ACCOUNTABILITY: ANGST, AWARENESS, ACTION

Copyright © Jay P Desai, 2013. All Rights ReservedAccountability: Angst, Awareness, Action
bills
media
Accountability
democracy
culture
performance
elections
transparency
officials
liability
trust
tolerance
information
solicit
control
implementation
improve
policy
independence
literacy
involve
transfers
infrastructure
monitoring
reformJudiciaryregulations
hierarchy
responsibility
justification
authority
laws
bureaucracy
decisions
impartiality
acts
civicparticipation
Institutions
voice
perform
sanction
Executive
rights
agencies
enforcement
Legislature
open
debate citizens
Angst
Action
Awareness
Constitution
governance
parliament
answerability
dismissal
audit
RTI
PILObjective
advocacy
impeachment
CSO
foundation

Jay P Desai
Founder & CEO
Universal Consulting India Pvt Ltd
Accountability
Angst Awareness Action

Copyright © Jay P Desai, 2013. All Rights ReservedAccountability: Angst, Awareness, Action 2
To increase the public understanding of accountability
Objective
Angst Awareness Action

&  Angst
A Question of Accountability
The Accountability Deficit
&  Awareness
Unveiling the Shroud
Three-Dimensional Accountability
&  Action
The Six Initiatives
The Five-Fold Path
Epilogue
The Origin of Angst

A Question of Accountability
“A prudent question is one-half of wisdom.”
Francis Bacon, 1561–1626

A host of acute and chronic tragedies underline the lack of accountability within
the public administration
Institutions
Distribution
Healthcare
Education
l  Public projects and auctions face accusations of financial impropriety
l  Inept public response systems exacerbate natural and industrial disasters
l  Millions of tonnes of food grains rot in warehouses every monsoon due to
inefficiencies in the Public Distribution System (PDS)
l  High absenteeism among doctors and support staff, chronic shortage of
medicines, primitive facilities, unhygienic conditions and sub-standard
care
l  Poor educational infrastructure and absent teachers plague the public
education system

The Origin of Angst
“Set up eyes and ears in your kingdom that pick up weak
signals before your enemies.”
Machiavelli, 1469–1527

Independent IndiaVedic Age Mauryan and Gupta
Empire
Medieval and Post-
Medieval India
Colonial India
60yrs200 yrs1500 yrs2500 yrs3500 yrs Years Ago
l  King was the supreme
authority, but provisions
to depose him in case of
misconduct existed
l  People s opinions were
invited on important
matters through Public
Meetings called Sabha
and Samiti
l  Arthashastra emphasised
on the system of spies
and penalties to check
mal-practices in society
l  However, it justified
bribery or fraud, if is was
conducted for welfare of
the State
l  Corruption in civil
service increased, as
monetary tips to
officials in return of a
favour became a norm
l  Usage of information
gatherers or spies to
report corruption cases
of officials continued in
this era too
l  Formal mechanisms
like Auditors and
Committees to check
public finance were
introduced
l  Role of citizens and
media in protesting
against wrong
Government practices
increased
l  India moved to
democracy, introduced
the Constitution and
elections
l  Framework of institutions
and policies to check
accountability introduced
l  CSOs and the media
have been playing an
important role in exposing
corruption
8
Source: UC Analysis, Secondary Research
Socio-Cultural Structure
l  Social stratification
into four castes
l  Introduction of
Hinduism, belief in God
l  Epics like Mahabharata
emphasized on dharma
(conduct), where
morality/fair play was
secondary
l  Caste based rigidity
increased with rules and
penalties for each strata
defined in Manusmriti
l  Foundation of Islam
religion was laid
l  Religious tolerance
reduced as most
Mughal rulers
discriminated against
practitioners of other
religions
l  Differentiation between
castes deepened due to:
-  Introduction of
caste-based
census
-  Reservation of
seats for
Scheduled
Castes in the
legislatures
l  Caste has degenerated
into an inflexible
hierarchical system
l  Communal harmony
has reduced due to high
social diversity
Institutional Structure
Social institutions and accountability practices that originated thousands of years
ago, mould our view of accountability today

Citizens Charter
9
Pre-1900 1900 -1925 1925 -1950 1950 -1975 1975 - 2000 2000 - 2009
CAG
USA
UK
India
CAG
CAG
RTI
RTI
RTI
PIL
PIL
LP
EC
EC
EC
DAC
DAC
DAJ
LP CC
CC
WBP
WBP
2009 onwards
DAJ WBP
Comptroller & Auditor
General
LP
Age of democracy:
59 yrs
Age of democracy:
129 yrs
Age of democracy :
200 yrs
CAG
PIL
Public Interest
Litigation
Right to Information
Disclosure of Assets by Judges/
Candidates
RTI
DAC
Election CommissionEC
CC
LokpalLP
WBP
Whistleblowers
ProtectionDAJ
Pending
MS
US
MS
USMS
US
Male SuffrageMS
US Universal
Suffrage
Although many key accountability mechanisms have already been introduced in
India, the lack of proper implementation is a roadblock

The Accountability Deficit
“The hardest thing to see is what is in front of your eyes.”
Goethe, 1749–1832

Source: Wignaraja, Kanni. Mutual Accountability Mechanisms: Accountability, Voice and Responsiveness. , UNDP Development Group (2006); Bovens,
Mark. Public Accountability. , The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, E. Ferlie, L. Lynne & C. Pollitt (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005
11
Public Officials Citizens/ CSOs/ Media
Objects (Duty Bearers) Agents (Rights Holders)
Accountability
Mechanisms
•  Justification
•  Information
•  Reward
•  Punishment
Accountability is a two way process – it is the responsibility of public officials to
justify their conduct to citizens by using accountability mechanisms. It is also the
responsibility of citizens to extract answerability and sanction public officials

Source: UC Analysis, Bovens, Mark. Public Accountability. , The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, E. Ferlie, L. Lynne & C. Pollitt (Eds.),
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005
Appropriate
Representation
Participative
Conduct
Legitimate
Conduct
Liability
Enforcement
Accountability
Proactive Reactive
Accountability should be both proactive - ensuring selection of right public
officials and participative governance process; and reactive - ensuring transparent
and legitimate conduct and enforcing liability for conduct on public officials
l  Electing/ appointing public
officials through an
objective and transparent
process
l  Inviting participation of
stakeholders like citizens,
CSOs and media, in policy
formulation and
implementation
l  Monitoring and assessing
the performance of public
officials, to ensure
transparent, fair and honest
functioning
l  Applying penalties such as
legal proceedings, penalty
fees or resignation, against
errant public officials

Source: UC Analysis; W. Carrington, J Debuse, H. Lee. The Theory of Governance and Accountability , The University of Iowa Centre for International
Finance and Development, 2008
ACCOUNTABILITY
Social
Performance
Economic
Performance
Governance
Performance
It is imperative to improve governance, to strengthen the economic and social
performance of a country

Source: UC Analysis, Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat , The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010; Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and
Individual Governance Indicators ; The World Bank; 2009; Corruption Perception Index , Transparency International, 2010;
Worldwide Governance
Indicators (2009)
Corruption Perceptions
Index (2010)*
World Bank
Transparency
International 87 78 69 1542022
India China Brazil RussiaUSA UKIndexInstitution
Note: The numbers indicate the ranks of the countries on respective indices.
112 148 9126 20 161
178
Total
213
Democracy Index (2010)
The Economist
Intelligence Unit
40 136 4717 19 107 167
*India s 2011 rank is 95
Governance Performance: Global cross-country surveys highlight the poor
quality of governance in India, on a comparative basis

Source: UC Analysis; ‘Doing Business Index 2010’, World Bank; ‘Global Competitiveness Index 2010-11’, World Economic Forum; ‘Governance Matters
VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators’; The World Bank; 2009
Doing Business Index
(2010)
Global Competitiveness
Index (2010-11)
World Bank
World Economic
Forum
133
51
89
27
129
58 63
4 5
124
120
Note: The numbers indicate the ranks of the countries on respective indices
Total
139
183
Economic Performance: Global cross-country surveys highlight India’s poor
comparative ranking on economic indicators

Source: UC Analysis; ‘Doing Business Index 2010’, World Bank; ‘Global Competitiveness Index 2010-11’, World Economic Forum; ‘Governance Matters
VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators’; The World Bank; 2009
Economic Performance: Poor governance reflects in the poor economic
performance of the country
-2
-1
0
1
2
3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0
Governance and Economic Performance
Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) Score 2009 (#)
Global Competitiveness Index 2010-11 (#)
Sample size: 96 countries
India
l  Governance performance is measured using the scores of
countries on Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2009
l  Economic performance is measured using scores of countries on
Global Competitiveness Index in 2010-11
l  The correlation between Worldwide Governance Indicators and
Global Competitiveness Index shows a very high positive
correlation co-efficient (r) of 0.86
l  This indicates a very strong relationship between governance
performance and economic performance of a country
l  Poor governance in India is reflected in its poor economic
performance, in global surveys (see below)
r = 0.86
Moderate
Weak
Strong
+0.5 < r < + 0.7
r < + 0.5
r > + 0.7

Source: UC Analysis; Human Development Index - 2010’, Human Development Report 2010, UNDP; ‘Global Gender Gap Index 2010’, World
Economic Forum; ‘Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators’; The World Bank; 2009
Human Development
Index (2010)
United Nations
Development
Programme
119
Note: The numbers indicate the ranks of the countries on respective indices
89 734 26 65
Global Gender Gap
Index (2010) 112 61 8519 15 45
World Economic
Forum
Total
134
169
Social Performance: Global cross-country surveys highlight India’s poor
comparative ranking on social indicators

Source: UC Analysis; Human Development Index - 2010’, Human Development Report 2010, UNDP; ‘Global Gender Gap Index 2010’, World
Economic Forum; ‘Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators’; The World Bank; 2009
-2
-1
0
1
2
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Governance and Social Performance
Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) Score 2009 (#)
r = 0.76
Human Development Index 2010 (#)
Sample size: 98 countries
l  Governance performance is measured using the World Bank s
World-wide Governance Indicators (WGI) score 2009
l  Social performance is measured using UNDP s Human
Development Index score 2010
l  The correlation between Worldwide Governance Indicators and
Human Development Index shows a high positive correlation co-
efficient (r) of 0.76
l  This indicates a strong relationship between governance
performance and social performance of a country
l  Poor governance in India is reflected in its poor social
performance, in global surveys (see below)
Social Performance: Poor governance also reflects in the poor social
performance of the country
India
Moderate
Weak
Strong
+0.5 < r < + 0.7
r < + 0.5
r > + 0.7
r = 0.76

Unveiling The Shroud
“… The success of democracy is not merely a matter of having
the most perfect institutional structure that we can think of.
It depends inescapably on our actual behaviour patterns and
the working of political and social interactions ….”
Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice

Source: UC Analysis
21
Income Per Capita
Social Hierarchy
Democratic Lineage
Adult Literacy
Individualism
Population
Social Diversity
Urbanisation
Number of years since the country attained democracy
Gross Domestic Product per capita, as an indicator of economic
development (Income Per Capita = GDP/ Population)
Share of total population residing in urban areas
Share of adult population that is literate (adult literacy defined by UNESCO
as individuals over 15 yrs of age, who can read and write simple statements)
Degree of racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation in a country
Extent of inequality of power and wealth, as perceived and accepted by less
powerful individuals, or groups
Degree to which individuals are integrated/dis-integrated into groups
Size of population of the country
Voter Turnout Percentage of registered voters who casted vote in elections
We examined Socio-Economic factors across 60-100 countries to understand their
correlation with governance

World Average: 12.5
USD Thousands
Source: UC Analysis; ‘GDP Per Capita (PPP)’ World Development Indicators, The World Bank, 2009; The Worldwide Governance Indicators
1996-2009 , The World Bank, 2010; Kaufmann Daniel and Art Kraay, “Growth without governance”, The World Bank, 2002
22
Per Capita Income Correlation
-2
-1
0
1
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
r = 0.87
Income Per Capita
(PPP) 2009
Sample Size: 99 countries
There is strong correlation between income per capita and governance. World Bank research
suggests that governance matters significantly for growth in the per capita income in the long run
Income Per Capita (PPP) 2009
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Score 2009
10
7
3
19
37
46
0
10
20
30
40
50
USA UK Russia Brazil China India
Income Per Capita – Are most countries with lower income levels, like India,
destined to have poor quality of governance and accountability?
India
Moderate
Weak
Strong
+0.5 < r < + 0.7
r < + 0.5
r > + 0.7
r = 0.87

Scores (#)
World Average: 43
Source: UC Analysis; Hofstede Geert, Individualism Index , Cultures and Organizations, Software of the Mind, 2010; ‘The Worldwide Governance
Indicators 1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010
23
Individualism Correlation
-2
-1
0
1
2
0 20 40 60 80 100
r = 0.69
Individualism (Hofstede s
Individualism Index) score
There is strong correlation between individualism and governance. India s collectivist culture could be a
barrier for India to achieve higher levels of accountability and a better order of governance
39 38
20
91 89
48
0
20
40
60
80
100
USA UK India Russia Brazil China
Individualism (Hofstede s Individualism Index)
Individualism - Is a relatively collectivist society as we find in India, a barrier to
achieving higher governance and accountability?
India
Moderate
Weak
Strong
+0.5 < r < + 0.7
r < + 0.5
r > + 0.7
r = 0.69

Source: UC Analysis; Hofstede Geert, Power Distance Index , Cultures and Organizations, Software of the Mind, 2010; ‘The Worldwide Governance
Indicators 1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010
24
-2
-1
0
1
2
00 20 40 60 80 100 120
r = (0.65)
Social Hierarchy (Hofstede s
Power Distance Index) score
Social Hierarchy Correlation
There is a moderate to strong correlation between social hierarchy and governance. Social hierarchy and
the numerous inequalities among the people of India, could be significant obstacles on the pathway to
better governance and greater accountability
Social Hierarchy (Hofstede s Power Distance Index)
World
Average: 55
Scores (#)
80
69
40 35
77
93
0
20
40
60
80
100
Russia China India Brazil USA UK
Social Hierarchy - Does the high degree of social distance, in terms of power &
wealth, predispose India to lower governance & accountability?
India
Moderate
Weak
Strong
+0.5 < r < + 0.7
r < + 0.5
r > + 0.7
r = (0.65)

58
45
60
130
162
201
0
30
60
90
120
150
180
210
USA Switzerland UK India Japan Singapore
Years
Source: UC Analysis; 2010; Country Reports, Polity IV project, Center for Systemic Peace; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2009’, The
World Bank, 2010
25
Democratic Lineage Correlation
-2
-1
0
1
2
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225
r = 0.63
No of years of
Democracy (as of 2010)
There is moderate correlation between democratic lineage and governance. Many democracies below
the age of 60, have substantially better governance scores than India. Young democracies, therefore,
are equally capable of demonstrating good governance
No of years of Democracy (as of 2010)
Democratic Lineage – Does age of democracy have a strong and significant
relationship with governance levels?
Moderate
Weak
Strong
+0.5 < r < + 0.7
r < + 0.5
r > + 0.7
India
r = 0.63

World Average: 57
(%)
Source: UC Analysis; 2010; ‘Urban Population’ World Development Indicators, The World Bank, 2009; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators
1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010
26
Urbanization Correlation
-2
-1
0
1
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
r = 0.55
Urban Population 2009
(% of total population)
There is moderate correlation between urbanization and governance, but rapid urbanization by itself, will
not usher in an era of good governance
Urban Population 2009 (% of total population)
73
44
30
828690
0
20
40
60
80
100
UK Brazil USA Russia China India
Estimated Urban and Rural population in India
72 70
55
28 30
45
0
20
40
60
80
100
2001-10 E2011-20 E2050
Urban
Rural
(%)
Urbanization – Is this low level of urbanisation in India, a key constraint in
achieving high accountability?
India
Moderate
Weak
Strong
+0.5 < r < + 0.7
r < + 0.5
r > + 0.7
r = 0.55

(%)
World
Average: 89
Source: UC Analysis; Global Rankings – Adult Literacy Rate (Total), UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2008; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators
1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010
27
There is a weak-moderate correlation between adult literacy levels and governance. High adult literacy,
thus, does not necessarily mean better quality of governance. Good governance is certainly not just the
preserve of the well-read
-2
-1
0
1
2
00 20 40 60 80 100
r = 0.50
Adult Literacy Rate (%)
Correlation
300 Mn
300 Mn
Adult Literacy
99 99 94 90
66
99
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
UK USA Russia China Brazil India
Adult Literacy Rate 2008
Adult Literacy - Is the low level of adult literacy in India a key constraint in
achieving high levels of governance and accountability?
India
Moderate
Weak
Strong
+0.5 < r < + 0.7
r < + 0.5
r > + 0.7
r = 0.50

(%)
World Average: 69.5
Source: UC Analysis; 2010; Unified Database , Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2009; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators
1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010
28
Voter Turnout Correlation
-2
-1
0
1
2
0 20 40 60 80 100
r = 0.33
Average Voter Turnout (%)
There is weak correlation between voter turnout and governance. This suggests that voter turnout,
while important, is not sufficient to address the issue of poor governance
69 65
5959
75
85
86
0
20
40
60
80
100
Denmark Germany UK Japan USA India Russia
Average Voter Turnout
Voter Turnout – Does low voter participation act as a roadblock to achieving better
governance?
India
Moderate
Weak
Strong
+0.5 < r < + 0.7
r < + 0.5
r > + 0.7
r = 0.33

World Average: 0.775
Source: UC Analysis; Okediji, T, Social Diversity Index- The dynamics of ethnic fragmentation: a proposal for an expanded measurement index ,
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 2005; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2009’, The World Bank, 2010
29
-2
-1
0
1
2
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20
r = (0.28)
Social Diversity Index (Score)
Social Diversity Correlation
There is a weak correlation between social diversity levels and governance. This shows that
India’s great diversity is not argument enough to justify the poor quality of governance in India
Social Diversity Index
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Score 2009Scores (#)
0.96
0.88 0.85
0.66
0.98
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
India USA China UK Brazil
Social Diversity - Does high linguistic, cultural & religious fragmentation in India
predispose it to lower governance & accountability?
India
Moderate
Weak
Strong
+0.5 < r < + 0.7
r < + 0.5
r > + 0.7
r = (0.28)

World Average: 188
Source: UC Analysis; ‘Population’ World Development Indicators, The World Bank, 2009; ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2009’, The
World Bank, 2010
30
-2
-1
0
1
2
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
r = (0.08)
Population (in millions)
Population Correlation
There is a weak correlation between population levels and governance. There is extremely low
probability that countries with large populations are automatically relegated to the basket of
poor governance
Population 2009 (in 000 s)
61
1155
193307
1331
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
China India USA Brazil UK
#
Population - Does high population in India predispose it to lower governance and
accountability?
India
Moderate
Weak
Strong
+0.5 < r < + 0.7
r < + 0.5
r > + 0.7
r = (0.08)

31
10083
63281
63491
98211
100891
1
100911
78701
85711
1001001
Correlation with Governance (r)Socio-Economic Factors
Per Capita Income
Social Hierarchy
Democratic Lineage
Adult Literacy
Individualism
Population
Social Diversity
Urbanisation
Voter Turnout
Strong 0.87
0.69
(0.65)
0.63
0.55
0.50
(0.08)
(0.28)
0.33
Moderate
Weak
India s Rank
Unfortunately, India s position on most of the socio-economic factors is weak,
limiting its ability to improve its ranking and demonstrate rapid change

Three-Dimensional Accountability
“The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new
lands, but in seeing with new eyes.”
Marcel Proust, 1871–1922

Source: UC Analysis, Bovens, Mark. Public Accountability. , The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, E. Ferlie, L. Lynne & C. Pollitt (Eds.),
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005; Goetz, Anne Marie and Rob Jenkins. Hybrid Forms of Accountability. , Public Management Review 3.3
(2001); Schacter, Mark. When Accountability Fails- A Framework for Diagnosis and Action. Institute of Governance, Ottawa Policy Brief, 2001
33
Civil Society
Organisations
Media
Citizens
Legislature JudiciaryExecutive
Internal
Accountability
Independent government
agencies (CAG, CVC, CBI..)
External
Accountability
Horizontal
Accountability
Institutions of
Government
Mechanisms of accountability could be internal - imposed from inside by self-
monitoring policies; horizontal - imposed by independent government
institutions; and external - imposed from outside by citizens, CSOs, media
l  Internal Accountability: A
government body monitoring the
performance of its staff internally
l  Horizontal Accountability: A
government body scrutinizing the
activities of another government
department
l  External Accountability:
Accountability imposed upon the
Government from outside, by
citizens, civil society organisations
(CSOs) and media

Source: UC Analysis
Appropriate
Representation
Participative
Conduct
Legitimate
Conduct
Liability
Enforcement
Accountability
Foundations of
Accountability
(1st dimension)
Mechanisms of
Accountability
(2nd dimension)
Civil Society
Organisations Media
Citizens
Legislatu
re
Judiciar
y
Executi
ve
Independent government agencies
(CAG, CVC, CBI..)
Public
Represent
ation
Public
Participati
on
Legitimate
Conduct
l  Accountability mechanisms that help improve the
quality of citizen s representatives in the Government
performance of the Government officials
l  Accountability mechanisms that help sanction the
Government officials for their performance
Liability
Enforceme
nt
Liability
Enforceme
nt
Public
Represent
ation
Public
Participatio
n
Legitimate
Conduct
quality of citizens participation in the Government
Judiciary
Internal Accountability
External
Accountability
Horizontal
Accountability
Public
Represent
ation
Public
Participati
on
Legitimate
Conduct
Liability
Enforceme
nt
Liability
Enforceme
nt
Public
Represent
ation
Public
Participatio
n
Legitimate
Conduct
Executive
Internal Accountability
External
Accountability
Horizontal
Accountability
quality of citizens participation in the GovernmentPublic
Represent
ation
Public
Participati
on
Legitimate
Conduct
Liability
Enforceme
nt
FoundationsofAccountability
Liability
Enforcement
Appropriate
Representation
Participative
Conduct
Legitimate
Conduct
Legislature
Internal Accountability External AccountabilityHorizontal Accountability
Enumerate
&
Evaluate
We assessed the strength of the internal, horizontal and external
accountability mechanisms, across the Legislature, the Executive and the
Judiciary, to examine the ability of the mechanisms to support the four
foundations of accountability Institutions of
Government
(3rd dimension)

Does Not Exist
Participative Policy
Formulation
No internal check on
implementation of citizen’s
participation mechanisms
Internal Evaluation of
Performance
Lack of checks on parliamentary
proceedings and behaviour of
MPs
Expulsion of MPs
-  Expelling MPs is rare
-  No penalties for poor
participation in Parliament
l  Elections
Low participation by citizens in
elections and biased voting
decisions
Citizen’s Evaluation of
Performance
-  Poor access to information
about MPs’ performance
-  Indifferent attitude of
citizens
Election Commission
-  Lack of authority with the
Election Commission in
controlling unethical voting
practices
-  Lack of co-operation from
election officers in the voter
registration processParticipative Policy
Formulation
No independent check to
ensure implementation of
citizen’s participation
mechanisms
Judicial Review
- Judiciary cannot question the
functioning of Legislature
- No independent check to
review parliamentary
proceedings exists
Police, Judiciary
-  Political interference in
appointments and transfers
-  Lack of accountability
-  Inadequate infrastructure
Citizen s Feedback and
Advocacy
-  Low awareness about
feedback mechanisms and
advocacy organisations
-  Indifferent attitude of
citizens
Legislative Accountability
Appropriate
Representation
Participative
Conduct
Legitimate
Conduct
Liability
Enforcement
Public Interest Litigation
Difficulty in using PILs due to lack of
understanding of scope and
application
Right to Recall
- Inadequate implementation
Not Applicable
Legislature: There are significant constraints that impede the implementation of
these accountability mechanisms

Objective and Transparent
Process
-  Lack of objective process of
selection of Council of Ministers
-  Lack of transparency in transfer
of public officials
Implementation
No internal check on
•  Annual Performance
Assessment Reports, Results
Framework Document
-  Performance not linked with salaries
•  Whistle-blowers Protection
-  Inadequate protection to whistle-
blowers
Dismissal, Removal or
Reduction in Rank
-  Lengthy process to prosecute
corrupt officials
-  Lack of action due to political
interference
RTI Act, Citizen’s Charter,
Budget Advocacy, Social
Audits, PETS, Report Cards &
Community Scorecards
-  Low awareness about
mechanisms
-  Low participation by citizens
-  Limited reach of CSOs
Objective and Transparent
Process
-  No independent check on
selection of Council of Ministers
-  No independent monitoring of the
transfers of civil officials
Implementation
No independent agency to check
Legislature, Parliamentary
Committees, Delivery
Monitoring Unit, Planning
Commission, CAG, CBI, CVC,
Lokayukta/ Lokpal
-  Limited authority to take action
-  Lack of independence in
functioning
-  Political interference
Advocacy and Government-
Citizen Initiatives
Lack of decentralized
governance structure to
encourage local participation
Executive Accountability
Appropriate
Representation
Participative
Conduct
Legitimate
Conduct
Liability
Enforcement
Police, Judiciary
-  Political interference in
appointments and transfers
-  Lack of accountability
-  Inadequate infrastructure
Difficulty in using PILs due to lack
of understanding of scope and
application
Public Disclosure of
Appointments
No justification for transfers
available in public domain
36
Does Not Exist
Executive: There are significant constraints that impede the implementation of

Does Not Exist
Judicial Collegium
-  Lack of neutral and external
members in the Collegium
-  Lack of an objective and
defined process for
appointment
-  Non-transparent and secretive
process to appoint judges
Internal Evaluation of Conduct
-  Investigation against judges has
been rarely initiated by
Collegium or judges
-  CJI rarely grants permission to
conduct investigation
Impeachment
-  Impeachment is seldom initiated
by the Collegium
-  No other mechanism of
imposing minor penalties or
punishing judges
Public Evaluation of Conduct
-  Difficult to challenge judges
due to threat of ‘contempt of
court’
-  Difficult to access information
about court proceedings
Independent Evaluation of
Conduct
No independent agency exists to
investigate complaints against the
Judiciary
Parliament & President
-  Slow and lengthy process of
impeachment
-  Political patronage hampers
impeachment process
-  No independent authority
exists to review PILs against
Judiciary
-  Difficulty in using PILs due to
lack of understanding of
scope and application
Weaknesses in Mechanisms of Accountability - Judiciary
Appropriate
Representation
Participative
Conduct
Legitimate
Conduct
Liability
Enforcement
President & Governor
-  Limited authority with President
and Governor to challenge the
appointment of judges
Judicial AccountabilityAppropriate
Representation
Participative
Conduct
Legitimate
Conduct
Liability
Enforcement
Public Monitoring of
Appointments
-  No voluntary disclosure of
information regarding
appointments by Judiciary
-  Citizens cannot file RTI for
appointment information
Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable
Judiciary: There are significant constraints that impede the implementation of

Source: UC Analysis
38
The four foundations of accountability have been severely weakened by
constraints in the implementation of accountability mechanisms
Lack of transparency in
appointment and
transfer
Lack of defined criteria
for appointment and
transfer
Citizen s apathy in
selecting appropriate
candidates
Appropriate
Representation
Participative
Conduct
Legitimate
Conduct
Liability
Enforcement
Accountability
Lack of authority
devolved to local
agencies
Ad-hoc implementation
of participation
mechanisms by public
officials
Low involvement of
citizens in policy-
making
Lack of authority with
investigating agencies
like CBI, CVC, CAG
Subjective and non -
transparent
performance
assessment of officials
Administrative apathy
and non-cooperation of
public officials
Low awareness of
accountability
mechanisms like RTI,
among citizens
Low involvement of
citizens in monitoring
Government
Corrupt and lengthy
process of prosecution
of officials
Low involvement of
citizens in monitoring
Government
Lack of adequate
infrastructure with law
enforcement agencies
Low awareness of
accountability
mechanisms like PIL,
among citizens

Corrupt and lengthy process of prosecution of officials
Foundations Weaknesses Inadequacies
Appropriate
Representation
Participative
Conduct
Legitimate
Conduct
Liability
Enforcement
Citizen’s apathy in selecting appropriate candidates
Lack of defined criteria for appointment and transfer
Lack of transparency in appointment and transfer
Low involvement of citizens in policy-making
Ad-hoc implementation of participation mechanisms by public officials
Lack of authority devolved to local agencies
Lack of authority with investigating agencies, like CBI, CVC, CAG
Low awareness of accountability mechanisms like RTI, among
citizens
Subjective and non-transparent performance assessment of officials
Administrative apathy and non-cooperation of public officials
Lack of adequate infrastructure with law enforcement agencies
Low awareness of accountability mechanisms like PIL, among citizens
1
2
3
4
Inadequate
Information
1
Inadequate
Impartiality
2
Inadequate
Implementation
3
Inadequate
Infrastructure
4
Inadequate
Independence
5
Inadequate
Involvement
6
Low involvement of citizens in monitoring Government
Lack of minor penalties like warnings to check mis-conduct
Source: UC Analysis
These constraints can be further categorized into six inadequacies, that limit the
performance of the existing accountability mechanisms

The Six Initiatives
I hope that I may always desire more than I can accomplish.
Michelangelo, 1475–1564

Source: UC Analysis
Impartiality Implementation Infrastructure Independence Involvement
Information
Availability
Information
Accessibility
Personnel
Technology
Policy
Formulation
Performance
Evaluation
Redressal
Enforcement
Authority to
Agencies
Decentralisation
Information
Independent
Agency
Fixed Tenure
Performance-
linked Incentives
Institutionalisation
Timelines
Penalties
To strengthen the foundations of accountability, initiatives are needed in six
areas: Information, Impartiality, Implementation, Infrastructure, Independence and
Involvement
1 2 3 4 5 6
No
Progress
Strong
Progress
Minimal
Progress
Partial
Progress
Good
Progress

Information Availability
Provide information about the amount allocated to public schemes, the
amount utilised and the outcome
Provide information on funds allocated, and the amount utilised by the
Ministries
Allow citizens to track their public services (license, ration card etc)
applications online
43
Initiative 1 - Information: Enhance transparency in government functioning by
improving information availability and accessibility
Information Accessibility
Leverage information and communication technology (internet, mobile
phones) to foster transparency
Build awareness about accountability mechanisms
Source: UC Analysis
1.1
1.2
Increase transparency in appointments and transfers
Provide information on the operational expenses incurred by Ministries
None StrongMinimal Partial Good
Progress

Independent Agency
Form an independent agency to overlook appointments and transfers
44
Initiative 2 - Impartiality: Introduce independent check on appointment and
transfers, fixed tenure and performance-linked incentives
Fixed Tenure
Introduce fixed tenure for civil service officials to avoid rampant transfers
Source: UC Analysis
2.1
2.2
Performance-linked Incentives
Introduce performance-linked incentives and build an integrated
performance management system
2.3
Progress

Initiative 3 - Implementation: Strengthen implementation of policies by
institutionalising social accountability checks, prescribing timelines and penalising
officials for poor performance
Source: UC Analysis
Institutionalisation
Institutionalise social accountability mechanisms as part of governance
structure
Timelines
Prescribe timelines for implementation of accountability mechanisms
3.1
3.2
Penalties3.3
Introduce penalties as a part of accountability mechanisms and public
schemes
Progress

Personnel
Provide adequate personnel to accountability agencies
Provide training to improve effectiveness of personnel
46
Initiative 4 - Infrastructure: Provide adequate infrastructure support in the form of
personnel and technology
Technology
Leverage information technology and telecommunications to facilitate
enforcement of accountability
Source: UC Analysis
4.1
4.2
Progress

Authority to Agencies
Provide adequate authority to monitoring agencies
47
Initiative 5 - Independence: Empower monitoring agencies and decentralize
authority, to enable them to function effectively
Delegation of Power
Strengthen local authorities by delegating power
Source: UC Analysis
5.1
5.2
Progress

Policy Formulation
Participate in policy formulation
Track public expenditure
Evaluate quality of public services
48
Initiative 6 - Involvement: Increase participation of citizens in seeking
accountability for non-performance
Redressal Enforcement
Complain against poor delivery of public services
Complain against corrupt officials
Source: UC Analysis
6.1
6.3
Performance Evaluation6.2
Participate in budget formulation
Progress

The Five-Fold Path
“What would life be if we had no courage to attempt anything?”
Vincent Willem van Gogh, 1853–90

Provide Time
Encourage employees to volunteer time for CSOs:
•  Infosys employees can opt to work for a year with a CSO at half the
salary
•  HSBC and Standard Chartered encourage their staff to officially dedicate
some time and energy for social causes
1
Provide Media Access
Sponsor media campaigns of CSOs:
•  Tata Tea supported the Jaago Re! campaign of a CSO, to build citizen s
awareness on the importance of voting
•  NDTV supported and screened the ‘RTI Awards’ organised by a CSO
2
Provide Intellectual Capacity
Conduct research for CSOs, or share technical expertise in areas like legal
or financial analysis:
•  Accenture extends its expertise and skills to local CSOs, at lower fees
•  A law firm, Public Interest Legal Support and Research Centre, supports
CSOs by providing legal advice, legal research and litigation support
3

Provide Technology & Infrastructure
Corporates can provide CSOs with IT infrastructure or physical
infrastructure:
•  SP Jain Institute provides a CSO with office space and lecture room to
conduct workshops
•  The ConnectIT workshops run by the NASSCOM Foundation, was
aimed at building IT capacity in NGOs
4
Provide Monetary Support
Corporates can provide grants/sponsorships to CSOs:
•  Ford Foundation, set by the Ford Motor Company provides grants to
CSOs working for various causes
•  National Foundation of India (www.nfi.org.in) collects funds from
corporates and provides them to CSOs focused on specific issues
5

Epilogue
“There is a tide in the affairs of men.
Which, taken at the flood, leads to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.
On such a full sea are we now afloat,
And we must take the current where it serves,
Or lose all our ventures”
William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar,
1564–1616

1 3 764
5
1947 - 1970 1970 - 1990 1990 - 2010
53 56 59 62 68 71 74 77 83 86 89
9
8 11
15
14
13
16
10
17
12 18 20
19 2421
22
23
65 80
Phase I Phase II Phase III
25
3626
29
28
3730
27
31
33
34
32
35
39
38 42 464540 43
4441 47
25. New industrial
policy
26. FDI allowed
in various
sectors
27. Banking
reforms
33. SEBI set up
28. Rules of
FERA
liberalised
29. Investment of
foreign equity
allowed
30. FIIs were
permitted
31. Greater
freedom to
banks
44. Quantitative
restrictions
on imports
removed
45. Competition
commission
set up
92 98 01 04 0795
32. Creation of
NSE
47. VAT
implemented
1. Nationalisation
of RBI
2. Planning
Commission
formed
5. Development
Banks
6.  Few industries
opened to
foreign
investment
3. Industrial
development
strategy
7. Foreign
Investment
Promotion Board
9. RBI strongly
regulated
banks
4. India investment
centre created
12.  Nationalisation
of insurance
companies
17. Regional
rural banks
set up
13. Inspector
Raj
18. Delicensing
of c. 50
sectors
21. Restrictions
on imports
liberalised
14. FERA
implemented
19. Production
capacity
limits
removed
22. Tax rates
reduced
15. Restriction
imposed on
industries
20. Foreign
equity
permitted
23. Board for
Industrial &
Financial
Reconstruction
16. Import
restrictions
2
8.  Monopolies
Restrictive
Practices Act
35. Tax reforms
36. Private &
foreign banks
allowed
38. FDI limits
increased
39. Further de-
licensing
40. FERA
replaced by
FEMA
42. Disinvest-
ment of sick
PSUs
Pre 50 10
Negative impact
Positive impact
10. Nationalisation
of banks
11. New industrial
licensing
policy
24.  One
committee
system for
approval
34. Firms allowed
to raise capital
from abroad
41. IRDA set up
43. Foreign
participation
in JVs
increased
46. De-
reservation
of items
Significant economic reforms have been introduced since 1991

1947 - 1970 1970 - 1990 1990 - 2010
53 56 59 62 68 71 74 77 83 86 8965 80
23. Panchayati
Raj Institution
29. Mandatory
disclosure of
information by
election
candidates
33. Centralized
Public
Grievance
Redress &
Monitoring
System
24. Alternate
Dispute
Resolution
34. SC Judges
declare assets
& HC Judges
agree to
disclose
assets
25. Citizen s
Charter
35. Delivery
Monitoring
Unit
92 98 01 04 0795
1. Official
Secrets Act
11. Central
Vigilance
Commission
2. Enactment of
the
Constitution
12. Central Civil
Services
Conduct Rules
3. Parliamentary
Committees
13. 1st
Administrative
Reforms
Commission
4. Comptroller
and Auditor
General
4
5
2013 25 28 29 319 21 2610 11
6
3
27
30
2 19 22 24147
12
15
16
17
6. Union Public
Service
Commission
7. First General
elections
8. Programme
Evaluation
Organisation
9. Law
Commission
14. Judges
Inquiry Act
15. Maintenance
of Internal
Security Act
21.  First
Lokayukta
16. Censor- ship
of media
19. National
Police
Commission
17. Political
parties were
banned
26. Judicial
Collegium
31. Mandatory
social audit
as part of
NREGS
34
36. UID-Aadhar
rollout
18
22. Prevention
of
Corruption
Act
30.  RTI Act
implemented
at national
level
23
35
27. Bhagidari
Initiative
1
50Pre 50
8
5. Election
Commission
10. Central
Bureau of
Investigation
32
10
Negative impact
Positive impact
36
33. National e-
Governance
plan
18. Controller
General of
Accounts
20. Public
Interest
Litigation
33
32. Outcome
budgeting
Governance reforms have been few and sparse over the past decades, resulting in
poor quality of governance and lower accountability

Source: UC Analysis
Has negative impact
Has positive impact
1947 - 1970 1970 - 1990 1990 - 2010
53 56 59 62 68 71 74 77 83 86 8965 80
92 98 01 04 0795
Key Accountability Policies
1947 - 1970 1970 - 1990 1990 - 2010
53 56 59 62 68 71 74 77 83 86 8965 80
92 98 01 04 079550
50
Pre 50
Pre 50
Burst of
economic
reforms
Burst of
accountability
reforms
needed
Key Economic Policies
10
10
A burst of high-intensity governance reforms, similar to the economic reforms
during liberalisation are needed to improve accountability & governance

Implementation of accountability
mechanisms
Valley of
Despair
PerceivedAccountability
New
Equilibrium
Initial
Equilibrium
Tipping
Point
Low
High
Exposure of misgovernance by
media, citizens, CSOs
Improvement in
Accountability
?
?
India’s
position
in 2011
External Accountability
Internal, Horizontal & External
Accountability
?
?
?
56
Looking at the current pace of reforms, it is likely that we will see a measurable
improvement in accountability medium to long term

Appropriate
Representation
Participative
Conduct
Legitimate
Conduct
Liability
Enforcement
…You must be the change
you want to see in the world…
Mahatma Gandhi
57
Accountability

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