Responding to crisis assessing situational crisis communication of the costa concordia crisis

Corporate
Communication

2st
semester
exam
2012

Master
of
Arts
in
Corporate

Communication

Student:
Tine
Grarup
286495

Supervisor:

Steen
Michael
Hejndorf

Responding
to
Crisis:
Assessing
Situational
Crisis

Communication
of
the
Costa
Concordia
Crisis

Total
number
of
characters:
32,992

A
case
study
of
the
Costa
Concordia
Crisis
January
2012

Responding to Crisis: Assessing Situational Crisis Communication of the Costa Concordia Crisis
Corporate Communication 2nd
semester exam 2012
Master of Arts in Corporate Communication
Table
of
Contents

1 INTRODUCTION
...................................................................................................................................
1

1.1
Problem
statement
.........................................................................................................................................
2

1.1.1
Research
Questions
.............................................................................................................................
2

1.2
Methodology
.....................................................................................................................................................
2

1.3
Delimitations
.....................................................................................................................................................
3

2 THEORETICAL
BACKGROUND
.........................................................................................................
4

2.1
Crisis
and
Crisis
Management
Defined
..................................................................................................
4

2.2
The
Value
of
Reputation
and
Stakeholder
Relationships
..............................................................
5

2.3
Crisis
Response

...............................................................................................................................................
6

2.3.1
The
Crisis
Situation:
Evaluating
Responsibility
and
Reputational
Threat
..................
6

2.3.2
Crisis
Response
Strategies
...............................................................................................................
8

3 CASE
STUDY
........................................................................................................................................
11

3.1
Costa
Cruises
-‐
Corporate
Profile
..........................................................................................................
11

3.2
Stakeholders
of
Costa
Cruises
................................................................................................................
11

3.3
The
Costa
Concordia
Crisis

.....................................................................................................................
12

3.3.1
The
Crisis
Situation:
Evaluating
Responsibility
and
Reputational
Threat
...............
13

4 EMPRICAL
ANALYSIS
.......................................................................................................................
16

4.1
Costa
Cruises’
Crisis
Responses
.............................................................................................................
16

4.2
Connecting
and
Reflecting
upon
the
Findings
.................................................................................
21

4.3
Effect
on
Corporate
Reputation
.............................................................................................................
24

5 CONCLUSION

......................................................................................................................................
28

6 LIST
OF
REFERENCES
.......................................................................................................................
29

6.1
Books
.................................................................................................................................................................
29

6.2
Articles
in
Journals
......................................................................................................................................
30

6.3
Online
Articles
...............................................................................................................................................
31

6.4
Other
Online
Sources
..................................................................................................................................
33

6.5
Costacruises.com/co.uk
Sources
...........................................................................................................
34

6.6
Online
Videos
.................................................................................................................................................
35

6.6
Other
Sources
................................................................................................................................................
35

7 APPENDIXES

7.1
Appendix
1:
Crisis
Management
Factors
...........................................................................................
36

semester exam 2012
7.2
Appendix
2:
Instructing
and
Adjusting
Information
in
Crisis
Response
.............................
38

7.3
Appendix
3:
Coombs’
Three
Crisis
Clusters
......................................................................................
39

7.4
Appendix
4:
Image
Restoration
Strategies
by
Benoit
..................................................................
41

7.5
Appendix
5:
Captain’s
Conversation
with
the
Italian
Coastguard
..........................................
43

7.6
Appendix
6:
Costa
Concordia
Crisis
Update
.....................................................................................
44

7.7
Appendix
7:
Costa
Cruises
Crises
Responses
on
Twitter
............................................................
53

7.8
Appendix
8:
Costa
Cruises
Crises
Responses
on
Facebook
.......................................................
56

7.9
Appendix
9:
Email
Correspondence,
Peter
Anker
Jensen,
owner
and
CEO
Fri
Ferie
.....
59

7.10
Appendix
10:
Three
CSR
Communication
Strategies
................................................................
63

FIGURES

Figure
1:
The
crisis
situation
(own
adaption)
............................................................................................
7

Figure
2:
Costa
Cruises
Vision
Statement
..................................................................................................
11

Figure
3:
Costa
Cruises
stakeholder
map
(own
adaption)

................................................................
12

Figure
4:
Outline
of
the
Costa
Concordia
Wreck
....................................................................................
13

Figure
5:
Statement
of
human
error
from
Costa
Cruises
....................................................................
14

Figure
6:
Statement
of
human
error
from
Pier
Luigi
Foschi,
CEO
of
Costa
Cruises

...............
14

Figure
7:
Crisis
Response
Timeline
(own
adaption)

...........................................................................
16

Figure
8:
Extract
from
first
statement
from
Costa
Cruises
................................................................
17

Figure
9:
Tweet
from
Costa
Cruises’
Twitter
account
..........................................................................
17

Figure
10:
Extract
from
second
statement
from
Costa
Cruises
.......................................................
17

Figure
11:
First
post
on
Costa
Cruises’
Facebook
page
.......................................................................
18

Figure
12:
Extract
from
statement:
Background
of
Costa’s
commitment
to
safety
................
19

Figure
13:
Article
from
Lovell
Communications
....................................................................................
20

Figure
14:
Article
from
news
media
CP
World
.......................................................................................
20

Figure
15:
Costa
Cruises’
rejection
of
discount
rumors
......................................................................
20

Figure
16:
Costa
Cruises
statement
on
Facebook
acknowledging
stakeholder
requests
.....
21

Figure
17:
Great
offers
for
Costa
Cruises
on
Fri
Ferie’s
website
.....................................................
24

Figure
18:
Costa
bolstering
tweet
by
Costa
Cruises
reminding
of
positive
views
...................
25

Figure
19:
Carnival
Cruises
at
NY
Stock
Exchange
the
days
after
the
crisis
..............................
25

Figure
20:
Social
Mentions
about
Costa
Cruises
.....................................................................................
26

Figure
21:
Captain
Francesco
Schettino’s
conversation
with
the
Italian
coastguard
............
43

semester exam 2012

TABLES

Table
1:
Crisis
response
strategies
by
the
SCCT
(own
adaption)
......................................................
8

Table
2:
SCCT
Recommendations
for
Crisis
Response
Selection
(own
adaption)

..............
9-‐10

Table
3:
Reputational
threat,
Costa’s
responses
&
SCCT
Recommendations
summarized
.
22

Table
4:
Crisis
types
by
clusters
....................................................................................................................
39

Table
5:
Image
Restoration
Strategies
........................................................................................................
41

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1. Introduction
Several elements and developments breed opportunities for crises, disrupting normal corporate
operations. Crisis management has always been a difficult task bringing along multiple challenges
and the demand for response. Moreover the emergence of social (global) media has complicated the
entire process, requiring practitioners to act faster and more carefully than ever. The important of
crisis management follows societal development, and as we live in a highly developed society
where “omnipresent technology means that the chance of a crisis situation arising is greater than it
has ever been”1
, corporations are faced with new responsibilities towards the more and more aware
stakeholders. Even corporations who track their operations and reputation closely are often
impacted by events outside of their control. “No organization is immune to a crisis”2
, and if badly
managed, a crisis can ruin hard-won reputations or even destroy companies3
. Thus ongoing crisis
and reputation management is of utter importance and can help ensure corporate sustainability.
When crisis strike, effective crisis response can turn what could be a disaster into an opportunity or
at least a chance move beyond the threat4
.
In January 2012 Costa Cruises faced a crisis when its cruise ship Costa Concordia ran aground and
partially sank off the coast of Italy5
. At least 30 people died as a result of the incident6
, making it
the largest passenger cruise ship accident since the Titanic7
. Facing a crisis further means facing
reputational threats, hence Costa Cruises had to take action in the attempt to minimize potential
damage to reputational assets and corporate endurance. So crisis response strategies had to be
chosen and the goal of this report is to investigate these choices and evaluate the company’s
responses in the perspective of situational crisis communication theory.

1
Anthonissen (2007) p. 9
2
Coombs (2007). P 1
3
Tench & Yeomans (2009) p. 386
4
Ulmer (2007) p. 33
5
Sloan (2012)
6
Bergman (2012)
7
Sloan (2012

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1.1 Problem Statement
The goal of this paper is to analyze and discuss Costa Cruises’ post-crisis management of the recent
Costa Concordia Crisis. The paper will examine Costa Cruises’ employment of crisis responses in
relation the normative guidelines put forth in the Situational Crisis Communication Theory by
Timothy Coombs. Further the response strategies will be discussed in relation to their impact on
corporate reputation.
1.1.1 Research Questions
RQ1: In the perspective of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory, and normative
guidelines hereof, how did Costa Cruises respond to the recent Costa Concordia Crisis on
international platforms?
RQ2: How did the crisis responses affect corporate reputation of Costa Cruises?
1.2 Methodology
The methodology operates as a basis of the paper, and scientifically it takes a socio-constructive
approach viewing knowledge as grounded in social existence, thus as society change so do ideas,
ideology and values8
. An approach that in this paper will cover the central argument of the
corporate communication context, where expression is given through the product of individual and
social interaction, thus changing together with societal occurrences9
. The method initiates in the
problem statement, outlining the scientific problem. In the process of testing the research questions
through a case study and empirical analysis of Costa Cruises10
, the concept of crisis management
and relevant theory is accounted for11
. Coombs’ Situational Crisis Communication Theory research
is chosen because of its relevance to the topic and the well developed theoretical framework it
provides, as “the model has been tested and detailed in many other types of crises and types of
response strategies”12
. The analysis is characterized by the method of a directed content analysis –
an interpretative analytic approach based on existing theory13
. It is carried out on the basis of Costa
Cruises’ crisis responses in relation to the theory put forth, and the data is collected through
exploration of the company’s overall external communication.

8
Berger & Luckmann (1966)
9
Hibberd (2005) p.26
10
Part 3 & 4
11
Part 2
12
Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205-206
13
Hsieh & Shannon (2005) p. 1277;1281

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1.3 Delimitations
In general an organization’s actions and behavior in a crisis situation go far beyond issuing press
releases and making statements online, so to cover all aspects of responses it is recognized that one
would have to include further perspectives. However, due to limitations, the analysis will purely be
based on a selection of external publications visible to salient stakeholders14
. It is known that Costa
Cruises further experienced fire on its Allegra cruise ship some months later, which in the long run
also will have an effect on corporate reputation. Yet this paper only focuses on the Concordia crisis,
and how the response hereto affected reputational assets. Moreover due to page restrictions the
analysis does not touch upon the involvement of parent company Carnival Cruises.
This part one has introduced the paper and the understanding of the structure and content. The
following part will set a basis for the case study and analysis, presenting the theoretical background.

14
Fombrun & van Riel “a reputation develops through the information stakeholders receive […]” (quoted in Coombs,
Protecting (2007) p. 164)

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2. Theoretical Background
While the importance of crisis management and communications is widely agreed upon, the
definition of a crisis is not. In order to set the stage of how the subject is approached in this paper,
the theoretical background will be initiated with a definition of the concept. It will further elaborate
on Coombs’ situational approach to crisis communication in the clarification of crisis response
theory. This is relevant in order to conduct the analysis and hence evaluate Costa Cruises’ responses
to the Concordia crisis.
2.1 Crisis and Crisis Management Defined
Despite no agreed upon definition most scholars and corporations would most likely agree that “a
crisis is the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectations of
stakeholders and can seriously impact an organization’s performance and generate negative
outcomes”15
. This is the definition by Coombs in the attempt to capture the various perspectives and
common traits of crisis definitions. The definition very well depicts the idea of a crisis being a
fundamental disruption of corporate stability and status quo, which is the essence of most
definitions16
, thus it will also be the one pursued by this paper. Coombs further stress the
importance of stakeholder perceptions stating that “[i]f stakeholders believe an organization is in
crisis […] stakeholders will react to the organization as if it is in crisis”17
, meaning that crisis
management is greatly related to stakeholder relationships and the reputational outcome hereof,
which is further discussed in section 2.2. Yet crises do not have to turn into a disaster “[a] crisis is
unpredictable but not unexpected”18
. Corporations are able to limit the damage by engaging in crisis
management, and the approach hereto is often what makes or break the crisis outcome19
. Effective
crisis management can turn a crisis into an opportunity. Nevertheless, it is argued that simply
pulling a corporation unharmed through a crisis may not be a sufficient criterion for success. Rather
crisis management is a systematic effort designed to “avert crises or to effectively manage those
that do occur”20
meaning that effective efforts are the ones where “operations are sustained or
resumed, […] stakeholder losses are minimized, and learning occurs so that lessons are transferred

15
Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 2-3
16
Seeger et. al. (2005) p. 80
17
Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 3
18
19
Anthonissen (2008) p. 1
20
Pearson & Clair (1998) p. 61

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to future incidents”21
. Coombs divide crisis management into “four interrelated factors: (1)
prevention, (2) preparation, (3) response, and (4) revision”22
, further presented in appendix 1. This
paper will solely discuss the aspect of crisis response, as focus of analysis is put on post-crisis
management, where crisis response is important to recover reputation and stakeholder relationships,
also it is argued to be too early to make a revision of the Concordia crisis.
2.2 The Value of Reputation and Stakeholder Relationships
“A reputation is an aggregate evaluation stakeholders make about an organization”23
meaning that
positive stakeholder relationships can be an indicator of favorable reputation and vise versa. As
Benoit argues a company must be concerned about reputation when expectations of salient
stakeholders are disturbed24
. Reputation is widely recognized as a valuable, intangible asset, linked
to corporate opportunities25
and further directly linked to credibility which in turn is broken, if a gap
occurs between expectations and performance. Thus corporate focus is increasingly moving towards
reputation management in the effort to ensure corporate sustainability, and based on the definition
of crisis above, a “corresponding emphasis must be placed on crisis management as a means of
protecting reputational assets”26
. In his research of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory
(SCCT) Coombs argue that a favorable, prior reputation will benefit a corporation during a crisis,
and when protecting or restoring reputation in the post crisis communication27
. Hence a key element
in crisis management is continuous positive interactions with stakeholders, and as stated by Coombs
“first priority in any crisis is to protect stakeholders from harm, not to protect the reputation”28
.
Thus efforts must be initiated by addressing the ethical responsibility of helping stakeholders to
cope with both the physical (instructing information) and psychological (adjusting information)
concerns, before focus is turned to reputation management29
. The notions of instructing and
adjusting information are further described in appendix 2. In this context it is important to note that
managing reputation and responding to a crisis involves knowledge and understanding of one’s
stakeholders and their reactions30
. During a crisis the media will often be the loudest and most

21
Pearson & Clair (1998) p. 60-61
22
23
24
Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 264
25
Coombs & Holladay (2006) p. 123
26
27
Further discussed in Section 2.3.1; Coombs & Holladay (2006) p. 123-124
28
Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165
29
Sturges (1994) p. 308; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165
30
Ulmer (2007) p. 36-37

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demanding group of stakeholders, however, as the media contact often is more short term, the
company must remember “all those to whom they must communicate”31
. Thus identification of
salient stakeholders is crucial, as their reactions and interpretations will gain much power when
information is shared, shaping the outcome of the crisis32
. As mentioned above a crisis exists when
stakeholders perceive it to, this situational approach is clarified in the following section.

2.3 Crisis Response
Post-crisis communication is a strong area of research and is mainly identified through crisis
response strategies, being the responsive actions taken on by corporations in crisis to minimize
negative outcomes33
. The SCCT is one of the most widely tested theories of crisis communication,
developed and refined by Coombs34
. Taking the situational approach to crisis management it is an
attempt to map out post-crisis communication and demonstrate how crisis response strategies can be
used to protect reputational assets. The SCCT embraces three core elements; the crisis situation,
crisis response strategies, and a system of matching the two based on the statement that “[a]
strategic communicative response can best protect the reputational resource by assessing the crisis
situation and selecting a crisis response strategy that fits the crisis situation”35
. These elements will
be clarified in the following sections.
2.3.1 The Crisis Situation: Evaluating Responsibility and the Reputational Threat
Rationally one cannot match crisis response strategies to the reputational threat of a crisis without a
link between the two. Responsibility is what provides this conceptual link as “the evaluation of the
reputational threat (the situation) is largely a function of crisis responsibility”36
. Responsibility
requires accountability37
, and crisis response strategies retain these answers. In his research of the
SCCT Coombs argue that three factors are used to evaluate and determine the reputational threat
presented by a crisis: the initial crisis responsibility, the crisis history and the prior relational
reputation38
, a situational framing that further serves to guide the choice of crisis response
strategies.

31
Seymour & Moore (2000) p. 116
32
Lewis (2011) p. 89; Seymour & Moore (2000) p. 77
33
Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 138; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 170; Coombs: Attribution (2006) p. 135
34
Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205
35
Coombs & Holladay (2012) p. 167
36
37
Weiner (1986) p. 22;70
38
Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205; Coombs, Protecting (2007) p. 166; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 141

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Figure 1: The crisis situation (own adaption)
39
The initial crisis responsibility is defined by how much responsibility for the crisis, stakeholders
attribute to the company, the more attributed responsibility the bigger the reputational threat40
. Here
Coombs proclaims “[...] three crisis clusters based upon attributions of crisis responsibility […]”41
(1) the victim cluster with very little attributions of responsibility, (2) the accidental cluster with
minimal attributions because of uncontrollability, and (3) the preventable cluster with strong
attributions and severe reputational threat, as the event is considered intentional42
. Appendix 3
provides a more detailed elaboration of the crisis clusters and crisis types within. The crisis history
is “whether or not an organization had had a similar crisis in the past”43
and the prior relational
reputation is how well the organization is perceived to have treated stakeholders earlier44
. This is
further related to both the Velcro effect stating that if you have a history, making the same mistakes
number of times, you are also more vulnerable in the future45
, and the early adaption of stakeholder
theory by Freeman, where a descriptive approach of existing relationships is associated with the
outcomes of organizational actions46
.

39
Coombs & Holiday (2012) p. 181
40
Coombs, Protecting (2007) p. 168
41
Coombs Protecting (2007) p. 168
42
Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 167-168
43
Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 142; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 167
44
45
Coombs & Holladay (2012) p. 59; 167
46
Lewis (2011) p. 86

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2.3.2 Crisis Response Strategies
When the attributions of responsibility have been identified, hence the reputational threat of a crisis,
the organization can begin to consider potential crisis response strategies. “Trying to specify the
exact number of crisis response strategies is a losing proposition”47
. A theorist such as William L.
Benoit has earlier set the stage with his list of 14 “image restoration” strategies48
, which is clarified
in appendix 4. To take a more productive approach Coombs has across theories identified the 10
most common strategies “built around the perceived acceptance of responsibility for a crisis
embodied in the response”49
. His crisis response strategies are illustrated in table 1 below.
Primary
crisis
response
strategies

Denial
crisis
response
strategies

Attack
the
accuser
Management
confronts
the
person
or
group
claiming
something
is
wrong.

Denial
Management
asserts
that
there
is
no
crisis.

Scapegoat
Management
blames
someone
outside
for
the
crisis.

Diminish
crisis
response
strategies

Excuse

Management
minimizes
organizational
responsibility
by
denying
intent
to
do

harm
and/or
claiming
inability
to
control
the
event.

Justification
Managements
attempts
to
minimize
the
perceived
damage
caused
by
the
crisis.

Rebuild
crisis
response
strategies

Compensation
Management
offers
money
or
other
gifts
to
victims.

Apology

Management
indicates
the
organization
takes
full
responsibility
for
the
crisis
and

asks
stakeholders
for
forgiveness.

Secondary
crisis
response
strategies

Bolstering
crisis
response
strategies

Reminder
Telling
stakeholders
of
the
past
good
work
of
the
organization.

Integration
Management
praises
stakeholders
and/or
reminds
them
of
past
good
work.

Victimage
Reminding
stakeholders
that
the
organization
is
a
victim
of
the
crisis
too.

Table 1: Crisis response strategies by the SCCT (own adaption)
50
Coombs divides the primary SCCT crisis response strategies into four groups; denial, diminish,
rebuild, and bolstering. The deny responses involve, as the title says, a denial of any connection to
the crisis, either by simply denying, claiming a fault, or blaming a third party51
. If accepted by
stakeholders the organization is safe for any reputational damage. Diminish response options

47
Benoit (1995) in Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139
48
Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 266
49
50
51
Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 204; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 171; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-140

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include minimizing the perceived damage and responsibility linked to the crisis, through excuse or
justification, here reputational harm occurs if stakeholders reject the frame set by the organization52
.
Rebuild strategies are about generating new reputational assets through compensation or apologies,
both being positive reputational actions, and lastly bolstering strategies function more as secondary
and a supplement, comprising efforts of goodwill from close stakeholders, reminders of past good
work, making the organization a victim etc.53
.
The last core element of the SCCT is matching the response strategies with the crisis situation as
discussed in the previous section. When determining the suitable response strategy for the crisis
situation at hand it is, as mentioned, important to understand how stakeholders perceive the crisis
and the crisis outcome. The SCCT embraces this and takes a stakeholder and audience-centered
approach to crisis communication54
, arguing that the larger the reputational threat the more
accommodative the response strategies should be55
. Table 2 below provides a summary of the
normative guidelines and SCCT recommendations for the use of crisis response strategies.
1.

Provide
instructing
information
to
all
victims
or
potential
victims
in
the
form
of
warnings

and
directions
for
protecting
themselves
from
harm.

2.
Provide
adjusting
information
to
victims
by
expressing
concern
for
them
and
providing

corrective
actions
when
possible.

Note:
Providing
instructing
and
adjusting
information
alone
can
be
enough
when
crises

have
minimal
attributions
of
crisis
responsibility
(victim
crises),
no
history
of
similar

crises
and
a
neutral
or
positive
prior
relational
reputation.

3.
Diminish
strategies
should
be
used
for
crises
with
minimal
attributions
of
crisis

responsibility
(victim
crises)
couples
with
a
history
of
similar
crises
and/or
negative
prior

relational
reputation.

4.

Diminish
strategies
should
be
used
for
crises
with
low
attributions
of
crisis
responsibility

(accident
crises),
which
have
no
history
of
similar
crises,
and
a
neutral
or
positive
prior

relational
reputation.

5.

Rebuild
strategies
should
be
used
for
crises
with
low
attribution
of
crisis
responsibility

(accident
crises),
couples
with
a
history
of
similar
crises
and/or
unfavorable
prior
relational

reputation.

6.

Rebuild
strategies
should
be
used
for
crises
with
strong
attributions
of
crisis
responsibility

(preventable
crises)
regardless
of
crisis
history
or
prior
relational
reputation.

7.

Denial
strategies
should
be
used
in
rumor
crises.

8.

Denial
strategies
should
be
used
in
challenge
crisis
when
the
challenge
is
unwarranted.

52
Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 171; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-140
53
Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-141; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 172
54
55

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9.

Use
corrective
action
(adjusting
information)
in
challenges
when
other
stakeholders
are

likely
to
support
the
challenge.

10.

Bolstering
strategies
should
be
used
as
supplements
to
the
other
response
strategies.

11.

Victimage
response
strategy
should
only
be
used
with
the
victim
cluster.

12.

To
be
consistent,
do
not
mix
denial
strategies
with
either
diminish
or
rebuild
strategies.

13.

Diminish
and
rebuild
strategies
can
be
used
in
combination
with
one
another.

Table 2: SCCT Recommendations for Crisis Response Selection (own adaption)
56
The above part has set a valuable basis for the forthcoming case study and empirical analysis of
Costa Cruises. The SCCT will be used in the case study accounting for the crisis situation regarding
the Concordia crisis, and in the empirical analysis evaluating Costa’s use of crisis response
strategies.

56
Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 143; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 173

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3. Case Study
This following section is set to paint the picture of Costa Cruises, involving company profile,
stakeholders and elaboration of the Costa Concordia crisis, including crisis situation and type
according to the SCCT, setting the basis for the analysis of crisis responses.
3.1 Costa Cruises – Company Profile
“The story behind Costa Cruises is at first glance a story of entrepreneurial success”57
, starting out
as a small trader of fabrics and olive oil Costa now has more than sixty years of tradition in cruise
holidays58
. Costa Cruises is the number one cruise company in Europe, and hold 7.2% of world
wide passengers59
. In 2000 the company was acquired by Carnival Corporation, and is now one of
eleven more or less independent brands operated by Carnival, accounting for approximately 16% of
the revenue60
. Today 65,000 Travel Agencies work with Costa Cruises all over the world and
research from 2010 shows that 98% of all passengers were satisfied clients61
. Costa clarifies its
vision by the following statement:
Figure 2: Costa Cruises Vision Statement62
With a mission of having the guests being the best partners for future growth, Costa puts customer
service in focus, which also comes to show in the Costa Touch statement "We all make our Guests'
dreams come true"63
.
3.2 Stakeholders of Costa Cruises
The stakeholders of Costa Cruises are many and the most predominant ones are depicted in figure 3.
In this paper focus will be on the external stakeholders, as they merely are the ones targeted in the
crisis responses of analysis and discussion in the following. As mentioned in section 2.2 it is
important to be aware of salient stakeholders in a crisis situation. In terms of external crisis
communication Costa Cruises’ most salient stakeholders are argued to be consumers and the media.

57
The Company history
58
About Costa
59
Market Share
60
Market Share
61
Company Profile
62
Our values
63
Our values

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During a crisis consumer reactions are often highly emotional and uncertainty is dominating, thus
this is also what media focus will be on. Even though consumers might distrust both the company
and the media during a crisis64
, their perceptions are easily influenced. Being an international
company as Costa Cruises, stakeholders will also differ across markets, and it is thus of utter
importance to align decision making and all communication, in order to keep responses consistent
and trustworthy65
.
Figure 3: Costa Cruises stakeholder map (own adaption)
3.3 The Costa Concordia Crisis
On January 13, 2012 Costa Cruises gained international attention, when one of its cruise ships, the
Costa Concordia, ran aground and partially sank overnight off the coast of Italy66
. At least 30
people died as a result of the incident, and two are still missing67
, making it the largest passenger
cruise ship accident in 100 years, since the Titanic68
.

64
65
66
Sloan (2012)
67
Bergman (2012)
68
Sloan (2012

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The accident occurred due to a deviation
from the approved route, as depicted in
figure 4. Sailing that close to the shore
on shallow water caused the ship to hit
rocks and tore a large cut in the hull69
.
Costa Cruises and prosecutors are
blaming the accident on the ship's
captain, Francesco Schettino, who they
say took the vessel off course70
. The
Captain, on the other hand, blames the
collision on the charts claiming that they
did not show the rocks71
. The period
after the wreck many news stories and
opinions circulated in the media about
the tragedy, and still do. Along with the
above accusations, failing to report the
accident to the coast guard in time, and
abandoning the ship before all passengers had been rescued72
, directed much focus towards the
captain, who was arrested the day after the tragedy, “accused of manslaughter and abandoning his
ship before all those on board were evacuated”73
. Schettino is now under house arrest while the
incident is being investigated74
. The grounding of Costa Concordia was an event that shocked the
world. The following section will attempt to determine the crisis situation and reputational threat
and thus the crisis type according to the SCCT.
3.3.1 The Crisis Situation: Evaluating Responsibility and Reputational Threat
As mentioned in section 2.3.1 Coombs argue that three factors are used to evaluate and determine
the reputational threat (crisis situation) presented by a crisis and further guide the choice of crisis
response; the initial crisis responsibility, the crisis history and the prior relational reputation75
.

69
Pisa (2012)
70
Sloan (2012); Sky News (2012)
71
BBC News (2012)
72
Appendix 5
73
Bozicevic (2012)
74
Pisa (2012)
75
Coombs, Protecting (2007) p. 166; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 141; Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205
Figure 4: Outline of the Costa Concordia Wreck (Agar, 2012)

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As noted earlier, the media will have a great power in letting other stakeholders know about the
crisis and influencing attitudes hereto, hence, “how the media frame the crisis is an important
consideration”76
. The Costa Concordia crisis created much disturbance in stakeholder expectations
and could most likely have been prevented if other actions had been made, meaning that the
responsibility attributed by stakeholders is high, and the crisis is thus, according to theory, situated
in the preventable cluster pursuing strong attributions of responsibility and a severe reputational
threat77
. The crisis type is argued to be a human-error accident78
, as human error most likely caused
the accident. Few days after the wreck both a corporate press release and a statement from CEO
Pier Luigi Foschi reported human error, as seen in figure 5 and 6 below.
Figure 5: Statement of human error from Costa Cruises79
Figure 6: Statement of human error from Pier Luigi Foschi, CEO of Costa Cruises 80
One could also argue for the crisis type to be organizational misdeed with injuries, as stakeholders
were placed at risk and injuries occurred. However according to this crisis type the risk should be
placed by management, which is quite debatable in this situation. In both cases the company is
facing severe reputational threat, leading to a certain type of crisis response according to the SCCT.
In the days after the crisis some dialogues referred to the past safety history of the company81
, and
not being the first reported accident with injuries, called Costa’s safety records into question. To
name a few, the very same Costa Concordia hit the dockside in Sicily in 2008, causing damage to

76
77
Section 2.3.1; Appendix 3; Section 2.2
78
Appendix 3
79
Costa Concordia - Update; Appendix 6
80
Foschi: Press (2012) [2:29-2:38]
81
Foxnews.com (2012)

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the port82
, and more seriously, in 2010 Costa Europa crashed during docking killing three crew
members and injuring four passengers83
. Incidents like these and Costs’ handling hereof will have
great influence on the attribution of responsibility in the recent Concordia crisis. Nevertheless
Costa’s positioning as the number one cruise company in Europe84
with 98% satisfied passengers85
,
provides the company with a positive prior relational reputation, and will of course benefit the
company during the crisis and in the attempt to restore reputational assets86
.

82
Paloti (2009); Derbyshire (2012)
83
SilverStein (2010); Bryant (2010)
84
Section 3.1
85
Section 3.1
86
Coombs & Holladay (2006) p. 123-124; Section 2.2

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4. Empirical Analysis
Based on the crisis situation accounted for above the Concordia crisis is placed in the preventable
cluster with an existing crisis history and favorable prior reputations. Thus the situation suggests
strong attributions of crisis responsibility and possesses a severe reputational threat87
. In such
instances the SCCT recommends the accommodative response strategy of rebuild, as compensation
or full apology would work to improve corporate reputation88
. The following section will examine
and discuss the crisis responses used by Costa to see if they are in agreement with the SCCT
recommendations and attempt to determine the overall success of the post-crisis management.
4.1 Costa Cruise’s Crisis Responses
After the Costa Concordia wreck on January 13th
Costa has engaged in different responses in order
to keep stakeholders informed and hopefully retain reputational assets.
Figure 7: Crisis Response Timeline (own adaption)89

87
Section 2.3.1; Section 3.3.1; Appendix 3
88
Section 2.3.2
89
Appendix 6, 7 & 8; Costa Concordia – Update; Costa Cruises on Twitter; Costa Cruises on Facebook

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From a corporate perspective several statements were made public on the corporate websites, and
some also published as press releases90
. From a more consumer perspective Costa also used the
power of social media, including Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, to communicate updates and
company statements. These responses are illustrated and discussed in appendix 6, 7 and 8. The
above figure 7 illustrates the timeline of the different crisis responses.
Figure 8: Extract from first statement from Costa Cruises91
Figure 9: Tweet from Costa Cruises’ Twitter account92
The first response was a confirmation of the evacuation of Concordia, published around 4 hours
after the wreck as a corporate statement on the website and on twitter as seen in the above two
figures93
. Shortly after expressions of condolences and concern was stated on the website and on
Facebook as seen in the below figure 10 and 1194
. With consumers as salient stakeholders, it is
argued to be valuable to include social media in the first responses.
Figure 10: Extract from second statement from Costa Cruises95

90
Press
91
92
Costa Concordia on Twitter; Appendix 7
93
Appendix 6 & 7; Costa Cruises on Twitter; Costa Concordia - Update
94
Costa Concordia - Update; Appendix 6 & 8; Costa Cruises on Facebook
95

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Figure 11: First post on Costa Cruises’ Facebook page96
Until this point no real response strategy had been used. Costa only did what Coombs call
instructing and adjusting information to help stakeholders cope with concerns97
, as the
communication was solely informative and at the same time somewhat indefinite, as not much was
known yet. In fact Costa waited more than 14 hours before providing a contact number for
assistance to friends and families98
. In a time where the media is very much global and news travel
across the world in no time, it is of utter importance to initiate immediate communication with
stakeholders involved99
. So despite the little knowledge, Costa’s timing was unacceptable and
indicates little or no crisis preparation100
.
During this first period Costa received several comments and condolences especially on Twitter as
seen in appendix 7, to which Costa also responded contributing to the key element of stakeholder
interaction101
. In these first communications Costa supported the captain in stating that “[…] still
preliminary the ship Costa Concordia under the command of the Master Francesco Schettino was
regularly sailing […]”102
. However only the day after, assessments changed and indications were
now “that there may have been significant human error on the part of the ship’s Master […]”103
.
Alongside reassuring that “[a]s all Costa Masters, he has been constantly trained passing all
tests”104
, this statement is argued to be an attempt to minimize corporate responsibility via

96
Costa Concordia on Twitter; Appendix 8 (facebook)
97
Section 2.2; Sturges (1994) p. 308; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165
98
99
Section 2.2
100
Section 2.1; Appendix 1
101
Section 2.2
102
103
104

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justification, using the diminish response strategy105
. Further this could even be argued to be an
attempt to shift blame and make the captain the scapegoat, hence touching upon denial strategy106
.
In the end of this same statement background information of Costa’s commitment to safety was
further included, as seen below. This was a reminder of the company’s high obligation to and
standards of safety and personnel training, thus a use of the bolstering posture to retain
reputation107
.
Figure 12: Extract from statement: Background of Costa’s commitment to safety108
The following days’ responses were merely online and through the media coverage of Costa’s press
conference on January 16 with Chairman and CEO Pier Luigi Foschi, sharing company condolences
and addressing key issues regarding the incident. In this press conference similar response strategies
as above were used109
. Watching the video, it is clear that English is not the CEO’s first language110
,
which affects the impression of concern and engagement required in such a situation, nevertheless it
was an in-person public statement, which until this had not been part of the responses. But it might
have come too late for the company to retain control, because at this time the world media had
already created their own perceptions and rumors were already fluctuating. The CEO was aware of
this and tried to justify his absence with the reason of being abroad “and therefore did not have a
direct and immediate knowledge of the facts occurred”111
. One could argue that someone else
should then have been appointed the role of spokesperson, to make sure that stakeholders got this
in-person information earlier and also to have a spokesperson with more media training and
international plea112
. However, this is another discussion which will not be taken in this paper.

105
Section 2.3.2; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 171; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-140
106
Section 2.3.2; Appendix 4
107
Section 2.3.2; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 172; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-141
108
109
Foschi: Press (2012)
110
Foschi: Press (2012)
111
Foschi: Senate (2012) [3:19-3:28]
112
Coombs (2007) p. 128;168-169

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One rumor fluctuating in the media was that Concordia victims were offered 30 percent discount on
their next cruise, being highly criticized as a tasteless compensation to victims still recovering, as
seen in the below articles.
Figure 13: Article from Lovell Communications; PR, crisis comm. and marketing comm. agency113
Figure 14: Article from news media CP World114
Figure 15: Costa Cruises’ rejection of discount rumors
115
Also seen above these accusations were rejected by Costa in statements shortly after. Not until
January 27th
the company itself addressed the issue of compensation and announced a compensation
package for Concordia victims and future cruise guests. Being a part of the rebuilding strategy,
compensation was an appropriate strategy to choose116
, however at this point stakeholders had
already had the time to develop another opinion of the company’s response, mainly based on

113
Coleman (2012)
114
Funaro (2012)
115
116
Section 2.3.2

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groundless assertions in the media, thus the reputational rebuild should have been announced
immediately after the claims, to have the full effect.
After the worst media storm had abated, Costa’s communication also became less frequent and
merely focused on information about the removal of Costa Concordia, and promise of corrective
actions. Also in the social media channels things were slowly returning back to normal, as the
Facebook post by Costa below illustrate. This also shows how Costa listens to and involves
stakeholders, which is further elaborated on in Appendix 8. This integration of stakeholders is also a
part of the bolstering strategy117
.
Figure 16: Costa Cruises statement on Facebook acknowledging stakeholder requests118
.

4.2 Connecting and Reflecting upon the Findings
Due to strong attributions of crisis responsibility, Costa should, as earlier established119
, use rebuild
response strategies “generating new reputational assets through compensation or apologies”120
.
Despite the theoretical suggestion, Costa’s first reaction to the crisis was not to apologize, but rather
to minimize responsibility by use of the diminish posture of justification and excuse. In fact the
company never provided a full apology. Even though compensation was given, initiating a rebuild
response, the company’s main strategy was to make the captain the scapegoat, thus Costa displayed
itself as a victim of the captain’s mistakes and denied responsibility. Costa further tried to bolster
the corporate image by reminding stakeholders of its high obligation to safety, and integrating
stakeholders via social media.
In the first statements from Costa one can tick off some of the key elements in crisis
communication; concern for stakeholders and actions addressing the situation, but the overt attempt

117
Section 2.3.2
118
Costa Cruises on Facebook; Appendix 8
119
Section 2.3.2; 3.3.1
120
Section 2.3.2

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to blame the captain could be a very risky strategy, as “it creates the impression of a business
willing to jump to conclusions before all the facts are known, rather than keeping a cool head”121
.
Theory further argues that at this early stage Costa’s focus should be on the human impact and not
protecting commercial interests122
. Shifting the blame and thus touching upon denial strategy123
might not be appropriate in a situation where the crisis possibly could have been prevented by the
company124
, as the CEO also stated himself “this is a tragic accident which shouldn’t have occurred
and could have been avoided”125
. So, even if the accusation of the captain holds true, corporate
changes will have to be made in order to fully retain reputation, as these changes will further impact
stakeholders due to the ripple effect126
. As stated by Ian Mitroff, crisis management expert, “it’s
easy to put the finger on just one bad apple but you still have to ask, ‘what about the whole
system?’”127
. Further Costa could stand in front of severe reputational damage if investigations later
conclude that the captain was not to blame128
.

Reputational
threat
of

crisis
situation

Costa
Cruises'
responses
SCCT
recommendations

Costa
Concordia

wreck
January
'12

Strong
attributions
of
crisis

responsibility
=
severe

reputational
threat

Diminish
crisis
response
strategy:
Rebuild
crisis
response
strategy:

Justification

Compensation

Excuse

Apology

Denial
crisis
response
strategy:
Bolstering
crisis
response
strategy:

Scapegoat

Reminder

Bolstering
crisis
response
strategy:

Integration

Reminder

Integration

Rebuild
crisis
response
strategy:

Compensation

Table 3: Reputational threat, Costa Cruises’ responses & SCCT Recommendations summarized129
.
Reviewing the summarization in table 3, Costa made use of various response strategies in its crisis
communication. The use of the rebuild strategy of compensation and the secondary bolstering

121
Hemus (2012)
122
Section 2.2; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165
123
124
Section 3.3.1
125
Foschi: Senate (2012) [3:07-3:14]
126
Lewis (2011) p. 8-9
127
Booton (2012)
128
Section 2.2
129
Summarized from above sections

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strategies reminder and ingratiation are coherent with the SCCT recommendations130
. However
neither the deny nor the diminish strategy match these recommendations, thus Costa’s overall crisis
response did not follow prescriptions. While the crisis situation classified the crisis as a severe
reputational threat, Costa mainly responded with strategies suitable for victim crises and accident
crises131
. Also mixing the denial with diminish and rebuild strategies will, according to the SCCT,
create critical inconsistency132
, and thus erode the effectiveness of the overall response133
.
Particularly also in Costa’s case, being an international company with stakeholders across many
markets, it is of utter importance to align responses134
. Nevertheless one could argue that the
complexity of crises, not being static, changing with society occurrences135
, might create a need for
corporate preparedness to change response if necessary during the crisis period to protect
reputation136
. Thus the SCCT’s incorporation of guidelines recommending consistency in crisis
response could be understood in different ways, and Costa might not have been as inconsistent as
first stated.
Also the lack of apology could be discussed, as one could argue that Costa gave a partial apology
through the use of regret and concern, possibly with the reasoning that it would not hold the same
liabilities. Even though full apology would have had a greater effect on the reputational rebuild,
accepting responsibility could also put Costa in a worse off position in potential lawsuits related to
the crisis137
, and it might in the long run benefit Costa and its corporate image not to use full
apology. Further, by not explicitly apologizing, Costa was able to focus discussion on corrective
actions, which is further included in the normative guidelines of instructing and adjusting
information138
, and would address the priority of protecting stakeholders from harm139
. At the same
time this is aligned with consumer focus in Costa’s vision and mission140
, but it does not change the
fact that Costa has damaged reputational credibility when creating a gap between the mission/vision

130
Section 2.3.2
131
132
Section 2.3.2; Figure x
133
Section 2.3.2; Coombs: Protecting (2007) 173
134
Section 3.2
135
Section 1 & 1.2
136
Heath & Coombs (2006) p. 206; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 173
137
138
Section 2.3.2; Heath & Coombs (2006) p. 206; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 143
139
Section 2.2
140
Section 3.1; Our values

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expectations and actual performance141
. This leads on to the following section determining the
reputational effect of Costa’s responses.
4.3 Effect on Corporate Reputation
According to theory, Costa Cruises should have suffered severe reputational damage. Several media
have too proclaimed that Costa might not survive, and that travelers would abandon the idea of
cruising142
. However, none of this has yet occurred, as agents are largely reporting that cruise sales
are business as usual143
. As stated by Peter Anker Jensen, CEO of the Danish travel agency Fri
Ferie, “I have heard comments like ‘now it must surely be the world's safest cruise line’ - and
people forget quickly”144
. Peter further stated that despite the tragedy, prices is still what matters
most, “we did not sell many cruise holidays before the accident. It's scary but true, Costa sat down
prices - and then we sold very well!”145
. As depicted below, Fri Ferie is now promoting great cruise
offers on their website. Thus indications show that the old notion of ‘bad press is better than no
press’ might be true in the long run.
Figure 17: Great offers for Costa Cruises on Fri Ferie’s website146
The above is further supported by statements from consumers. One even wrote an article on how
the media buzz had opened his eyes for cruise holidays, and not just any cruise – a Costa cruise,

141
Section 2.2
142
Walker (2012); MacMillan (2012)
143
Turen (2012); Appendix 9
144
Appendix 9
145
Appendix 9
146
Fri Ferie Cruise

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stating that he “guessed that there's probably no safer time to travel on Costa than right now”147
.
This article was also highlighted by Costa in the tweet below.
Figure 18: Costa bolstering tweet by Costa Cruises reminding of positive views148
.
Also the stocks of parent company Carnival Cruises149
did not suffer as much as one might have
feared. Naturally they initially did go down, as illustrated in the figure below the stocks made a
steep drop on the opening bell on January 17150
. This was only anticipated in the situation of crisis,
however, it is notable that already on the first day of trading the stock was starting to balance out,
and at the end of the third day of trading the stock was slowly ascending again.
Figure 19: Carnival Cruises at NY Stock Exchange the days after the crisis151
Using a monitoring tool to check the social mentions of Costa Cruises, one can assess the sentiment
of the company, being “the ratio of positive conversations happening online verses the amount of
negative”152
. From the time around the crisis and till now, the sentiment has, as seen in the figure 20
below, gone from having one negative conversation for every one positive, to now having only one
for every eleven positive conversation. Further the strength shows that the media buzz around
company have abated, and the likelihood of Costa being discussed in social media has gone from 25

147
Serminara (2012)
148
Costa Cruises on Twitter
149
Which as well indicate the situation of Costa Cruises
150
Which was the first day of trading after the wreck, as Monday was a holiday (NYSE trading hours)
151
NYSE Carnival Corporation
152
Hayes (2012); SocialMention FAQ

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to 3 percent. This support the statement above that people might quickly forget, and indicate that
Costa might not suffer as much from the crisis as first assumed.
Figure 20: Social Mentions about Costa Cruises153
So, even though Costa acted somewhat contrary to what the SCCT recommends in similar crises,
and was criticized in the media, consumer interaction and investor affairs imply that the cruise
operator will make it through the crisis. Naturally, there are limitations on the ability to explain the
exact influences of the crisis on Costa’s reputation, and the included data might say more about the
image than the long term reputation. However, the Costa image appears to be in the process of
repair as the attitude among salient stakeholders seems to be turning. Further Costa is launching
new initiatives and a new flagship liner, hoping to rebuild reputation154
. This puts forth Benoit’s
view on crisis management in taking restorative actions to cope with the image threat155
. Though it
is argued to be image repair and not restoration, as the image not necessarily is restored back to its
former stage, but rather repaired to a new stage for future endurance. Whether or not these actions
will result in the full repair of consumer confidence is yet to be seen, as the holiday season unfold,
and thus beyond the scope of this paper.
Concluding one could argue for crisis preparation to be of utter importance, by being better
prepared for a crisis situation, Costa would have been able to respond much faster and more
specific156
. When being the center of tragedy, one must be ahead of the PR battle on every front. A
great part of PR is reputation management, which includes continuous monitoring (social) media

153
Hayes (2012); SocialMention – Costa Cruises
154
Sinha (2012)
155
Appendix 4
156
Section 2.1; Appendix 1

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activity for any possible dissatisfied consumer157
, as it will change along individual and social
interactions158
. In time this monitoring could prevent an episode as the Concordia wreck from
developing into an image damaging incident. As stated earlier effective crisis management is
“where operations are sustained or resumed, […] stakeholder losses are minimized, and learning
occurs so that lessons are transferred to future incidents”159
, making the revision factor of crisis
management important as well, learning from the crisis and using this for both the prevention of and
preparation for future crises160
.

157
Baldelomar (2012)
158
Section 1.2
159
Section 2.1; Pearson & Clair (1998) p. 60-61
160
Appendix 1

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5. Conclusion
The paper has been built on an interest in post-crisis management theory, and its relation to the
reality of crisis management by corporations such as Costa Cruises. Based on an understanding of
the concept, a situational perspective was taken through the clarification of Coombs’ Situational
Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT). With the aim of testing the normative crisis response
guidelines hereof, a case analysis of Costa’s crisis responses has been carried out. Through the
analysis it was found that Costa did not follow theoretical recommendations, as the company used a
combination of strategies from all the different crisis response postures in no specific or thought
through order. However despite Costa’s mismatch responses, certain measures indicate that Costa
might not suffer as much damage to its corporate reputation as first assumed.
Mixing different strategies and taking the position as a victim of the captain’s mistakes, Costa
places itself in the same situation as most stakeholders, creating sympathy and minimizing
responsibility. In its own form Costa engaged in situational crisis responses when choosing its
responses according to the context and media coverage at hand, and the threat that followed.
Whether or not this was intentional and a planned strategy or merely just a lucky strike for a
company that was not at all prepared for a crisis, one can only guess. Nevertheless, it can be argued
that theoretical recommendations might not be essential in all types of crisis situations. Again had
the SCCT prescriptions been followed, Costa would most likely not have been target for the many
critiques and negative discussions, and would thus be in a better reputational position going through
the crisis. In conclusion, the paper has provided a basis for the discussion of whether or not
theoretical guidelines always should be followed and questions remain of how the reputational
situation of Costa would have been, had the company followed the SCCT prescriptions.

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6. List of References
6.1 Books
§ Anthonissen, Peter F. Crisis Communication – practical PR strategies for reputation
management and company survival. Kogan Page: London, 2008.
§ Barton, Laurence. Crisis in Orgnaizations II. South-Western: Ohio, 2001.

§ Benoit, William L. Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies: A Theory of Image Restoration
Strategies. State University of New York Press, 1995.

§ Benoit, William L. 2004. Image restoration discourse and crisis communication. In
Responding to crisis: a rhetorical approach to crisis communication, edited by Millar, D. P.
and Heath, R. L.. Mahwah, NJ, USA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

§ Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality. New York:
Doubleday & Co, 1966.

§ Coombs, W. Timothy. Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, and responding.
Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA, 2007.
§ Coombs, W. Timothy & Sherry J. Holladay. The Handbook of Crisis Communication.
Wiley-Blackwell: Oxford, 2012.
§ Grunig, James E., and Todd T. Hunt. Managing Public Relations. New York: CBS College
Publishing, 1984.
§ Heath, Robert L. Handbook of Public Relations. Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA, 2001.
§ Heath, Robert L. & Timothy W. Coombs. Today’s Public Relations: An Introduction. Sage:
Thousand Oaks, CA, 2006.

§ Hibberd, Fiona J. Unfolding Sosial constructionism. Springer, 2005.
§ Lewis, Laurie K. Organizational Change: Creating Change Through Strategic
Communication. Wiley-Blackwell: West Sussex, 2011
§ Morsing, Mette, and Suzanne C. Beckmann. Strategic CSR Communication. Copenhagen:
DJØF Publishing, 2006.

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§ Seymour, Mike & Simon Moore. Effective Crisis Management: Worldwide Principles and
Practice. Cassell: London & New York, 2000.
§ Tench, Ralph & Liz Yeomans. Exploring Public Relations. Pearson Educated: Harlow,
2009.
§ Ulmer, Robert R. Effective Crisis Communication: Moving From Crisis to Opportunity.
Sage Publications: California, 2007.
§ Weiner, Bernard. An Attributional Theory of Motivation and Emotion. Springer-Verlag:
New York, 1986
6.2 Articles in Journals
§ Allen, M. W., & Caillout, R. H. “Legitimation endeavors: Impression management
strategies used by an organization in crisis”. Communication Monographs 61 (1994): 44-62.
§ Cooley, Skye Chance & Asya Besova Cooley. “An examination of the situational crisis
communication theory through the general motors bankruptcy”. Journal of Media and
Communication Studies 3.6 (2011): 203-211.
§ Coombs, W. Timothy. “Attribution Theory as a guide for post-crisis communication
research”. Public Relations Review 33 (2007): 135-139.
§ Coombs, W. Timothy. “Protecting Organization Reputations During a Crisis: The
Development and Application of Situational Crisis Communication Theory”. Corporate
Reputations Review 10.3 (2007): 163-176.
§ Coombs, W. Timothy & Sherry J. Holladay. "Unpacking the halo effect: reputation and
crisis management". Journal of Communication Management 10.2 (2006): 123 – 137.
§ Hsieh, Hsiu-Fang, and Sarah E. Shannon. “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content
Analysis.” Qualitative Health Research. 15.9 (2005): 1277-1288.
§ Morsing, Mette and Majken Schultz. “Corporate social responsibility communication:
stakeholder information, response and involvement strategies.” Business Ethics: A European
Review. 15.4 (2006): 323-338
§ Seeger, Matthew W., Robert R. Ulmer, Julie M. Novak & Timothy Sellnow. “Post-crisis
discourse and organizational change, failure and renewal” Journal of Organizational Change
Management. 18.1 (2005): 78-95.

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§ Sturges, David L. 1994. “Communicating through crisis: A Strategy for Organizational
Survival”. Management Communication Quarterly 7.3 (1994): 297-316.
§ Pearson, Christine M. and Judith A. Clair. “Reframing Crisis Management” Academy of
management review 23.1 (1998): 39-78
6.3 Online Articles
§ Agar, Michael. “Concordia: How the disaster unfold”. The Telegraph. 16 Jan. 2012. 22 Apr.
2012. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/interactive-graphics/9018076/Concordia-How-the-
disaster-unfolded.html>
§ Baldelomar, Raquel. “Costa Concordia and Brand Reputation Management”. 24 Jan. 2012.
Quaintise. 15 May 2012. <http://blog.quaintise.com/costa-concordia-and-brand-reputation-
management/>

§ BBC News. “Costa Concordia cruise ship captain ‘went off course’”. BBC News. 16 Jan.
2012. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16576979>
§ Bergman, Jamey. ”Concordia Update: Five Bodies Removed from Wreckage Identified”.
Cruise Critic. 17 Apr. 2012. 21 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.cruisecritic.com/news/news.cfm?ID=4710#>
§ Booton, Jennifer. “Carnival Fails Crisis 101 in Costa Response”. Fox Business. 27 Jan.
2012. 07 May 2012. <http://www.foxbusiness.com/travel/2012/01/26/experts-say-carnival-
should-have-learned-from-wendys-fedex-post-crisis/#ixzz1sOHF8UXr>
§ Bozicevic, Zoran. ”Striking photos as sinking cruise ship Costa Concordia lies in
shallow waters”. National Post. 16 Jan. 2012. 21 Apr. 2012.
<http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/01/16/striking-photographs-of-tragedy-in-shallow-
waters-as-the-costa-concordia-sinks/>
§ Bryant, Sue. ” Costa Europa Hits Pier In Egypt; Three Dead, Four Injured”. Cruise Critic.
27 Feb. 2010. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://www.cruisecritic.com/news/news.cfm?ID=3710>
§ Coleman, Dana. “Costa to Concordia Passengers: “Ya’ll Come Back Now, You Hear!””.
Lovell Communications Inc. 24 Jan. 2012. 02 May 2012. <http://lovell.com/crisis-
communications/costa-concordia-passengers-%E2%80%9Cya%E2%80%99ll-now-
hear%E2%80%9D/>

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§ Cruise Market Watch ~ 22nd January 2012. “Costa Concordia Impact to Cruise Prices and
Bookings“. Cruise Market Watch. 22 Jan. 2012. 14 May 2012.
<http://www.cruisemarketwatch.com/articles/costa-concordia-impact-to-cruise-prices-and-
bookings/>
§ Derbyshire, David. ”So what DID cause the Costa Concordia to hit the rocks? Human error,
electrical failure and uncharted ridge are all theories”. Daily Mail Online. 16 Jan. 2012. 21
Apr. 2012. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2087133/Costa-Concordia-accident-
So-DID-cause-cruise-ship-hit-rocks.html#ixzz1shvbwVRR>
§ Evans, Rebecca, Harris, Paul & Nick Pisa. “Captain Coward: 'I only left because I FELL
into lifeboat when ship listed suddenly as I was trying to help'”. Daily Mail Online. 19 Jan.
2012. 21 Apr. 2012.<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2087704/Costa-Concordia-
Captain-Francesco-Schettino-I-left-I-FELL-lifeboat.html#ixzz1sgJgpzfk>
§ Foxnews.com. “Website reviews show slew of past safety concerns raised by Costa
Concordia passengers”. Fox News. 17 Jan. 2012. 22 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.foxnews.com/travel/2012/01/17/website-reviews-show-slew-past-safety-
concerns-raised-by-costa-concordia/#ixzz1snkAdVgd>
§ Funaro, Vincent. “Costa Concordia Survivors 'Insulted' by 30 Percent Cruise Discount
Offer”. CP World. 24 Jan. 2012. 9 May 2012. <http://www.christianpost.com/news/costa-
concordia-discount-insult-survivors-offered-30-percent-off-next-cruise-67838/>
§ Hayes, Kevin. “Mom was right: It’s important people like you!” Kevin Hayes: Digital
Communications & Social Media Consultant. 13 May 2012.
<http://www.kevinhayes.ca/blog/mom-was-right-its-important-people-like-you/#comment-
3126>
§ Hemus, Jonathan. “Costa Cruise’s blame game is dangerous crisis communication strategy”.
Insignia Talks. 16 Jan. 2012. 02 May 2012. <http://insigniatalks.com/2012/01/costa-cruises-
blame-game-is-dangerous-crisis-communication-strategy/>
§ MacMillan, Davis. “Can a Name Change Save Costa Cruises?” The Daily Feed. 1 Mar.
2012. 13 May 2012. <http://www.minyanville.com/dailyfeed/2012/03/01/can-a-name-
change-save/>
§ Paloti, Melissa Baldwin ”Fire Onboard Costa Romantica Impacts Cruise, Cancels Another”.
Cruise Critic. 27 Feb. 2009. 22 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.cruisecritic.com/news/news.cfm?ID=3086>

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§ Pisa, Nick ”Huge Operation To Refloat Costa Concordia”. Sky News. 2 Apr. 2012. 21. Apr.
2012. <http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16200962>
§ Serminara, Dave. “Sailing with Costa, Post-Concordia: A Review of Costa’s Neo
Romantica”. Gadling. 15 May 2012. 16 May 2012.
<http://www.gadling.com/2012/05/15/sailing-with-costa-post-concordia-a-review-of-costas-
neo-roma/>

§ Silverstein, Erica. “Update: Costa Cancels Final Europa Cruises in Wake of Tragic Dock
Accident”. Cruise Critic. 5 Mar. 2010. 21 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.cruisecritic.com/news/news.cfm?id=3721>
§ Sinha, Sanskrity. Costa Hopes to Rebuild Reputation with New Cruise Ship after Deadly
Concordia Disaster. International Business Times. 7 May 2012. 14 May 2012.
<http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/338012/20120507/costa-concordia-tragedy-cruises-new-
ship-fascinosa.htm>
§ Sloan, Gene. ”Italy cruise ship disaster could take toll on industry”. USA Today. 17 Jan.
2012. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/travel/story/2012-01-
17/Cruise-disaster-could-take-toll-on-industry/52622068/1>
§ Sky News “Ship Was “Too Close To Shore””. Sky News. 6 Feb. 2012. 21. Apr. 2012.
<http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16149523>
§ Squires, Nick. ”Cruise disaster: company say errors made by ship's captain may have caused
crash”. The Telegraph. 16 Jan. 2012. 21 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9017326/Cruise-disaster-
company-say-errors-made-by-ships-captain-may-have-caused-crash.html>
§ Turen, Richard. ”Media bullies and the Concordia”. Travel Weekly. 12 Apr. 2012. 5 May
2012. <http://www.travelweekly.com/Richard-Turen/Media-bullies-and-the-Concordia/>
§ Walker, Jim. “Will the Costa Cruise Brand Survive?” Cruise Law News. 19 Feb. 2012. 13
May 2012. <http://www.cruiselawnews.com/2012/02/articles/social-media-1/will-the-costa-
cruise-brand-survive/>
6.4 Other Online Sources:
§ Carnival, press room. 2012. Carnival Cruises. 05 May 2012. <http://carnival-
news.com/press-room/>

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§ Market Share: 2012 World Wide Market Share. 2012. Cruise Market Watch. 20 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.cruisemarketwatch.com/market-share/>
§ Costa Cruises on Twitter. 2012. Twitter.com. 30 Apr. 2012.
<https://twitter.com/#!/costacruises>
§ Costa Cruises on Facebook. 2012. Facebook.com. 30 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.facebook.com/costacruises.na>
§ Fri Ferie Cruise. 2012. Danskfriferie.dk. 14 May 2012.
<http://www.danskfriferie.dk/cruise>
§ NYSE Carnival Corporation. 2012. New York Stock Exchange. 14 May 2012.
<http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lcddata.html?ticker=ccl&fq=D&ezd=1Y&index=5>
§ NYSE trading hours. 2012. New York Stock Exchange. 14 May 2012.
<http://www.nyx.com/holidays-and-hours/nyse>
§ SocialMention FAQ. 2012. SocialMention.com. 13 May. 2012.
<http://socialmention.com/faq>
§ SocialMention – Costa Cruises. 2012. SocialMention.com. 13 May 2012.
<http://www.socialmention.com/search?q=costa+cruises&t=all&btnG=Search>
6.5 Costacruises.com/co.uk Sources:
§ About Costa. 2012. Costa Cruises. 20 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.costacruises.co.uk/B2C/GB/Corporate/The+company/thecompany.htm>
§ Company Profile. 2012. Costa Cruises. 20 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.costacruise.com/B2C/USA/Corporate/The+company/aboutourselves/aboutours
elves.htm>
§ Costa Concordia – update. 2012. Costa Cruises. 21 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.costacruises.co.uk/B2C/GB/Info/concordia_statement.htm>
§ Our values. 2012. Costa Cruises. 20 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.costacruise.com/B2C/USA/Corporate/The+company/aboutourselves/ourvalues
/ourvalues.htm>
§ Press. 2012. Costa Cruises. 30 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.costacruise.com/B2C/USA/Press/default.htm>

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§ The Company history. Costa Cruises. 19 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.costacruises.co.uk/contents/corporate/STORIA_COMPLETA_UK_EU.pdf>
6.6 Online Videos
§ Foschi, Pier Luigi. Press Conference Costa Concordia - Introduction Speech. 16 Jan. 2012.
Costa Cruises on YouTube. 21 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KNqAq2bHtFc>
§ Foschi, Pier Luigi. Senate of the Italian Republic - VIII Permanent Commission for Public
Works - Senate of the Italian Republic - Hearing of Wednesday 25th January, 2012. 25 Jan.
2012. Costa Cruises on YouTube. 21 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=1yvWGFcI4Sg#!>
6.7 Other Sources
§ Grarup, Tine. Gaining Sustainable Competitive Advantages through CSR Engagement and
Communication. Corporate Communication 1st
semester exam 2011/2012 at Master of Arts
in Corporate Communication

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7.1 Appendix 1: Crisis Management Factors
Coombs divide crisis management into four interrelated factors arguing that “crisis management is a
process of preventing, preparing for, responding, and revising from crises”161
. The two factors of
prevention and preparation both are part of the precrisis stage involving actions before a crisis in
come across. The factors of response and revision belong to the postcrisis stage being key activities
that must take place after the crisis. For the postcrisis stage to begin the crisis need to be recognized
including information of how the incident is understood and accepted as crisis.
Prevention represents what management and the organization in general should do in order to
avoid crises. This involves detecting different warning signs and taking actions accordingly to
prevent a possible crisis situation. The news media rarely uncover crisis that did not happen.162
Preparation is the best way to avoid problems related to crisis situations that cannot be prevented,
such as harming stakeholders, damaging reputation, losing market share etc. Preparation involves
making a crisis management plan (CMP) that should help the organization select and train
spokespersons and public employees, it should help diagnose vulnerabilities and on this basis build
and improve a crisis communication system.163
Response in a crisis situation is vital for the subsequent survival of the organization/brand. Here the
components from the preparation factor above should be applied to the actual crisis situation. The
better the preparation the better outcome, as organization’s crisis response often is discussed and
critiqued in the media. Communication with stakeholders through words and action is a essential
part of this crisis management response phase.164
An element of the response is further recovery,
being “the organization’s attempt to return to normal operations”165
.
Revision is all about evaluating crisis management and learning from the crisis. Ideally the
organization will learn from mistakes and be able to prepare more appropriate actions. Other

161
162
163
164
165

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