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AVOIDING THE OWASP
Top 10 security exploits

Saturday, 5 October, 13
ME

Illustrator turned developer
PHP developer for 8 years
Architect/Developer at FreshBooks
Lead developer of CakePHP

Saturday, 5 October, 13
SECURITY

Saturday, 5 October, 13
SECURITY CONTINUUM

(

unusable

Saturday, 5 October, 13

)

unrestricted
OWASP
Open Web Application Security Project

Saturday, 5 October, 13
OWASP TOP 10

Saturday, 5 October, 13
1

INJECTION

Saturday, 5 October, 13

‘ OR 1=1 ‘--
RISKS

Command - Permits arbitrary shell commands.
SQL - Permits query manipulation, and arbitrary SQL.
Bad guys can run arbitrary code/queries.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
SQL INJECTION EXAMPLE
$username = $_POST[‘username’];
$password = $_POST[‘password’];
$query = “SELECT * FROM user
WHERE username = ‘$username’
AND password = ‘$password’”;
$user = $db->query($query);
Saturday, 5 October, 13
USER INPUT
$username = “root”;
$password = “‘ OR 1 = 1 --”;

Saturday, 5 October, 13
FINAL QUERY

$query = “SELECT * FROM user
WHERE username = ‘root’
AND password = ‘‘ OR 1 = 1 --”;

Saturday, 5 October, 13
FINAL QUERY

$query = “SELECT * FROM user
WHERE username = ‘root’
AND password = ‘‘ OR 1 = 1 --”;

Saturday, 5 October, 13
PREVENTION
Use an ORM or Database abstraction layer that
provides escaping. Doctrine, ZendTable, and
CakePHP all do this.
Use PDO and prepared statements.
Never interpolate user data into a query.
Never use regular expressions, magic quotes, or
addslashes()

Saturday, 5 October, 13
EXAMPLE (PDO)
$query = “SELECT * FROM user
WHERE username = ?
AND password = ?”;
$stmt = $db->prepare($query);
$stmt->bindValue($username);
$stmt->bindValue($password);
$result = $db->execute();
Saturday, 5 October, 13
COMMAND INJECTION

$file = $_POST[‘file’];
$res = file_get_contents($file);
echo $res;

Saturday, 5 October, 13
USER INPUT
$f = “../../../../../../etc/passwd”;

Saturday, 5 October, 13
PREVENTION

Escape and validate input.
Check for ..
Check for ;
Ensure the realpath resolves to a file that is allowed.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
2

BROKEN AUTHENTICATION
& SESSION MANAGEMENT
/index.php?PHPSESSID=pwned

Saturday, 5 October, 13
RISKS

Identity theft.
Firesheep was an excellent example.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
SESSION FIXATION EXAMPLE
<?php
session_start();
if (isset($_GET[‘sessionid’]) {
session_id($_GET[‘sessionid’]);
}

Saturday, 5 October, 13
SESSION FIXATION EXAMPLE
<?php
session_start();
if (isset($_GET[‘sessionid’]) {
session_id($_GET[‘sessionid’]);
}

Saturday, 5 October, 13
PREVENTION

Rotate session identifiers upon login/logout
Set the HttpOnly flag on session cookies.
Use well tested / mature libraries for authentication.
SSL is always a good idea.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
3

XSS

<script>alert(‘cross site scripting’);</script>

Saturday, 5 October, 13
RISKS

Allows bad guys to do things as the person viewing a
page.
Steal identities, passwords, credit cards, hijack pages
and more.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
XSS EXAMPLE

<p>
<?php echo $user[‘bio’]; ?>
</p>

Saturday, 5 October, 13
XSS EXAMPLE

<p>
<?php echo $user[‘bio’]; ?>
</p>

Saturday, 5 October, 13
I know, I can use regular expressions!

Saturday, 5 October, 13
NO
Saturday, 5 October, 13
PREVENTION

Regular expressions and strip_tags leave you
vulnerable.
The only robust solution is output encoding.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
EXAMPLE
<p>
<?php echo htmlentities(
$user[‘bio’],
ENT_QUOTES,
‘UTF-8’
); ?>
</p>

Saturday, 5 October, 13
DANGERS

Manually encoding is error prone, and you will make
a mistake.
Using a template library like Twig that provides autoescaping reduces the chances of screwing up.
Encoding is dependent on context.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
4

INSECURE DIRECT OBJECT
REFERENCE

Saturday, 5 October, 13
RISKS

Bad guys can access information they shouldn’t
Bad guys can modify data they shouldn’t.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
BROKEN PASSWORD UPDATE
<form action=”/user/update” method=”post”>
<input type=”hidden” name=”userid” value=”4654” />
<input type=”text” name=”new_password” />
<button type=”submit”>Save</button>
</form>

Saturday, 5 October, 13
PREVENTION
Remember hidden inputs are not really hidden, and
can be changed by users.
Validate access to all things, don’t depend on things
being hidden/invisible.
If you need to refer to the current user, use session
data not form inputs.
Whitelist properties any form can update.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
5

SECURITY
MISCONFIGURATION

Saturday, 5 October, 13
RISKS

Default settings can be insecure, and intended for
development not production.
Attackers can use misconfigured software to gain
knowledge and access.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
PREVENTION

Know the tools you use, and configure them
correctly.
Keep up to date on vulnerabilities in the tools you
use.
Remove/disable any services/features you aren’t using.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
6

SENSITIVE DATA EXPOSURE
4012 8888 8888 1881

Saturday, 5 October, 13
RISKS

Bad guys get credit cards, personal identification,
passwords or health records.
Your company could be fined or worse.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
ASSESSING RISK
Do you have sensitive data?
Is it in plaintext?
Any old/bad crypto in use?
Missing SSL?
Who can access sensitive data?

Saturday, 5 October, 13
7

MISSING FUNCTION LEVEL
ACCESS CONTROL

Saturday, 5 October, 13
RISKS

Anyone on the internet can request things.
Missing access control could mean bad guys can do
things they shouldn’t be able to.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
PREVENTION

No simple solutions sadly.
Good automated tests help.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
8

CROSS SITE REQUEST
FORGERY

Saturday, 5 October, 13

(CSRF)
RISKS

Evil websites can perform actions for users logged
into your site.
Side effects on GET can be performed via images or
CSS files.
Remember the Gmail contact hack.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
CSRF EXAMPLE

Your app
Evil site

Saturday, 5 October, 13
CSRF EXAMPLE

Your app
Evil site

Login

Saturday, 5 October, 13
CSRF EXAMPLE

Your app
Evil site

Login
Accidentally visit
Saturday, 5 October, 13
CSRF EXAMPLE

Your app

Submit form for evil
Evil site

Login
Accidentally visit
Saturday, 5 October, 13
PREVENTION

Add opaque expiring tokens to all forms.
Requests missing tokens or containing invalid tokens
should be rejected.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
SAMPLE CSRF VALIDATION
<?php
if (!$this->validCsrfToken($data, ‘csrf’)) {
throw new ForbiddenException();
}

Saturday, 5 October, 13
9

USING COMPONENTS WITH
KNOWN VULNERABILITIES

Saturday, 5 October, 13

CVE bingo
RISK

Using old busted software can expose you to
documented issues.
CVE databases are filled with version numbers and
matching exploits.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
PREVENTION

Do routine upgrades. Keep up to date with all your
software.
Read mailing lists and keep an eye out for security
releases.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
PREVENTION

Several vulnerability databases around.
https://cve.mitre.org/cve/

Saturday, 5 October, 13
10

UNVALIDATED REDIRECTS &
FORWARDS

Saturday, 5 October, 13
RISKS

Trusting user input for redirects opens phishing
attacks.
Breach of trust with your users.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
PREVENTION

Don’t trust user data when handling redirects.

Saturday, 5 October, 13
THANK YOU

Saturday, 5 October, 13

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2013 - Mark story - Avoiding the Owasp