Battle of Narratives: Kremlin Disinformation in the Vitaliy Markiv Case in Italy

BATTLE OF NARRATIVES:
KREMLIN
DISINFORMATION
IN THE
VITALIY MARKIV
CASE IN ITALY
by Olga Tokariuk

 Introduction
 Structure of research
 Methodology
 Added value of this research
Chapter 1. The case of Vitaliy Markiv in Italy: background
Chapter 2. Key Russian propaganda narratives about Ukraine and the Markiv case
Chapter 3. Russian influences in Italy: general overview
Chapter 4. Propaganda narratives in the Markiv trial: analysis of the court sentence
Chapter 5. Disinformation related to the Markiv case in the Italian media
Chapter 6. Network of Italian online resources spreading disinformation about the Markiv case
 Conclusions and recommendations
Table of contents

3
BATTLE OF NARRATIVES: KREMLIN DISINFORMATION IN THE VITALIY MARKIV CASE IN ITALY
The judicial case of Vitaliy Markiv in Italy has become one
of the most controversial and high-profile cases related to
Russia’s war against Ukraine in recent years.
Markiv, who lived in Italy since he was a teenager
and obtained an Italian citizenship while keeping his
Ukrainian one, returned to Ukraine in 2013 to participate
in Maidan protests and later enrolled as a volunteer into
the National Guard to fight against Russian aggression in
Donbas. In 2017, he was arrested in Italy and charged
with a deliberate murder of the Italian photojournalist
Andrea Rocchelli and his Russian interpreter, former
dissident Andrei Mironov, in the war zone in Eastern
Ukraine. In 2019, Markiv was found guilty and sentenced
to 24 years in prison by the court in Rocchelli’s hometown
of Pavia.
Markiv’s trial and conviction were criticized as political and
controversial by the Ukrainian government, as well as by
Italian progressive parties Radicali Italiani and Più Europa.
The latter even asked the European Commission to send
independent observers to the appeals trial to ensure its
objectivity1
.
International human rights organizations expressed their
concern with the prominence of Kremlin disinformation in
the Markiv trial. The Italian Federation of Human Rights said
the trial was marred by propaganda about the conflict in
Ukraine2
.
Russian human rights NGO Memorial in a joint statement
with the French Centre pour la Protection International
and the Ukrainian Center for Civil Liberties criticized the
court for ‘insufficient examination of facts’ and expressed
doubts about ‘the objectivity of court’s conclusions’. It
said negative media coverage and disinformation related
to the case might have had an impact on the ruling,
considering that among the judges of the Italian court,
who took the decision, two were professional judges and
six were lay judges, selected from the people3
. The use of
INTRODUCTION
1
www.piueuropa.eu/2019/12/06/ucraina-della-vedova-scrive-a-von-der-leyen-osservatori-ue-al-processo-di-appello-a-vitaly-markiv/#!
2
www.fidu.it/caso-markiv-dalla-parte-della-verita/
3
www.memohrc.org/ru/news_old/predvaritelnye-itogi-ocenki-effektivnosti-sledstviya-po-delu-ob-ubiystve-fotokorrespondenta

4
Kremlin propaganda sources as evidence in the trial was
highlighted by international media4
.
Prominent lawyers joined the choir of those concerned
with Markiv’s conviction. Wayne Jordash, one of the world’s
leading international criminal lawyers, said the sentence
was a ‘reversal of burden of proof’ and an ‘undermining
of the presumption of innocence’5
. Enrico Zucca, deputy
general prosecutor of the Italian city of Genova, said the
Pavia court ignored the international status of the war
in Ukraine and a crucial role Kremlin propaganda and
disinformation played in it6
.
In November 2020, the appellate court of Milan fully
acquitted Markiv and ordered his immediate release. After
spending more than three years in a high-security prison in
Italy, he has returned to Ukraine. While recognizing there is
not enough proof of Markiv’s involvement, the appellate court
however confirmed the reconstruction of events presented
by the first instance court. Precisely, that journalists died as
a result of a deliberate attack, committed by the Ukrainian
military. This version of events, before being voiced by the
prosecution in the court, has been given much prominence
in Russian and Italian pro-Kremlin media. Markiv’s defense
argued it had no basis in facts: according to it, journalists’
died as a result of an unfortunate incident in the middle of
war, and there was no intention to kill them.
In February 2021, the prosecution objected against the
appellate court decision. The Supreme court of cassation in
Rome, the third and final instance, will consider the case in
Autumn this year.
In this paper, we want to examine the role Kremlin’s
disinformation played in the Markiv’s case in Italy. Our
goal is to establish how prominent it was both inside
the courtroom and outside it, in the information space,
and whether there are grounds to believe it might have
had an impact on the first instance court decision to find
Markiv guilty. To reach this objective, we will analyze both
the trial papers and the online media coverage of this
case in Italy.
4
www.nytimes.com/2019/12/17/world/europe/russia-italy-propaganda.html
5
www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/wayne-jordash-how-an-italian-court-undermined-the-presumption-of-innocence-in-markivs-conviction.html
6
www.altreconomia.it/un-soldato-a-processo-per-lomicidio-di-andy-rocchelli-un-caso-controverso/

5
STRUCTURE OF RESEARCH
First, the circumstances of journalists’ death, Markiv’s arrest
and trial will be described. We will then identify the most
popular Kremlin disinformation narratives about Ukraine,
which have been in use since the start of Maidan protests and
Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2013-2014, as well as
Russian propaganda main talking points about the Markiv’s
case.
Next, Russian influences in Italy and presence of Kremlin
disinformation in the Italian political and media scene will be
outlined. The full text of the first instance court’s reasons of
judgement in the Markiv case will be analyzed, with the goal to
verify whether it contained any narratives about Ukraine that
correlate with Russian disinformation, and whether any Kremlin
propaganda sources were quoted in the judgment.
Media coverage of the Markiv’s trial will be scrutinized, both
by the mainstream and fringe media in Italy, in order to
understand what idea of the case the Italian general public –
and, quite possibly, the jury – was getting. Finally, a network
of disinformation spreaders in Italy related to the Markiv’s case
will be established. The role of Italian media organizations in
this case will be analyzed as well.
METHODOLOGY
Based on existing research, the main Russian propaganda
narratives about Ukraine and the Markiv’s case will be
identified. Qualitative analysis of the first degree court’s
reasons of judgment will be conducted in order to establish
any possible matching narratives. Content analysis of the
Italian media publications (two mainstream media outlets and
three fringe websites which covered the case most extensively)
will be done with the same goal. An attempt to outline the
network of disinformation actors will be made, based on online
resources monitoring for keywords.
ADDED VALUE OF THIS RESEARCH
This research will show the constantly growing threat of
Kremlin’s disinformation – and how they influence not only
the public debate and the political decision making processes,
but can also have an impact on the verdicts of independent
judiciary in the Western democracies. The risk factors leading
to this need to be exposed and mitigating strategies to be
found. It will also put in the spotlight current weaknesses in
some countries’ resistance to Kremlin disinformation, as they
eventually take a very concrete toll on people’s lives. Finally, it
could serve as a warning to other countries and would allow
them to design proper and effective defense strategies.

6
Cargo train used as a barricade by Russian proxy fighters, with the Karachun hill in the background.
Sloviansk, Ukraine, 3 May 2014.
Photo courtesy by Vasiliy Maximov

7
Photographer Andrea Rocchelli and his Russian interpreter,
former Soviet dissident Andrei Mironov, were the first
journalists to lose their lives in the war in Eastern Ukraine. On
May 24, 2014 they were hit by a mortar fire near the frontline
in occupied Sloviansk in Donetsk region. Other three people
who were part of their group – French photographer William
Roguelon, Ukrainian taxi driver Yevhen Koshman and another
Ukrainian civilian – survived in the shelling.
Sloviansk was the first city in Donbas captured by Russian
special forces and their local proxies in April 2014. In early
May, Ukrainian military surrounded the city, trying to get back
control. By the second half of May, the fighting in Sloviansk
intensified. Ukrainian forces were firmly positioned on top of a
Karachun hill, overlooking the city and protecting a strategic TV
antenna. Russian proxy forces were firing at them from their
positions in occupied factories and residential areas.
Kremlin propaganda was in full swing, describing the anti-
terrorism operation against Russian hybrid forces, launched
by Ukraine, as ‘punitive’ and inventing grotesque fake stories
(such as an infamous fake about a boy allegedly crucified by
Ukrainian soldiers7
). Its goals were to intimidate and alienate
local population from the Kyiv government, distract the attention
from Russian aggression and discredit Ukraine abroad.
Russian propaganda outlets, such as RT, immediately blamed
the Ukrainian National Guard on Karachun hill for the deaths
of Rocchelli and Mironov8
. Ukraine said it was Russian hybrid
forces who killed them.
From the outside, it looked like an unfortunate deadly incident
in a crossfire in a war zone. Journalists died in a spot which
was one of the most dangerous at the time in Sloviansk, just
under the Karachun hill. It was close to the frontline, next to
CHAPTER 1.
THE CASE OF VITALIY MARKIV IN ITALY:
BACKGROUND
7
www.euvsdisinfo.eu/anniversary-the-crucified-boy-turns-two/
8
www.russian.rt.com/article/33748

8
two ceramic factories, occupied by Russian fighters, and near
a so-called ‘armoured train’ – a cargo train stationed on the
railway passage, used by Russian proxies as a barricade to fire
in the direction of Ukrainian forces on the Karachun hill. There
are numerous photos of them hiding behind the train9
. By the
end of May, the exchanges of fire in the area have intensified,
and, according to accounts of international journalists in
Sloviansk, they avoided the railway passage because of risks
connected to it. Mironov’s last words on the video, recorded
just minutes prior to his death, confirmed there was an
exchange of fire between the two sides of the conflict10
.
The next day after Rocchelli and Mironov’s deaths, on May 25,
2014, a short article11
was published on a website of the most
popular Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera. In this article,
entitled ‘The story of the captain: This is how Rocchelli died’, the author,
little-known freelance journalist Ilaria Morani, based in Donetsk,
quoted an anonymous soldier, whom she called a ‘captain of the
Ukrainian army’: "Normally we do not shoot in the direction of the city
and civilians, but once we spot movement, we load heavy artillery. This
is what happened to a car of two journalists and the interpreter. From
here, we shoot at a range of 1,5 kilometers. There is no clear frontline,
this is not a war like in Libya. There are actions scattered around the city,
we only wait for a green light to launch a final attack".
Two years later, public prosecutor in the Rocchelli’s hometown
of Pavia – as he himself later said in an interview12
– stumbled
upon the Corriere article while doing online research on this
case. An investigation which seemed to be in a dead end,
suddenly had a suspect: the ‘army captain’ quoted in the
article. Despite the journalist’s refusal to reveal her source,
investigators managed to identify him among her friends on
Facebook. The only Ukrainian soldier who had a connection
to Italy and an Italian citizenship – which made him easier to
prosecute – was Vitaliy Markiv.
Markiv’s and his Italian family phones were wiretapped: police
for months monitored their conversations waiting for his return
to Italy. On June 30, 2017, Markiv was arrested in Bologna
airport upon his arrival from Kyiv on a vacation with his wife,
and charged with deliberate murder of Rocchelli.
The quote attributed to him in the Corriere article was the
9
www.stampsy.com/stamp/17149
10
www.youtube.com/watch?v=6BowmAjxqqA&t=3s
11
www.corriere.it/esteri/14_maggio_25/ucraina-racconto-capitano-7bf53c06-e40a-11e3-8e3e-8f5de4ddd12f.shtml
12
www.storytel.com/it/it/series/43908-La-volpe-scapigliata

9
View of Karachun hill, where Ukrainian positions were stationed, from the railway passage with the cargo train.

10
only clue linking him to Rocchelli’s death. It was interpreted by
the prosecution as Markiv’s ‘extrajudicial confession’. Markiv
denied having taken responsibility for Rocchelli’s death during
the conversation, he said he learned about the tragic event
from the journalist and had no idea where it happened. Morani
failed to provide a recording or written notes to back up the
quote in her article.
Although it was established that Markiv indeed was on
Karachun hill near Sloviansk that day, it was also revealed
that he wasn’t a captain giving orders, but a regular National
Guard soldier. He also didn’t have access to a weapon that
killed the journalists. Despite that, charges against him were
not dropped: they were changed to ‘complicity in murder’.
The prosecution alleged that Markiv saw Rocchelli and
Mironov from his position on Karachun hill, identified them as
journalists, tried to intentionally shoot at them with his AK-74
rifle and, when failed, passed their coordinates to the mortar
unit of the Ukrainian army, thus ‘providing a crucial material
contribution to their murder’.
The trial began in Pavia, Rocchelli’s hometown, in July 2018.
Simultaneously with a criminal case against Markiv, the court
was considering a civil complaint against the state of Ukraine,
accusing its military of a war crime against journalists. Civil
plaintiffs were the relatives of the deceased photoreporter,
photo collective Cesura Lab he co-founded, and two
journalistic guilds: Italian National Press Federation (FNSI) and
Association of Lombardy Journalists. These unions claimed
the death of Rocchelli and Mironov was a deliberate attack on
representatives of the press and demanded a compensation
from Ukraine.
The court refused to conduct the inspection of the scene in
Ukraine, citing long time passed since the events and blaming
Ukrainian authorities to their failure to properly investigate
the case prior to Markiv’s arrest. Ukraine repeatedly offered to
create a joint investigative team after his detention in 2017,
but Italian authorities didn’t respond.
After a year of court hearings and with no Italian investigators
in Ukraine, in July 2019 Markiv was found guilty of complicity
in deliberate murder of Andrea Rocchelli and sentenced to 24
years in prison. It was more than the public prosecutor asked:
in his closing remarks, he insisted on 17 years of imprisonment
and said that he won’t appeal if Markiv is found not guilty, on
a condition that Ukrainian military is judged as responsible for
the attack.
Key witnesses in the trial were journalists. Ilaria Morani
confirmed the content of her Corriere article, but said
she hasn’t actually spoken to Markiv and has overheard
his conversation on a loudspeaker with a common friend,
photographer Marcello Fauci. Morani said she didn’t quote

11
Markiv’s words literally, but rendered their general meaning.
Fauci testified that he met Markiv during Maidan protests and
called him occasionally on the phone to get information, and he
did so on the day of Rocchelli’s death. In court, Fauci couldn’t
remember the exact content of their conversation or that Markiv
mentioned his or Ukrainian side responsibility for the reporter’s
death.
Another key witness was French photographer William
Roguelon, who was together with Rocchelli and Mironov that
day and survived in the attack. He has never met Markiv
before and previously said he didn’t know which side was
shooting at them. However, in Pavia court he changed his
opinion: he testified it was now his ‘intimate belief’ that
Ukrainian military on Karachun deliberately targeted journalists.
All evidence presented by the prosecution in the first instance
trial was circumstantial, as noted by senior international
lawyers familiar with the case13
. There was no documented
proof of Markiv’s criminal intent or his presence at the position
on the day and time of journalists’ death, as well of his
physical ability to identify them from 2 km distance and target
with an AK-74 rifle, the only weapon he had.
Considering this, the Milan court of appeals overturned
the Pavia court conviction and acquitted Vitaliy Markiv on
November 3, 2020 for ‘not having committed a crime’. In its
reasons of judgement, published in January 2021, the court
concluded, however, that while Markiv’s guilt is impossible
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, it considers proven the
fact that it was the Ukrainian military to launch an intentional
attack against journalists. This assumption – that murder
of Rocchelli and Mironov was deliberately committed by the
Ukrainian side, and that they did not become accidental victims
of a crossfire between warring parties – in the court’s opinion,
was confirmed by the testimony of Roguelon and alleged
Markiv’s quotes in Corriere.
Since no investigation on the scene in Ukraine was done,
the court relied on Google Earth images as well as photos
and videos found online to conclude that Ukrainian military
had full visibility over the spot where Rocchelli and Mironov
died. The court believed the motive for the Ukrainian side to
intentionally kill Rocchelli and Mironov was that they reported
‘uncomfortable truth’ about the suffering of civilians in
Sloviansk due to the actions of Ukrainian side.
An article by Rocchelli and Mironov, in which they interviewed
locals who blamed Ukraine for constant shellings, was quoted
to support that argument14
. However, their last article prior
13
www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/wayne-jordash-how-an-italian-court-undermined-the-presumption-of-innocence-in-markivs-conviction.html
14
www.echo.msk.ru/blog/novaya_gazeta/1327254-echo/

12
to death and messages to friends were not mentioned in
the courtroom. In them, Rocchelli and Mironov presented a
different point of view: they wrote about the use of civilians
as ‘protective shields’ by Russian proxies15
and interviewed
Sloviansk residents who blamed Putin, not Ukraine, for the war
and civilian sufferings16
.
The court agreed with the prosecution argument that Rocchelli
and Mironov were ‘inconvenient’ journalists only for the
Ukrainian side, while there was no motive to ‘eliminate them’
for Russian hybrid forces. A hypothesis that Mironov, an
15
www.euromaidanpress.com/2020/10/23/italian-court-says-ukrainian-army-killed-inconvenient-journalists-their-premortem-report-suggests-otherwise/
16
www.memohrc.org/ru/monitorings/intervyu-s-bezhencami-iz-groznogo-v-slavyanske
17
www.piueuropa.eu/2019/12/06/ucraina-della-vedova-scrive-a-von-der-leyen-osservatori-ue-al-processo-di-appello-a-vitaly-markiv/#!
outspoken Putin’s critic who survived several attacks on his life
in Russia, could have been a target of Kremlin hybrid forces in
Sloviansk, was not given significant weight during the trial17
.
In the trial where evidence against Markiv and Ukranian
military was only circumstantial and no investigation on the
scene was done, narratives about war in Ukraine, actions of
warring parties and Markiv personally, assumed a crucial role.
Before analyzing these narratives, let’s take a look at key
Kremlin disinformation about Ukraine since 2013 and Italy’s
particular susceptibility to it.

13
CHAPTER 2.
KEY KREMLIN PROPAGANDA
NARRATIVES ABOUT UKRAINE
AND THE MARKIV’S CASE
In its aggression against Ukraine, launched in March 2014
with the annexation of Crimea, Russia relied heavily on non-
military means. Ukraine has become a testing ground for the
Kremlin approach that warfare in the information field must
be conducted simultaneously with warfare at land, air and
sea, and that information superiority is essential for achieving
victory on the battlefield.
Numerous studies have stablished that Russian disinformation
campaign against Ukraine was conducted at all levels –
from the political level against the state of Ukraine, its
structures, and politicians, up to the military level18
. It was
instrumental to sow fears and intimidate the population of
Eastern Ukraine in order to make them oppose the central
government and support the creation of so-called ‘separatist
republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk. Kremlin used propaganda
and disinformation to demoralize the Ukrainian military,
to sow discord within the society and to alienate Ukraine’s
international allies.
Spread by both Russian state officials and Kremlin-controlled
media, propaganda targeted not only domestic or Russian-
speaking audiences in Ukraine and neighboring countries. With
the help of its powerful media outlets broadcasting in English
and other languages, such as RT and Sputnik, the Kremlin
was able to spread distorted and manipulative narratives
about Ukraine and the war well beyond the borders of the
post-Soviet space. Its goal was to legitimize the annexation of
18
Russian Information Campaign Against the Ukrainian State and Defence Forces: Combined Analysis. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence,
Riga 2017. www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Report_infoops_08.02.2017.pdf

14
19
www.uacrisis.org/en/image-of-ukraine-on-russian-tv
20
www.stratcomcoe.org/download/file/fid/77757
21
www.stopfake.org/en/fakes-debunked-by-the-stopfake-project-between-2014-2017-narratives-and-sources/
22
www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/fiiareport45_fogoffalsehood.pdf
23
www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/11/11/7043924/
Crimea, deny any Russian responsibility for providing military
and financial support to its proxies in Donbas and to discredit
Ukrainian state institutions and military, in order to undermine
their support in the West.
As 2018 study ‘Image of Ukraine on Russian TV’ notes, in
the Russian media ‘facts and events are used to support the
pre-prepared narratives […] Once established narratives are
supported by fake news in smaller part, but mainly by a deliberately
manipulated interpretation of real events’19
.
A narrative is ‘an oral or written story setting out the author’s ideas
about an object, person or process in a specific order’20
. Narratives
are controlled through the creation of myths and manipulation
of the current elements of identity. In the framework of
narrative control, it is possible to “insert” a particular country
in a positive or a negative context.
Based on the findings of several qualitative studies of Kremlin
propaganda in Russian, Ukrainian21
, as well as Eastern and
Western European media22
, here are some disinformation
narratives related to Ukraine and the war in Donbas, relevant
for this research.
There is a civil war in Ukraine and Russia has nothing
to do with it. A narrative, aimed at denying Russia’s
responsibility for initiating and continuously instigating the
conflict in Donbas. It was well documented that Russian
special forces led by a former military intelligence officer Igor
Girkin occupied Sloviansk in Eastern Ukraine in April 2014
(Girkin himself publicly admitted this in his interviews23
). Since
then, Russia financed, provided manpower and weapons to its
proxies in Eastern Ukraine. In the same vein, Russia denied its
role in downing the MH17 flight, despite mounting irrefutable
evidence and the trial in the Netherlands, where Girkin is one
of the suspects.
Ukraine conducts a ‘punitive operation’ against the
people of Donbas. This narrative is based on another one,
dominant since the Soviet times: that of the Great patriotic war
and Russian victory over Nazism. Ukrainian soldiers are called
‘karateli’ (punishers) in an analogy with Nazis during the WWII,

15
they are accused of ‘bombing their own people’ and conducting
‘a punitive operation against those opposing a Nazi coup in
Kyiv’. On the contrary, Russia, according to this narrative, is
the one who cares about the people of Donbas and provides
them with aid in order to save them from a ‘humanitarian
catastrophe’.
Ukrainian military forces and volunteer battalions
commit crimes against civilian population. In spring
and summer 2014, Russian state media, politicians and
diplomats spread numerous fakes about alleged crimes of
the Ukrainian army and volunteer battalions. Probably the
most infamous one is the story of a ‘crucified boy’. Ukrainian
soldiers were accused of killing a child in front of his mother
on Sloviansk central square after entering the city in July
2014, allegations that were completely baseless24
. Russian
media and officials constantly spoke about a ‘genocide’ in the
Eastern Ukraine, mass executions at hands of the Ukrainian
army and deliberate shelling of civilian residential areas.
While there were reports of the damage to civilian housing as
a result of the Ukrainian side responding to bombardments
by the Russian proxies from residential areas, most of the
allegations were not confirmed by independent observers and
international organizations.
Fascists and Nazi are prominent in Ukraine. This
narrative has a historical connection to the Soviet narrative
of ‘banderovtsi’, Ukrainian Insurgent Army and their leader
Stepan Bandera who fought during the WWII for the
creation of an independent Ukrainian state. Ukrainians
who participated in Maidan protests in Kyiv were called
‘banderovtsi’, radical nationalists, fascists and Nazis by
Russian state officials and media. The Ukrainian government
which came to power as a result of ex-president Yanukovych
escape in 2014, was called a ‘fascist junta’. Soldiers of the
Ukrainian army and volunteer battalions, who fought in the
East against Russian aggression, were presented as far-right
radicals.
Ukraine is a failed state and a marionette of the
West. According to this narrative, Ukraine has been
plunged into chaos after Maidan protests, it’s a dangerous
place from which everyone tries to escape. Ukrainian
state institutions are weak and incapable of governing the
country. Maidan was orchestrated by the USA and EU to
undermine Russia’s positions in the region and install NATO
bases on Ukraine’s territory. Now Ukraine is under external
control of the Western financial institutions and George
Soros.
24
www.stopfake.org/en/lies-crucifixion-on-channel-one/

16
Some other propaganda narratives included Maidan as a
coup d’état, rampant Russophobia in Ukraine, assault on
freedom of speech (because of blocking of Russian media and
social networks), etc. The aims of these narratives were to
denigrate the new course of the Ukrainian state and anyone
supporting it, and to apologize and justify all actions by the
Kremlin and its proxies in Ukraine.
An analysis of Russian media coverage and politicians’
statements about Markiv’s arrest and trial shows that
there were two main narratives about it, consistent with
abovementioned ones. The first one is that of ‘a civil war’ in
Ukraine, in which Ukrainian military kills civilian population
of Donbas. The other one is that Ukraine is a ‘fascist’ and a
‘Nazi’-run country. By depicting Ukraine as uncivilized, far-right-
dominated, corrupt, incapable to govern and ready to destroy
a part of its own population, Russian propaganda was trying
to make a point that the democratic West cannot be partner of
such a country.
Vitaliy Markiv was accused by the Kremlin-controlled media of
being a Russophobe, who committed a hate crime because he
killed a Russian citizen, and a Nazi. In the eyes of propaganda
spreaders, he impersonated a threat to freedom of speech
in Ukraine. Rocchelli and Mironov’s deaths were described as
an outcome of a deliberate attack on journalists, which are
widespread in Ukraine.
Russian propaganda media used the Markiv’s trial in Italy as a
way to legitimize these manipulative narratives about Ukraine.
At the same time they tried to downplay the significance of
the case, ridiculing Ukrainians for their attention and their
perception of Markiv as a national hero. Kremlin propaganda
praised the verdict of the first instance court in Italy and
blamed Ukrainian interference for the decision of the appellate
court to acquit Markiv, while saying this is not the final decision
and it can be reversed. It also hailed the opening of the
criminal case against Markiv in Russia in December 2020, after
his release from the Italian prison.

17
CHAPTER 3.
RUSSIAN INFLUENCES IN ITALY:
GENERAL OVERVIEW
Italy historically has close relations with Russia on political,
economic and cultural level. According to Pew Research survey,
in early 2020 43% of Italians had a favorable attitude towards
Russia, up from just about 20% in 2014 and more than a
European average25
.
The problem of Kremlin propaganda and disinformation in
Italy has long been underestimated. A few publications on the
topic were made by Italian journalist Jacopo Iacoboni26
and
the Italian edition of the Ukrainian fact-checking initiative Stop
Fake27
.
This has been slowly changing since late 2016 after the
constitutional referendum in Italy, which Russia reportedly
tried to influence28
. In 2018, ahead of general elections, there
were several social media campaigns by accounts connected
to Russia, endorsing political parties promoting the Kremlin’s
agenda in Italy29
and reposting content of its propaganda
media30
. In spring 2020, a new alert was raised by the Italian
parliamentary committee on national security about the danger
of Kremlin disinformation in connection to the coronavirus
pandemic31 32
.
25
www.stratcomcoe.org/analysis-russias-information-campaign-against-ukraine
26
www.lastampa.it/politica/2016/11/02/news/la-propaganda-russa-all-offensiva-anti-renzi-e-il-web-grillino-rilancia-1.34764558
27
www.stopfake.org/it/
28
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2017-12-05/how-stand-kremlin
29
www.medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-echo-campaigns-and-electoral-results-in-italy-dc222dd2b6e6
30
www.english.elpais.com/elpais/2018/03/01/inenglish/1519922107_909331.html
31
www.formiche.net/2020/05/russia-cina-propaganda-italia-rapporto-copasir/
32
www.medium.com/dfrlab/russia-exploits-italian-coronavirus-outbreak-to-expand-its-influence-6453090d3a98

18
On the official level, Italy condemned the annexation of Crimea
and aligned itself with the EU in imposing sanctions on Russia.
At the same time, many influential political forces inside the
country justified Russian aggression in Ukraine and spread
disinformation about Maidan protests and the war in Donbas.
These political forces mostly stem from extreme left and right
wings of the Italian political spectrum, but are not limited to
them.
As Russia’s 1990s and early 2000s favorite, media tycoon Silvio
Berlusconi was gradually losing power and popularity, the
Kremlin established new alliances in Italy with nationalist Lega
and populist Five Star Movement (5SM). For a short period of
time in 2018-2019, these two parties formed a government
coalition in Italy. Opposition to the EU sanctions against Russia
was one of the points uniting them.
Lega’s leader Matteo Salvini repeatedly traveled to Moscow
after the start of war in Ukraine to show his support for the
Kremlin and call on the EU to lift sanctions against Russia,
saying that they were damaging Italian entrepreneurs33
. In
an interview with The Washington Post in 201834
, Salvini
called Maidan protests in Ukraine ‘a fake revolution […]
a pseudo-revolution funded by foreign powers’. He refused
to condemn the annexation of Crimea, justifying an
illegitimate ‘referendum’ conducted by Russia at a point of
a gun.
Lega has close connections with Russian ultranationalists,
such as theorist of Eurasianism Alexander Dugin and ‘orthodox
oligarch’ Konstantin Malofeev, who financed Russian hybrid
forces in Eastern Ukraine since 201435
and owns a propaganda
TV station Tsargrad. In 2014, Lega helped to set up the
Lombardy-Russia Cultural Association which advances Russian
agenda in Italy on various levels and spreads disinformation
about Ukraine. It promoted the opening of two pseudo
‘consulates’ of unrecognized Donetsk and Luhansk ‘people’s
republics’ in Milan and Turin36
.
A journalistic investigation in 2019 revealed that the president
of Lombardy-Russia Gianluca Savoini, Salvini’s close aide, held
negotiations with the Kremlin about a transfer of 49 mln euro
33
www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/The_Kremlins_Trojan_Horses_2_web_1121.pdf
34
www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/italy-has-done-a-lot--maybe-too-much/2018/07/19/dc81a292-8acf-11e8-8aea-86e88ae760d8_story.html
35
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/jl9729.aspx
36
www.vice.com/it/article/wj9x5q/consolato-torino-donbass-separatista

19
to support Lega’s electoral campaign37
This led to a collapse
of coalition government of Lega and 5SM. Savoini, according
to a report the author of this study co-authored38
, also had
a connection to the network of recruiters of Italian far-right
mercenaries to fight for Russian proxy forces in Donbas.
On the left side of the political spectrum in Italy, the Kremlin
has its sympathizers as well. Leftist populists from the Five Star
Movement have been a part of the government coalition in
Italy since 2018. While 5SM rhetoric has been more restrained
since coming to power, its representatives were actively
spreading Russian disinformation about Ukraine when they
were in the opposition.
In June 2014, a Five Star Movement MP Marta Grande
(currently head of foreign affairs parliamentary committee)
delivered a controversial speech39
in the Italian parliament. In
it, she talked about ‘filtering camps’ in Ukraine and mentioned
a photo of alleged cannibalism by Ukrainian soldiers (which
was revealed to be a shot from a fiction movie; Grande
apologized for it several days later40
). She accused Ukrainian
government of bombing civilians and of ‘persecuting, torturing
and killing’ Russians as an ethnic group. In the same speech,
she also tried to justify Russian aggression in Ukraine by saying
that this was the way for the Kremlin to defend itself from the
NATO threat, and that the West should be grateful for Russia’s
contribution to the victory in World War II. In this way, Kremlin
narratives and disinformation about Ukraine were able to make
it to the halls of the Italian parliament.
The Five Star Movement’s Manlio di Stefano in 2015 accused
the West of staging a coup d’état in Ukraine and installing a
pro-US government in Kiev. In a now removed post on the
blog of 5SM founder Beppe Grillo, he argued that the West
is preparing to turn Ukraine into a NATO base in order to
launch “a final assault on Russia”41
. Since becoming a deputy
foreign minister in 2018, Di Stefano has abstained from such
rhetoric.
37
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/albertonardelli/salvini-russia-oil-deal-secret-recording
38
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/albertonardelli/matteo-salvini-russia-gianluca-savoini
39
www.youtube.com/watch?v=PCZAd0tqps8
40
www.stopfake.org/it/fake-marta-grande-i-soldati-ucraini-sono-cannibali/
41
web.archive.org/web/20171119004605/http://www.beppegrillo.it:80/2015/06/putin_circondato.html

20
42
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/608864/IPOL_STU(2019)608864_EN.pdf
43
www.lastampa.it/politica/2016/11/08/news/l-antidiplomatico-cosi-un-sito-divulga-la-linea-filo-russa-del-m5s-1.34767734
44
www.repubblica.it/politica/2017/05/08/news/forenza_e_banda_bassotti_in_donbass_con_la_carovana_antifascita_kiev_li_vuole_processare_per_terrorismo-164918963/
45
www.ilcittadinodirecanati.it/notizie-territorio-marche/33879-ucraina-una-guerra-dimenticata-se-ne-parla-a-tolentino-lunedi-29-maggio
46
www.codastory.com/disinformation/soft-power/russia-coronavirus-aid-italy/
47
www.static1.squarespace.com/static/59f8f41ef14aa13b95239af0/t/5c6d8b38b208fc7087fd2b2a/1550682943143/Smagliy_Hybrid-Analytica_10-2018_upd.pdf
48
www.euromaidanpress.com/2016/07/16/euromaidan-and-the-donbas-war-in-the-italian-media/
5SM-affiliated websites and social media continue to spread
disinformation to this day. As noted in the EU report on
propaganda and disinformation42
, Five Star Movement and
Lega are linked to seemingly independent websites and
social media accounts that push fabricated content. Website
L’Antidiplomatico, reportedly connected to 5SM, regularly
publishes content with anti-Western, pro-Kremlin messages
and conspiracy theories43
.
Italian communists also engaged in pushing Kremlin’s agenda
about Ukraine. In 2017, a European parliament MP Eleonora
Forenza, member of the Italian Communist Refoundation party,
travelled to the occupied Donbas, in violation of the Ukrainian
law. She expressed support for Russian proxy fighters there
and condemned Maidan protests as a Western-sponsored
coup44
. A month before Vitaliy Markiv’s arrest, Forenza along
with Rocchelli’s family and lawyer participated in an event in
Tolentino, a central Italian town where Markiv’s family lived.
During this event, Ukrainian authorities and military were
accused of deliberate attacks on journalists and linked to
Rocchelli’s death45
.
Russia tries to influence Italian cultural and educational
institutions as well. According to Sergio Germani, director
of Gino Germani Institute for Social Sciences and Strategic
Studies, over the last years ‘Moscow invested a lot of resources
into supporting cultural centers, think tanks and news outlets’
in Italy46
. As Hybrid Analytica study shows, The Russkiy Mir
Foundation, which promotes Russian imperialist agenda, has
centers of Russian culture in three Italian universities47
.
Russian disinformation narratives, in particular about
Ukraine, are often present in the Italian media48
. Kremlin-
sponsored websites, such as Sputnik, operate in Italian
language and up until recently were quoted as credible
news sources by the mainstream Italian media. According

21
to Oksana Pakhliovska, professor at La Sapienza university
of Rome, there is an information vacuum in Italy about
Ukraine, and even if there are news, they are usually
coming from Russian sources49
.
The author of this study has personal experience of
participation in various Italian TV and radio shows since
2013, in which she had to refute and debunk various Russian
narratives about Ukraine, expressed by other guests, usually
Moscow correspondents, former Italian diplomats in Russia and
pro-Kremlin analysts. These narratives included ‘a civil war’ in
Ukraine, Ukrainian Nazis on Maidan and in the military, Russia’s
‘historical rights’ to Crimea, its war in Ukraine as a response to
NATO ‘encircling Russia’, etc.
Some Italian journalists who covered Russian aggression
in Ukraine and questionable Russian activities in Italy were
subjected to threats, accused of Russophobia and far-right
49
www.glavcom.ua/interviews/oksana-pahlovska-v-italiji-val-antiukrajinskoji-literaturi-jiji-leytmotiv-kijivska-hunta-vchinila-genocid-385760.html
50
www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/04/04/news/russia_italia_jacopo_iacoboni-253071519/
51
www.codastory.com/disinformation/soft-power/russia-coronavirus-aid-italy/
52
www.facebook.com/ilFattoQuotidiano/posts/sulla-crisi-ucrainaroberta-zunini-auguro-a-lei-e-alla-sua-famiglia-di-essere-bom/872753722738875/
53
www.affarinternazionali.it/2020/03/se-la-disinformazione-russa-in-italia-corre-piu-della-pandemia/
views. The most recent case is that of La Stampa journalist
Jacopo Iacoboni who received threats from the spokesman of
Russian defence ministry50
in response to his critical coverage
of Russian coronavirus aid delivery to Italy in March 202051
.
Another journalist Roberta Zunini was subjected to online
harassment52
following her coverage of Maidan protests and
the war in Ukraine.
Italian politics and society have been targets of Kremlin
influence operations for a long time, putting at risk the
country’s democracy. However, a worrying new development,
noted by Nona Mikhelidze from the Italian Institute of
International Affairs, is that Kremin disinformation seems to
have penetrated the Italian judiciary system as well, and the
case of Vitaliy Markiv is the case in point53
. In the next chapter,
we analyze the verdict of the first instance court in the Markiv’s
trial in order to verify whether there are any narratives that
correlate with the Kremlin disinformation.

22
CHAPTER 4.
PROPAGANDA NARRATIVES
IN THE MARKIV TRIAL:
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT SENTENCE
The motivational part of the first instance trial sentence
(reasons of judgement) to Vitaliy Markiv describes the trial
proceedings, witnesses accounts and evidence presented. This
comprehensive document, which explains the decision to find
Markiv guilty of the complicity in murder of Andrea Rocchelli
and sentence him to 24 years in prison, consists of 176
pages54
.
As a result of the analysis of this document, several main
narratives were identified, which were used by the court to
describe events in Ukraine, such as Maidan protests, war in the
East, actions of the Ukrainian military and Russian proxy forces
in Donbas. Many of these narratives contain factual mistakes
and correlate with those commonly used by the Kremlin
propaganda machine.
54
www.giustiziami.it/gm/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/sentenza-rocchelli-markiv-motivazioni_compressed.pdf
1. Historical mistakes in description of Maidan protests,
modern Ukrainian history and Donbas war
The court’s description of the ‘scene of events’ in Ukraine
is factually incorrect. It states that ‘after the revolt in
February 2014, known as ‘Euromaidan’ in the square in Kyiv,
there were violent clashes between the militias of the Ukrainian
armed forces and pro-Russian separatists’. The ‘Euromaidan’
protests, in reality, lasted since November 2013 till
February 2014, and encompassed many cities across
Ukraine. The definition ‘militias of the Ukrainian armed forces’

23
looks problematic, as does a lack of mention that ‘clashes’
in Donbas began due to the intervention of Russian special
agents who were coordinating occupation of police stations
and public offices.
The court also claims that ‘pro-Russian groups’ in the
Eastern Ukraine, ‘that opposed the recognition of the
Ukrainian government’, were formed ‘after the Declaration
of independence by Ukraine’. This is again a factual mistake.
Ukraine declared its independence in 1991, and there were no
separatist movements in Donbas until April 2014, when Russia
sent there its special forces led by an ex-GRU colonel Igor
Girkin.
Historical negligence and scarce familiarity with the Ukrainian
context is also manifested on several occasions, when the
word ‘pro-Soviet’ was used in the court papers instead of ‘pro-
Russian’.
2. What is happening in Ukraine is a civil war.
Distorted representation of the situation in Sloviansk in 2014
The war context, in which the death of Andrea Rocchelli and
Andrei Mironov occurred, is not presented correctly either.
Conflict in the Eastern Ukraine is called ‘a civil war’
throughout the document. There is no mention that it was
a Russian aggression in which participated Russian military
and special forces. There is no mention of the annexation
of Crimea, which marked the start of Russian military
intervention in Ukraine. Nor there is a mention that Ukraine’s
government decision to launch an anti-terrorism operation
was in compliance with its right to protect its sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
Therefore, a false idea of an internal conflict in Ukraine is
created, in which there is only ‘a confrontation between the
Ukrainian Army, which sought to regain possession of the
territories, and the pro-Russian forces of the self-proclaimed
Donetsk and Luhansk Republics’. This further leads the court to
embrace the narrative of the Ukrainian military fighting against
civilian population of Donbas, one of the favorite tropes of
Russian propaganda.
Civilian population of Sloviansk is presented as
overwhelmingly pro-Russian: ‘Where the separatists
were, let’s say, an occupying force, there was really no

24
conflict with the local population. We also believe that
a lot of people who lived there, in fact, were culturally
pro-Russian. So, say, they did not take up positions
in places where civilians could be affected. Therefore,
they choose abandoned structures’ (testimony of
Maiocchi). It was however confirmed by international
organizations that Russian proxy forces in Sloviansk
fired from residential areas. They set up their positions
in church yards or near hospitals, fired from there on
Ukrainian positions and hastily left before the response
arrived.
Russian proxies’ attacks on civilians are not mentioned in
the court’s description of the situation in Sloviansk. There
is no reference to extra-judicial killings and torture of
representatives of religious minorities and pro-Ukrainian
activists, happening from April till July 2014, when the city was
under occupation55
.
55
www.rferl.org/a/the-executioners-of-slovyansk/30743132.html
In the initial indictment to Markiv, the National Guard of
Ukraine was called an ‘irregular paramilitary corps’. Later, this
wording was changed into an ‘auxiliary paramilitary corps’ who
joined ‘the regular units of the Ukrainian Army engaged in the
suppression of separatist movements that originated in the
Ukrainian region of Donbas’.
However, confusion over the status of the National Guard
persisted, as at one point its regular soldiers are called ‘Ukrainian
rebels’ who ‘conquered the Karachun hill’. The court basically put
them on par with Russian proxy forces, often referred to as
‘rebels’. This flawed representation undermined the legitimacy of
the Ukrainian military and National Guard as representatives of
the state, non-comparable to Russian-backed irregular forces.
3.
Legitimacy and status of the Ukrainian National
Guard questioned

25
Russian-backed combatants in civilian clothes shoot in the direction of Ukrainian positions on Karachun hill. /

26
A significant amount of attention was dedicated to supposed
wrongdoings of the Ukrainian military against civilians.
The court, in fact, in convicting Markiv, believed that he shot
‘ “at everything that moved, at a distance of two kilometers”,
according to what turned out to be the usual regime of joint
military operations of the National Guard and the Army’. This
far-reaching assumption about the regular modus operandi
of the Ukrainian military is based on the article in Corriere
della Sera and Markiv’s quote there, which he disowned
and which his defense claimed was misinterpreted by the
reporter. The journalist herself admitted that Markiv’s words
were quoted not literally.
The court believed that Ukrainian military regularly attacked
civilians based on Markiv’s testimony that people dressed in
civilian clothes sometimes fought for Russian hybrid forces
or provided them support. Therefore, the jury concluded,
for the Ukrainian soldiers ‘it was common to look with suspicion
even at the civilian population, which was seen as possible
enemies who could provide the separatists with support and
useful information’.
4.
Ukrainian military deliberately and routinely
targeted civilians and journalists
This narrative of the prosecution convinced the court that it
was the motive of a deliberate attack on a group of journalists,
in which Rocchelli and Mironov died. The court believed it to
be ‘a crime against humanity as an injury to inviolable human rights
committed by the accused’ in collusion with his superiors from the
Ukrainian National Guard and Armed forces.
Another conclusion was made by the court regarding
the Ukrainian side alleged previous voluntary attacks on
journalists. The Ukrainian military, according to the sentence,
was ‘responsible, in that period, of other attacks, which, in a similar
manner, involved other journalists in the area where pro-Russian
forces were stationed’. The court believed that Ukrainian soldiers
were ‘indifferent to the presence of journalists and civilians’
when launching their attacks. This is based on a testimony of
the Italian journalist Carubba who, a week before Rocchelli’s
death, found himself under a mortar fire, probably from
Karachun, while talking to soldiers of Russian hybrid forces in
the same spot.
In fact, the train passage and the area near Zeus ceramics
factory nearby were controlled by Russian-backed forces
who regularly attacked Ukrainians on Karachun hill. They

27
were known targets for the Ukrainian military who fired in
response. However, the court believed journalists could not
have been mistaken for Russian proxy fighters, that they
were recognized as such and deliberately attacked by the
Ukrainian military in an unprovoked attack, ‘with the clear
intention of eliminating them, which is a violation of humanitarian
law and the fourth Geneva Convention’.
The court dismissed the possibility that journalists became
accidental victims of a crossfire between the warring factions,
disregarding Mironov’s last video (poorly translated into
Italian at the trial, with the meaning of his words distorted).
By convicting Markiv, it also convicted the Ukrainian state,
‘because the actions of the accused were not an act of individual
and improvised military aggression, and represented the
implementation of the decision that concerned the entire chain of
command of the armed forces’.
The arguments of the Ukrainian witnesses – National Guard
soldiers and commanders – that they were only allowed to
open fire when under attack and had an explicit order not to
target civilians, were not taken into account.
5.
Portrayal of Russian proxies in Sloviansk as friendly
towards journalists
While accusing the Ukrainian side of deliberately attacking
journalists, the court also stated that Russian proxy fighters in
Sloviansk had a positive attitude to the members of the press.
In doing so, it relied mostly on the testimony of the survivor of
that attack, French photographer William Roguelon.
Roguelon, whose credibility was put into doubt by several
colleagues who worked with him in Sloviansk56, testified
that ‘there had never been problems of aggression towards
journalists with the pro-Russian military men with whom
relations were established’. Roguelon, who spent several
nights with Russian-backed combatants on the barricades,
also said that ‘they gave instructions for protecting journalists,
recommended more or less dangerous areas so that they could
stop and take pictures, so as not to come under fire from
Ukrainian forces’.
56
www.hromadske.ua/posts/u-den-obstilu-vin-ne-mig-poyasniti-sho-vidbulosya-i-zvidki-strilyali-fotograf-pro-klyuchovogo-svidka-u-spravi-markiva

28
The court agreed with the description of Russian proxy forces in
Sloviansk as friendly towards members of the press and argued
that they ‘made possible and facilitated’ Roguelon’s escape from
the scene after Rocchelli and Mironov died. However, Roguelon
himself in his testimony contradicted this by saying that Russian
fighters shot from Kalashnikovs into a ditch where he was hiding.
At the same time, Roguelon accused the Ukrainian side of a
deliberate attack on their group of journalists. Although during
his first questioning by the police he stated he wasn’t sure
which side was shooting, in court he changed his opinion. He
testified that it was ‘an intentional attempt to eliminate them’
by the Ukrainians, because ‘there were no warning shots and they
were taken aim along with the car - to prevent them from escaping’.
His account of a unilateral attack contradicts the video, on
which Andrei Mironov says they were caught in a crossfire, and
shots from close distance are heard.
The court concluded that Ukrainian military deliberately and
regularly obstructed journalists’ work in Sloviansk. This conclusion
is in contrast with international organizations and media reports
about numerous cases of illegal detentions of journalists,
committed by Girkin-led forces in Sloviansk in the same period of
time. Those detained by Russian proxies were usually Ukrainian
and American journalists (the most prominent case is that of Vice
News reporter Simon Ostrovsky57
), who spent several days or
several months in the basement of the occupied SBU building.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights report,
published on May 15, 2014, explicitly blamed Russian proxies in
Sloviansk for the attacks on media representatives: ‘journalists,
bloggers and other media personnel either based in the region,
or visiting, are facing increasing threats and acts of intimidation,
including abduction and unlawful detention by armed groups.
According to information received by the HRMMU, the so-called
“Slovyansk self-defence unit” has been unlawfully detaining
journalists since 15 April. There are reports that at the check-
points of Slovyansk, there are lists of journalists and others that
the armed group is seeking, with photographs and personal data.
Allegedly, in this way many journalists have been detained. Most
are accused by the armed groups who detain them of working for
the CIA, FBI, the Right Sector or of being one-sided about their
reports from Slovyansk’58
.
There is no evidence by international bodies about any actions
of the Ukrainian military in Sloviansk directed against journalists.
57
www.vice.com/en/article/xwp5en/i-had-it-pretty-easy-because-i-was-let-go-simon-ostrovsky-on-his-detention-in-sloviansk
58
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15May2014.pdf

29
Russian-backed fighter near the cargo train used as a barricade to shoot at Ukrainian positions on Karachun hill.

30
59
www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/06/ukraine-human-rights-watch-letter-acting-president-turchynov-and-president-elect
60
www.osce.org/fom/119009
61
www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/23/ukraine-anti-kiev-forces-running-amok#
While the UN report was not quoted in court, two other
documents of international organizations were presented by
the civil plaintiff lawyer Ballerini. These are the only reports
of international bodies on the situation in Ukraine which were
referred to during the Markiv trial. However, the content of
these reports – the Human Rights Watch letter to president-
elect Poroshenko on June 6, 201459
, and OSCE May 23, 2014
report on the media freedom in Ukraine60
– was presented
one-sidedly during the trial.
Quoting a case described by the HRW of a mortar shelling
of a psychiatric hospital near Sloviansk, the court claimed
that Ukraine was deliberately attacking civilian population.
It didn’t mention that the report said Russian proxy forces
were occupying the hospital and shooting at Ukrainian
positions from its yard. While the HRW calls on Ukraine to
ensure civilians are protected, there is no claim in that report
the attack of the Ukrainian army was intentionally targeting
civilians and not combatants.
6.
Manipulation of international
organizations reports
The OSCE media freedom report was mentioned in court
as a testimony that Ukrainian military deliberately targeted
journalists in Donbas to prevent them from telling ‘the
world about events taking place in Ukraine’. A thorough
reading of the report in fact indicates the opposite: most
attacks on press representatives are attributed to Russia
and its proxy forces on the occupied territories and in
Crimea.
Another Human Rights Watch report, published one day before
Rocchelli’s and Mironov’s death, on May 23, 2014, warned
about serious human rights violations on behalf of Russian
proxy forces in Donbas. «Anti-Kiev forces in eastern Ukraine
are abducting, attacking, and harassing people they suspect of
supporting the Ukrainian government or consider undesirable...
anti-Kiev insurgents are using beatings and kidnappings to send
the message that anyone who doesn’t support them had better
shut up or leave’.61
This report was not mentioned during the
trial.

31
The Pavia court in its decision to convict Vitaliy Markiv quoted
several Russian propaganda sources. These sources, such as
website Russian Spring and Kremlin-funded TV station RT,
were described as ‘open sources’, ‘local television’, ‘found on
YouTube’, apparently with no awareness that they are directly
connected to the Kremlin and are its tools for spreading
propaganda and disinformation across the globe. The appellate
court defended the use of these sources by the first instance
court, comparing RT to reputable international media, such as
CNN and Al Jazeera, in its reasons of judgment.
A document published on the Russian Spring website was
included as a piece of evidence in the first instance trial of
Vitaliy Markiv. In the list of evidence, it is indicated as a ‘web
page from the open source «Russian Spring» (Russkaya vesna) as
of 10.8.2017’. This online resource, called ‘a journalistic website
«Russkaya Vesna»’ in the court sentence, systematically spreads
Kremlin propaganda and disinformation about Ukraine.
In court, the prosecution quoted a document, published on
this website: it was a letter, allegedly leaked from Ukraine’s
National Guard. In this letter, reportedly signed by the head of
one of National Guard military units, he assures his superior
7.
Use of Russian propaganda media
as credible sources
that soldiers, chosen to testify in Markiv’s trial, were instructed
to confirm the position of the defense. Therefore, claimed
the prosecution, their testimonies cannot be trusted. Markiv’s
defense objected, saying that the document was forged; the
head of Legal Department of military unit 3066 of National
Guard in her testimony denied the authenticity of the letter.
The court was not convinced. In its decision it put into doubt
the credibility of Ukrainian witnesses in the trial, because
‘they were from the beginning undermined by the document that
appeared on the website «Russian spring»’.
The court also based some of its conclusions on videos of Kremlin-
funded RT station, without questioning their authenticity and
impartiality. In the verdict, it quoted an interview with Russian
proxy fighters in the aftermath of Rocchelli and Mironov’s death,
making claims about the origin of shots and type of the weapon
that killed them. Their faces were not visible on the video and
it was impossible to verify their identity and authenticity of their
claims. Nonetheless, the court considered this video as credible.
Use of Russian propaganda sources in the trial against Vitaliy
Markiv was noticed by major international media, such as the
New York Times62
.
62
www.nytimes.com/2019/12/17/world/europe/russia-italy-propaganda.html

32
The prosecution accused the Ukrainian state of not willing
to investigate Rocchelli and Mironov deaths and of lack
of cooperation with the Italian side in 2014-2017, prior to
Markiv’s arrest. The prosecutor drew the attention as well to
‘a low credibility of the investigations carried out on the scene’ in
Ukraine. This correlates with a propaganda narrative of Ukraine
as a failed state, unwilling and incapable to investigate alleged
crimes.
While the criticism of slow investigation is justified, it is also true
that it was impossible for the Ukrainian authorities to conduct an
immediate investigation on the scene, because the area where
journalists died remained under Russian proxies’ control till July
2014. Since 2017, Ukraine repeatedly offered to create a joint
investigative team and to conduct the inspection of the scene in
Sloviansk. These offers were ignored by the Italian side and the
investigation was done without visiting Ukraine.
The prosecution and the civil plaintiffs’ lawyers heavily focused
on Vitaliy Markiv’s personality during the trial.
8.
Ukraine failed to investigate
and cooperate on the case
Vitaliy Markiv in court prior to the reading of the sentence.
Pavia, Italy, 12 July 2019.
Photo by Olga Tokariuk

33
Vitaliy Markiv in court prior to the reading of the sentence.

34
9.
Vitaliy Markiv has far-right affiliations and
participated in other war crimes
It was alleged that Markiv had far-right affiliations, based
on photos from his electronic devices, confiscated during
the arrest. In particular, one image, in which Ukrainian
soldiers are pictured holding a flag with a swastika on it.
When asked about this photo in court, Markiv said he is not
pictured on it. He said this image was sent to him on Viber
and the swastika flag was a trophy seized from a Russian
proxies’ base. Markiv was also accused of having far-right
affiliations because he attended a Porter pub in Kyiv which
had far-right paraphernalia as elements of décor. He said he
didn’t share far-right views.
It was also alleged that Markiv participated in war crimes,
again based on his photos. In one of them, there was a
man with a pistol pressed to his head, with Markiv smiling
right next to him; in another one, a man in a hood was
tucked in a car trunk. The prosecution claimed they were
war prisoners and victims of torture. These photos were
not related to events in Sloviansk or Rocchelli’s death: they
were made in the years after 2014. It turned out later that
at least one of the men pictured was actually a Ukrainian
National guard soldier, who contacted the court during the
appeal hearings and said that on the photo he was drunk
and subjected to a bad joke by his colleagues.
The court decision also quoted Markiv’s intercepted
conversations in prison after his arrest. In one of them, he
compared journalists who went to the place that was known
to be dangerous, to a man who was warned not to approach
the lion, but did just that. The court believed his words that
‘it makes no sense to prosecute the lion who tore him to pieces’
could be interpreted as an admission that he participated
in an attack on journalists. The court also attributed him
words ‘we screwed a reporter’. During the appeal trial a new
expertise of that conversation was ordered. It established
that this was a bad translation and he actually said ‘a
reporter was screwed in Ukraine and now they want to put a
blame on me’.
Branding Markiv as a ‘Nazi’, complicit in other war crimes,
based on photos taken in other circumstances and on
misinterpreted conversations, was instrumental for the
prosecution (and the media, as we will see later) to create
the image of him as a merciless criminal. While there was

35
no direct proof of his involvement in the killing of Rocchelli
and Mironov, he was ‘guilty by association’ with supposed
offenders of civilians and journalists in Donbas, who, in
the court’s understanding of the situation, were Ukrainian
soldiers.
The burden of proof was reversed: according to the court,
Markiv was found guilty because the defence failed to
prove he ‘was in another place … and was not involved in the
attack’, and not because the prosecution demonstrated his
involvement. Court’s prejudice can be deduced as well from
a phrase in the reasons of judgment, accusing Markiv that
he ‘played the role of a hero who defended his country and tried
not to betray or involve others’ by refusing to name other
National Guard soldiers who were present on Karachun hill.
In the next chapter we will look at disinformation related
to the Markiv’s case in the Italian media, which could have
shaped the perception of the case by the society and the
jury.

36
Members of the Ukrainian community in the courtroom during the last hearing in the Markiv case.

37
CHAPTER 5.
DISINFORMATION RELATED
TO THE MARKIV CASE IN ITALIAN
MAINSTREAM MEDIA
There wasn’t much coverage of the first instance Markiv trial
in the mainstream Italian media. A local website Milano Today
was the only medium to follow and meticulously report on
each hearing. Big newspapers/TV stations only attended one
or two. Their coverage was often one-sided and tainted by
disinformation.
Many print and broadcast media in Italy called Markiv ‘a killer’
since they day of his arrest63
and during the trial quoted only
the position of the prosecution. Some prominent examples
are articles by journalist Fabrizio Gatti for the left-leaning
Espresso weekly magazine and by Nello Scavo for the Vatican
newspaper Avvenire. Their partial approach to covering Markiv
trial is especially worrying considering that these journalists are
respected and influential in Italy.
Gatti, who didn’t cover Ukraine before, embraced Kremlin
disinformation narrative about the prominence of far-right
in his articles on the Markiv trial. In his piece for Espresso,
entitled ‘The last insult in courtroom to the memory of Andy
Rocchelli, a reporter from Europe’s darkness’ in March 201964
, he
describes the Ukrainian diaspora members in the courtroom –
mostly middle-aged women and men who came from all over
Italy to show support for Markiv and demand justice – as his
‘nationalist fans’. According to the author, they show disrespect
to the memory of the deceased reporter by calling ‘Glory to
Ukraine’ when greeting Markiv.
The journalist draws the attention with a questionable choice
of words not only to the Ukrainians’‘round faces’ and ‘shaven
heads’, but also to ‘maniacal perfectionism’ of their traditional
63
www.hromadske.ua/posts/sprava-vitaliya-markiva
64
www.espresso.repubblica.it/plus/articoli/2019/03/05/news/l-ultimo-oltraggio-in-aula-alla-memoria-di-andy-rocchelli-reporter-dalle-tenebre-d-europa-1.332324

38
embroidered shirts. ‘This public [...] is an instant picture of the
European nationalism which we see flourishing everywhere
today, even in the palaces of justice. It is what Andy [Rocchelli]
started to document from the beginning of that first experiment
of sovereignty, which from the Independence square in Kyiv five
years ago has led to the entry of far-right into the Ukrainian
parliament and inevitably to the war against Russia’. The author
puts the blame for the war with Ukraine and the West, writing
that is was ‘Russia’s response to the plans of NATO expansion’.
An emphasis in the article on the prominence of extreme
right in Ukrainian parliament contradicts the official figures,
which show that nationalist parties only had about 4% of
seats in 2019. The author also accuses the former speaker of
the Ukrainian parliament Andriy Parubiy of being one of the
founders of a ‘National-socialist party of Ukraine’, ‘with evident
(always denied) allusions to national-socialism of Adolf Hitler’.
The author focuses a lot on presumed far-right affiliations of
Ukrainian soldiers and Markiv himself, writing that ‘National Guard
consisted of volunteers, nationalists, extremists’. He quotes a photo
with a swastika, found on Markiv’s phone, as a proof of that.
He mentions other photos which, according to the prosecution,
depicted tortured war prisoners, and asks rhetorically whether
‘the soldier who tortures his enemies can be considered a hero by the
government of a European country?’. Gatti believes them to be images
that ‘accuse presumed killers, in their actions and in their thoughts’.
The family of a victim and civil plaintiffs, who fight for
justice and defend press freedom, in the courtroom have
to endure ‘the battle cries of Markiv, the arrogant looks of his
supporters, their happy selfies in the corridors, as if it were a
party’, is written in the article. ‘Nationalism never had pity of its
victims’, concludes the author. No one on the Ukrainian side:
neither witnesses nor diaspora members in the courtroom nor
Ukrainian soldiers and politicians are reached for a comment.
In his later article for Espresso during the appeals trial in
October 2020, entitled ‘Ukraine continues to shoot on the
memory of Andy Rocchelli’, Gatti accuses Ukraine of ‘orchestrating
a campaign of fake news and delegitimization’ to undermine a
fair trial65
. He also criticizes a group of independent Italian and
Ukrainian journalists working on a documentary-investigation
about the case66
. The embassy of Ukraine in Italy sent letters
to the Espresso editor-in-chief, objecting to the content of
these articles. There was no response.
65
www.espresso.repubblica.it/plus/articoli/2020/10/08/news/ribaltare-la-verita-sulla-sua-morte-l-ultimo-colpo-di-cannone-contro-il-fotografo-rocchelli-
1.354224?preview=true&wt_referer=https://www.google.com/
66
www.euromaidanpress.com/2020/02/10/documentary-on-markiv-case-to-be-screened-in-italian-parliament/

39
Members of the Ukrainian community in Italy outside the court.

40
The narrative of Ukrainian nationalists who commit war
crimes surfaced in other articles about the Markiv trial.
In his piece for a print edition of Avvenire newspaper, the
author Nello Scavo used similar rhetoric about the alleged
far-right affiliations of Ukrainian diaspora in Italy who
attended the trial. Avvenire ignored a letter from the leader
of one of Ukrainian associations in Italy asking to retract
those claims. In another article published online67
, Scavo
described photos from Markiv’s smartphone as ‘images
that betray the presumed assassin’, linking them to Rocchelli
murder, although they were taken at a different time and
location.
In this way, Italian mainstream media, consciously or not,
repeated Kremlin propaganda narratives and created a
distorted background of the war and general situation in
Ukraine. Considering that these articles were written by
popular journalists and published in respected media, they
likely had an impact on public opinion about the Markiv’s case
in Italy.
In the wake and during the appeals trial the representation
of the case in Italian mainstream media has become more
balanced. It could be due to the fact that concerns about
Markiv’s conviction were raised by several important actors,
including Italian Federation of Human Rights and Italian
Radicals party (whose member was late Andrei Mironov)68
.
After the reasons of judgement of the appeals court were
published, some Italian mainstream media wrote that, despite
Markiv’s acquittal, the ‘historical truth’ and ‘historical guilt of
the Ukrainian state’ have been established.
Part 6. Network of Italian online resources spreading
disinformation about the Markiv case
67
web.archive.org/web/20190119021442/https:/www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/rocchelli-foto-shock-del-presunto-killer
68
www.radioradicale.it/scheda/580468/ombre-russe-il-caso-markiv-e-lo-stato-della-giustizia-e-dellinformazione-in-italia

41
CHAPTER 6.
NETWORK OF ITALIAN ONLINE
RESOURCES SPREADING DISINFORMATION
ABOUT THE MARKIV CASE
As a result of our research, we have identified a network of
three Italian fringe online resources which were regularly
writing about the Markiv case and actively spread Kremlin
propaganda narratives related to it.
These are left and radical left websites L’Antidiplomatico,
Contropiano and Voxkomm, as well as their social media pages
and Youtube channels. These resources frequently shared and
referenced each other’s content related to Ukraine and the
Markiv case. Their sources were usually Kremlin propaganda
media, such as Sputnik, and pro-separatist websites News-
front.info, Novorosinform.org, Asd.news etc. Writing about the
Markiv case, these Italian and Russian resources amplified and
shared each other’s content.
The most popular among Italian resources spreading
disinformation on the Markiv case is L’Antidiplomatico.
Presenting itself as a source of independent information
about international politics, it has a reach of 400,000 monthly
visits and frequently publishes anti-American, pro-Kremlin
and conspiracy content. It has been previously reported
on L’Antidiplomatico links with the left-populist Five Star
Movement69
.
In its articles about Markiv’s arrest and trial,
L’Antidiplomatico uses the full spectrum of Kremlin
propaganda narratives. In various publications, Markiv is
called an ‘Italo-Ukrainian Nazi’70,
Ukraine a ‘Nazi’ country71
,
Maidan protests a ‘violent сoup d’état’72
, supported by ‘USA,
69
www.radioradicale.it/scheda/580468/ombre-russe-il-caso-markiv-e-lo-stato-della-giustizia-e-dellinformazione-in-italia
70
www.lantidiplomatico.it/dettnews-ha_stato_putin_per_kiev_c_mosca_dietro_larresto_in_italia_del_nazista_italoucraino/11_20736/
71
www.lantidiplomatico.it/dettnews-chi_ha_ucciso_il_fotoreporter_andrea_rocchelli_nellucraina_nazista/82_20790/
72
www.lantidiplomatico.it/dettnews-omicidio_rocchelli__24_anni_a_vitalij_markov_perch_ad_altri_non_venga_pi_voglia_di_fare_la_stessa_cosa/82_29478/

42
NATO and the EU’, etc. Ukrainian military is also accused
of deliberately killing civilians, while the actions of Russian
hybrid forces in Donbas are justified73
.
One of the authors of these articles is Maurizio Vezzosi,
reportedly marked as a ‘friendly’ journalist on the accreditation
list of Russian proxies from the separatist Donetsk People’s
Republic74
. In his first article about Markiv’s arrest for
L’Antidiplomatico in July 2017, entitled ‘The witch hunt in
Goebbels’ Ukraine’75
, he denounced the alleged persecution of
journalists in Ukraine.
This article was shared by the lawyer of Rocchelli family
Alessandra Ballerini on her personal blog76
. During the
trial, the strategy of Ballerini, who is a widely quoted
media personality in Italy, heavily focused on portraying
Markiv as affiliated with the far-right and the Ukrainian
state as a threat to journalists. In her interviews to
the Italian media, she compared Rocchelli’s case with
another high-profile case she leads, that of Giulio Regeni,
an Italian student who was killed in Egypt. She drew
parallels between the ‘rogue states’ of Egypt and Ukraine
and alleged that they murder foreign citizens and obstruct
investigations77
.
Another part of the network of disinformation spreaders was
an ‘online communist magazine’ Contropiano, which constantly
posts publications justifying Russian aggression in Ukraine and
pushes the narrative of ‘Nazi’ Ukraine. It also posted articles
in defence of Italian mercenaries who fought in Ukraine on
the side of Russian hybrid forces78
. Contropiano, which has
between 100,000 and 200,000 monthly visits to its website,
was engaged in spreading disinformation related to Markiv’s
case since 2018.
One of its authors was Alberto Fazolo, described in the media as
a former Italian far-left fighter and suspected mercenary recruiter
for the so-called separatist ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’79
.
73
www.lantidiplomatico.it/dettnews-donbass_il_regime_ucraino_intensifica_laggressione_dopo_la_proclamazione_di_biden/82_38139/
74
www.vice.com/it/article/wj9x5q/consolato-torino-donbass-separatista
75
www.lantidiplomatico.it/dettnews-caccia_alle_streghe_nellucraina_di_goebbels/5871_20972/
76
www.alessandraballerini.com/voci-dal-mondo/168-caccia-alle-streghe-nell-ucraina-di-goebbels
77
www.agi.it/cronaca/andrea_rocchelli_fotoreporter_ucciso_ucraina-1920496/news/2017-07-01/
78
www.contropiano.org/news/politica-news/2020/03/05/il-governo-fascista-dellucraina-persegue-i-solidali-italiani-con-il-donbass-la-magistratura-lo-prende-sul-serio-0124812
79
www.lastampa.it/torino/2017/04/24/news/mercenari-e-istruttori-nel-conflitto-fra-russia-e-ucraina-1.34623350

43
In his article in October 2020, he attacked80
the investigative
documentary Crossfire (previously entitled The Wrong Place) by a
group of Italian and Ukrainian journalists who raised doubts about
Markiv’s conviction81
.
This Contropiano article by Fazolo, attacking journalists and
their investigation, was reprinted on the website of Articolo 21,
a media freedom NGO, close to the Italian Press Federation
(FNSI), a civil plaintiff in Markiv’s trial82
.
In another publication on Articolo 21, it was alleged, without
any evidence, that the documentary was funded by the
Ukrainian National Guard and intends ‘to justify the murder’
of Rocchelli83
. This article was also shared on Twitter by FNSI
president84
.
A smear campaign against the documentary began after
Markiv’s defense asked the appeals court to consider new
evidence contained in it85
. It started with a report on Russian
state TV in October 2020, and soon spilled over into the
Italian information space. Antidiplomatico, Contropiano and
Voxkomm published articles which attempted to discredit the
documentary, link its authors to the Ukrainian government or
describe them as ‘fascists’.
During the appeals trial hearings in Markiv’s case in October
2020, L’Antidiplomatico published an article with the names of
the individuals who, according to the author Valerio Gentili,
‘protect the criminal Markiv in Italy and Ukraine’86
. It included the
Italian Radicals party, two international foundations for human
rights and for press freedom, the fact-checking organization
Stop Fake, Italian and Ukrainian authors of the investigative
documentary Crossfire, as well as several Italian and
Ukrainian diaspora activists. This article was later translated
and published on the Russian propaganda website ukraina.
ru87
. People mentioned in it received threats and offensive
messages online from social media accounts that shared
content in support of Russian proxy forces in Donbas.
80
www.contropiano.org/news/politica-news/2020/10/18/the-wrong-place-e-un-film-sbagliato-0132659
81
www.open.online/2020/09/29/the-wrong-place-documentario-morte-andrea-rocchelli-fotoreporter-ucraina/
82
www.articolo21.org/2020/10/the-wrong-place-e-un-film-sbagliato/
83
www.articolo21.org/2020/10/processo-rocchelli-minacce-a-chi-vuole-giustizia-per-andy-e-un-film-che-vuole-giustificare-lomicidio/
84
web.archive.org/web/20210323162539/https://twitter.com/BeppeGiulietti/status/1320626913392680960
85
www.euromaidanpress.com/2020/10/21/journalists-investigating-who-really-killed-journalist-in-donbas-under-attack-by-russianitalian-media-markiv/
86
www.lantidiplomatico.it/dettnews-verit_e_giustizia_per_andrea_rocchelli_chi_protegge_anche_in_italia_il_criminale_markiv/37277_37963/
87
www.ukraina.ru/exclusive/20201031/1029455781.html

44
A ‘platform for the hosting and promotion of content aimed
at social and political change’, as it calls itself, Voxkomm was a
third website in the Italian network of Kremlin disinformation
spreaders about the Markiv’s case. Its Youtube channel was
created in April 2013, Facebook and Twitter pages in spring
and summer 2014. Most of its content is dedicated to Ukraine
and features narratives about ‘fascist coup’ in Kyiv, neo-Nazis in
Ukraine, ‘antifascist resistance’ in occupied Donbas, etc.
Voxkomm also shared publications from Russian propaganda
websites and Youtube channels, such as Novorossiya TV.
Among its posts there are tributes to killed commanders of
Russian hybrid forces in Donbas88
and those in defence of pro-
Kremlin blogger Anatoliy Shariy after Ukraine opened a criminal
case against him89
.
In relation to the Markiv’s case, Voxkomm, among other things,
published on its Youtube channel the audio of Rocchelli’s family
lawyer Alessandra Ballerini, who criticized the documentary
and its authors during her intervention in the appeals court90
.
She, in turn, shared the link to it on her Twitter91
. Voxkomm
publication was also reposted by Antidiplomatico92
.
There are no names of authors or contact persons on
Voxkomm website or social media platforms. On Voxkomm
website, it’s stated that one of its projects is an Italian
organization ‘Committee for Anti-Nazist Donbas’. Information
on its Facebook page says that it ‘supports forces fighting
for free, socialist, antifascist Novorossiya’ (another name for
Kremlin’s proxy republics in Ukraine)93
.
Other examples of Voxkomm engagement in spreading Kremlin
disinformation and propaganda are its publications describing
Belarusian opposition protesters as far-right94
and attempts to
portray Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny as a Nazi95
.
The network of these fringe Italian websites was very active
in spreading disinformation about Ukraine, the Markiv case
and attacks on journalists working on a documentary about it.
Some of their publications, containing Kremlin disinformation
narratives and written by questionable authors, like former
Italian combatant on the side of Russian hybrid forces in
Ukraine, were shared and amplified by reputable organizations
and public figures in Italy, affiliated with the Italian press
federation FNSI, civil plaintiff at the Markiv’s trial.
88
www.voxkomm.noblogs.org/post/2020/03/06/hanno-ucciso-volk/
89
www.voxkomm.noblogs.org/post/2020/11/08/lucraina-apre-procedimento-penale-contro-giornalista-che-pubblica-la-mappa-del-paese-senza-crimea-e-donbass/
90
www.youtube.com/watch?v=LtTdehCdmrk&t=4s
91
www.twitter.com/leg_alessandra/status/1318154940045529095
92
web.archive.org/web/20201101005720/https://www.lantidiplomatico.it/dettnews-video_legale_famiglia_rocchelli_non_ci_sono_posti_sbagliati_per_i_giornalisti/82_37831/
93
www.facebook.com/ComitatoDonbass/
94
www.voxkomm.noblogs.org/post/2020/08/23/la-bandiera-bianca-e-rossa-delle-rivolte-bielorusse-simbolo-di-collaborazionisti-nazisti-e-controrivoluzionari/
95
www.voxkomm.noblogs.org/post/2021/01/26/alexey-navalny-e-i-nazisti-russi/

45
CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The trial of Ukrainian soldier Vitaliy Markiv in Italy is the
first high-profile case highlighting the problem of Kremlin
disinformation and propaganda penetration into a Western
country’s judiciary system.
During the trial, the prosecution and civil plaintiffs used
Kremlin propaganda sources and disinformation narratives
about Ukraine to build their case.
These narratives were long-present in the Italian information
space and were often voiced by actors from across the political
spectrum, from far-right Lega to populist Five Star Movement
and communist parties. Disinformation about Ukraine and
Kremlin’s agenda were also promoted by Italian organizations
with murky connections to Moscow, such as Lombardy-Russia,
which appears to provide support to Russian hybrid forces in
Ukraine.
The main narratives in the Markiv trial, as analysis of the
reasons of his conviction by the first instance court shows,
were the following: there is a civil war in Ukraine; the National
Guard and Ukrainian army deliberately shoot at civilians
and journalists in the conflict zone as their regular modus
operandi; Ukrainian military commits war crimes in Donbas;
Russian proxies protect journalists; far-right and neo-Nazi
are prominent in the Ukrainian politics and military. These
narratives echo those pushed by Kremlin propaganda about
Ukraine in general and about еру Markiv case in particular.
Russian propaganda sources, such as Russian Spring and
RT, were quoted as reliable by the court in its reasons for
judgement. The content of two international organizations
reports about the situation in Ukraine was manipulated and
misinterpreted in favor of the prosecution.
While far-right circles are known to be spreading Kremlin
disinformation in Italy and elsewhere in West, in the Markiv’s
case it was left and radical left websites and actors, who
played a major role in spreading disinformation. They pushed
the narrative about the prominence of far-right extremists in
Ukraine, portraying Markiv and Ukrainian military as Nazi.
The network of disinformation spreaders on the Markiv case
in Italy contained three Italian online platforms with left

46
and radical left affiliations: L’Antidiplomatico, Contropiano and
Voxkomm. They spread pro-Kremlin disinformation and engage
in smear campaigns against its adversaries on a regular
basis. At least two of these three websites have connections
to ‘antiNazi’/‘antifascist’ Italian organizations which support
Russian proxy forces in Donbas. One of their contributors is a
former Italian communist fighter for Russian hybrid forces in
Ukraine, who was suspected to be a recruiter of mercenaries
for the unrecognized ‘republics’.
Civil plaintiff lawyer at the Markiv trial, a popular media
personality, representatives of the Italian National Press
Federation (FNSI) and organizations affiliated with it shared
and amplified the content of resources spreading pro-Kremlin
disinformation in Italy related to the case.
The narrative of ‘Ukrainian Nazis’ and disinformation
about Maidan protests and war in Ukraine were also given
prominence by several Italian mainstream media in their
coverage of the Markiv case.
Disinformation spreaders in Italy and Russia were also sharing
each other’s content.
The ideological prejudice surrounding the trial and the role of
disinformation and propaganda in it was highlighted by various
international organizations, including the Italian Human Rights
Federation and Russian human rights NGO Memorial, whose
founder was late Andrei Mironov.
Despite Markiv’s acquittal by Milan court of appeals, the court
still concluded that it was the Ukrainian military to deliberately
kill Rocchelli and Mironov. The court of appeals in its reasons
of judgement backed the conclusions of the first instance court
that Ukrainian soldiers intentionally and regularly targeted
civilians in Donbas.
This reasoning, as demonstrated in this paper, was partially
based on distorted information about the situation and
conflict in Ukraine, as well as on Russian propaganda sources.
One-sided media coverage of the case in Italy and online
disinformation, amplified by influential figures, might have also
had an impact on the court’s understanding of the situation,
considering that no investigation in Ukraine was done.
Milan court of appeals also declared that Ukrainian soldiers,
who were heard as witnesses in the first instance court,
should have faced trial as defendants, complicit in Rocchelli’s
murder. In January 2021, FNSI, the Italian Press Federation
and a party at the Markiv trial, called on the government in
Rome to pressure Ukraine to identify the real culprits . It was
reported that an investigation is underway in Italy against a
former Ukrainian National Guard commander, ex MP Bohdan
Matkivskyi. It is plausible that more cases against Ukrainian

47
soldiers could be launched in the future. Therefore, a battle
of narratives and disinformation, as well as calls on the Italian
government to stop supporting Ukraine as a country that
allegedly covers up war crimes, will likely continue.
The arrest and trial of Vitaliy Markiv in Italy was widely used
by Kremlin propaganda to legitimize its narrative about alleged
crimes against civilians committed by the Ukrainian military.
The fact that Markiv was found guilty and sentenced by a court
in the EU member country provided a perfect occasion for that.
The case of Vitaliy Markiv in Italy shows how a judiciary
system in a democratic country, which doesn’t pay enough
attention to a threat of Russian disinformation and tolerates
domestic actors spreading it, could be used as a tool in the
hybrid aggression against a foreign state, preying on local
weaknesses and feeling of journalistic solidarity.
Based on this research findings, it can be concluded with
a certain level of confidence that the case of Vitaliy Markiv
in Italy was a Kremlin influence operation. Its goal was to
discredit the Ukrainian state and its military, with an ultimate
objective to weaken Italy’s political support to Ukraine on the
national and the EU level.

48
1) Monitor, detect and flag propaganda and
disinformation on an early stage: if ignored, it may
cause irreparable damage and have a devastating
impact;
2) Expose and take to account disinformation
spreaders, even – and especially – reputable ones
(because they cause more damage);
3) Make sure representatives of the judiciary system,
especially jury/people’s judges, are aware of the
operations of modern information warfare and the
threat of malign foreign interference, especially
when dealing with sensitive international cases;
4) The principle of double-checking and verifying
sources of information should be valid for criminal
Here are some recommendations that can be used by other countries,
based on the experience of the Vitaliy Markiv case in Italy:
investigation and judiciary, especially when relying
on open-source investigations;
5) Be aware of vested interests of foreign countries
in pursuing their geopolitical agenda; do not fall for
the easiest and most convenient explanation (as
happened with Markiv, who seems to have been
prosecuted because he was the only one Ukrainian
soldier with the Italian nationality and had contacts
with Italian journalists);
6) Strengthen independent media;
7) Raise awareness about the operations of far-left
networks in European countries that promote
Kremlin agenda and may have links to it, as they
are usually taken less seriously than far-right.

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