New Technology – Old Theories of Harm? – Ryan Struve, US DOJ - October 2019 OECD-AGCM Workshop on Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets

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OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs

This presentation by Ryan Struve, US DOJ, was made during the panel III “New Technology – Old Theories of Harm?” held at the OECD/AGCM Workshop on Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets on 10-11 October 2019. More information on this event can be found at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/oecd-agcm-workshop-on-abuse-of-dominance-in-digital-markets.htm

Government & Nonprofit

Panel III – Theories in Digital Markets
Ryan Struve
October 11, 2019
Views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the United
States Department of Justice.

2
Overview of U.S. Monopolization Law
• Section 2 of the Sherman Act
– “Monopolize, or attempt to monopolize”
– “any part of the trade or commerce”
• Elements of Proof
– Monopolization
• Monopoly power
• “Willful acquisition or maintenance of that power”
– Attempted monopolization
• Anticompetitive conduct
• Specific intent to monopolize
• Dangerous probability of success

3
Are Our Tools Out of Date?
• Platforms have existed since before antitrust laws
–Newspaper advertising
• Digital platforms have been analyzed under existing laws for decades
–Microsoft Section 2 case
–Google/Yahoo search agreement

4
Theories of Harm in Digital Platforms
• Important to distinguish between different types of
platforms
–Advertising-funded
–True platform model
• Nature of the illegal restraint depends on the nature of the
platform – follow the money

5
Alternatives to Tackling Dominance
• Proving dominance and exclusion can be difficult and takes a
significant amount of time
• Other avenues of enforcement available
–Dominance-facilitating acquisitions or agreements
–Behavior in standards setting bodies

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