Based on the 4th annual Cornell International Real Estate Competition.
A potential recommendation for a buy or pass of mezzanine debts
Completing this case involved:
- Using the lien on a mezzanine debt in order to take equity interest of the owner's properties
- Computing an amortisation schedule in order to determine the financial capabilities of the owner
- Analysing the post GFC conditions of the U.S economy and real estate market
- Conducting a DCF to determine exit selling price of the properties
- Providing relevant renovations to the properties in order to main standard of Class A classification
2. 2
Table of Contents
2 2
Strategic Overview3
5
6
7
9
10
11
National Market Overview
Portfolio Summary
West Loop Summary
Cutler Centre
San Diego Summary
Rivers Tower
Los Angeles Summary12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Bryant Plaza
Portfolio Recap
Valuation
Valuation of Debt
Valuation of Property
Assumptions
Recommendations19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Strategic Summary
Due Diligence
Acquisition of the Loans
Debt - Equity
Refinancing
Renovations
Cutler Centre - Upgrades26
27
28
29
30
31
32
Rivers Towers - Upgrade
Bryant Plaza - Upgrade
Exit & Sale
Risk
Recap
Overview & Summary
Expected Returns33
35
36
57
83
93
Appendix
Division 1 – Market
Research
Division 2 – Strategic Research
Division 3 - Risk
Division 4 - Valuation
Summary34
3. 33
After conducting appropriate
negotiations and due diligence, we
should move to purchase the
portfolio at a 75% discount to it’s
face value.
We should leverage our lein against
the borrowers equity and our
capacity to limit investor losses to
convert out mezzanine loans to a
proprietary interest in the properties
We should renovate all three
properties to maintain the Class A
classification of the properties.
We are pursuing a minimum multiple
on equity of 2.5x.
Our model indicates that the portfolio
will return a levered IRR of 22.28% and
a levered equity multiple of 4.11x
This exceeds the needs of Sun Rock
Capital’s fund.
Expected Returns
Strategic Overview
SWAPACQUIRE RENNOVATE
3
We believe that we will be in the
end of a strong bull real estate
market in 2018. Thus, we should
sell them
SELL
The current downturn in global real
estate market conditions creates the
opportunity for us to purchase quality
Real Estate assets at a substantial
objective discount.
Investment Thesis
3
We recommend pursuing loan-to-own strategy consistent with the funds targeted returns and overall strategy
5. 5
• GFC-driven Yield spikes appear to have ended
• Research into the principles of mean reversion suggest yield will
compress slowly over the coming decade
Expected Growth Rates Yield Trends
US Property Market
Overview
• The recent decline in global market conditions
has caused a substantial shift in the
commercial real estate industry
• Interest rates are at all an time low – 0.25%
• Commercial prices are currently sitting at 2002-
2003 prices.
• The current interest rate environment is
expected to cause a gradual decrease in yields
over the coming 5-10 years
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
1997-12-01 1999-12-01 2001-12-01 2003-12-01 2005-12-01 2007-12-01 2009-12-01
Green Streets - Commercial Property Price Index
• Investors expect rent to grow at an increasing pace
• In the short term, it appears that rent growth will be
outstripped by expense growth and inflation
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
US Delinquency Rates
• Loan Delinquency rates appear to have peaked mid-
2009
• We expect rates to decrease slowly in line with current
interest rate conditions
Our analysis indicates that equity offers better
long-term risk adjusted returns than debt
5
6. 6 A portfolio in context…
• The fund has diversified its
holdings well across major
American cities
• This limits our exposure to
localised disaster and regional
economic volatility
Geographic Diversity
The global financial crisis has forced us to target a minimum MOI of 2.5x
• 67% of used capital has been
deployed to purchase equity
• Current market conditions imply
that a weighting towards equity is
best practice
Investment Vehicle
Office
52%
Industrial
13%
Hotel
16%
Retail
19%
• Office buildings are less sensitive
to macroeconomic conditions
than retail or hotels
• This allows them to act as a
relative hedge to current financial
volatility
Building Kind
• 4 properties are expected to
make a loss
• This means that, in order to meet
the portfolio target MOI of 2x, the
remaining capital must be
invested at at least 2.5x
Projected MOI
67%
Capital In Equity
1
3
1
3
1
2
1
<0.5 <1 <1.5 <2 <2.5 <3 <3.5
7. 7
• West Loop is a former industrial
center that has experienced a
significant degree of urban
gentrification
• It’s central geographic position
creates an opportunity for high
reach retail businesses such as
bars and restaurants
• The decline of many of Chicago’s
outer suburbs creates substantive
demand for high-wealth,
developed inner-city property
West Loop
West Loop – A growth centre…
The West Loop submarket is a substantial growth pocket that persists despite Chicago’s poor economic performance
4000000
4100000
4200000
4300000
4400000
4500000
4600000
4700000
4800000
Chicago Historical and Projected Unemployment Data - 2007-2011
Consumer
17%
Services
28%
Manufacturin
g
14%
Construction
41%
Chicago
Industry
1641
935
855
730
622
520
494
487
New York
LA
Chicago
DC
Dallas
Atlanta
Houston
San…
Business Service Employers (‘000)
8. 8
Copernicus Landsat 1984
West Loop - Growth and Development Trends
Copernicus Landsat 2010
We believe the fundamental geographic characteristics of the West Loop submarket will drive intrinsic demand growth. A comparison of
satellite imagery shows that the developmental boundaries of Chicago have expanded 200-300% over the past 25 years. This city growth is a
strong driver of demand for centralised real estate assets.
9. 9
5400000
5600000
5800000
6000000
6200000
6400000
6600000
6800000
7000000
7200000
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
W Location: West Loop
Cutler Centre
• Cutler Centre is a 15-storey Class A office
tower located in the West Loop submarket
of Chicago.
• 240,000 square feet of office space
consisting of well-diversified mix of tenants.
– 82% occupancy rate in office
– Currently in line with market, but was below-
market last year
• 10,000 square feet of street-level retail
space consisting of the Bank of America,
convenience store, and clothing boutique.
– 100% occupancy rate
– Entire rental contract rolls over in 2018
• Rent roll unknown
• Loan structure consists of a senior loan and
two mezzanines
Property Overview
SUMMARY
Cutler Towers can act as a lever to access growth in the growing West Loop submarket
NOI Projections
10. 10
• San Diego has been considered a leading
area to launch a company
• San Diego is enclosed by the Laguna
Mountain Range. This creates a premium
for downtown real estate.
• San Diego has been designated a Foreign
Trade Zone. This creates opportunities to
leverage global trade trends
• Property sales reached an all time low of
2,142 in January 2008
• Currently, sales sit at around 3000 –
substantially lower than the historical
mean of 4,000-4,500
• Auction success rates are at an all time
low
Downtown San Diego
Downtown San Diego – Dense development
San Diego Property Sales 2000-10
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Auction Success Rates 2000-10
We can capitalize on poor market conditions to ride San Diego’s growing technology and trade industries
11. 11
6400000
6600000
6800000
7000000
7200000
7400000
7600000
7800000
8000000
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
W Location: Downtown San Diego
Rivers Tower
• Rivers tower is a 20-storey Class A office
tower located in the San Diego CBD.
• 500,000 square foot of office space
consisting of a diversified tenant mix
– 75% occupancy rate
– Below-market
• No major capex has been invested and
no major renovations have been made
• Rent roll unknown
• Loan structure consists of a senior loan
and two mezzanines
Property Overview
SUMMARY
Rivers Tower will give us access to the Downtown San Diego submarket
NOI Projections
12. 12
• The Los Angeles Property
Market appears to have
bottomed out
• Trade volumes, a major driver of
LA economic activity, are at
2003 levels
• Commercial yields have fallen by
over 2% over the past two years
• There has been a substantial
drop in the volume of Real
Estate transactions across the
city
• This indicates that liquidity has
dried up substantially over the
past 1-2 years
• We can leverage this in our debt-
equity swap
• This will also allow us to ride the
inevitable economic recovery
Downtown Los Angeles
Los Angeles – Leveraging a global trade fulcrum
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Volume(MillionTEU)
Port of Los Angeles Trade Volumes - 1990-2020
Poor Real Estate performance creates an opportunity to capture recovery-linked growth
Los Angeles Commercial Yields
Sales Volume
13. 13
3700000
3800000
3900000
4000000
4100000
4200000
4300000
4400000
4500000
4600000
4700000
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
W Location: Downtown San Diego
Bryant Plaza
• Bryant Plaza is a 15-storey Class A office
tower located in downtown Los Angeles.
The building enjoys excellent visibility
and contains 300 on-site parking spaces.
• 275,000 square foot of office space
occupied by varied tenant groups
– 75% occupancy rate
– Below-market
• Building has undergone a significant
renovation in 2000.
• Loan structure consists of a senior loan
and a mezzanine loan
Property Overview
SUMMARY
Bryant Plaza will give us access to the Downtown Los Angeles submarket
NOI Projections
14. 14
• Real Estate market cycles typical cycle over
between 7-11 years
• The last cycle ended in 2008-2009
• The portfolio could act as a vehicle to leverage
this trend
Fitting the portfolio together…
Economic
Recovery
Market Cycles
MARKETS
West Loop
Increasing
Rent & Yields
If purchase at the right price, the Portfolio may allow us to ride and profit from a global economic recovery
San Diego
Increasing
Rent & Yields
Los Angeles
Increasing
Rent & Yields
US Property Market Cycles
16. 16
W
Valuation of the portfolio: Debt Instruments
We should purchase the debt instruments at a 75% discount to their implied value
Rivers Tower $30,851,197
Discount: 70.00%
Purchase Price: $9,255,359
Cutler Centre $20,776,748
Discount: 70.00%
Purchase Price: $6,233,024
Bryant Plaza $55,334,228
Discount: 90.00%
Purchase Price: $5,533,423
17. 17
W
Valuation of the portfolio: Underlying Properties
Performing a debt to equity swap would allow us to access the underlying value of these properties
18. 18
CAPITALISATION RATESGROWTH RATESDiscount Rate
9 9 9We have calculated a 9.85%
discount rate
Our rental growth rates are
predicted to grow 2-3% p.a.
We predict a 0.4% decline in
cap rates per year, leading to
an exit cap rate of 5.55%
Assumptions
Discount Rate Assumptions:
Loan Start Date: 01-June-2007
Loan End Date 01-June-2012
Discount Rate: 9.85%
10 Year US Treasury Rate: 3.85%
Real Estate Risk Premium: 6.00%
Rental Growth Rates Assumptions:
Cutler Center 1.2%
Post-Capex 3%
Rivers Tower 2%
Rivers Tower Post Capex 3.85%
Bryant Plaza 2%
Bryant Plaza Post Capex 3%
as the CRE equivalent of the price/earnings ratio in the stock market (see Campbell and Shiller 1988 for
the pricing implications of these valuation measures). According to theory, this rent/price ratio is largely
a function of interest rates and expected increases in the property’s price. Consider someone who wants
to use a real estate property for one year. This person can get the space in two ways. He or she could rent
the property for the year, which would cost a year of rent. The rent would appear as part of the property
owner’s net operating income. Alternatively, the person who wants to use the property could borrow
money, buy it, and hold it for a year. The cost of this ownership option, referred to as the user cost,
consists of interest payments on the purchase loan plus the expected change in the property’s price over
the holding period. In a well-functioning market with zero transactions costs, the price of these two
alternatives should be the same. If they were not—if rents were higher than the user cost, for example—
then all market participants would want to buy, bidding up prices until the rental option cost the same.
The important point here is the direct link between the net operating income of the rental option and
prices, ownership costs, and expected capital gains of the ownership option. When purchasing CRE,
market participants often link cap rates to expected future rental rates and vacancies. Expected increases
in rent or lower vacancies tend to lower the cap rate. If rents are expected to increase, then the property
has become more valuable and the owner will expect a higher capital gain, which will lead to a lower cap
rate. A similar argument can be made for falling vacancies.
Thus, expected price appreciation is ultimately a reflection of the outlook for fundamentals such as rents
and vacancies. However, there could also be unidentified nonfundamental reasons for changes in
expected price appreciation. For example, investor sentiment may improve and the discount rate applied
to cash flows from a property may fall, thereby lowering the cap rate. Indeed, investor sentiment could
become so exuberant that a bubble could form, in which expected appreciation soared and the cap rate
dropped sharply.
This link between cap rates, interest
rates, and expected price appreciation
is not merely theoretical. Using a
slightly different representation of the
cap rate, Ghysels, Plazzi, and Valkanov
(2007) show that it predicts CRE
returns. In our data we can see these
linkages in Figure 2, which compares
CRE cap rates with the interest paid on
loans to finance CRE transactions. We
focus here on the office market, but
other CRE asset classes have behaved
similarly. Ideally, the interest measure
should be the rate on new CRE loans,
but those are not readily obtainable.
Instead, we use as a proxy for CRE
purchase loans the yield on AAA-rated five-year commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), which
finance a large share of CRE transactions.
Figure 2
Office building cap rates and CRE mortgage rates
Sources: CB Richard Ellis (CBRE) and Commercial Real Estate Direct.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Percent Percent
CMBS yield (left axis)
Office cap rate (right axis)
Summer
2010
Our valuation is driven by a 9.85% discount rate, a 2-3% rent growth rate and a 0.4% Cap Rate compression each year
20. 20 Strategic Summary
We propose purchasing the debt, swapping it to equity, renovating the properties and exiting at the peak of the market in 2018
• Conduct due diligence:
Property Condition
Owner’s Equity
Any binding
agreements
between HRC
Capital, senior debt
holders and owner
• Negotiate an interparty
agreement between owner
Debt to Equity
swap for the
ownership interest
in the property is
viable
Due Diligence
Interparty agreementPrior to Acquisition
• Purchase all Mezzanine
offered at a 75-90%
discount to its value
• Conduct a Debt to Equity
swap
Purchase Mezzanine Debt
• Owner will most likely
default in payments
Senior debt will
be compensated,
but mezzanine
debt may not be
We will not get
our money back
• Do not pursue investment
any further
Do not Purchase Mezzanine
Debt
SWAP
• Refinance the senior debts at a
lower interest rate
• Renovate the office buildings to -
Suit changing
contemporary economic
conditions
Appreciate underlying
value
Occupy Ownership Interest of the
Properties
Owner DefaultsBuy or Pass Exit Strategy
Contingencies
SELL
• Exit each office
building in year for a
total of $311M
• Offering a levered IRR
of 22.8%
Exit the Office Buildings
2010-2018
21. 21
Borrowe
r
Senior
Debt
Mezz
Debt
Senior
Debt
Mezz
Debt
Senior
Debt
Bryant Plaza
Cutler
Centre
Rivers Tower
Is the purchase of the mezzanine loans UCC
(Uniform Commercial Code) approved?
Negotiations and Due Diligence Questions
Will inter-creditor agreements interfere with either
the purchase of the loan or the Debt-Equity Swap?
What upper-level debt agreements are the
properties subject to?
What senior mortgage covenants and restrictions is
the property subject to?
Is the borrower willing to swap the mezzanine loans
for an equal proprietary interest in the building?
Do the terms of the current capital structure allow
for us to refinance immediately?
Due Diligence & Negotiations
We need to run a number of meetings and operate several due diligence checks before we proceed further…
2010
Due Diligence Checklist
Property & Markets
Borrower Position
Legal Structure & Documents
Other Creditors
Servicing History
22. 22 Acquiring the loans…
The debt on the portfolio matures after the next interest payment, thus there is a clear need to refinance
2010
CUTLER CENTRE
ACQUISITIO
N
• Targeting a 70% discount to the
implied, risk free value of the loan.
• Reflective of the fact that the loan will
default as the property and capital
structure are distressed
• The fulcrum position of the loan with
respect to the capital stack as a whole
should allow us to pursue this discount
PURCHASE PRICE: $6.2M
RIVERS TOWER
ACQUISITIO
N
• Target an identical 70% discount to the
implied risk free value of the loan
• Reflective of similar conditions to the
Cutler Centre
PURCHASE PRICE: $9.3M
BRYANT PLAZA
ACQUISITIO
N
• Bryant Plaza’s NOI is two times lower
than their debt service requirements
• Therefore it is the most distressed out
of all three properties
• Thus, we are targeting a 90% discount
to the implied, risk free value of the
loan.
PURCHASE PRICE: $5.5<
THE PORTFOLIO
ACQUISITIO
N
• Overall, we are targeting a weighted
discount of 75.26%
• This is the minimum discount required
to meet the 20% IRR requirement set
out by Sun Rock Capital
PURCHASE PRICE: $21M
23. 23 Performing a debt to equity swap
By nature, mezzanine debt is a more effective vehicle for pursuing loan-to-own strategies
• Mezzanine are more flexible than senior debt
• A debt-equity swap would avoid the borrower
public embarrassment
• Mezzanine debt cause a great deal of anxiety
among borrowers for the following reasons
• Mezzanine Debt commands a higher interest
rate than senior debt, therefore it has a
higher chance of default
• If a borrower defaults on a mezzanine loan,
the lender foreclose on the equity of the
borrower rather than the property
• Estimates of cash flows indicate the borrower will
default on their next interest payment
• This will allow the holder of the mezzanine to
foreclose on the equity of the borrower
• As a result, a default would be catastrophic
for the borrower
• A debt to equity swap would allow the borrower to
avoid this issue
PERSUASIVE
FACTORS
LEVERAGE
TERMS OF SWAP
TERMS
• We will swap our mezzanine debt at 1:1 ratio,
i.e. 1% debt is converted into 1% equity
• We will take on the current obligations subject
to the property and owed to senior and other
mezzanine debt holders
• We will take management of the property in all
areas, such to indicate that we are the sole
equity partner and owner of the properties
Borrower
Senior
Debt
Mezzanine
Loan1
Mezzanine Loan
2
Senior
Debt
Mezzanine
Loan1
Owner (Sunrock
Capital)
2010
24. 24 Refinancing the loans
The debt on the portfolio matures after the next interest payment, thus there is a clear need to refinance
2010
CURRENT CAPITAL
STRUCTURE
CONDITIONS
Capital Structure Of Properties:
Cutler Center - Chicago
Senior Loan: $35,000,000
First Mezzanine: $30,000,000
Second Mezzanine: $20,000,000
Rivers Tower - San Diego
Senior Loan: $57,000,000
First Mezzanine: $25,000,000
Second Mezzanine: $30,000,000
Bryant Plaza - Los Angeles
Senior Loan: $45,000,000
Mezzanine: $51,000,000
Cutler Centre – Refinanced Capital Structure &
Conditions
Senior Loan:
Principal: $35,000,000
Loan Term (Years): 10
Rate: 4.50%
Amortisation (Years): 30.00
Payment: $2,148,704
First Mezzanine:
Principal: $30,000,000
Loan Term (Years): 7
Rate: 12.00%
Amortisation (Years): IO 7
Payment: $3,600,000
Rivers Tower – Refinanced Capital Structure
& Conditions
Senior Loan:
Principal: $57,000,000
Loan Term (Years): 10
Rate: 4.50%
Amortisation (Years): 30.00
Payment: $3,499,318
First Mezzanine:
Principal: $25,000,000
Loan Term (Years): 7
Rate: 12.00%
Amortisation (Years): IO 7
Payment: $3,000,000
Bryant Plaza – Refinanced Capital Structure &
Conditions
Senior Loan:
Principal: $45,000,000
Loan Term (Years): 10
Rate: 4.50%
Amortisation (Years): 30.00
Payment: $2,762,619
Loan
Structure
TARGETED CAPITAL STRUCTURE
STRUCTURE
We are targeting a 4.5% fixed interest rate
for senior debt. This is derived from similar
loans at the time, and the competing impact
of low interest rates and poor
macroeconomics
We target a 12% fully amortized structure
for mezzanine loans. This will compensate
investors for the risk they are taking.
25. 25 Renovation as a defensive strategy…
Renovation is necessary as a defensive move to lock in the Portfolio’s value in the heat of a strong bull market
2018
Renovation
Rationale
MARKET TRENDS
STRUCTURE
• As value and liquidity returns to the
market, competition will follow
• There will be strong growth in the
number and value of new property
projects
• In order to be competitive in this
environment, we need to keep our
property up to date
CONSUMER TRENDS
STRUCTURE
• At the peak of the market, there will be
a set of consumer demands which will
become standard for Class A
properties
• We must ensure that our properties are
sufficiently equipped to meet the
demands of both tenants in purchasers
in 2018
BUILDING CLASSIFICATION
STRUCTURE
• If we do not ensure sufficient Capex, it
is possible several properties may be
downgraded to Class B
26. 26 Cutler Centre – Creating a luxury entertainment space…
The retail space in the Cutler Centre can be renovated and upgraded to leverage market cycles
We propose upgrading and reconfiguring the
10,000sqft of retail space, with the following
proportions of rental space in mind;
• 40% of rental space dedicated towards
formal luxury dining
– This establishes a convenient platform for
office tenants to use as a meeting and
entertaining space
• 40% of rental space dedicated towards
casual dining
– This leverages the catering needs of office
space tenants
• 20% of rental space dedicated towards a
bar or other licensed facility
– This helps meet the entertainment and
social needs of tenants
Luxury Entertaining
UPGRADE
An analysis of large scale retail space
renovations indicates an average cost of
between $340-1200 sq ft. We believe our
renovations will cost roughly $5M
Costings
EVALUATION
Measuring Return
RESULTS
2013-2014
26
3%
Post Value Add
Growth Rate
1-1.5%
Decrease in
exit Cap Rate
27. 27 Rivers Tower – Stronger communities…
Updating shared spaces within the River Tower will drive down exit yields while increasing NOI
We propose renovating the
estimated 24,000 square feet of
lobby and shared space in Rivers
Tower. This will be critical to
decreasing the vacancy rates,
increasing rates and compressing
exit yields
• As we are aiming to sell at the
peak of the market in 2018 , we
believe it is critical to ensure the
building is designed well
– As such, we have allocated
capital towards graphic
design and architecture
Lobby & Shared Space
Upgrades
UPGRADE
An analysis of large scale office space
renovations indicates an average cost of
between $200-300 sq. ft. We believe our
renovations will cost roughly $6M.
Costings
EVALUATION
Measuring Return
RESULTS
2013-2014
27
Post Value Add
Growth Rate
1-1.5%
Decrease in
exit Cap Rate
2%
4.9-7M Value Add
28. 28 Bryant Plaza – Changing the platform
We can elevate Bryant Plaza’s value by changing the way space is utilized and leveraging it’s geographic position
We are proposing two major changes to
Bryant Plaza
Rooftop Bar
• The excellent views offered by Bryant
Plaza create the opportunity for us to
build a rooftop bar
• This would drive up rent in 2018-19,
increasing the sale price
Underground Carpark
• Bryant Plaza’s access to motorways
creates an opportunity to generate
excess cash returns
• The Los Angeles population uses cars
heavily
Parking & Bars
UPGRADE
An analysis of large scale retail space
renovations indicates an average cost of
between $450 sqft. We believe our renovations
will cost roughly $6M
Costings
EVALUATION
Measuring Return
RESULTS
2013-2014
Generates 1.8 extra
revenue per annum
Present Value of
6.8M
29. 29 Exiting the position - Selling and Profiting…
The debt on the portfolio matures after the next interest payment, thus there is a clear need to refinance
2018
5.5%
Target Exit
Cap Rate
311.4
USD Exit
River
Tower
125.7M
USD
Bryant
Plaza
74.6M
USD
Cutler
Center
111M
USD
130M USD Levered
Free Cash Flow in Year
8
WHY SELL IN 2018?
Market Cycles
Our analysis indicates that the
market will peak between 2017 and
2020.
In order to be conservative and
avoid mistiming the market, we
believe 2018 is strong target sale
period
Capitalization Rates
We believe the current interest rate
environment will persist in general
terms for the next decade
This, along with the general
economic recovery, will compress
capitalisation rates and thus
increase our sale price
30. 30
Increasing Likelihood
IncreasingImpact
Strategic
Failure
Macroeconomic
Challenge
Tenant
Risk Matrix
Overview: Commercial properties are
sensitive to market conditions.
Due to the post-recession environment,
unemployment rates and US office market
vacancy rates has increased steadily across
the nation.
We believe these factors may impact our
ability to find quality tenants when rents
rollover in 2012.
Overview: Delinquency rates of commercial
real estate loans are rising rapidly and the
market currently holds record levels of
outstanding commercial debt mortgage.
Rent growth and net absorption has also
experienced declines. We believe these
factors proposes a risk of tenants’ default on
lease repayments or loans.
Overview: We believe we will be exposed to
interest rate risks when we refinance our
loans.
Additionally, the presence of Mezzanine
loans on two of the properties, which will lein
on SunRock, need to managed carefully.
Strategic Risks Overview:
Exposure to senior debt risk.
Construction and renovation risks
due to impacted construction
industry.
Macroeconomic Risk
Tenant Risk
Financing Risk
Strategic Risk
Financing
Failure
Analysing Risk…
The debt on the portfolio matures after the next interest payment, thus there is a clear need to refinance
31. 31 Recapping our strategy
We believe that performing a debt to equity conversion will allow us to deliver results in line with our portfolio’s needs
21M USD
Purchase
Equity Injection
17M USD
130M USD
Free Cash Flow
Exit
27M USD
After conducting appropriate
negotiations and due diligence, we
should move to purchase the
portfolio at a 75% discount to it’s
face value.
We should leverage our lein against
the borrowers equity and our
capacity to limit investor losses to
convert out mezzanine loans to a
proprietary interest in the properties
We should renovate all three
properties to maintain their class A
classification.
SWAPACQUIRE
RENNOVATE
We believe that we will be in the
end of a strong bull real estate
market in 2018. Thus, we should
sell them
SELL
33. 33 Valuing our returns
We believe that performing a debt to equity conversion will allow us to deliver results in line with our portfolio’s needs
Cutler Centre – West Loop, CH
Bryant Plaza, Downtown, LA
Rivers Tower – Downtown, SD The PortfolioProperty Returns
Unlevered IRR: 63.20%
Unlevered Equity Multiple: 13.70 x
Levered IRR: 22.69%
Levered Equity Multiple: 4.55 x
Property Returns:
Unlevered IRR: 48.12%
Unlevered Equity Multiple: 9.28 x
Levered IRR: 25.94%
Levered Equity Multiple: 4.41 x
Return Metrics
Unlevered IRR: 55.96%
Unlevered Equity Multiple: 11.47 x
Levered IRR: 22.28%
Levered Equity Multiple: 4.11 x
130M
Levered
Sale
27M Free Cash
Flow Equity
(excluding sale)
48M
Levered
Sale
6M Free Cash
Flow Equity
(excluding sale)
47M
Levered
Sale
2.68M Free Cash
Flow Equity
(excluding sale)
35.6M
Levered
Sale
17M Free Cash
Flow Equity
(excluding sale)
Property Returns:
Unlevered IRR: 56.61%
Unlevered Equity Multiple: 11.53 x
Levered IRR: 19.06%
Levered Equity Multiple: 3.56 x
34. 34 Recapping our presentation
We believe that performing a debt to equity conversion will allow us to deliver results in line with our portfolio’s needs
Acquisition
and Due
Diligence
Debt-
Equity
Swap
Holding &
Renovation
Sale & Exit
Due Diligence Checklist
Property & Markets
Borrower Position
Legal Structure & Documents
Other Creditors
Servicing History
21M Portfolio Purchase
LEVERAGE
We believe that our
claim against the
borrowers equity
and said borrowers
poor financial
position will
persuade the
borrower to accept
our DIL
Persuasive
Factors
UPGRADES
Renovations are
necessary as a
defensive move to
ensure that the
property remains
Class A and can
fully capture the
economic recovery
Defensive
Renovations
BEGINNINGS RETURNS
Expected Returns
Return Metrics
Unlevered IRR: 55.96%
Unlevered Equity
Multiple: 11.47 x
Levered IRR: 22.28%
Levered Equity Multiple: 4.11 x
37. 37
W
US Property Market Information
CRE Index
• Moodys/REAL commercial property price index
• (CPPI) is based on actual repeat sales of a
large sample of CRE properties
• Transaction-based index (TBI) also uses sales
prices, but employs a different index
methodology and a smaller property sample.
• Figure 1 shows the behaviour of the
aggregated all-properties CPPI and TBI
indexes from 2004 and 2011
properties, is about $11 trillion, according to the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic
Analysis. That compares with an estimated $17 trillion in the total value of residential structures in the
United States. Given the size of the market for commercial real estate (CRE), it is important to
understand CRE price movements. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Real Estate
publishes two widely used CRE price measures. The Moodys/REAL commercial property price index
(CPPI) is based on actual repeat sales of a large sample of CRE properties. The transaction-based index
(TBI) also uses sales prices, but
employs a different index methodology
and a smaller property sample. Figure
1 shows the behavior of the aggregated
all-properties CPPI and TBI indexes
from 2004 to 2011.
From the second quarter of 2007
through the fourth quarter of 2009,
both indexes dropped sharply, with the
CPPI falling 41% and the TBI 39%.
However, since the beginning of 2010,
these indexes have been painting very
different pictures. The CPPI indicates
that, since the end of 2009, CRE prices
have slid 7%. But the TBI indicates that
CRE prices have actually risen 19%
over that period. This unusual
deviation in these two indexes raises
the questions of whether CRE prices are currently recovering and how prices are likely to behave going
forward. To explore what may happen to these prices, we consider the capitalization rate, or cap rate for
short, as an alternative indicator of CRE valuations.
Figure 1
Two measures of commercial real estate prices
Sources: Moodys/MIT Center for Real Estate. Both indexes are based on
“all properties.”
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Index
CPPI
TBI
38. 38
W
Situational Overview
Context
Current date and location: North America Jan 1 2010
Unemployment topped 10% at end of 2009
Central business district offices fell about 53% from 2007 levels – this
class is closely related to unemployment and hiring trends
Market may bottom out in 2010 – office vacancies touching 19% -
any recovery for offices dependent on jobs
Some areas weathered the downturn better than others – location is
important – focus on locations with educated workforces, strong
population growth, prevalence of desirable industries such as IT
Deal activity going forward to be focused on modern, well leased,
stable cash flow, well positioned assets – outside these markets,
recovery will lag for some time
Overall delinquency rate (number of loans with delinquency
payments/total number of loans held) has more than doubled since
Aug 2008
Loans on properties in secondary markets are delinquent at about 2x
the rate of those loans on primary market properties
Investor profile
SunRock Capital – opportunistic, global real estate investment
management company
Core (Core plus): least risky because often target stabilised, fully
leased, secure investments in core markets; well kept and require no
improvements by owner; usually warrants low leverage acquisitions
Value add: seek to increase cash flow over time by making
improvements to or reposition property; medium to high leverage
used to acquire
Opportunistic: require significant rehabilitation; usually fully vacant
upon acquisition or need to be developed from the ground up; offer
highest level of return if successful; bears most risk as property has
no in-place cash flow; usually high leverage acquisitions
HQ in NYC
Past strategies: high yield superior risk adjusted returns; significant
renovations of properties, foreclosures (loan to own scenarios –
acquisition of secured debt position to influence control and
ultimately acquire ownership of target); asset repositioning where
relevant
Most recent fund – SRC Capital VI
Closed in Q1 2009 with $1.5b in equity from pension funds,
endowments, sovereign wealth funds, HNW individuals
Target gross returns of 20% IRR and 2x equity multiple on investment
MOI – multiple on investment
39. 39
W
Situational Overview
The opportunity
Off market opportunity with another real estate private equity fund (HRC Capital)
Opportunity: Buy a portfolio of 3 loans on class A office buildings in 3 different North American cities
Classes reflect different risk and return – graded on location, physical characteristics, tenant levels, rental income etc.
Class A = highest quality building in the area and market; generally newer properties built within the last 15 years with top amenities,
high income earning tenants and low vacancy rates; well located in the market and typically professionally managed; typically
demand highest rent with little or no deferred maintenance issues
While HRC waits for our response, the loans will move between 60-90c on the dollar
Each loan is at the fulcrum point in the capital stack of the corresponding property
Capital fulcrum point – measures the annual % growth rate required from the underlying instrument for you to do equally well in
terms of capital appreciation from its associated warrant (security that entitles the holder to buy the underlying stock of the issuing
company at a fixed price called exercise price until the expiry date); the indifference point between buying a warrant rather than the
stock in a company
Warrants are derivative instruments, are dilutive (Receive new stock when exercised), do not pay dividends or come with voting
rights; traditional warrants are issued with bonds
ALL LOANS MUST BE PURCHASED IF THE DECISION IS BUY
40. 40
W
Situational Overview
Portfolio & asset history
Loans originated from part of a larger office portfolio acquisition at the peak of the market in
2007
Sponsor expected to find easy refinancing for the Class A, iconic assets when loans matured
in mid-2012, given the properties’ (now aggressive) underwriting and assumed steady
property market increases
Properties are geographically dispersed
Portfolio relatively uniform in quality
The 3 buildings backing the loans are of a representative quality
Loans organised in complex structure
Debt was split and syndicated to multiple parties, including CMBS and mezzanine debt
holders
Commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) – type of MBS secured by mortgages on
commercial properties. CMBSs are a group of commercial loans on properties such as
apartment complexes, factories, office buildings etc. that are bucketed into various tranches
(usually 3-4). Tranches are ranked from senior (highest quality) to lowest quality
Mezzanine debt - occurs when a hybrid debt issue is subordinated to another debt issue from
the same issuer. Mezzanine debt has embedded equity instruments attached, often known
as warrants, which increase the value of the subordinated debt and allow greater flexibility
when dealing with bondholders; enables firm to gain capital without offering any collateral, if
business defaults on the loan, the lender can convert its loan into an ownership stake using
options or warrants built into the deal; charges higher interest rate (usually 15-18%) due to
lack of due diligence, higher risk and is subordinate to higher forms of debt; The value of the
warrant is a floating number based on the future value of the company
Mezzanine debt v senior debt: Mezzanine debt is a hybrid form of capital that is part loan
and part investment. Senior debt is a loan from a bank. There are many differences between
the two. Banks lend off of asset values so most senior loans are collateralized with assets.
The bank loan is always secured and in the first position. Mezzanine debt is not collateralized
by assets and is usually in the second position with assets. Mezzanine loans are made against
the cash flow, not the assets of the business. Because of this feature, mezzanine debt
providers use different criteria than banks in qualifying borrowers. They look closely at their
EBITDA, their EBITDA margins, and the strength of their historical cash flow.
When market declined and office portfolio didn’t perform to underwritten projections,
delinquencies weighed on the 3 loans in the portfolio
Sponsor worked with lenders on several strategies to consolidate loans and get them out of
delinquency
After successfully bringing the loans up to date, holder of mezzanine pieces (HRC Capital)
decided to market the loans
HRC offered a potential off market deal to SunRock before bringing the opportunity to more
investors
HRC (the borrower) is an established private equity fund – specialises on owning and
operating office assets across US (bulk of portfolio in top quality assets in major urban
markets such as NYC and WDC)
41. 41
W
US Property Market Information
• The Federal Reserve left the target range for its
federal funds rate unchanged at 1 percent to
1.25 percent during its July 2017 meeting and
said it will start reducing its USD 4.5 trillion
portfolio relatively soon.
• The committee considered near-term risks to
the economic outlook as roughly balanced, but
said it will closely monitor inflation
• Interest Rate in the United States averaged
5.78 percent from 1971 until 2017, reaching an
all time high of 20 percent in March of 1980
and a record low of 0.25 percent in December
of 2008.
42. 42
W
US Property Market Information
Capitalisation Rates
• If rents are expected to increase
property has become more valuable
owner will expect a higher capital gain
lead to a lower cap rate
• During GFC, CRE prices dropped about
40% and the market for financing CRE
transactions was severely disrupted,
resulting in very high CMBS yields.
• Since summer 2010, yields on highly
rates CMBS have increased about
0.30%. However, cap rates have come
down 0.50%.
– Decline in cap rates despite the slight
increase in interest rates suggest that
investor expectations for CRE price
appreciation have strengthened
has become more valuable and the owner will expect a higher capital gain, which will lead to a lower cap
rate. A similar argument can be made for falling vacancies.
Thus, expected price appreciation is ultimately a reflection of the outlook for fundamentals such as rents
and vacancies. However, there could also be unidentified nonfundamental reasons for changes in
expected price appreciation. For example, investor sentiment may improve and the discount rate applied
to cash flows from a property may fall, thereby lowering the cap rate. Indeed, investor sentiment could
become so exuberant that a bubble could form, in which expected appreciation soared and the cap rate
dropped sharply.
This link between cap rates, interest
rates, and expected price appreciation
is not merely theoretical. Using a
slightly different representation of the
cap rate, Ghysels, Plazzi, and Valkanov
(2007) show that it predicts CRE
returns. In our data we can see these
linkages in Figure 2, which compares
CRE cap rates with the interest paid on
loans to finance CRE transactions. We
focus here on the office market, but
other CRE asset classes have behaved
similarly. Ideally, the interest measure
should be the rate on new CRE loans,
but those are not readily obtainable.
Instead, we use as a proxy for CRE
purchase loans the yield on AAA-rated five-year commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), which
finance a large share of CRE transactions.
Figure 2
Office building cap rates and CRE mortgage rates
Sources: CB Richard Ellis (CBRE) and Commercial Real Estate Direct.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Percent Percent
CMBS yield (left axis)
Office cap rate (right axis)
Summer
2010
43. 43
W
US Property Market Information
Terminology:
Net Absorption: Absorption is the amount of space
or units leased within a market or submarket over a
given period of time (usually one year).
Absorption considers both construction of new
space and demolition or removal from the market of
existing space. It represents the demand over a
specified period, contrasted with supply.
When supply is less than demand, vacancy
decreases and absorption is positive.
When supply is greater than demand, vacancy
increases and absorption is negative.
44. 44
W
Chicago Property Market Information
Overall, the CBD remains a landlord’s market as
rent continues to increase across all building
classes and fewer concessions are granted. Limited
availability of quality high-rise space coupled with
continued corporate migration into the CBD has
solidified an advantageous environment for
landlords; however, tenants in a position to open
negotiations with landlords in 2017 will be looking at
a more tenant favourable market as approximately
2.3 million square feet are delivered in early 2017.
As this space is delivered to the market, landlords
will seek to avoid losing tenants to the new
developments, which will likely increase
concessions granted to tenants.
Investors see value in Chicago’s assets as they
offer a significant discount in pricing relative to
comparative properties on the coasts and believe
Chicago’s diverse economy and talented workforce
make for strong investments.
45. 45
W
Chicago Property Market Information
• From 2009 – 2015, the vacancy rates
have continually dropped
– Total decline of 3.8%
• Period 2009 had a net absorption of -
1,614,937
– Oversupply of office properties
• Can be explained by the effect of the GFC
that caused a loss of jobs, a decline in real
income, a slowdown in industrial production
and manufacturing and a slump in
consumer spending
• From 2010 – 2011, economy began to
recover as vacancy rates declined and
net absorption levels became positive
again.
46. 46
W
Chicago Property Market Information
• From 2009 – 2015, the vacancy rates
have continually dropped
– Total decline of 3.8%
• Period 2009 had a net absorption of -
1,614,937
– Oversupply of office properties
• Can be explained by the effect of the GFC
that caused a loss of jobs, a decline in real
income, a slowdown in industrial production
and manufacturing and a slump in
consumer spending
• From 2010 – 2011, economy began to
recover as vacancy rates declined and
net absorption levels became positive
again.
• The CBD’s overall vacancy decreased by 70
basis points over the past year, falling from
12.3 percent to 11.5 percent. Vacancy
decreased by at least 50 basis points across all
assets classes, with Class A leading the way
with an 80 basis point decrease during the
47. 47
W
Chicago Property Market Information
Asking Rental Rates
The average direct asking rental rate in the
CBD currently resides at $36.92 per square
foot, an increase from $36.16 per square foot in
the third quarter. The average overall asking
rental rate increased by 5.43 percent from one
year prior.
Investment Sales and Deal Activity
• 2009 represents a period of low sales
activity, however from 2009-2013 there has
been a significant growth in the number of
sales activity (3 to 31 sales)
• Class B offices seems to be frequently
traded more than Class A and C
• The market remains incredibly hot for
sellers, and there is little reason to suspect
investment sales activity will slow.
50. 50
W
Los Angeles Property Market Information
• Education and Unemployment
• The highest unemployment rates, in both the City of
Los Angeles and Los Angeles County, exist for
individuals with an educational attainment of high
school or less (Exhibit E-6).
• Residents with a Bachelor’s degree or higher had an
unemployment rate of 5.9 percent in the County (7.0
percent in the City) in 2013, roughly half the rate
experienced by those at the opposite end of the
spectrum—less than a high school education and high
school diploma or equivalent reported unemployment
rates of 10.1 percent
usually face challenges such as higher
unemployment and poverty and will there
higher levels of public services and resources.
The city and county both have a large proportio
resident population with low levels of ed
attainment (Exhibit E-5). Almost 25 percen
population has less than a high school educa
high school graduates (or equivalent) accoun
additional 20 percent. As an increased numbe
require higher skill levels, a shortage of individ
higher levels of education can result in fewer p
for their employment, and consequently higher
unemployment.
Education and Unemployment
The highest unemployment rates, in both the Ci
Angeles and Los Angeles County, exist for in
with an educational attainment of high schoo
(Exhibit E-6).
Residents with a Bachelor’s degree or higher
unemployment rate of 5.9 percent in the Cou
percent in the City) in 2013, roughly half
experienced by those at the opposite end
spectrum—less than a high school education
school diploma or equivalent reported unemp
rates of 10.1 percent (9.6 percent) and 10.8
(11.6 percent) respectively.
Less than HS
23.1%
Less than HS
25.4%
HS or
equivalent
20.4%
HS or
equivalent
19.4%
Some
College
19.4%
Some
College
17.9%
Associates
7.0%
Associates
6.0%
Bachelor's
19.7%
Bachelor's
20.9%
Masters
6.8%
Masters
6.6%
PhD or
Prof'l
3.6%
PhD or
Prof'l
3.9%
LA County
City of LA
Population 25 years and over City of LA: 2.6 million
Source: 2013 ACS 1-year estimates
8.6%
9.2%
10.1% 9.6%
10.8%
11.6%
9.2%
10.0%
5.9%
7.0%
LA County City of LA
Exhibit E-6
Civilian Unemployment Rate
by Educational Attainment 2013
Population 25 to 64 years Less than High School
High School or equiv Some college or Associate's
Bachelor's or higher
Source: 2013 ACS 1-year estimates
Executive Summary
Exhibit E-12
Industry Employment Growth 2014-2019 in Los Angeles
Annual
Average %
Δ
Employment
Em
Em
Co
ec
Lo
an
Fr
re
tro
th
re
Th
an
th
pe
wh
6.2
Re
oc
int
lab
Mo
po
Ho
Re
ma
Ind
to
re
8.7%
7.5%
8.3%
6.2%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Exhibit E-10
Unemployment Rate
City of LA California
LA County United States
Sources: CA EDD, BLS
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
2007 2010 20132014 '15f '16f '17f '18f '19f
Exhibit E-11
Nonfarm Employment in Los Angeles County
(millions of jobs)
Sources: CA EDD; Moody's Analytics; LAEDC
Lost jobs are
recovered by 2015
51. 51
W
Los Angeles Property Market Information
• Employment, Industries and Jobs
• Los Angeles County was hard hit during the recession, and has
experienced a slow and anaemic recovery. From an
employment base of 4.2 million at the pre- recession peak in
December 2007 to a post-recession trough of 3.9 million, the
county saw a loss of more than 330,000 jobs, and an
unemployment
• an unemployment rate consistently 10 percent above the
county average, standing currently at 8.7 percent—both are
above the state rate of 7.5 percent, which is also above the
national rate, which stood at 6.2 percent in 2014.
• Most industry sectors will follow this general contour of post-
recession recovery followed by moderation. However, there
are differences among industries. Recovery strength in many
cases is determined by the magnitude of the industry’s decline
during the recession. Industries where employment fell steeply
are expected to experience stronger than average growth as
they recover from these deep losses.
• Recovery of all jobs lost during the recession did not occur until
2015 (Exhibit E-11). Still, this does not take into account the job
growth needed to accommodate labour force growth.
• The expected employment growth in individual sectors at the
county level is shown in Exhibit E-12. While these growth rates
are expected to apply at the city level as well, the projected job
creation will differ given the different mix of industries in the
two regions.
• Between 2014 and 2019, the economy is expected to add
322,000 new jobs in nonfarm industries across Los Angeles
County, and 126,000 new jobs in the
Exhibit E-12
Industry Employment Growth 2014-2019 in Los Angeles
Annual
Average %
Growth
Δ
Employment
(000s)
Total Nonfarm Payroll Employment 1.5% 322.0
Good Producing Industries: 0.5% 12.4
Natural Resources and Mining (1.4%) -0.3
Construction 1.8% 11.9
Manufacturing – Durable Goods 0.1% 2.1
Manufacturing – Nondurable Goods (0.0%) -1.2
Service Providing Industries 1.8% 287.6
Wholesale Trade 0.8% 8.6
Retail Trade 0.7% 14.7
Transportation, Warehousing, Utilities 0.7% 5.5
Employment, Industries and Jobs
Employment opportunities for residents of Los Angeles
County will depend on the health of the regional
economy.
Los Angeles County was hard hit during the recession,
and has experienced a slow and anemic recovery.
From an employment base of 4.2 million at the pre-
recession peak in December 2007 to a post-recession
trough of 3.9 million, the county saw a loss of more
than 330,000 jobs, and an unemployment rate
reaching a high of 12.6 percent (Exhibit E-10).
The City of Los Angeles fared somewhat worse, with
an unemployment rate consistently 10 percent above
the county average, standing currently at 8.7
percent—both are above the state rate of 7.5 percent,
which is also above the national rate, which stood at
6.2 percent in 2014.
Recovery of all jobs lost during the recession did not
occur until 2015 (Exhibit E-11). Still, this does not take
into account the job growth needed to accommodate
labor force growth.
Most industry sectors will follow this general contour of
post-recession recovery followed by moderation.
However, there are differences among industries.
Recovery strength in many cases is determined by the
magnitude of the industry’s decline during the recession.
Industries where employment fell steeply are expected
to experience stronger than average growth as they
recover from these deep losses.
The expected employment growth in individual sectors
at the county level is shown in Exhibit E-12. While these
growth rates are expected to apply at the city level as
well, the projected job creation will differ given the
different mix of industries in the two regions.
Between 2014 and 2019, the economy is expected to add
322,000 new jobs in nonfarm industries across Los
Angeles County, and 126,000 new jobs in the City of Los
Angeles.
8.7%
7.5%
8.3%
6.2%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Exhibit E-10
Unemployment Rate
City of LA California
LA County United States
Sources: CA EDD, BLS
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
2007 2010 20132014 '15f '16f '17f '18f '19f
Exhibit E-11
Nonfarm Employment in Los Angeles County
(millions of jobs)
Sources: CA EDD; Moody's Analytics; LAEDC
Lost jobs are
recovered by 2015
iv
Exhibit E-12
Industry Employment Growth 2014-2019 in Los Angeles
Annual
Average %
Growth
Δ
Employment
(000s)
Total Nonfarm Payroll Employment 1.5% 322.0
Good Producing Industries: 0.5% 12.4
Natural Resources and Mining (1.4%) -0.3
Construction 1.8% 11.9
Manufacturing – Durable Goods 0.1% 2.1
Manufacturing – Nondurable Goods (0.0%) -1.2
Service Providing Industries 1.8% 287.6
Wholesale Trade 0.8% 8.6
Retail Trade 0.7% 14.7
Transportation, Warehousing, Utilities 0.7% 5.5
Information 1.4% 14.7
Financial Activities 1.2% 13.1
Professional and Business Services 2.1% 67.8
Educational and Health Services 2.7% 105.6
Leisure and Hospitality 2.3% 54.7
Other Services 0.5% 4.0
Government 0.8% 20.6
Sources: California Employment Development Department; LAEDC
The C
an une
the c
percen
which
6.2 pe
Recove
occur
into a
labor f
Most i
post-re
Howev
Recove
magni
Indust
to exp
recove
The ex
at the
growth
well, t
differe
Betwe
322,00
Angele
Angele
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
2007 2010 20132014 '15f '16f '17f '18f '19f
Exhibit E-11
Nonfarm Employment in Los Angeles County
(millions of jobs)
Sources: CA EDD; Moody's Analytics; LAEDC
Lost jobs are
recovered by 2015
52. 52 Los Angeles Property Market Information
Executive Summary Los Angeles: People, Industry and Jobs 2014-2019
Exhibit E-13
Occupational Growth in Los Angeles County 2014-2019
(Δ Employment)
SOC Occupational Group
New
Jobs
Replace-
ment
Total
*
11-0000 Management occupations 14,130 25,810 39,940
13-0000 Business and financial 13,440 23,520 36,960
15-0000 Computer and mathematical 8,100 7,740 15,840
17-0000 Architecture and engineering 2,790 7,790 10,580
19-0000 Life, physical, social science 2,130 5,210 7,330
21-0000 Community and social services 9,200 8,060 17,260
23-0000 Legal occupations 1,960 3,720 5,680
25-0000 Education, training and library 13,030 22,510 35,540
27-0000 Arts, entertainment, sports 6,110 18,850 24,960
29-0000 Healthcare practitioners 26,720 20,230 46,950
31-0000 Healthcare support 16,500 9,180 25,680
33-0000 Protective services 10,500 13,400 23,900
35-0000 Food preparation and serving 45,210 63,460 108,670
37-0000 Building/grounds maintenance 17,300 13,400 30,700
39-0000 Personal care and service 20,850 18,610 39,460
41-0000 Sales and related 20,480 62,990 83,470
43-0000 Office and administrative 50,090 74,190 124,280
45-0000 Farming, fishing and forestry 130 730 860
47-0000 Construction and extraction 9,920 8,830 18,750
49-0000 Installation, maint / repair 6,530 13,160 19,690
51-0000 Production 7,940 24,190 32,030
53-0000 Transportation/material moving 15,960 34,530 50,490
Total* 322,000 480,000 802,000
* May not sum due to rounding
Source: Estimates by LAEDC
Less than HS
33.9%
HS, no exp
29.0%
HS, some exp
5.9%
Postsecondary
non-degree
award
5.3%
Associate's
4.4%
Bachelor's,
no exp
11.3%
Bachelor's,
some exp
5.2%
Master's
1.6%
Doctoral or
professional
degree
2.2%
Exhibit E-14
Entry Level Education and Experience Requirements
Source: Estimates by LAEDC
53. 53
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San Diego Property Market Information
• The effect of the GFC caused construction of office buildings to lessen, due to the fact
that less offices were being demanded, and so the supply overweighed the demand.
• From 2006 – 2008, Net absorption trended downwards whilst vacancy rates increased.
In addition, the number of offices constructed began to lessen from the onset of the
GFC.
• From 2009 onwards, vacancy rates have decreased, whilst net absorption gradually
increased.
54. 54
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San Diego Property Market Information
• Construction activity has exceeded 1.5 million SF and by year-end, will be at its highest
level since 2008. With only 551,349 SF currently under construction, there is no concern
for over- building as was the case prior to the recession that began in 2007. Additionally,
demand since 2014 remains as strong – if not stronger – than most of the years prior to
the recession.
55. 55 San Diego Property Market Information
• California and San Diego economy showing signs of improvement
• Housing market strengthening • Unemployment declining
• But employment conditions still difficult for many
• Considerations for LMI workers
• Fewer mid‐wage jobs, more low‐wage jobs
• Most low‐wage jobs don’t pay living wages
• Increasing importance of educational attainment
U.S.GDPgrowth0.4%forQ42012
‐10
‐8
‐6
‐4
‐2
0
2
4
6
20052006200720082009201020112012
Percent Change
Percent Change in Real GDP, 2005‐2012
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
4thQ 2008: TARP
1stQ 2009: ARRA
Californiamortgagedelinquenciescontinuetofall
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
20052006200720082009201020112012
Number of Mortgages
Loans in ForeclosureAll Mortgages Past Due
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey
CaliforniaandNevadahavethehighest
unemploymentamong12thDistrictstates
11.8
10.8
8.9
8.4
8.4
7.1
7.5
6.2
5.9
9.6
9.6
8.4
7.9
7.5
6.5
6.2
5.2
5.2
‐
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
NVCAORAZWAAKIDHIUT
Unemployment Rate (seasonally adjusted)
Unemployment Rates in the 12th District
Feb. 2012Feb. 2013
U.S. (Feb. 2013) ‐7.7%
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
56. 56 San Diego Property Market Information
Californialaborforcecontinuestogrow,
employmentrecovering
14
15
16
17
18
19
20032004200520062007200820092010201120122013
Individual Workers (in millions)
Labor Force and Employment in California, 2003‐2013
Labor Force
Employment
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Californiahasaddedjobsforthelastseveral
quarters,SanDiegojobgrowthonpace
‐8%
‐6%
‐4%
‐2%
0%
2%
4%
200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012
Employment (Year‐over‐Year Growth)
CALASD
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (quarterly data through end of 2012)
SanDiegoemploymentcontinuestogrow
1,140
1,160
1,180
1,200
1,220
1,240
1,260
1,280
1,300
1,320
1,340
2003200420052006200720082009201020112012201
Total Nonfarm Employment (in thousands)
Total Nonfarm Employment (in thousands) 2003‐2013
San Diego‐Carlsbad‐San Marcos
Recession
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, not seasonally adjusted
Source: National Employment Law Project
‐21%
‐60%
‐19%
58%
22%
20%
‐80%‐60%‐40%‐20%0%20%40%60%80%
Lower Wage
Mid Wage
Higher Wage
Jobs Lost in the RecessionJobs Gained in the Recovery
Growthinlowerwagework
Source: National Employment Law Project
‐21%
‐60%
‐19%
58%
22%
20%
‐80%‐60%‐40%‐20%0%20%40%60%80%
Lower Wage
Mid Wage
Higher Wage
Jobs Lost in the RecessionJobs Gained in the Recovery
Growthinlowerwagework
59. 59
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Due Diligence Checklist
Property and Local Market Conditions
1. Property type and physical condition / quality
2. Property location and competitive position
3. Property cash flows over the loan period
4. Property values (today, at maturity, at stabilization, in liquidation and recovery)
4. Rent rolls
5. Capital needs
6. Tenant defaults and payment delays, retention and renewals
8. Significance of personal property
9. Local market and sub market conditions
Borrower Capabilities and Motivation
1. Borrower/sponsor financial and managerial strength
2. Extent of distress on borrower’s other properties / businesses
3. Borrower’s exposure on guarantees (contingent, full repayment, completion, or
loss recovery)
4. Borrower’s tax position
5. Borrower’s reliance on management fee revenue (property, asset management, etc.)
6. The ownership entity’s control, capital structure, and approval processes
These factors are essential as they influence the borrower’s behaviour and negotiating
strategy. It can vary from obtaining a release from personal guarantees (DIL), maintaining
control of the property to protect or to participate in its potential upside recovery,
preserving management fee revenues, contributing and getting credit for ‘new’ money,
pursuing bankruptcy or lender liability actions, and / or managing tax consequences and
timing.
Legal Structures and Documents
Loan documents and key terms such as interest rates, maturities, escrows, and lock boxes
Mortgages, assignments and other security
Guarantees
Additional collateral
Other credit support
Development and management agreements
Lender recognition of agreements including leases
Assignments of rents and receivables
Lender lock box arrangements for collection of rents
Default events, rights, and remedies
Lender rights, obligations, and exposure under documents
Other Creditors
Construction trade claims
Mechanics liens
Other mezzanine debts
Inter-creditor agreements
Other secured or unsecured debt
Servicing History
Review of the loan servicing history and files can be used to develop pricing assumptions.
Servicing files can be used to help indicate whether the property or borrower has
supported the debt.
Servicing and payment history and sources
Servicing and correspondence
Existence and status of any defaults
Correspondence to/from borrower
Financial analysis of borrower and guarantors
Availability of assets to satisfy guarantees
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Legal Background
Mezzanine financing tends to be highly negotiated and customised for the particular situation.
Type of Instrument
MF typically consist of unsecured or second lien debt, or less frequently, preferred stock.
In practice, most mezzanine financing, particularly for larger financings, takes the form of subordinated, unsecured debt. Initial structuring discussions often focus on whether the debt should be in
the form of loans or debt securities, with the investors' view of the likely resale market (bank or bond) driving the result.
MF in the form of debt often includes equity participation, in the form of warrants, options and/or conversion features or co-investment rights associated with the primary mezzanine investment.
Covenants
Key negative covenants in mezzanine debt may include limitations on:
Incurrence of debt.
Restricted payments (including dividends, repurchases of equity and junior debt, and certain types of investments).
Liens.
Change of control transactions.
Asset sales.
Affiliate transactions.
Affirmative covenants may include those relating to:
Financial reporting.
Maintenance of insurance.
ERISA compliance.
Equity Participation
Mazanine investors regularly seek to enhance their returns by negotiating for equity participation alongside debt investments. This can take various forms:
Warrants or options to purchase a specified percentage of equity (1-5% usually)
Right to co-invest in the issuer alongside the controlling stockholder or a PE sponsor. Purchased equity would usually be bound by the terms of any stockholders’ agreement or other arrangement
among other stockholders.
Conversion feature that allows mezzanine investors to convert all or a portion of their principal investment into common equity of the issuer.
61. 61
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Legal Background
Inter-creditor Relationships
Senior debt holders have ability to suspend payments to mezzanine debtholders for up to 179 days in cases of default.
While precedents vary, in cases where mezzanine investors will receive only limited equity interests in the issuer, ordinarily they have limited leverage to negotiate for more than standard tag-along rights and
registration rights, as well as customary anti-dilution protections. In cases where mezzanine investors are also taking larger equity stakes, however, they may also negotiate for veto rights for specified corporate actions
including equity offerings, mergers, affiliate transactions or changes in senior management.
Mezzanine borrower typically only owns limited liability interests in a limited liability company
Addition of a mezzanine loan to the borrowing structure can bring the total loan-to-value ratio of a transaction to 90-95%.
Limitations on Rights and Remedies under Intercreditor Agreements
Mezz loans are typically contractually subordinated to the related senior mortgage loans pursuant to the terms of an Intercreditor agreement entered into between the senior mortgage lender and mezzanine lender.
These agreements severely limit and restrict the ability of mezz lenders to enforce their rights and remedies under the mezz loan documents.
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association (CMSA) have developed model forms that have become the industry norm on the content and coverage of these Intercreditor agreements.
The agreements limit the mezz lender’s ability to control Equity Interest and to establish indirect control of the underlying real estate and to make certain decisions and take certain actions without the senior mortgage
lender’s consent.
The Intercreditor agreement typically requires borrower to obtain a ‘no downgrade letter’, which provides confirmation from rating agencies that mezz lender’s enforcement actions will not cause a downgrade of the
rating of the related CMBS issurance which is secured.
The Intercreditor agreements also place strict limitations on the identity of the mezzanine lender since it may succeed to the indirect ownership of the underlying mortgage borrower and therefore end up being the
owner and operator of the land serving as collateral for the mortgage.
The only ability of the mezzanine lender to escape the confines of the senior morgtage is to buy out the senior lender. If there is a default under the senior mortgage loan, most Intercreditor agreements grant the mezz
lender to purchase the senior mortgage loan.
Even if the mezzanine lender is able to obtain control of the mortgage borrower, its rights remain very limited not only because of the restrictions in the Intercreditor agreement, but also because the mezzanine lender
(in its new capacity as mortgage borrower) is still subject to the senior mortgage covenants and restrictions.
62. 62
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Legal Background
Inter-creditor Relationships
The senior mortgage typically contains many limitations on the ability to sell the property, make major improvements to the property, change control of the property, or undertake other major decisions without the
senior mortgage lender’s consent.
The only option available is to refinance the property or to buy out the senior lender at par. Mezz lenders are further restricted since they rarely succeed to the benefits from certain third-party agreements such as
ground leases, subordination and non-disturbance agreements, etc.
The mezz lender is under time pressure and must realise upon its collateral and exercise its remedies prior to the senior mortgage lender completing a foreclosure on the underlying mortgage. Once the senior
mortgage lender completes its foreclosure, the underlying mortgage borrower will no longer own the income producing property and the mezz borrower will own equity in an entity with no assets.
In the case the underlying mortgage borrower sells the property, the mezz lender’s only action against the mezz borrower is for a breach of the contractual promise not to sell.
Compared to the senior mortgage lender’s right to foreclose its senior mortgage, the mezz lender’s right to foreclose on the Equity Interests of the mezzanine borrower is riskier and of limited value. Upon default, the
mezz lender’s remedies derive solely from its lien on personal property (i.e. the equity in the mezz borrower). This means the mezz lender has no rights to foreclose any other liens on the underlying real property, its
rights are limited solely to foreclosing junior liens on the equity in the mezzanine borrower and not the real property.
What this means is that even after a successful foreclosure of a mezzanine loan, the underlying mortgage property remains subject to the lien of the senior mortgage as well as any other liabilities, liens, leases and
other encumbrances of the underlying mortgage borrower and the underlying real property. Meaning the mezz owner will only indirectly own the underlying mortgaged property
63. 63
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Legal Background
Debt to Equity Swap
In the case of Nine Entertainment, they were able to avoid bankruptcy in 2012 after warring lenders agreed on a A$3.3bn debt-for-equity swap that hands control of Channel 9 to two investment groups. Apollo Global
Management and Oaktree Capital, which owned about 40% of Nine’s 2.3bn senior debt, offered Goldman Sachs (second-tier lenders) a bigger equity stake in a recapitalised and debt-free Nine (7.5%). In return,
Goldman Sachs dropped its demand for warrants in the restructured company. This was subsequent to Goldman Sachs’ original proposal of swapping the mezz debt for 30% equity in Nine.
Debt to equity swaps (restructure) from the junior (mezzanine) lender is subject to the senior lender’s approval. However, at the same time, if valuation provides that ‘the value of the company breaks into the
mezzanine debt’, aka, the junior lender has an economic interest in the business, the restructure requires consent of the junior lender.
This effectively means the mezzanine debt holder also has a leverage against the senior debt owner by barring their ability to restructure their capital structure.
Debt to Equity Swap was done by Goldman Sachs and Park Square to take control of Northgate, from owner KKR. This was backed with a 320m leveraged loan financing.
Mezzanine Lender’s Leverage against Senior Debt Holder
It is arguable that if the senior lenders are able to convince a court that the junior lenders’ debt is out of the money.
High Court Justice of England and Wales’ judgment of Bluebrook Ltd in 2009
It was determined that if they had an economic interest, they must be consulted in a Scheme of Arrangements and they must give consent.
64. 64
Outlining population movement in Chicago – Phone Tracking
Analysis Overview
Using geographic data from twitter, we are able
to map out where people congregate in urban
centers.
• This provides important socio-economic
information - as iPhone users earn, on
average, 40% more than Android users
• This data shows that West Loop (as outlined
by the white box) is subject to more foot
traffic by higher net wealth individuals than
inland Chicago
• We can infer that this means that the
process of gentrification is nearly complete,
establishing long-term demand for real
estate and commerce
64
65. 65
Outlining population movement in San Diego– Phone Tracking
Overview
• From the data, it is clear that iPhone
users congregate in the Downtown
region
• This allows us to infer that there is a
high concentration of higher-wealth
individuals passing through this area
65
66. 66
Outlining population movement in Los Angeles– Phone Tracking
Overview
• This map indicates that while Android
users are distributed evenly across LA,
iPhone user tend to cluster in areas
such as the Downtown region
• This is indicative of the socio-economic
division in LA
• It also spotlights the defensibility of the
LA office market
66
68. 68
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Precedent & Supportive Transactions
2009: Blackstone- purchasing at discount
• Blackstone helped Hilton Worldwide restructure
substantially all its debt by the purchase and
retirement of $1.8 billion debt and the conversion of
$2.1 billion of junior mezzanine debt to preferred
equity
• Blackstone borrowed $13 billion and agreed to take
on $7 billion of Hilton’s existing debt.
• Blackstone offered to buy back some of the bank
debt at a discount
• Blackstone negotiated its equity stake in Hilton to
70%
69. 69
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Precedent & Supportive Transactions
2008: Apollo Real Estate Advisors (AREA) – Loan to
Own
• Africa-Israel Investments and Mann Realty were
owners to the Apthorp apartment.
• Condo conversion was unsuccessful
• Foreshadowing a default, their $135 million
mezzanine debt lender AREA and first mortgage
lender Anglo Irish Bank threatened to foreclose on
the deal.
• Owners forced to come up with $23 million in
additional equity which lead to the lenders
controlling the property and ultimately replacing
Mann’s manager
70. 70
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Precedent & Supportive Transactions
2007: Icahn Enterprises – purchasing at a discount
- Stratosphere resort was a hotel-casino in Las
Vegas facing bankruptcy in 1997
- Icahn purchased Stratosphere’s debt for under 10
cents on the dollar pennies on the dollar and
eventually also bought out the minority
shareholders for $82 million.
- In 2007 Icahn sold the Stratosphere along with
neighbouring properties for $1.3 billion.
71. 71
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Precedent & Supportive Transactions
2009: Apollo Management and Oaktree Capital – Loan
to Own
- Countrywide was UK’s largest estate agency.
- In 2007, weighed down by the housing market, it
was unable to support its debt load in the long-
term
- In 2008, Oaktree began purchasing Countrywide’s
bonds, up to 34% in the company’s secured
bonds.
- In 2009, Apollo negotiated with bondholders to
discuss a potential debt restructuring and
successfully recapitalised the company
72. 72
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Bryant Plaza Research
Renovation #1: Underground carparking
(WIP Leadership Board Member Michelle
Wendler, AIA, is Principal of Watry Design.
She has been creating parking solutions for
the firm’s clients for more than 24 years.
Wendler, a licensed architect in 12 states, is
responsible for the design)
Assumptions:
(Assumptions made from Michelle Wendler,
the lead parking designer and structure for
Watry Design and a licensed architect in 12
states, is responsible for the design of more
than 150 parking projects)
The property’s on-site parking of 300 spaces
is on land and not part of the building
Soil condition of property is suitable and
allows for underground car park construction
$5000 annum revenue/ stall
135 sf width and length
300-340 sf/ stall
$45/sf
Plan:
Additional 400 spaces as underground
parking, this will bring additional
$2M/annum
Construct 4 underground car parking levels
to add 400 parking spots
Cost of construction:
Average size of car park: 320 sf
No. car parks: 400
Price per sf: $450-$550
320sf*400=12,800*45= $5.7M
NOI:
Car park rent flat rate: $10
No. days per year: 265
No. car parks: 400
$10*365*400= $1.5M
Things to consider:
Geography:
LA
Average costs of labor and resources needs
to be noted. As well as condition of soil,
seismic regions and availability of materials.
73. 73
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Bryant Plaza Research
• Number of parking levels:
• In general, a larger-footprint parking structure
that is shorter will cost less per parking space
than a taller structure with a smaller footprint.
The cost per square foot of the first level that
is on the ground is less than levels that are
elevated above the ground. A lower-height,
larger-footprint structure will have a higher
proportion of the cost in the first level. The
taller a structure is the heavier it is, and this
affects the foundation cost. A taller structure
generally has a less efficient parking layout,
which translates into more square feet for
each parking space.
•
• Cost of underground parking:
• If a parking structure is one level underground,
the cost per square foot can increase by
approximately 15%. If the structure is more
than one level below the ground, the cost
would be approximately 45% higher than the
original cost per square foot as cost increases
due to impacts of having to dig deeper.
• Cost of structural system:
• 60% to 70% of the cost of parking is in the
structural system. Therefore, the selection of
the framing system will have a significant
effect on the cost of each parking space. There
are two general types of framing layouts and
there are different types of structural systems.
The two types of framing layouts are short-
span and long-span. Short span is where you
have a column approximately every three
parking spaces (27x30 feet square) to support
the floor slab. Long-span is where you have
columns spaced 60 feet apart, with beams
spanning over the stalls and the drive aisle.
Generally, short-span systems cost less per
square foot, but the efficiency is not as good.
Long-span systems cost more per square foot,
but you are getting more stalls in the same
square footage. The structural system of a
parking structure can be either Cast-in-Place
Concrete, Precast Concrete or Structural Steel.
Which system is more cost effective depends
on the location of the project and the
preferred methods of construction in the
region. This is a case-by-case analysis. The
selection of a system that is not common in
the area will generally cause the structure to
cost more.
•
• The foundation system of the car park has a
huge impact on cost of structured car parks.
• Structures founded in poor soils’ conditions
that require more expensive, deeper
foundation systems will cost more. The
difference between a shallow and deep
foundation system can increase the price
approximately 10% overall – taking the cost
from, say, $50 to $55 per square foot.
74. 74
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Bryant Plaza Research
Total car parking spaces
The overall size of a project has an
effect on the cost per parking
space. A smaller project will cost
more per space than a larger
project. A 200-stall parking
structure on a small site may cost
about 30% more per square foot
than a 1,000-stall structure on a
“reasonably” sized lot.
Efficiency
This is the amount of square
footage it takes for every parking
stall overall. The cost of a parking
space is the cost per square foot
times the square foot per parking
stall. So, the more square feet you
have to build per stall will increase
the cost per stall.
Market conditions
As we have seen over the last few
years, the cost of parking can be
affected by market conditions.
Costs can go both down and up.
The swing can be 10% or more. A
normal bid market will generate
four to six bids from qualified
contractors. An aggressive bid
market might see 10 or even more
bids, some not necessarily from
qualified bidders. This will cause
the price to decrease but can
create concern if the bidders are
not qualified. An impacted bid
market might see one to three
bidders and price increase due to
lack of competition.
76. 76
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Bryant Plaza Research
Assumptions:
(Data from U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development)
6 ft fire code safety setback
7% unusable area of roof due to safety setbacks – minus 1283 sf
15% rooftop obstructions- minus 2750 sf
Total usable rooftop area= 18333-1283-2750= 14,300 sf
(Quote from US-based professional design services firm ‘Cabaret
Design Group’)
Average cost to build a bar is $200-$300 per sf
Average 18’ 6” bar equipment cost: $8,000
Cost of contstuction:
Construction cost per sf: $200-$300 per sf
Bar equipment cost: $8,000
Total Cost: ($250*14300)-8000= $360,000
Cost: $300,000-$400,000
NOI: $1.8M
77. 77
Appendix – Cutler Center Renovation Comps
Overview - Costings
• $800M Costing
• 1.2M Sqft renovation
• Indicative of $667/sqft
Westfield Century Centre
Returns Analysis
• Occupancy expense proportions
imply an annualized increase in
rental revenue of 50-80m p.a
78. 78
Appendix – Cutler Center Renovation Comps
Overview - Costings
• $500M Costing
• 400K Sqft renovation
• Indicative of $1250/sqft
Willis Towers
Renovation
• Willis Tower’s is the tallest
building in Chicago
• Purchased by the Blackstone
Group
• Renovation inclusive of five-star
restaurants, casual dining
options, a 30,000sqft outdoor
deck and 50,000swft ‘digital
attraction’
• Significantly more expensive
than planned cutler renovations
79. 79
Appendix – Cutler Center Renovation Comps
Overview - Costings
• $1B overall costings
• 3M sqft of retail space
• Indicative of $340/sqft
Union Station
Renovation
• Union Station is a major inner-
city rail hub
• Renovation is inclusive of retail,
office and administrative space
80. 80
Appendix – Rivers Towers Renovation Comps
Overview - Costings
• $7M renovation of facilities
• Roughly 24,000 square feet
renovated
• Implies a cost of $290/sqft
701 B St
Renovation
• 701 B St is a class A office and
entertainment space
• Renovation was focused on
upgrading the lobby, lifts and
other shared spaces
81. 81
Appendix – Rivers Towers Renovation Comps
Overview - Costings
• $500M costing
• 2.5M sqare feet
• Implies a cost of $200 per
square foor
Chicago Old Post Office
Renovation
• The Chicago Old Post office is a
major office space
• Renovations inclusive of a brand
new lobby and rooftop gardens
82. 82
Appendix – Rivers Towers Renovation Comps
Overview - Costings
• $500M costing
• 2M square feet
• Implies a cost of $250 per
square foot
Moscone Center
Renovation
• The Moscone Center is a major
hotel, office and office space
• Renovations inclusive of major
aesthetic and functional changes
84. 84
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Macroeconomic Risks
• Unemployment rate
• Risk: difficulty in finding suitable tenants
• Low unemployment rates may affect our occupancy rate and ability to find tenants when
leases rollover
• We should find a well-diversified mix of tenants for our office buildings when leases end.
Selected tenants should be from growing employment rate sectors such as health &
education industry and the financial services industry
• However, unemployment rates forecasted to peak in 2010 and then fall steadily
• Occupancy and rents forecasted to begin sustainable growth in 2011
• 8.7M jobs were lost during the recession but 7.4M jobs were gained by 2014 during
recovery. Six subsectors have accounted for 83.4% of recovered jobs. Professional and
business services sector accounting for the most percentage of recovered jobs then Health
care and Leisure & Hospitality inudstries
•
• Chicago:
• Metro Chicago economic results have proven unsteady. However, CH has recorded year-to-
date growth of more than 31,000 jobs compared to losses of 92,000 from the same period
of 2009. Unemployment rate forecasted to drop to 8.1% in coming 3 years (2013)
• Economy is expected to go into accelerated expansion especially office jobs sector
• Projected positive absorption duelled by drop in rate of sublease additions and increased
occupancy rates
• Office buildings leased to young social media tech companies
• Chicago’s CBD leasing market experienced most activity from small to mid-sized users
• Many landlords improved and upgraded their properties to stay competitive by investing in
lobby renovations or adding outdoor trances
• Chicago CBD has a trend of plug-and-play and on-demand suite availabilities
• River North tower a $1.3 m.s.f office building sold for $480 p.s.f (record setting p.s.f pricing
in 2010)
85. 85
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Macroeconomic Risks
LA:
Moderate occupancy rate gains
Tenants dominated by law firms and financial services tenants
Trend of owners increasingly target a more diverse tenant base, including creative and
entertainment companies
Westside an established home base for media, technology and mobile industries- these industries
are expected to see continued growth and will drive new requirements
Increase in competition among tenants for “creative” space has led landlords to increase rental
rates- interplay between entertainment and high-tech is significant trend
Growing demand for office buildings and sustained growth from existing tech tenants
Leisure and hospitality experienced a steep decline due to the recession, but added more than
15,700 LA-based jobs since Jan 2010, driven by an increase in discretionary and business spending
San Diego:
Leisure and hospitality sector posted the greatest employment recovery- adding 7,000 in 2013
Office-using industries such as professional and business services was one of 7 sectors that saw
employment gains
Also measured growth in construction
Downtown submarket heightened activity- growing demand of tenants in tech sector and
projected growth in professional services industries
Steady leasing market, transaction volume and sales value in 2010 is forecasted to outpace those
seen in past years
87. 87
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Tenant Risk
Rent Roll quality
Refer to credit worthiness, stability and number of tenants
Rollover risk
refers to remaining term left on leases at a property and it affects both single
Delinquency Rate
Delinquent loans rising- through 2009 9% of CRE loans in bank portfolios were delinquent, which is more than double of
2008
There has been a significant increase in non-performing commercial real estate in the US since 2008. This period also saw
heightened levels of maturities and record levels of outstanding commercial mortgage debt.
The total value of distressed commercial real estate was $166.8 billion in 2010, including properties in distress, foreclosure,
and lender REO, according to data from Real Capital Analytics
Starting June 2010- volume and value of distressed commercial real estate has dropped
Delinquency rates has risen steadily over the past two years from 5% in the 4Th quarter of 2007 to 19.0% in first quarter of
2010. Non-accrual rate increased rom 2.9% to 14.6%
The commercial mortgage sector’s total delinquency rate grew to 5.5% in the 1st Q of 2010, compared to 5.1% in 4th Q of
2009 and 3.6% one year ago
Non-accrual rate is the main factor contributing to coverall growth, accounting for 69% of the total delinquency
Bank-held commercial mortgage default rate rose to 4.2% in the 1st quarter 2010 compared to 2.3% the previous year
88. 88
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Tenant Risk
Rent growth fastest in CBD Class A offices based on supply and
demand coming in close to equilibrium levels
89. 89
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Tenant Risk
New supply coming to market is slowly increasing
but still well below historic norms
New supply coming to market is slowly
increasing but still well below historic norms
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Financing Risk
Interest Rate RIsk
Risk that interest rates will increase when we refinance and
get a loan from the bank I
Debt to Equity Swap
Risk of senior lender not giving approval of debt to equity swaps
Debt-for-equity swap significantly de-levers the distressed
property’s balance sheet
Mezz lender faces the risk of a separate foreclosure on pledged
equity interests of the borrowing entity.
Inter-creditor agreements creating rights and obligations
between lenders can also impact the success of lender’s control
of the borrowing entity.
A mezz lender in foreclosure can significantly change the loan
resolution outcome if the mezz lender has a position that is
partly in the money or has the ability to bring new money or
expertise to the situation.
Inter-creditor agreement assumption- E.g. provide that all cash
flow be paid on occurrence of a default, to senior note holders
interest and principal until the senior debt is fully repaid before
any interest can be paid to subordinate holders
Upon a borrower’s default, mezz lender’s only commercial
alternative is to cure the default by refinancing the secured
property or taking out the senior lender at par value.
Average mezzanine loans have a default rate of 16.10%
92. 92
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Competitive & Construction Risk
Construction Risk
Cost overruns
May take longer than anticipated to complete
Expose previously unknown defects in the physical asset
Default of construction company? During post-recession where
manufacturing and construction industry suffered the most
Tenant improvements are currently averaging 18% of the first year’s
least cost for ‘A’ properties