Movements are typically sustained by those most affected by the action of the movement. Organizers have a vested interest in the purpose and outcome of the movement and find it practical to ensure its survival. There are different forms of local or internal self-organized action, including civil resistance, and different forms of external assistance to local actors. What can be learned from assistance to community banking and financial self-help projects in development assistance?

1. Fragile and conflict-affected states:
the role of non-violent social
movements
By Sadaf Lakhani for FSI 2012

2. What are fragile states?
States where the government cannot or will not
deliver core functions to the majority of its
people, including the poor.

3. Criteria for assessing ‘fragility’
Lack of authority, capacity and legitimacy of the state
• Risk of conflict or violence
• Accountability of government institutions,
• Capacity to manage public resources and deliver services,
• Territorial control,
• Levels of poverty, and ability to protect the poorest
• Lack of effective political processes to influence the state to meet
social expectations.
• Other characteristics include weak institutions and governance
systems.
• Problems with defining fragility and with applying the label

4. Why does fragility matter for
development actors?
• Fragility: countries classified as fragile are home to
over one-quarter of the world’s population.
• At least half of these states are affected by armed
conflicts of varying intensity.
• Fragile and conflict-affected states are the furthest
from reaching the Millennium Development Goals
(reverse of poverty trends).

5. Why is violent conflict important for
international actors?
Symptomatic of severe government failures but
also of ruptures within society.
Recent history of violent conflict makes
countries up to 44% more likely to fall back into
violent conflict.
Failure of international actors- multilateral
bodies, country allies, development actors.

6. Needs and challenges in Post-conflict
States
• Lack of acceptance of peace-process/victory
• Proliferation of small arms
• Lack of presence of state in some areas
• Rapid political transitions
• Need to rebuild infrastructure,
• Restoration or building of state architecture
• Need to provide livelihoods, restore economy

7. Post-conflict needs and challenges
• Continuation of violence and insecurities after end of
‘formal’ peace.
• Post-conflict nationbuilding and statebuilding
• Post conflict recovery and development

8. Continuation of violence and insecurities after
end of ‘formal’ peace.
• Lack of authority of the state in all parts of the country
• Presence of armed non-state actors
• Criminal gangs, terror groups and other forms of
violence
• Militarized communities
• Demobilized former -combatant
 support for effective, peaceful reintegration of former
combatants
 support for communities to limit or resist the actions of
armed actors

9. Post-conflict nation and statebuilding
• Need to address root-causes of violent conflict
• Political reorganization of the state
• Redistribution of resources /or productive assets
such as land
• Support the convergence of societal goals and
social cohesion
 Addressing grievances and tensions between
‘ethnic’ groups
 Safe return and integration of IDPs

10. Post conflict recovery and development
• Delivering services to people
• Restructuring war economies
• Inclusive growth and development
• Social accountability
 Ensuring responsive service delivery
 Combatting corruption, ensuring social accountability
 Guiding or even challenging development
 Leveraging and further opening ’spaces for
participation’
 Supporting traditionally marginalized groups

11. Demanding social accountability:
Ghana water privatization
• Link between water and health
• 70% of Ghanaians living on <$1/day
• 30% did not have access to safe drinking water
• Government shift to cost-recovery rather than
Right to Water
• 95% increase in fees for water
• Concerns over the process and content of
tender and contract

12. Ghana Coalition Against Water
Privatization
• Formed in year 2000, headed by ISODEC, a community-
based organization working on health issues
• Broad coalition-women’s groups, trade unions,
churches, public health workers, students,
environmental groups, disabled organizations.
• Multi-pronged strategy-’academic’/technical, rights-
based, politicization, popularization. Involved
legislature and decentralized government.
• Internationalization: Links to international actors (US,
UK), and to other related actors in S.A. to build allies
and support
• Learning from Cochabamba

13. Ghana CAP Outcomes?
• 2004, WB provided $103 million grant for
urban water project, along with other donors
• Management contract awarded to AquaVitens
-Rand in 2005, for 5 year period
• Severe problems effecting delivery of
services, contract reconsidered in 2008
• Non-renewal of contract in 2010

14. Supporting communities to resist or limit
the actions or armed non-state actors
Mindanao, Philippines
*Zones of peace in midst of conflict
*Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fighting
for 30 years
*Government responds with militarization
*Local communities felt conflict fatigue

15. Peace zones, Mindanao, cont
• Initiated by Church-based organizations with support of the
Coalition for Peace
• Failed negotiations with armed parties
• Declaration of ceasefire by communities of Naga city,
endorsed by other key leaders such as school
superintendent
• Other peace-promotion public activities (banners,
headbands, signs at village perimeters, defying armed
actors to reclaim their villages)
• Pushed for permanent zones of peace, freedom and
neutrality (ZOPFAN)
• Combination of methods- church backed position papers,
monitoring via new media, peoples’ marches and protests

16. Coalition for peace outcomes?
• Government take-over of ZOPFANS, even arming local
groups, communities sought to distinguish themselves
from these, creating second wave of Zones for Peace
• Secure peace in their villages- war has by-passed or
had a lesser effect on many zones for peace
• Reducing the tensions between communities that
contribute to the armed conflict
• Encourage development by securing local area, NGO
activities and return of government services.
• Exert pressure on all parties to find a political solution
to the problem.

17. What is the role of strategic non-violent
methods in fragile and conflict-affected states?
 Raising consciousness, reframing problems, discriminations,
and inequalities in society before they turn into acute
grievances
 Mobilizing interest and resources to intervene in social
conflicts and the power structures of society before citizens
see violence as a viable means of achieving their goals
 Responding to and creating political opportunities on different
scales to promote their interests and social change
 Developing alternatives to current political, economic, and
cultural practices.

18. Opportunities and constraints for support from
international actors
Opportunities
 heavy focus of attention and resources on fragile and conflict effected states
 break from ‘business as usual’
 emphasis on social accountability
 aid dependency of host governments
 Facilitating connections between groups globally (south-south learning)
Constraints
• Little awareness of possibilities of application of non-violent conflict methods
• Discourse
• Implementation issues- who to work with, how to select
• Reluctance of civic movements to accept assistance
• Aid can distort incentives, impact legitimacy
• Collusion of international actors in state and society failures