Emotion feelings stem from evolution and neurobiological development, not form conceptual acts

1. PE R SP EC TI V ES O N P SY CH O L O G I CA L S CIE N CE
Emotion Feelings Stem from
Evolution and Neurobiological
Development, Not From
Conceptual Acts
Corrections for Barrett et al. (2007)
Carroll E. Izard
University of Delaware
ABSTRACT—Contrary to the arguments of Barrett et al. Barrett et al. contend, products of conceptual acts (Langer,
(2007) in critiquing Izard (2007), emotion feelings (the key 1967–1982; Merker, 2007).
component of human emotions) stem from evolution and Barrett et al. (2007) also misattributed the idea of an ‘‘ar-
neurobiological development, not from conceptual acts. chitecturally and chemically distinct’’ circuit for each basic
Barrett et al. made several other erroneous and seriously emotion. That descriptor did not appear in Izard (2007). Actu-
misleading criticisms of Izard (2007), and they had little to ally, I conceptualized the substrates of discrete emotions in
say about the final two thirds of that article—an explica- terms of multiple brain regions or neurobiological systems (more
tion of emotion schemas and a new paradigm. compatible with Edelman’s ‘‘neuronal arrangement’’ than with
a single emotion-specific unique circuit).
Discrete emotion feelings, like other qualia, stem from evolution In weighing the evidence that favored the conceptual act
and neurobiological development, not from conceptual acts as hypothesis of emotion activation, Barrett et al. (2007) failed to
claimed by Barrett et al. (2007) or from proximal learning. How weigh the evidence relating to basic emotions separately from
could we teach a child to feel joy, sadness, or fear and to sense that relating to emotion schemas. Consequently, much of the
their quality and motivational power (Izard & Malatesta, 1987)? data they cited in refuting the concept of basic emotions were
Barrett et al. failed to address this most critical question relating very likely data on emotion schemas and were not relevant to
to the origins of emotions. basic negative emotions (which are difficult to study in the
Contrary to a strong criticism by Barrett et al. (2007), I cited laboratory). In their specific argument about the ontogeny of
Edelman (2006) correctly and specifically in support of the emotion expressions, Barrett et al. did not review some of the
hypothesized evolutionary and developmental origins of qualia. most compelling evidence (e.g., Kahana-Kalman & Walker-
Edelman argued that ‘‘. . . a set of evolutionary events produced Andrews, 2001; Montague & Walker-Andrews, 2002).
the neuroanatomical bases for reentry, which led to the devel- Contrary to the tenor of the Barrett et al. critique, current
opment of the enormous number of discriminatory states, or differential emotions theory (Izard, 2007) recognizes the inter-
qualia, characteristic of conscious experience’’ (p. 144). If we dependence of emotion and cognition in emotion schemas and
assume with Edelman that evolutionary and developmental the predominance of the latter among emotion experiences in
processes gave rise to the neuronal arrangements that produce the normal human brain under normal conditions. It holds that
the qualia of conscious experience, then emotion feelings—the basic negative emotions, the primary targets of the criticisms of
key component of human emotions (Izard 2007)—are not, as Barrett et al. (2007), are relatively rare.
Address correspondence to Carroll E. Izard, Psychology Depart-
ment, 108 Wolf Hall, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716; Acknowledgments—I thank Mark Stanton, Steven Most,
e-mail: izard@udel.edu. Christopher Trentacosta, Kristen King, and Fran Haskins for
404 Copyright r 2007 Association for Psychological Science Volume 2—Number 4

2. Carroll E. Izard
their comments on drafts of this article. The work was supported Izard, C.E., & Malatesta, C.Z. (1987). Perspectives on emotional de-
by National Institute of Mental Health Grant 5R21MH68443-3. velopment: Differential emotions theory of early emotional de-
velopment. In J.D. Osofsky (Ed.), Handbook of infant development
(2nd ed., pp. 494–554). New York: Wiley Interscience.
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