, 19). The third model is to involve an extra-region state, group of states, or hegemonic order to partner with a regional ad-hoc coalition. One example is the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which is a current partnership between the EU and states in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean to promote economic growth, political reform, and conflict resolution (Gylfason, Martínez-Zarzoso, and Wijkman 2015, 247). Regional or Extra-Regional Hegemonic Order Implements the Security Order In the absence of regional collective action, a hegemonic order such as the Middle East Quartet—the UN, U.S., EU, and Russia—could be the driver for collective action in the Middle East. Currently, the Quartet functions as a contact group operating in an informal diplomatic manner to facilitate coordination and mediation of certain regional issues (Müller 2015, 464). Another idea is for a regional hegemonic order of regional powers to lead regional cooperation, such as Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Because regional cooperation is unlikely without extra-regional support, a likely partnership would be one with the United States, the EU, or another rising world power. A more comprehensive partnership could combine key regional actors with key global actors, such as the 4-element bloc of the EU, U.S., Russia and China, the Quartet, the Quartet plus China, or the P5+1 members of the U.S., UK, France, China, Russia plus Germany (Harrison 2015, 16). Building on the recent diplomatic success of the P5+1 countries and the UN in negotiating a nuclear agreement with Iran, and the rising
  • 16. 12 instability in the Middle East, the United Nations, since July 2015, has pushed for advancing the Middle East Peace Process by the Middle East Quartet in combination with the Arab Peace Initiative (United Nations 2015). Closing the Gap: U.S. Policy and Regional Organizations in the Middle East In the most recent National Security Strategy, there is an emphasis on the leadership of the United States in the world to address security challenges. The mandate is to lead with purpose, with strength, by example, with capable partners, with all instruments of national power, and with a long-term perspective (The White House 2015, 2-5). The stated ways to increase cooperation with international institutions, including regional organizations, are to share burdens and uphold international norms (The White House 2015, 3). For conflict prevention within and among states, the United States is to “continue to bolster the capacity of the U.N. and regional organizations to help resolve disputes, build resilience to crisis and shocks, strengthen governance, end extreme poverty, and increase prosperity” (The White House 2015, 11). In a review of the literature regarding the activities of the United States toward increasing the capacity of regional organizations in the Middle East, there appears to be a large say-do gap. Even though there is a strategy which clearly involves institution-building of regional organizations, especially to resolve conflict, the United States clearly engages almost exclusively in bilateral and multilateral methods on a state-to-state level, with minimal involvement of regional organizations. The policies and actions of the United States toward regional organizations have been sorely lacking for nearly half of a century. Referring to the Johnson Administration’s “ad-hoc” and “neglecting” approach to regional organizations in the
  • 17. 13 1960s, “a number of critics…have echoed a more consistent policy of support for autonomous regional organizations without direct United States membership as a means to a structure of world order” (Nye 1969, 723). With the exception of NATO, the African Union (AU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the League of Arab States (LAS), “little attention is placed in Washington on the myriad of regional bodies that exist” (Kingah 2012, 5). Along with lackluster policies and activities between the United States and regional organizations in the Middle East, there is a lack of literature to advocate for increased engagement and capacity-building efforts which would improve the efforts of regional organizations to address regional security problems and resolve conflicts. This paper will attempt to close that literature gap.
  • 18. 14 CHAPTER 3 REASONS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION Overview of Middle East Insecurity The sources of insecurity in the Middle East have been traditionally identified using the main schools of theoretical thought—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—with the emerging perspective of regionalism, providing constructive additions to understanding the complex nature of the region, and contributing factors to domestic, regional, and global insecurity. Using regions as the level of analysis, vice global or national levels, different analytical perspectives are brought together to explain the complex insecurity of the region. The broad and lasting issues that affect peace and security in the Middle East region all contribute to the reasons for cooperation and non- cooperation. These issues are well-known and define the region: the Arab-Israeli conflict; the Shiite-Sunni divide; Saudi Arabia and Iran contesting to be the voice of Islam; and the large disparities among groups of people regarding power, influence, human capital, and resources. Conflict and cooperation are shaped by the historical and overarching forces of conflict within the Middle East. These forces include: the Westphalian borders drawn from the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 which are at odds with how the regional nations view their own community and are the cause of border clashes; regional fragmentation of weak states, artificial states, and non-state groups which are incongruent with the supra- state identities of Arabism and Islam, causing state legitimacy deficits; the marginalization of minority groups, namely the Palestinians and Kurds who struggle for recognition and statehood; and the hyper-sensitivity of states, such as Israel and Iraq, to
  • 19. 15 maintain their own security by launching several wars with their neighbors. Outside intervention by extra-regional powers and hegemons have substantially compounded the sources of instability, caused further divisions between regional states, eroded state sovereignty, and hindered regional cooperation. Outside hegemons, therefore, have further caused the instability in the region that they tried to reduce in the first place by accelerating the security dilemma (Hinnebusch 2014, 122-123). The United Nations and Regional Organizations During formation of the United Nations in 1945, the founders clearly had a concept for the relationship between the UN and regional arrangements and an expectation of the role of regional organizations towards peace and security. In fact, the League of Arab States (LAS) was founded six months prior to the UN, and in light of the potential for a regional organization contributing to peace in the Middle East, Article VIII of the UN charter was established to recognize the connection between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and regional arrangements and agencies, and the contributions of regional organizations towards international peace and security. The charter explicitly designated the UNSC with the responsibility of international peace and security, giving it power to authorize and enforce regional actions contributing to peace and security. Recognizing its own limits and the advantages of regional bodies, the UN had a concept that “regional agencies” would be central to implementing peace and security measures within the borders of established states, between states, and among regions. In 2006, the United Nations recognized the increasing need for regional organizations and issued a report from the Secretary-General that described the framework of a regional-global security partnership concept based on the legality of the
  • 20. 16 United Nations and the legitimacy of regional organizations, which could contribute to international peace and security (Söderbaum and Tavares 2011, 6). Although the UN did not specifically define a regional or sub-regional organizations, it did declare that “regions” were difficult to describe and had many different characteristics. The report made clear that sub-regional organizations were an extension of regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In addition, the report defined seven functions of regional and sub-regional organizations which could contribute to international peace and security: conflict prevention; peacemaking; peacekeeping; peacebuilding; disarmament and non-proliferation; protection of civilians; and natural disaster relief. The updated 2006 concept of regional arrangements with the UN was based on a resolution issued in 2005 which placed importance on regional and sub-regional organizations that could enter into standby arrangements with the UN and be rapidly deployable for specific UN- mandated missions, including counter-terrorism, countering the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons, and assisting in capacity-building efforts (United Nations 2006, 1-14). The relationship between the UN and regional institutions is important because it creates the legality-legitimacy nexus. The UN and UNSC, when authorizing intervention in a region or within a state’s borders, bring international legality for action. Regional and sub-regional institutions and orders bring regional and local legitimacy for action. Reasons for Regional Cooperation and Regional Organizations Nation-states cooperate within bilateral, multilateral, and international institutional mechanisms, such as informal agreements, coalitions, formal alliances, and treaties with neighboring and distant states, regional organizations, and international organizations for many reasons. With respect to regional cooperation, and more broadly international
  • 21. 17 relations, there is no one theory adequate to understand, analyze, and explain why states and other important actors cooperate. There are many reasons for regional cooperation. Some reasons are broad, while other reasons are very specific. Some reasons are characterized as being more important, while other reasons are viewed as less important. Regionalism and Realism: Power, Peace, and Security Generally-speaking from a realist perspective, states conduct activities in their own self-interest to maximize their power and security. They cooperate to enhance their strength, influence, and relative position vis-à-vis other states and actors. Strong states, including hegemons, integrate into regional institutions and systems to project their power and influence (Fawcett 2015b, 133), while weaker states integrate to maximize their collective strengths and to balance an opposing power. On the domestic or sub- national level, regimes and groups seek to balance an opposing power or threat, originating both from inside and outside its borders. On the regional level, regimes and transnational groups seek to balance an opposing power or threat, both from inside and outside the region. States enter into regional cooperation to reduce instability at the domestic, regional, and international levels. Because regional organizations exist at the crossroads of the domestic and international realms, they are regarded as the gateway to address insecurity and resolve conflict (Fawcett 2013b, 186-187). Crossing the political and economic stratifications of regional cooperation, collective defense and collective security are primary reasons for states to enter into regional arrangements. In collective defense, states have a common perception of a threat, and cooperate to prepare for, and respond to, a threat emanating from an outside state or group of states. Such an action is permitted under provisions of the United
  • 22. 18 Nations Charter, but must be approved by the United Nations Security Council. Collective security is a much broader concept, and is undefined by the UN. It refers to “collective action in response to a collectively identified threat” (Orakhelashvili 2011, 4), from both external states and internal member-states. Collective security involves formal arrangements between states, usually via treaties, which are binding and delineate certain rights and responsibilities of the signatories. Collective defense and collective security arrangements are similar, involving “long-term relationships among the members, formal decision-making structures, and an expectation that action under the arrangement could be activated by a variety of threats” (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2014, 4). Another reason for regional cooperation is collective conflict management (CCM), which is different from, but related to, collective defense and collective security. It involves four main elements: ending or reducing violent conflict; mediating or assisting in a negotiation process; helping to resolve social, economic, or political issues resulting from the conflict; and providing monitoring services, guarantees, or other measures to sustain a long-term peace settlement (Croker, Hamson, and Aall 2014, 4). Examples of CCM include intervening in a state-on-state war, a civil war within the borders of a state, cross-border insurgencies, and border disputes. The UN often refers to peacekeeping, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding as elements of conflict management. This regional cooperative action is recognized by the UN under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter as a just cause for a regional organization or a regional actor to intervene to resolve disputes affecting international peace and security. Regional organizations are becoming more involved in CCM because of an increase in the cases of regional conflict, a declining interest by the world’s great powers to
  • 23. 19 intervene, and the limitations of an overstretched and under-resourced UN (Croker, Hamson, and Aall 2014, 4). The UN and regional actors need regional organizations. Regionalism: Political and Economic The factors which drive regionalism, and hence the formation and transformation of regional organizations, can be characterized as falling into two main groupings: political factors and economic factors (Karns and Mingst 2010, 148; Kirchner and Dominguez 2014, 170; Fawcett 2015a, 44). Political factors driving regionalism, and the actions of regional organizations, include power dynamics, identity and ideology, internal and external threats, domestic politics, and leadership (Karns and Mingst 2010, 148-150). Power dynamics are at play when hegemonic or rising regional or global powers attempt to influence regional orders and create a perceived imbalance. The rise of Egypt and Israel in the Middle East has been contested many times, both by regional powers and external powers. External hegemons, namely the United States, have also been resisted. Today, as the United States withdraws from the region, a rising Iran, Russia, and China are being resisted in the Middle East, not only by states, but by non-state actors as well. The power vacuum left by the withdrawal of external powers and the weakening of regional states, has allowed ISIS to establish space to operate. Identity and shared perceptions of what defines a region, and a common ideology, contribute to regional cooperation and the formation of a regional organization. The League of Arab States was formed around the Arab linguistic-cultural identity; the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is formed around the Islamic religious-cultural identity; NATO and the EU are based on a liberal and democratic ideology; the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU) formed based on non-
  • 24. 20 interference and anti-colonialism. Shared threats are powerful drivers of organizations. NATO formed to halt Soviet aggression and the expansion of communism; the GCC formed because of the external threats of Iran and Iraq, and the internal threats of domestic economic crisis. Similar domestic politics, in the form of regime types and economic governance, make agreements among members of a regional organization easier to attain. All members of the EU are democracies and all members of the GCC are authoritarian, making cooperation easier. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), especially since the 1990s, has had difficulty in reaching agreements because of the wide variation of political systems between its members. Leadership, in the form of aggressive leaders and regional powers, provides the impetus to form collective policies and collective actions. The United States has consistently exercised leadership in NATO and Organization of American States (OAS), while Japan and Australia have led efforts in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Economic factors at the local/domestic, regional, and global levels drive cooperation between states, regionalism, and the activities of regional organizations. A regional marketplace connects the global market to domestic markets, as well as adjacent regional markets. The economic health of a nation-state, especially a small and relatively weak state, depends on the regional economy. Larger, more developed states depend on both regional and global markets for their economic health. Economic cooperation allows consumers and producers to benefit from economies of scale, reduced transaction costs and trade barriers, and more efficient movement of goods and labor. The cooperative economy attracts foreign direct investment and allows a state to have more economic
  • 25. 21 power within international markets and more political power within international institutions (Börzel 2012, 258). Economic cooperation facilitates movement of people and goods across state borders, the development of regional infrastructure, and connections to the global marketplace. Some regional organizations, such as the EU, Mecrosur in South America, and members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), prefer a “closed regionalism” which grants trade advantages to its members. Other states and regional organizations, especially in Asia, practice an “open regionalism” to take advantage of the benefits with trading partners which are not part of their region (Karns and Mingst 2010, 151-152). The Balance Sheet: Primary Reasons for Regional Organizations in the Middle East Nowhere in the world is the security dilemma amongst a state of anarchy more pronounced than the Middle East. Although the constructivist concept of cooperation leading to a higher level of security is understood at the local level, the realist concept of a fight for power prevails at the regional and international level. From a review of the scholarly literature, the three main reasons in rank order for regional cooperation and regional organizations emerge in the Middle East: first, protecting a state’s regime from internal threats; second, protecting a state’s regime from external threats; and third, maintaining a state’s perceived borders. These reasons for regional cooperation in the Middle East are hyper-inflated compared to other regions of the world. The focus of security is on the regime and ruling elites, which comes at the expense of the well-being of the general population. The domestic security dilemma and the regional security dilemma combine to create large disparities in power, resources, and the public goods resulting in a political security mechanism in which nobody wins.
  • 26. 22 CHAPTER 4 BARRIERS TO REGIONAL COOPERATION The Security Dilemma, Self-determination, and Non-intervention Barriers to international cooperation have distinct regional flavors, while at the same time, are affected by global, transnational, and domestic causal factors. In a very broad sense, the main challenges to the formation, existence, and effectiveness of regional organizations in addressing security threats in every region of the world are the principles of self-determination and non-intervention established by the Westphalian state system, which cause a reluctance of member states to cooperate and cross boundaries both in a physical and functional sense. These international normative principles, combined with the minimalist outcome of the combined security and prisoner’s dilemmas, cause collective action problems and diminish the ability for regional organizations to collectively and effectively deal with security threats. Regional organizations which have a declared emphasis on security and collective defense, are impeded by the barriers to regional cooperation, and tend to issue declarations that are out of balance with the actions taken to support collective security (Kirchner and Dominguez 2014, 175-176). The disparity between the overuse of rhetoric by regional organizations and member states, and the under-delivery of public goods, is often called the “say-do gap.” The disconnect between what is said and what is delivered causes trust and legitimacy problems between governing regimes and the governed populations, as well as between states. In the Middle East, the “say-do gap” looms large. The principles of self-determination and non-intervention as barriers to regional cooperation are especially pronounced in the Middle East, with its lengthy historical
  • 27. 23 legacy of maintaining the status quo in the interest of stability in three areas: regime survival, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty (Snetkov and Aris 2013, 10). However, in recent times, states have permitted exceptions to the principle of non- interference and have allowed outside intervention. From a collective action perspective, member states of regional organizations have established just cause to intervene inside the boundaries of another state, under the auspices of the responsibility to protect (R2P) within the UN system (Paris 2014, 569), and the newly-developed concept of the responsibility while protecting (RwP) introduced by Brazil in 2011 (Powers 2015, 5). Barriers to regional cooperation can be understood from different perspectives, considering different referent objects (state, region, non-state actors). From a realism- realist perspective framed on the self-interested desire for power and the distrust of other actors, the role of regional organizations is greatly hindered by power plays and competition between existing and rising regional hegemons, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt; between global hegemons, such as the United States, Russia, and China, for regional penetration; and between regional hegemons and global penetrators which all aspire to be major players in the region. Furthermore, the persistence of identity markers, such as Islam, religious sects, the concept of pan-Arabism or “Arabness,” or other ethno- linguistic identifiers serve to preserve social cohesion at the expense of improving security and reducing common threats (Aris and Wenger 2014, 249). Hegemons, Identity, and Threat Perceptions Across the scholarly literature, the most identified barriers to regional cooperation in the Middle East are competition between hegemonic states, overlapping and contested socio-cultural identities, and differing threat perceptions. One of the most identified
  • 28. 24 barriers to regional cooperation, and reasons for instability in the Middle East, is the influence of a hegemon in the region, and the counter-response by regional actors to diminish the influence of the hegemon (Hinnebusch 2003, 239; Harders and Legrenzi 2008, 1; Snetkov and Aris 2013, 271; Fawcett 2013b, 200; Aris and Wenger 2014, 249). After the Cold War, the Middle East was deeply penetrated by external powers, mainly via two wars in Iraq and the War on Terror. Unable to compete with overwhelming hard power, many states chose to bandwagon with the U.S. hegemon, using soft power approaches to provide some counterbalance. This era of instability shows that an external hegemon with an overbalance of hard power is disruptive to regional security and inhibits the development of regional security institutions (Hinnebusch 2013, 87). A hegemon can come from two separate regions. A hegemon from inside the region, such as Egypt, Iraq, or Iran, exerts influence, is opposed by other regional powers, and is forced back into a quasi-hegemonic or middle-power role. A hegemon from outside the region, such as the U.S. or a Western-aligned security order, further intensifies the regional power-balancing effects. The hegemonic influence from outside the region is more disruptive than an internal hegemon, as some regional powers will align with the external hegemon, in order to maintain state-regime integrity, border controls, and prestige vis-à-vis other regional states and their regimes. When more than one external hegemon enters the region, regimes will either align with one particular external power, or will hedge their bets by aligning with both in some fashion that maximizes regime integrity. Many states in the region, as a matter of foreign policy, will leverage interdependence with more than one external power. For example, wealthy states in the Gulf region will purchase military equipment and training from a number of
  • 29. 25 states across the globe who act as peer competitors, thereby ensuring the survival of the regime and the well-being of its political and economic system. The Middle East has been characterized by many scholars as a “uniquely penetrated region” (Hinnebusch 2013, 78), partly because of the failure of regional rival powers to achieve any lasting hegemony, the actions of regional powers to prevent the rise of any single regional power, and the ability of regional powers to entice external powers into the region as an allied force. External hegemons, assisted by other extra- regional powers, have penetrated into the region for a number of reasons, including preventing the rise of regional hegemons, securing control over energy resources, and conducting a war on terrorism (Hinnebusch 2013, 78). The effect of the external hegemon in the region over time has been to prohibit the development of regional institutions and regional cooperation in the Middle East, causing the very instability in the long-term that the hegemon was actually trying to limit in the short-term. Transnational and trans-regional identities which shape political, societal, and individual contexts also create barriers to regional cooperation. Often referred to as “social consciousness” (Monier 2014, 430), a region goes beyond the spatial concept and into other regional identifiers such as language, culture, religion, ethnicity, and socio- economic groupings. Terms such as the Middle East, the West, Arab, and Islamic are highly contested, have many segmented divisions, are overlapping, and are often opposing. Some states compete regarding their rights to be the voice of a group of people, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, which compete to be the voice of Islam. These groupings also have the power to exclude other groups of people. Turkey, Iran, and Israel are not considered Arab, yet they are important powers in the Middle East region. Sunni and Shia
  • 30. 26 sects compete for legitimacy and to define what it means to be Islamic. All these intertwined, complementing, and opposing regional groupings face different threats, and they have different priorities regarding those threats. A regional consciousness shapes identification of threats, enemies, and allies. Stated another way, who you think you are defines who you think your friends and enemies are, and what your threats are. In a circular fashion, the regional consciousness shapes the regional order, and the regional order continuously attempts to shape the regional consciousness. Without one dominating regional consciousness, many regional orders create a fragmented social structure and state system, which then become barriers to regional cooperation. Even when trying to solve major international problems, there is disagreement on defining the threat and hence, developing solutions that lead to an improved security order. The security dilemma further spirals out of control. The third major barrier to regional cooperation in the Middle East is differing threat perceptions, which are deeply rooted in the history of conflict. Across the region, there is a lack of agreement on the major threats to security and how those threats are prioritized, all leading to collective inaction and exacerbation of the security dilemma (Hinnebusch 2014, 122-124; Kodmani 2011, 228). On the domestic level, state regimes perceive security threats from within their own borders and citizenry as the primary threat to regime existence. Citizens of a state may view the primary threat to its people to be the regime itself (i.e. Syria) or other sub-national or trans-national groups, resulting in regional and domestic sectarian conflict or an inability of a state to provide basic governance and provision of collective goods, such as food, water, electricity, rule of law, and employment. To counter this threat, regimes rely heavily on domestic intelligence
  • 31. 27 services and military actions to protect the ruling regime, creating a securitized approach to internal security. Thus, there is disagreement between the government of a state and the citizens of the state on the threats to security within the state’s borders, which has been called the “state-society gap” (Kodmani 2011, 223). State regimes perceive transnational and cross-border subversion from regional rivals—state and non-state actors—as the secondary threat to regime existence. To counter such threats, regimes will obtain protection from one or more external powers from outside the region, bandwagon with one or more regional power, or balance against the threat itself, usually through subversion tactics and non-military counter-methods. Regional consciousness, or how individual people and groups of people view their identity, comes into play when attempting collective action and identifying threats. Nothing embodies the character of the Middle East region and the barriers to regional cooperation more than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Born from the Balfour Declaration and the mandate for Palestine in 1917, through the declaration of Israel as a state in 1948 and the wars of conflict, to the current regional and global complexities of insecurity today, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict displays how the aforementioned main barriers to regional cooperation in the Middle East come together and play out. Although intense Israeli-Arab fault lines exist, the most prominent fault lines are within Arab-Arab alignments. Since the 1950s, Arab states have chosen alignment and non-alignment strategies in the combined context of the Arab-Palestinian divide and the influence of extra-regional and hegemonic actors. (Smith 2013, 246). Of the three prominent organizations in the Middle East—OIC, LAS, and GCC—all have strong mandates supporting a Palestinian state and resolution of the Middle East Peace Process. The result
  • 32. 28 has been major friction between Arab powers, and Arab powers and the United States, creating Arab distrust towards the West (Mousavian and Saberi 2015) and inhibiting institutional development of regional cooperation against common threats. Because of repeated failures by international efforts to obtain significant progress toward an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement and the acknowledgement of the importance of a region-led solution to the conflict, the king of Saudi Arabia put forward the Arab Peace Initiative (API) in 2002 at the annual summit of the League of Arab States (LAS), calling for a two-state solution and Arab normalization with Israel. It has broad support in the Arab world and received renewed attention as recent as July, 2015 in a revitalized UN-led peace initiative (United Nations 2015). The API is significant, because is the first time Arab states have publically endorsed a mechanism which could lead to recognition of the state of Israel. Although the API is viewed by Israel as an ambiguous all-or-nothing proposal which Israel has countered with its own Israeli Peace Initiative in 2011, it is viewed as the only regionally legitimate foundation in the Middle East Peace Process (Baskin and Siniora 2015, 153-157). The three main regions to regional cooperation—hegemons, identity, and threat perceptions—all come together within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to this day. Although some scholars and policy officials identify the Israeli-Palestinian issue as being the main barrier to regional cooperation, many others identify it as a result of other barriers to cooperation. Regardless, the issue reigns supreme. Thus, many experts argue that regional security in the Middle East cannot progress without seriously addressing the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, the United States is not listening and Middle East insecurity continues (Fahmy and Haggag 2015, 66).
  • 33. 29 CHAPTER 5 REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST Regional organizations in the Middle East have been very slow to form and evolve and are only marginally effective in addressing conflict and other regional problems. There are only three prominent regional institutions representing the Middle East, each having a peace and security mandate: the trans-regional Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the regional League of Arab States (LAS), and the sub- regional Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, only the LAS and GCC have had an effect on peace and security matters. Although only slightly effective prior to the Arab Spring uprisings in 2010-2011, the LAS and GCC have had an “awakening” of their own, addressing some factors affecting peace and security inside the borders of their members, and to a lesser extent, outside their borders (Beck 2015, 190; Beck 2014, 1). League of Arab States The League of Arab States, often called the Arab League, was founded in 1945, six months before the formation of the United Nations, by seven states: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Yemen. It is headquartered in Cairo, Egypt and is the second oldest regional organization in the world, behind the Organization of American States (OAS). Today, it has 22 members stretching from the Arabian Peninsula to North Africa, including Somalia in East Africa and Comoros, an island just north of Madagascar. Palestine is a member, and is recognized by the LAS as a state. Syria, is a member, but in a suspended status. The LAS promotes general interests among its members regarding the economy, finance, culture, social welfare, and health. It has a strong non-interference policy regarding the sovereignty of member states, and peace and
  • 34. 30 security matters are addressed only in a general sense. As such, the LAS is ineffectual in direct actions to regional security. However, it is influential as a voice of the majority of Arab states, especially in its relationship with the 57 members of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and within the United Nations. The LAS has had observer status in the United Nations since 1950 (Masters and Sergie 2014, 1-2). Table 1: League of Arab States Membership Founding Members (7) Current Membership (22) Observer States (4) Egypt Egypt Qatar (GCC) Eritrea Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia (GCC) Palestine Brazil Iraq Iraq Mauritania Venezuela Lebanon Lebanon Morocco India Transjordan Jordan Algeria Yemen Yemen Tunisia Syria Syria (suspended) Libya Bahrain (GCC) Sudan Kuwait (GCC) Djibouti UAE (GCC) Somalia Oman (GCC) Comoros Source: (Love 2013, 1348, 1359; Masters and Sergie 2014, 1) Figure 1: Map of the League of Arab States (BBC 2015).
  • 35. 31 The LAS has played a role in a number of defining issues which have helped solidify Pan-Arab nationalism but have also hindered it from acting in a cohesive manner. Arab unity took shape in the 19th century in opposition to Ottoman (Turkish) rule. During World War I, Arabs united in opposition to Ottoman and British aggression, culminating when the British betrayed an agreement to establish an independent Arab state, and endorsed the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, which divided the Arab region and set boundaries contrary to Arab logic. Soon after the LAS was formed, Arabs further united in opposition to the declared state of Israel in 1948, and simultaneously in support of an established state of Palestine. To this day, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the greatest defining issue of the region. The LAS initially rallied behind a rising Egypt and President Nasser’s popular Pan-Arab movement in the 1950s and 1960s, but opposed Egypt when it began peace negotiations with Israel in 1979. The civil war in Yemen from 1962-1970 put two of its founding members, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, on opposing sides in a proxy war. The LAS tried to assert control over the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) when it emerged and gained what was seen as too much power in the region. There was considerable disunity within the LAS during the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War (Masters and Sergie 2014, 2-3). Gulf Cooperation Council The GCC was founded in 1981, is headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and has six member states (see Figure 2 and Table 1), all of which are members of the League of Arab States. In contrast to the regional aspect of the Arab League, the GCC is a sub- regional organization. It was originally formed as a security response to counter Shiite Iran’s threats to Sunni Islam as Iran emerged from its Islamic revolution of 1979, as well
  • 36. 32 as responding to the overall weakness of the League of Arab States. The Gulf States were also alarmed by the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The GCC feared the rise of a powerful Iraq, as displayed during Iraq’s involvement in the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Figure 2: Gulf Cooperation Council Member States (Role of the GCC 2014) Although the GCC charter states the basic objective of the GCC is “to effect coordination, integration, and inter-connection between member states in all fields in order to achieve unity between them” (GCC Charter 2015), the focus of the GCC is clearly related to security, sovereignty of its borders, and regime stability of each member. The GCC has not developed a formal collective security framework, which gives the GCC flexibility responding to security concerns, with the restriction that “substantive matters shall be carried out by unanimous vote” (GCC Charter 2015). For GCC external actions, such as the response to the Arab Spring uprisings, unanimous consent has been followed. Since the Arab Spring, three examples show a remarkable
  • 37. 33 shift in the GCC’s regional policies regarding Bahrain, Yemen, and possible GCC expansion. League of Arab States and Gulf Cooperation Council since the Arab Spring Post Arab Spring: LAS Role in Tunisia and Egypt Responding to the revolts in Tunisia in December 2010, Amr Moussa, secretary- general of the LAS, acknowledged in January 2011 that the uprising was caused by poor economic conditions in the greater Arab world, as a signal to encourage other Arab leaders to respond to public outcries before such protests could arise in other Arab states. At the same time, the LAS announced a $2 billion program to assist Arab economies in relieving the unrest caused by economic pressures. The LAS refrained from declaring support for the protesters to avoid inciting further violence in Tunisia. One week later, the uprisings in Egypt began, and the LAS took a similar passive role but expanded its rhetoric in another signal to Arab leaders to take action. After President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt re-shuffled his cabinet, Secretary-General Moussa stated that a deeper change was needed in Egypt and in other countries across the region. As Tunisia, and to a greater extent Egypt, retaliated with brute force against protesters, the LAS was split on the degree of brutality being used by individual regimes, and issued very cautious, but critical statements against regime actions. Regarding Tunisia and Egypt, the LAS took the role of regional facilitator and maintained its policy of non-interference, even though the United Nations pushed the League to take a more active role (Schulz 2015, 210). Post Arab Spring: LAS Role in Libya After the uprisings in Libya and the extreme brutality used against protesters, the LAS suspended Libya’s membership in February 2011, and acted within the UN as the
  • 38. 34 “Arab voice” to convince the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to vote in favor of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) mandate of action towards Libya, which led to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the strong support of the LAS for establishing a no-fly zone. This was notable because it was the first time that the LAS intervened because of the internal affairs of a member state, going against its non- interference policy. Even though the LAS endorsed R2P for the initial intervention in Libya, it later opposed expanded NATO action in Libya, reasoning that the R2P mandate went well beyond action to protect civilians when NATO took action to cause regime change, protect oil reserves, conduct counter-terrorism, and limit weapons proliferation (Eriksson 2015, 223-225). Post Arab Spring: LAS Role in Syria In the wake of the Libyan uprisings, the LAS became very active in Syria. The newly elected secretary-general of the LAS, Nabil El-Araby, in August 2011, voiced concern over the public uprising in Syria and the extreme brutality of the Syrian military forces against its citizens. The LAS and GCC worked together to pressure Syrian President Assad to accept a political solution and institute political reforms. The LAS brought the Syrian peace plan to the UNSC, but it was rejected by the vetoes of Russia and China in October 2011, February 2012, and July 2012. The LAS, along with the GCC, continued to work with the Syrian regime, getting it to agree to a temporary cease fire in November 2011 and a roadmap to reform. During intense UN peace negotiations with Syria from December 2011 until January 2012, the LAS took the lead in the peace talks and sent observers to Syria to report on the implementation of a “protocol” arrangement (Schulz 2015, 212-213). The observer mission was suspended in late
  • 39. 35 January 2012 because of escalating violence and direct threats to the observer group (Samir and Soloman 2012). During the peace negotiations, the League continued its show of strength. It suspended the membership of Syria in November 2011 and transferred the seat to the Syrian opposition. The League also imposed economic sanctions on Syria. Because of Assad’s resistance to reform and the UN’s inability to agree on a peace plan for Syria, the situation continued to deteriorate, as Russia and Iran supplied the Syrian regime with military hardware, while Saudi Arabia and other GCC states supported the Syrian opposition. The proxy war in Syria has split the LAS. Within the LAS, support of the Assad regime is led by Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon; and support of the Syrian opposition is led by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (Schulz 2015, 212-213). Post Arab Spring: GCC Role in Bahrain In response to the popular uprisings in Bahrain, February 14-19, 2011, which called for a transition to a constitutional monarchy and created opposition forces, the GCC took two very unusual and forceful steps against what they perceived as threats to their sovereignty and unity. First, it displayed an aggressive use of its public rhetoric to condemn Iran, which supported domestic opposition groups and Hezbollah within Bahrain. Second, in response to a failed action by Bahraini security forces to quell an uprising in Manama on March 13, the GCC sent 1,000 Saudi troops of the joint Peninsula Shield Force from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain to support the ruling al-Khalifa family. This force augmented 500 police officers from UAE and a small number of security forces from Qatar (Pinto 2014, 168).
  • 40. 36 Post Arab Spring: GCC Role in Yemen The uprisings in Yemen beginning in January 2011 and the escalation of force by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) quickly triggered the possibility of a full- scale civil war and threatened to spread instability to other Gulf countries. By November 2011, Saudi Arabia led GCC efforts and forcefully brokered a deal with the Yemeni government, which was approved by the LAS. The deal led to the uncontested resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, along with his guaranteed immunity. The ensuing stability in Yemen allowed Saudi Arabia to get on firmer footing after being jolted by the string of 2010-2011 Arab uprisings, until the conflict escalated again in Yemen in late March 2015 (Beck 2015, 201). Saudi Arabia then led a ten-coalition response called Operation Determination Storm with nine Arab Nations and the United States beginning on March 26 that consisted primarily of airstrikes against Shia rebels known as Houthis and their allies. On April 21, operations shifted to Operation Restore Hope, with the goals of facilitating a political solution, protecting civilians, enabling humanitarian assistance and international cooperation, and conducting anti-terrorism operations (SUSRIS 2015). Post Arab Spring: Possible Expansion of GCC Membership As early as 2000, the idea of extending GCC membership beyond the six member states to Jordan and Morocco first developed. The idea gained traction again in May 2011 and in April 2014 (Beck 2015, 201). Collaboration between the Gulf States and the two monarchies of Jordan and Morocco have increased since 2011, and the increased public debate on the possible expansion shows the GCC wants to become a more influential sub- regional force in the Middle East.
  • 41. 37 Compared to the conditions which led to GCC creation in 1981, there are four striking similarities affecting current considerations for GCC expansion (Al Tamamy 2015). First, the decline of Egypt has removed its current and potential contributions to regional stability. Second, Iran’s renewed involvement in the region and expansionist actions threaten the Gulf States and their Sunni allies, with the added concern of Iran being much closer to being a nuclear power and the ensuing regional nuclear arms race. Third, outside of diplomatic efforts, the League of Arab States has been ineffective in direct contribution to regional security. Fourth, regional confidence in the ability of the United States to contribute to regional stability is on the decline after the Iraq and Afghanistan disengagement, as it was after the Vietnam disengagement. With the increasing hegemonic influence of Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Qatar, the GCC is better-positioned to be the premier regional organization in the Middle East. The GCC’s present focus is to quell domestic uprisings within the borders of its members and adjacent countries and to counter increasing Iranian and Russian activities in the region. Although the membership of the GCC has not formally expanded beyond its original six members, Yemen and Iraq have a quasi-observer status and benefit from inclusion in committees associated with culture, health, and sports. Other Regional Organizations and Regional Cooperation Agreements In addition to the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council, there are other regional organizations and regional cooperative arrangements in the Middle East. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is a transregional organization, formed in 1972, second in size only to the United Nations, representing 57 members, including all 22 LAS members, promoting Islamic solidarity and social, cultural,
  • 42. 38 scientific, economic, and political cooperation (Lansford 2015, 1742). Although the organization has international peace and security as part of its mandate, the OIC acts more as an Islamic caucus within and among other international and regional bodies using its summits to issue supporting or opposing declarations of international and regional issues. Recent declarations have supported eliminating weapons of mass destruction, Iran-IAEA nuclear negotiations, establishing a no-fly zone in Libya, and resolution of the civil war in Syria, while condemning acts of terrorism and the ISIS attacks in Syria and Iraq. The OIC has consistently supported the recognition of Palestine and an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in 2014 it established a ministerial contact group to mobilize OIC assistance and support to the Palestinians in efforts to negotiate a peace settlement (Lansford 2015, 1742-1744). There are two noteworthy transregional organizations in the Middle East. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security organization in the world, having 57 members from Europe, Central Asia and North America. Turkey is the only member in the Middle East (OSCE 2015a). Of the eleven partners for cooperation recognized by the OSCE, three are from the Middle East—Egypt, Israel, and Jordan—and three are from the Southern Mediterranean— Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia (OSCE 2015b). The twelve-member Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has six members that are in the Middle East— Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait—and two members that are in North Africa—Libya and Algeria (OPEC 2015). Regional trade agreements and regional economic cooperation forums exist in the Middle East. Unfortunately, they have been ineffective in producing any notable
  • 43. 39 economic and trade advantages and have not contributed to significant institution- building. The five-member Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Mauritania formed in 1989, and the four-member Agadir Agreement between Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia formed in 2004 were established to facilitate economic integration and decrease trade barriers, but despite repeated conferences and rhetoric, they have shown meager results (Abdmoulah 2011, 39). Figure 3: Regional Trade Agreements in MENA (Arab-EU Business Facilitation Network 2015, 22). Note: Modified by author; Syria is suspended from the LAS and OIC The larger Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement (PAFTA), sometimes referred to as the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), is an 18-member economic bloc. When created in 1997, the goal was to phase in tariff reductions by 2005 and compete with other regional economic orders. Today, only partial implementation has been realized,
  • 44. 40 with no noticeable increase in trade benefits. Reasons for failure of a free trade area include high transportation costs, violent conflicts, inefficient and corrupt public economic sectors, and external trade agreements with economic powers such as the U.S. and the EU (Youngs 2012, 26-27). Within its bilateral European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and multilateral Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the EU works with is Mediterranean neighbors to promote economic integration and democratic reform, including financial support and increased access to EU markets. These neighbors include Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Turkey (European Union 2015a; European Union 2015b). Although still in early development, these relationships offer a method to foster increased institution-building in the region towards improving prosperity, security, and stability.
  • 45. 41 CHAPTER 6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE AND UNITED STATES POLICY Some regions of the world have been more successful attaining and maintaining stability than other regions. However, the mere presence of established regional organizations does not always result in a stable region. Europe has a strong regional institutional system and a high level of stability. Africa has well-developed regional institutions but suffers from a high level of instability. The Middle East has a weak regional institutional system and a high level of instability. Clearly, there is no one-size- fits-all approach to a regional institutional system that can deliver peace and security to a particular region; security regimes must be tailored to each region and sub-region. The future of peace and security in the Middle East depends on sub-regional organizations and sub-regional cooperation. An effective region-wide security mechanism is not in place, and a regional, comprehensive security regime is a bridge too far. Sub-regional orders are where international action really takes place to address regional security problems, such as resolving conflict, delivering humanitarian assistance, and preventing human rights violations. Sub-regional orders, whether formal, informal, or ad-hoc, can bring together the legality for action of the United Nations and the legitimacy for action of region-wide authoritative structures. They can also facilitate action and intervention by states and non-state actors and overcome collective action problems. Although sub-regional organizations and sub-regional cooperation are underdeveloped in the Middle East, sub-regional approaches to security problems have shown some promise since the Arab Spring. Actions by the GCC, when combined with diplomacy by the LAS, have been somewhat effective. Regional economic cooperation
  • 46. 42 also shows some promise. Sub-regional cooperation mechanisms and cooperative forums, where the primary drivers to cooperation exist, should be the focus of diplomatic and capacity-building efforts to further develop sub-regional security institutions in the Middle East. As part of the next iteration towards peace and security in the Middle East, regional and international states and actors should incorporate three basic lines of effort towards development of a regional security regime: increase the capability and capacity of sub-regional organizations and agreements; partner external hegemonic orders with regional hegemonic orders; and move aggressively to solve the Middle East Peace Process regarding the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Develop More Robust Sub-regional Organizations and Institutions At the core of a regional security regime is the engine for action: sub-regional organizations. Individual states and actors do not have the capacity to resolve regional conflict, and a region-wide approach suffers from cooperative inaction. Although individual states and regional organizations are important, sub-regional orders and institutions will have the most impact on regional peace and security. A number of steps should be taken at the sub-regional level. First, the GCC should be immediately expanded to include Jordan and Morocco. Although the GCC will unlikely give full membership to additional states, the first iteration would be to formalize an institutional partnership between the GCC and Jordan and Morocco since they would be the easiest fit with the Gulf monarchies. The second iteration would be to formalize institutional partnerships with Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey. The third iteration could include Israel. At some point, the GCC would have options to further develop sub-regional organizations such as extending full membership
  • 47. 43 beyond the current six GCC members or spinning off a second sub-regional organization, such as Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and Israel to make it easier to solve sub- regional and micro-regional problems. In this case, the GCC could act as a sponsor. Second, existing regional economic agreements should become further institutionalized, adding peace and security interests to their current mandates. For example, the four-member Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) could become an economic and security agreement, and additional members could be added such as Mauritania and Algeria to cover the North Africa region. Libya, with its current instability, would be difficult to add as a full member unless global powers such as the U.S. and EU get involved with facilitation efforts. Another example would be to form a sub-regional organization with the six southern Mediterranean members of the OSCE—Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Overlap of members within multiple sub- regional organizations should not be avoided because of the unique nature of the region and the advantages of interdependence. In this case, the OSCE and EU could act as sponsors, incorporating EU efforts into its existing European Neighborhood Policy. External Hegemonic Orders Must Partner with a Regional Hegemonic Orders A regional hegemonic order, instead of a single hegemonic power, could provide the impetus for regional action. When partnered with an external hegemonic order, the combination could be a very powerful driver for action. History shows that the Middle East will not accept a sole hegemon, whether from inside or outside the region. Thus, a hybrid approach is necessary. An example of a regional hegemonic order could be the four states of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel working together. An example of an external order with regional ties could either be the existing Quartet of the UN, U.S.,
  • 48. 44 EU, and Russia or a derivation of the P5+1 states which negotiated the Iran nuclear deal—U.S., UK, France, China, Russia, and Germany. The external hegemonic order would support the regional hegemonic body and let it lead the Middle East security order. The challenge to this security regime would be to identify common threats. The threat of ISIS could be used as the primary unifying threat to the region. After all, ISIS poses direct threats to individual regime stability. The side-effects of the conflict in Iraq and Syria could be handled first, such as refugee flows, humanitarian interventions, establishing safe havens, and the responsibility to protect (R2P). Directly addressing the threat of ISIS would need to immediately follow, and the U.S.-led global coalition to counter ISIS could be transferred to the partnered hegemonic order. This may seem a tall order, and it is, but getting two hegemonic orders together to solve regional problems would be a big step in the right direction. Diplomatic efforts of world powers, especially the EU, U.S., and Russia would be critical. Move the Middle East Peace Process Forward: Solve the Israeli-Palestinian Problem Because the Arab-Israeli conflict is the greatest barrier to regional cooperation, the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) needs to be aggressively pursued. Resolution of this issue can no longer be put off, even with the more immediate threat posed by ISIS and other regional security threats. The United Nations has renewed efforts in mid-2015 toward resolution, and a global hegemonic order, such as the Quartet or P5+1, must come together to solve this enduring problem. An aggressive approach to resolving the Israeli- Palestinian dispute must be a shared process between external and regional hegemonic orders and regional organizations. Without a solution that targets the enduring Israeli- Palestinian conflict, regional security in the Middle East will not improve.
  • 49. 45 U.S. Policy Recommendations As the United States disengages from the region and attempts to focus more on the Asia-Pacific region, a storm of complex instability is quickly forming at an accelerated pace which could overwhelm existing regional states. Major regional threats are synchronizing: ISIS expansion; civil wars in Syria, Iraq and Yemen; massive refugee flows into Europe; a rising Russia; an invigorated Iran; and an escalating conventional and nuclear arms race. The region is on the verge of a third Palestinian intifada and a second Arab Spring. The United States must rebalance its approach to the Middle East by emphasizing international relations and capacity building efforts at the sub-regional level for long-term benefits. First, the United States must be a regional partner instead of a regional leader. Recalibrating its smart power approach must include being part of an external multi-polar hegemonic order which engages with an internal regional multi-polar hegemonic order. Second, the United should act as lead facilitator by putting together a small international contact team and aggressively pushing the Middle East Peace Process forward. Third, the United States must take action to increase the capacity of sub-regional institutions and arrangements in the Middle East by facilitating bilateral, multilateral, and international institutional mechanisms. Fourth, and most importantly, the United States must re-define its core interests in the region based on security pragmatism, so that its strategy can be recalibrated to better apply smart power by using smart leadership.
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