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This lessons learned presentation is about the human factors at Kennedy Space Center. Human factors is used at Kennedy space center to improve out launch systems to reduce human error during ground processing activities.
We would like to thank: Gena Henderson, Darcy Miller, Tim Barth, Barbara Kanki for their contributions towards human factors at Kennedy Space Center.
The sections of the presentation are: The importance of human factors for ground processing Human factors lessons learned and Lessons learned accomplishments at KSC And the human factors recommendations for the future of NASA
From 1996 to 2007, there were 332 Space Shuttle ground operations mishaps Related to these mishaps are 10 causal factors, as is shown in the pie chart and list to the right. All of these causal factors, in some way, can be improved by applying human factors techniques.
From 2006 to 2007, there were eleven (11) mishaps which resulted in personal injury, schedule delays, and costs us several millions of dollars. To reduce the likelihood of mishaps in the future, Kennedy Space Center has been applying human factors to improve our systems.
Since we have been doing this, several lesson learned have been developed from 2004 to 2012. Within these lessons, there are 59 recommendations. Forty-four (44) of these recommendations have been implemented Six (6 ) of these recommendations were partially implemented And nine (9) recommendations have not yet been implemented
From these recommendations several accomplishments have taken place. These accomplishments will be explained during the presentation. Human factors analysis tool Orion time line analysis Spacecraft requirements for ground processing Ares Mockup analysis Biomechanical analysis of avionics boxes Motion capture human factors analysis Pro E Manikin KSC Design Visualization KSC Display/Control Screens
The first accomplishment is the Human factors engineering analysis tool. The tool is used by the human factor engineers to define and improve the human factors aspects in the designs.
In conjunction with the tool, we have developed the human factors engineering process. The tool and the process were used to analyze 40 ground subsystems during the Constellation Program. A few of those ground subsystems are listed here.
The process included meetings with design and systems engineers to determine: the human interfaces the issues at these interfaces the allocation requirements for these interfaces And ultimately the design solutions to comply with these requirements.
In the left section of the tool, the human interface, the interface issues, and the interface requirements are defined.
In the middle section of the tool, environmental conditions, consequences of human error, and the type of processing phase is defined.
And in the right section of the tool, The risk and verification method is determined, and the design solution used to improve issue is described in the last column. This process is done for each of the human factors chapters in the FAA Human Factors Design Standards that apply to the subsystem. The tabs at the bottom, divide the tool into the FAA human factors design standards.
In this example the component under review was the actuator motor, which is located in the crew access arm, on the mobile launcher. The issue was a concern for adequate visual and physical access. The solution was to move the actuator motor to an open and more accessible location inside the mobile launcher area.
This process is done for all the human issues with the subsystem, and once complete a dedicated set of requirements is developed for this Crew Access Arm unique subsystem.
This accomplishment is on the human factors timeline analysis of the Orion processing flow at Kennedy space center. The Orion is processed in the MPPF, the VAB and at the Launch Pad.
Within these facilities there are several operations that occur. Within each of these operations there are several activities that take place in a timeline sequence Each of these activities needs to be analyzed for human factors to improve the design of ground flight hardware.
In order to do this, the human factors analysis tool was modified by listing the activities in a time line sequence from top to bottom. Also, additional columns were added for recording the building location where the operations take place The operation number, or FFBD event number And the activities within the operations, and their issues. And any actions related to these activities
In this example, the blue boxes are eight operations that take place in the multi purpose processing facility. The circled operation is to establish access to the Orion. As seen in the picture, this is done by maneuvering the Orion vehicle into the access bay, The concern here was human’s ability to correctly align the Orion in the access bay The solution to improve alignment, was to install guide rails on floor to help the human direct the pallet, and prevent misalignment
The last two accomplishments were about level 5 human factors requirements, this accomplishment is about the development of the NASA STD 3001, Level 1 human factors requirements for ground processing of flight hardware. This work was accomplished through the efforts of Janis Connolly, Charles Dischinger, Keith Holubec, and Barry Tillman.
Historically the level 1 NASA STD 3000 document, the Man Systems Integration Requirements did not include human factors requirements for designing flight hardware for ground processing. The solution during the Constellation Program was to include a set of ground human factors requirements into a section of the Constellation Program’s Level 2 Human Systems Integration Requirements document, referred to as the HSIR
The ground section is the called the 3.9, Ground Maintenance and Assembly. This slide shows the Scope, and introduction to that section. ‘
Also during the same time the NASA STD 3001, the NASA Space Flight Human System Standard was under development, to replace the NASA STD 3000. And because of the lessons from Constellation Program, a Ground Maintenance and Assembly Chapter 13 is being included into NASA STD 3001, This will ensure that the human factors requirements are in place for the ground processing aspects of flight hardware.
An example of where the HSIR requirements were applied during Constellation Program is this accomplishment on the Ares I forward skirt mockup analysis. The mockup is an actual life size mockup of the forward skirt area, where several ground activities were analyzed.
One of the activities analyzed here was installing, removing, and inspecting avionics boxes. To help the technician to work effectively in this environment, a seating platform and foot rest design was developed.
Also, the locations and spacing of the boxes were determined by considering: The weight of the box, The space for tools and hands and for the cable around the boxes.
Other areas analyzed during the mockup analysis were: Emergency egress of technicians, and simulations of rescue activities.
This accomplishment is the biomechanical analysis of installing avionics boxes in avionics shelves. The study is determining how carefully a human can place an avionics box in restricted spaces, and is also measuring the spinal stresses to the human during installation. So the study is looking at how to prevent injury to the human and damage to flight hardware.
The idea of the study came from the lessons from cold plate damages in the space shuttle . The top picture shows an actual space shuttle avionics box in restricted spaces and the right top picture is a damaged cold plate. The bottom picture shows the subject lifting and installing an avionics box onto a mockup avionics shelf which is similar to the Space Shuttle’s avionics shelves.
This accomplishment is on the use of motion capture for human factors analysis.
Motion capture is being used at Kennedy Space Center to perform ergonomic analysis for designing spacecraft and ground support equipment Some advantages of motion capture are: Real-time human model is immersed into a full scale CAD model Real time ergonomic analysis of body stresses can be performed And the mockups for motion capture are, simple, flexible, and in expensive
This study was done to evaluate the removal and replacement of the astronaut seats in the Orion vehicle. The top pictures are the motion capture activity, and the bottom picture is the human motions immersed into the CAD models To reduce collateral damage to the flight hardware, and do reduce stresses to the human, ergonomic analysis is used to evaluate several different scenarios to determine the best locations for the operators and equipment.
A similar study was done to evaluate the removal and replacement of avionics boxes. Ergonomic analysis is used to determine the optimal locations of the operator and equipment, to reduce collateral damage to hardware, and to reduce biomechanical stresses to the human.
This study modeled the Self Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble. This suit is used at KSC during hazardous operations, such as for fueling Hypergols, and ammonia. This study proved that the anthropometrics of the SCAPE suits could be modeled and immersed into the CAD models. This technique can now be applied to future human factors analysis for SCAPE suits and other types of suites
Most recently real time motion captures from two remote areas, one located at KSC and the other at MSFC combined there motion captures into one human/CAD environment. This capability provides real-time design collaborations between Centers.
In addition to motion capture, the incorporation of wearable Head-Mounted Displays (HMDs) is being tested. Head mounted displays can be combined with motion capture mockups. Or they can be used for collaborative web sharing among NASA centers
I have three items to discuss that are related to the HUMAN FACTORS work that we are currently involved with at KSC which are: Pro E Manikin KSC Design Visualization KSC Control/Screen Finally, I will wrap up the presentation with some recommendations to the Agency regarding to Human Factors Assessment, Tools and the Lesson Learned.
One of the software that I used to support Constellation Program Ground Ops Subsystem Design was Pro E Manikin (from PTC Company). We found that using Pro E Manikin software was an effective way to: Determine the optimal design solution to ensure it is a human-centric design. Human-Centric design means design the product that would meet the need of human usage and operation. Get buy-in from the design engineers to improve the designs. Validate the Human Factors requirements.
In this example, the control panel was designed with one of the panel faces at an angle due to space constraints inside the building (there is a LIMIT in space that the panel can only be 102 inches across). In addition, because the panel must be operated up at 20 ft in the air inside of a building so the control panel is mounted on the metal platform in order to be fork lifted up to 20 ft high in the air. By placing the human manikin in this system you can see that he has difficulty in reaching the control knobs in the top left corner. Because most people are right handed, there is a risk that the human right arm or hand will hit the NH3 sample bottle. In addition, the operators feet are very close to hitting the metal bar of metal platform. Therefore, this is not a good human-centric design.
From this TOP view, you can see that the feet are under the platform, and the legs are very close to hitting the metal bar. In addition, the operator has an awkward reach to the control knob in the corner where the two panels come together. Not much room for hand movement while he adjusts the control knob due to this angled panel which is in the way.
So the final human-centric design solution was to remove the angle panel, and to have one flat panel 102 in across. In addition, the flat panel was brought out to the front edge of the platform to allow the operators to get closer to the control panel (The platform now does not block off the operators feet anymore).
From this TOP view, you can see that the feet are under the platform, and the legs are very close to hitting the metal bar. In addition, the operator has an awkward reach to the control knob in the corner where the two panels come together. Not much room for hand movement while he adjusts the control knob due to this angled panel which is in the way.
Another area of accomplishment at KSC is the Design Visualization group.
We have a group called “KSC Design Visualization” who perform: 3D Modeling, Animation and Simulation. A few examples of the achievements are modeling of: Self Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) fueling and access into the Orion Spacecraft vehicle, Astronaut emergency egress, and Modeling of Launch Abort System (LAS) safe and arm access.
Here are a few more examples.
Currently, we are performing human factors analysis on Launch Control screens, and screens for the inspection and maintenance of the subsystems. This effort has resulted in the development of specific human factors requirements, and the development of processes and tools for performing human factors analysis on these screens.
The Human Factors requirements for the control/display analysis were derived from the FAA Human Factors Design Standard (HFDS). The Launch Control Screens currently under development are for the following 6 subsystems and we are performing Human Factors Assessment on them. * GSP (Ground Special Power) * ECS (Environmental Control System) * CMASS (Crew Module Ammonia Servicing System) * FLDS (Fire Detection) * LH2/LO2 * IOPSS (Ignition Overpressure Sound Suppression)
This is a typical screen shot of a launch control screen for the Ignition Overpressure Sound Suppression Subsystem (IOPSS).
This is the same screen shot with the Human Factors Analysis review. We marked up all issues that go with the screen such as : Does the VALVE color change to green when it is open, to grey when it is closed? Are the sections in the screen grouped in functional order? Are the label acronyms easily understood?
The notes of the “issue” on the screen must coincide with the requirements section of our HFEA Final report.
This is what the Human Factors Analysis requirements section looks like.
Now that we had seen the Human Factors Lesson Learned at KSC in the past, this section will give the recommendations for applying the Human Factors Lessons Learned across the agency.
Continue to develop Human Factors requirements at All levels. Continue to develop Human Factors tools, motion capture and other mockups and human modeling. Continue the Human Factors collaborations between centers for our missions and programs. Continue to revisit and to improve upon these lessons from the past. And to develop new lessons from these incremental developments.
DS During the Orbiter Space Plane documents from the Apollo era were reviewed which led to this human factors lesson learned entry 5376. The lessons 5376 shows that during the transition from the Apollo program to the Shuttle program, there was no documented ground processing human factors review of what was learned from Apollo, and how it could assist the Space Shuttle Program. For the recommendations, We have been implementing lessons from previous programs at the beginning of new programs . We need to do better at apply flight crew human factors lessons to ground crews, and also at applying launch vehicle systems lessons to ground crews.
This is another lesson developed during the Orbiter Space Plane Program. The lessons 5377 shows that human factors was applied during Apollo, but was not established as human factors engineering in the NASA processes or documentation. We have been ensuring that the development of hardware is assessed by a human factors engineer. We are providing proper training for the new technology and systems to reduce confusion and human error. Continue to use the SFA program as a training tool. We have been coordinating with the flight crew human factors group, as well as the launch vehicle groups.
DS During the Orbiter Space Plane Program, These recommendations were documented. 1. We have been placing more emphasis on Human Engineering effects for design, development, and operation. 2. We have included Human Engineering under Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I). 3. We have ensured that data products are in place up front to address Human Engineering Functions at the Systems level. 4. We have ensured that Human Engineering is not overlooked within each system, e.g., Mechanical, Electrical, Fluids, etc., each system does have its own Human Engineering section to confirm that this particular system has been addressed by Human Engineering. And within this section, useful parts of MIL-STD-1472 and other applicable Human Engineering documents that apply to this system are listed.
DS Although these recommendations were mainly developed for the flight crew human factors engineering, there application to ground crew is also valid. Below is the evaluation mostly based on how these lessons apply to ground hardware development. 1. Human Factors Engineering requirements in KSC Engineering Directorate have been carried as applicable requirements and have not been ignored; they have been adequately funded, implemented in the design definition, and properly verified. 2. Human Factors Engineering personnel with training, experience, and expertise have been hired and retained as key personnel within KSC Engineering Directorate. 3. Human Factors Engineering design tools and mockups have been funded to enable spacecraft-specific research and design development, providing actual data from trade-off studies.
DS 4 . Human Factors Engineering awareness training and re-education is NOT provided to NASA and contractor management, budget controllers, contracting officers, design discipline leads, as well as to legislative and executive branch government leaders. 5. Human Factors Engineering is not emphasized as a primary systems discipline necessary for safe and efficient spaceflight. 6. Human Factors Engineering scope and language at NASA has been begun to be standardized with the overall Human Factors Engineering community via the NASA STD 3001. 7. In the Engineering Directorate and KSC, Human Factors Engineering is not included in the work breakdown structure (WBS) in the Systems Engineering / Systems Integration section, But a standard Human Factors Engineering statement is called out in every for deliverables having human interfaces.
DS 9. Data from Human Factors Engineering assessments and tests are driving lower level requirements and resulting design. 10. Human Factors Engineering is involved and integrated in the daily engineering problem solving and integration process. 11. Human Factors Engineering has a signature of authority on designs and drawings affecting human environments, interfaces, and interactions. 12. Human Factors Engineers with training, experience, and expertise are the ones making decisions on Human Factors Engineering. This is done with participation of the users (crew, ground support personnel, mission controllers) and managers.
DS HFE expertise is embedded in the design teams and various engineering organizations. We have not yet prioritize limited Human Factors Engineering (HFE) resources by ranking systems based on assessments of human-system integration technical risks (complexity, criticality/hazards, and frequency of human-system interactions) and schedule risks. HFEs do have adequate training and relevant spacecraft (launch vehicle, payload) processing experience. We have been supplementing our HFE expertise with the experiences and expertise of technicians, operations engineers, systems engineers, quality engineers and inspectors, engineers from other disciplines, and Safety and Mission Assurance(S&MA) as needed.
DS HFE methods, processes, and tools need are part of the systems engineering process over the entire system life-cycle. Human interface modeling and simulation capabilities are being used for evaluating designs from a HFE perspective to integrate human factors engineering into the systems engineering process. Human factors is taking a systems engineering perspective across multiple design teams. We have not developed a HFE process to accept and adapt heritage ground systems and GSE designs from one program to the next. For some cases we have used mishap, close call, and process escape data from comparable systems to improve heritage designs.
DS We have infused HFE concepts early during the design phases and reinforced during all milestone reviews. We formally require human factors 60, and 90% design review packages, and informally introduce human factors during the 30% design review process. We do have a human factors POC within the Engineering and Technology Directorate at KSC, but we do not have a chief human factors engineer function at KSC. We are using a common human factors assessment tool. 14. Engineers do exercise good engineering judgment in addition to satisfying human factors requirements. When needed we do provide training on applicable HFE standards and program/project requirements that are specifically tailored for ground system/GSE design teams. 15. We do provide a complete human factors assessments, documents and reviews to the design teams. But we have not been providing practical guidance materials handbooks and workbooks for ground system/GSE design teams. Provide as many relevant ground system/GSE examples and design case studies in the training materials and handbooks as possible.
We have been using available experiences and lessons from prior programs to optimize ground processing operability by leveraging human capabilities, not exceeding them. We have employed qualified human factors engineers on the team from the beginning of the project. Human factors is a proactive part of the design process to develop well-defined requirements that add value to the design. And, we have voiced the need for human factors accommodations where appropriate.
DS We haven’t had resources to look at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) lessons learned publications, to promote human factors improvements at KSC. We do incorporate human factors into the design proactively and apply them to the areas that will produce the best results. And we do build on past successes and integrate the successes across multiple projects. We supported the development of human factors requirements at a higher level into the HSIR during constellation and during the development of the NASA STD 3001. NASA has incorporated include the ground processing human factors requirements for ground hardware into the NASA STD 3001 along with the ground processing human factors requirements for flight hardware. We are continually developing new processes to accommodate and improve the human factors needs at KSC.
DS We have been tailoring requirements from the FAA HFDS to develop a requirements set to each of the subsystems by using the Human Factors Engineering Analysis tool. Human factors engineers do perform the human factors assessment as embedded members of the design team. We are accomplishing the other four lessons here as well.
DS As far as I know KSC did not used human factors for initial flight tests of Ares IX. We have developed and refined the Human Factors Engineering Analysis (HFEA) Tool and processes as an efficient and effective means to develop design packages for 30%, 60%, and 90% design reviews, and as a tool for final design reviews. We have formally document the human factors assessment process in the 2713, the Technical Review process for the KSC Engineering and Technology Directorate . We have developed and incorporate a complete set of the high-level (parent) ground systems human factors requirements into the NASA STD 3001. But we have not developed a L3 set of human factors requirements by rolling up the level 5 requirements developed for the individual ground subsystems during Constellation, and then compare this to the high level requirements in the NASA STD 3001.
DS We have incorporate the FAA’s Human Factors Design Standard into the HFEA Tool. We will apply human factors principles and analysis during the design of ground processing activities to prepare for flight hardware for test flights. Human factors is part of the work breakdown structure of projects at KSC. As future work for the HFEA Tool, we have not incorporate this lessons learned information into the HFEA Tool so the human factors engineer may better select requirements and methods when designing ground processing systems. We will employ the human factors systems engineering processes and lessons learned from development of Ares I ground systems to the development of ground systems for Ares V.
NASA PM CHALLENGE LESSONS LEARNEDKSC Human Factors Lessons Learned Damon B. Stambolian NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Engineering and Technology Directorate Katrine Stelges NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) United Space Alliance Donald H. Tran NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Engineering and Technology Directorate
KSC Human Factors GroupGena Henderson Ph.D. Darcy Miller Tim Barth Ph.D. Barbara Kanki Ph.D.
Sections of Presentation Importance of Human Factors for Ground Processing Human Factors Lessons Learned and Accomplishments Recommendations
The Importance of Ground Human Factors for Ground Processing
The Importance of Ground Human Factors for Ground Processing Courtesy to Tim Barth for these slides
Summary of Lessons Learned Lessons Learned Entries: 1801 Human Factors Engineering; Acceptance, Implementation, and Verification as a System. 1831 Human Engineering should be considered a Systems Engineering and Integration function 2136 1-G Human Factors for Optimal Processing and Operability of Constellation Ground Systems 5200 Synchronization of Vehicle Development with Ground Systems Development 5376 No clear communication between the Apollo program and the Shuttle program 5377 The use of human factors and the Space Flight Awareness (SFA) in the Apollo development 5378 Improved Quick Disconnect (QD) Interface Through – Visual Indicators and Labeling 5416 Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Ground Support Equipment (GSE) Human Factors Engineering Pathfinder 5480 Human Factors Review in the Critical Review Board (CRB)44 recommendations implemented6 partially implemented9 have not been implemented
Human Factors Accomplishments from Lessons Learned The Human Factors Engineering Analysis (HFEA) Tool Orion Human Factors Timeline Analysis Spacecraft Requirements for Ground Processing Ares I Forward Skirt Mockup Analysis Biomechanical Analysis of Installing Avionics Boxes Assessing Human Factors using Motion Capture Pro E Manikin KSC Design Visualization KSC Display/Control Screens
The Human FactorsEngineering Analysis (HFEA) Tool
The Human Factors Engineering Analysis (HFEA) Tool KSC Design Engineering; Define the human factors Level 5 requirements from the FAA HFDS for each CxP GOP subsystems (Over 40 Subsystems) Develop a process for developing these requirements and improve the design for ground operations Examples of subsystems: Crew Access Arm Hypergol Breathing Air LO2 Cold Gas Helium LH2 Crew Module Ammonia GHE Environmental Control Ignition Overpressure/Sound Electrical Ground Support Vehicle Access Arms Equipment Umbilicals
HFEA Process Human factors engineering analysis was required to be performed by qualified human factors engineers Human Factors Engineering Analysis (HFEA) Tool was used to develop a dedicated subset of requirements from FAA requirements for each subsystem Meetings were held between the human factors engineers, lead design engineers, and systems engineers: To understand the human interfaces of the subsystem To understand the task at these interfaces To determine the human factors considerations/issues with these task interfaces To get agreement on the allocation of requirement on these task interface issues And to derive human engineered design solutions for these requirements
HFEAT Type of processing,Conditions Consequences Assembly, Nominal, inspection, Emergency, etc.
HFEAT Requirement Satisfied, Verification, Consequence, Likelihood, Priority Rank, Why Non-Compliant, Recommendation, Notes.Each Tab is a FAA Chapter: Design equipment for maintenance, Controlsand visual indicators, etc.
Example Actuator Motor Mobile Launcher Crew Access Arm Actuator MotorActuator motor Complete visual and physical access Access for maintenance Move the motor
HFEA Report for Crew Access ArmActuator Motor Issue
Orion Human Factors Timeline Analysis Multi Purpose Vehicle Assembly Launch PadProcessing Facility Building
Orion Human Factors Timeline Analysis Orion vehicle goes through several areas and stages of processing before its launched at the Kennedy Space Center In order to have efficient and effective processing, all of the activities need have a human factors engineering analysis Corresponding Human factors requirements and design solutions needed to be defined Areas of Processing MPPF (Crew module and Service module) Vehicle Integration Building (VAB) (Crew module/Service module to Launch Vehicle and Ground Support Equipment Launch Pad
Modification of HFEAT for TimelineAnalysis The HFEAT was modified to analyze the task in a timeline, and additional input columns were added. Location FFBD Event and Number Tasks, Issues and Actions Team Actions Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 3
Example of Establishing Access in Multi Purpose Processing FacilityFunctional flow block diagram at MPPF Short stack pallet
Development of Human Factors Requirements for Ground Processing of Flight Hardware Janis Connolly Charles, Jr. H. Dischinger Keith V. Holubec Barry Tillman
Development of Human Factors Engineering Requirements for Application to Ground Task Design for a NASA Flight Program The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has long employed human factors requirements for development of flight systems. The Level 1 NASA-STD-3000, Man Systems Integration Requirements, does not include human factors design requirements for ground tasks, and therefore, programs have not been required to develop human factors requirements for ground crew tasks. The result has been that ground crews have had to develop complicated strategies for accomplishment of ground assembly and maintenance of flight systems. The Constellation Program (the execution program for the Exploration Vision) has accepted the responsibility, imposed by the NASA Administrator, to find ways to reduce ground operations costs. One of the ways the Program is doing this is through the application of human factors design requirements for the ground processing to flight systems. This is in the Level 2, Human Systems Integration Requirements document (HSIR)
Human Systems Integration Requirements (HSIR)1.2 SCOPE AND PRECEDENCEThe requirements in this document are applicable to the Constellation Systems,including but not limited to Orion, Ares I, Ares V, Altair, Mission Systems (MS),Ground Operations (GO), Extravehicular Activity (EVA), and Flight Crew Equipment(FCE)The requirements in this document address the needs of the flight crew during allphases of flight. These requirements also address the needs of ground personnelduring pre-flight preparation, maintenance, and post-flight activities on the flightvehicles where there is a common interface with the flight crew3.9 GROUND MAINTENANCE AND ASSEMBLYThis section addresses tasks to be performed by NASA and its launch sitecontractors in accomplishment of launch site processing and ground maintenance.Launch site processing includes vehicle assembly (e.g., Ares I + Orion) activitiesthat occur within the Outer Mold Line of the Launch Stack, Launch Stack physicalintegration (e.g., umbilical integration), and launch preparation (e.g., propellantloading). Ground maintenance includes corrective and preventive maintenanceactivities associated with Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) removal and replacement.
NASA-STD-3001, VOLUME 2Section 13, Ground Maintenance and Assembly, will addressthe requirements for the configuration of interfaces that arecommon to both flight crew and ground personnel. Thissection is currently marked reserved and will be developedduring Fiscal Year 2010.https://standards.nasa.gov/documents/viewdoc/3315785/3315
Ares I Forward Skirt Mockup AnalysisUpper Stage MOCKUP Forward Skirt First Stage
Example Ground Support Equipment There is little that can be done to change these cramped dimensions in rocket design, so adjustments were made to: the ground support equipment box placement locations and heightsSEAT The ground support equipment acts as a seat, and foot rest. Ground support equipment installed to: protect the technician from injury protect the flight hardware from damageFoot Rest
Avionics Boxes The analysis determined the best locations of avionics boxes based on the technicians location capabilities and: Box weight Tool access Hand volumes Cable routes
KSC Human Engineering Modeling and Performance Laboratory (HEMAP) Human Factors Analysis Process Motion Captured Task Real time (Actual Techs & Biomechanical Biomechanical Data) Model CAD and Human Real Task Real time Simulations Human Factors Analyses and Real time Ergonomic Recommendations Analysis HEMAP supports multiple person/object tracking into live ergonomic analyses
Orion Seat Removal & Replacement Motion CaptureCAD Models with Human Models SEAT
Self-Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble SCAPE Suit Markers placed on SCAPE suits to create actual life size and motion of suits
Interactive Virtual collaboration Interactive virtual collaboration of motion capture data among KSC and MSFC The web sharing of motion capture tasks within the shared virtual environment provides real-time ability to update designs based on actual human-system interfaces being evaluated. Combined Design EnvironmentMotion Capture at KSC Motion Capture at MSFC
Head-Mounted Displays Incorporation of wearable Head-Mounted Displays (HMDs): Negates need for physical mockups. Familiarization/training benefits Collaborative web sharing of models and live motion tracking among NASA centers Immersing the HMD wearers in simple physical mockups
KSC Design VisualizationKSC Design Visualization has the capability to analyze human factors.These factors include sight lines, visibility, reach, motion, joint loading, repetition, calories and any additional impediments caused by safety or life support systems.
KSC Design Visualization LAS safe and arm access at PAD SCAPE fueling SCAPE access Astronaut emergency egress
KSC Design Visualization Pryo access Water filter access Astronaut egress post flight Access arm assessment
Display and Control Screen Requirements Human Machine Interface (HMI) Programming Guidelines, (KGCS) local screen guidelines document Ground Elements Integrated Launch Operations Application Software Implementation Standards (ILOA) human factors section for local and remote screen design. Screens currently under development GSP (Ground Special Power) ECS (Environmental Control System) CMASS (Crew Module Ammonia Servicing System) FLDS (Fire Detection) LH2/LO2 IOPSS (Ignition Overpressure Sound Suppression)
Recommendations to Agency Continue to develop Human Factors requirements at all SE&I levels (1 to 5). E.g. NASA STD 3001. Continue to develop human factors processes, tools, motion capture and other mockups and human modeling. Continue the Human factors collaborations between centers for our missions and programs, tools, requirements, and processes. Continue to revisit and improve upon these lessons from the past. And develop new lessons as we go through these incremental developments.
Thanks to the folks across the NASA Agency, and at KSC, for your contributions towards thehuman factors achievements forimproving ground processing for launch and crewed space vehicles.
No clear communication between the Apollo program and the Shuttle program 5376Description of Driving Event:During the transition from the Apollo program to the Shuttle program, concerning ground processing human factors, there was no clear review of what they learned from the Apollo and how it could assist their efforts in the Shuttle Program.Lesson(s) Learned: It is extremely important from the beginning of a program to review and use what you have learned from the program before it. The entire agency needs to be coordinated in the development of a program, and the agency needs to look everything they learned from previous program. One center may be able to learn from a situation at another center that could assist them in the development process of a program.Recommendation(s): At the pre beginning stages of a program or a project, review situations that evolved from previous programs and see if you can implement and incorporate these solutions in the new program or project. Human Factors and other lessons from flight crew can be applied to ground crews, and ground crew lessons can be applied to flight crews. Also, a lesson from launch vehicle systems, ground systems, or crewed vehicle systems; may be applicable to all three systems.
The use of human factors and the Space Flight Awareness (SFA) in the Apollo development 5377Description of Driving Event:o Since there was not a dedicated human factors section in the Apollo reference materials, there were no formal human factors lessons learned as well. However, there were several methods used to analysis human factors and provide proper training for the human interacting with the hardware that was developed.Lesson(s) Learned:o With the increase of new technologies and untried methods, and the importance that spacecraft processing operations play in the success of each mission, more emphasis in human factors will be required. The 0-G human factors practices for the flight crew are well in place and will be easily accepted in future programs, but 1-G human factors for the ground personnel will need special attention because there has not been an emphasis for this in previous spacecraft development.Recommendation(s): As the use and development increases, ensure that the new designs are assessed by a human factors engineer. Provide proper training for the new technology and systems established immediately to reduce confusion and human error. Continue to use the SFA program as a training tool. Coordination between the flight and ground crew are essential to mission success.
Human Engineering should be considered aSystems Engineering and Integration function 1831 Lesson(s) Learned: Human Engineering contributions are best considered if integrated during the design process. Failure to involve Human Engineering at the System level ultimately leads to design that are less then optimal from a maintainability, supportability, and operability standpoint. Recommendation(s): 1. Future Programs should place more emphasis on Human Engineering effects for design, development, and operation. 2. An effective approach would be to include Human Engineering under Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I). 3. Ensure data products are in place up front to address Human Engineering Functions at the Systems level. 4. To ensure that Human Engineering is not overlooked within each system, e.g., Mechanical, Electrical, Fluids, etc., each system should have its own Human Engineering section to confirm that this particular system has been addressed by Human Engineering. Within this section, useful parts of MIL- STD-1472 and other applicable Human Engineering documents that apply to this system should be listed.
Human Factors Engineering; Acceptance, Implementation, and Verification as a System 1801 Lesson(s) Learned: Include Human Factors Engineering as an essential system for human spaceflight. Human Factors Engineering impacts all systems having interfaces and interactions with humans, including: hardware, software, flight preparation, mission operations, and maintenance for both ground and flight. How Solved: The Human Engineering Office was established within the Spacecraft Project Office. Human Engineering was included at a visible level for RFPs and WBSs. Recommendation(s): 1. Human Factors Engineering requirements that are carried as applicable requirements should not be ignored; rather they should be (a) adequately funded, (b) implemented in the design definition, and (c) properly verified. 2. Human Factors Engineering personnel with training, experience, and expertise should be hired and retained at NASA and at the contractors as key personnel. 3. Human Factors Engineering design tools should be funded to enable spacecraft- specific research and design development, providing actual data from trade-off studies. Include 1-g full-scale mockups and multi-degrees-of-freedom simulators as well as virtual simulators.
Human Factors Engineering; Acceptance, Implementation, and Verification as a SystemLesson(s) Learned: 4. Human Factors Engineering awareness training and re-education should be provided to NASA and contractor management, budget controllers, contracting officers, design discipline leads, as well as to legislative and executive branch government leaders. 5. Emphasize that Human Factors Engineering is a primary systems discipline necessary for safe and efficient spaceflight. 6. Human Factors Engineering scope and language at NASA and among the contractors must be standardized with the overall Human Factors Engineering community. For example, does Human Factors Engineering include everything in NASA-STD-3000 or is it limited to what might be funded for crew systems and cockpit layout? For example, does habitable volume mean the same thing to each NASA and contractor player? 7. Human Factors Engineering should be included in the work breakdown structure (WBS) of the new program, Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). Preferably this should be done in the Systems Engineering / Systems Integration section; alternatively a standard Human Factors Engineering statement should be called out in every WBS callout for deliverables having human interfaces.
Human Factors Engineering; Acceptance, Implementation, and Verification as a SystemLesson(s) Learned: 8. Spaceflight proposals should include a stand-alone section on Human Factors Engineering, with emphasis on scope, personnel, resources, and facilities all with sufficient funding to accomplish a successful Human Factors Engineering design. In addition, the introduction and executive summary should make it clear that Human Factors Engineering is a primary system. 9. Data from Human Factors Engineering assessments and tests should drive lower level requirements and resulting design. 10. Human Factors Engineering should be involved and integrated in the daily engineering problem solving and integration process. 11. Human Factors Engineering should have signature authority on all designs and drawings affecting human environments, interfaces, and interactions. 12. Human Factors Engineers with training, experience, and expertise should be the ones making decisions on Human Factors Engineering. This should be done with participation, but not domination, by users (crew, ground support personnel, mission controllers) and managers.
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Ground Support Equipment (GSE) Human Factors Engineering Pathfinder 5416Description of Driving Event:Opportunity to improve KSC designs by optimizing flight and ground crew interfaces with ground systems and GSE. The expected outcomes are: Ground systems/GSE that are safer and easier (and therefore cheaper) for ground crews to operate and maintain. Fewer mishaps during ground operations where ground system/GSE designs are cited as contributing factors or causes.Lesson(s) Learned: HFE expertise should be embedded in the design teams and various engineering organizations. Prioritize limited Human Factors Engineering (HFE) resources by ranking systems based on assessments of human-system integration technical risks (complexity, criticality/hazards, and frequency of human-system interactions) and schedule risks. HFEs should have adequate training and relevant spacecraft (launch vehicle, payload) processing experience. Supplement HFE expertise with the experiences and expertise of technicians, operations engineers, systems engineers, quality engineers and inspectors, engineers from other disciplines, and Safety and Mission Assurance(S&MA) as needed.
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Ground Support Equipment (GSE) Human Factors Engineering PathfinderDescription of Driving Event:Opportunity to improve KSC designs by optimizing flight and ground crew interfaces with ground systems and GSE. The expected outcomes are: Ground systems/GSE that are safer and easier (and therefore cheaper) for ground crews to operate and maintain. Fewer mishaps during ground operations where ground system/GSE designs are cited as contributing factors or causes.Lesson(s) Learned: HFE methods, processes, and tools need to be part of the systems engineering process over the entire system life-cycle. Use human interface modeling and simulation capabilities for evaluating designs from a HFE perspective Integrate human factors engineering into the systems engineering process. Taking a systems engineering perspective also promotes consideration of common/shared HFE issues across multiple design teams. Develop a HFE process to accept and adapt heritage ground systems and GSE designs from one program to the next. Use mishap, close call, and process escape data from comparable systems to improve
Lessons Learned Entry 5416 HFE concepts need to be infused as early as possible during the design phases and reinforced during all milestone reviews. Require human factors assessments as part of 30, 60, and 90% design review packages. Determine criteria for a complete, valid human factors assessment at each design phase. A centralized authority or Point of Contact (chief human factors engineer function) and common assessment tools can help ensure accurate, consistent, valid, and value-added human factors engineering assessments. 14. Engineers need to exercise good engineering judgment in addition to satisfying human factors requirements. Provide training on applicable HFE standards and program/project requirements that are specifically tailored for ground system/GSE design teams. 15. Provide practical guidance materials handbooks and workbooks for ground system/GSE design teams. Provide as many relevant ground system/GSE examples and design case studies in the training materials and handbooks as possible.
1-G Human Factors for Optimal Processing and Operability of Constellation Ground Systems 2136Description of Driving Event:The early work of the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) focused on human factors engineering (i.e., applying what is known about human capabilities and limitations to the design of products, processes, systems, and work environments) as it related to human spaceflight, particularly crew health and performance. During the transition from the Orbital Space Plane Project (OSP) Program to the Constellation Program, the requirements for applying human factors engineering to the design of tasks related to the ground processing of space vehicles were not well-defined.Lesson(s) Learned: Use available experiences and lessons from prior programs to optimize ground processing operability by leveraging human capabilities, not exceeding them. Employ people qualified in human factors engineering on the team from the beginning of the project. Make human factors a proactive part of the design process with well-defined requirements that add value to the design. Voice the need for human factors accommodations where appropriate. Even if these comments are not accepted, the effort is worthwhile because it helps to develop a better awareness of the importance of human factors.
1-G Human Factors for Optimal Processing and Operability of Constellation Ground SystemsLesson(s) Learned: In document reviews, look at previous successful human factors program documentation such as Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) lessons learned publications, and make comments to promote consideration of human factors. Try to incorporate human factors into the design proactively, reactively, and everywhere. When resources are limited (which is often the case when using human factors engineering in a particular engineering culture for the first time), apply them to the areas that will produce the best results. Also, build on past successes and combine the work done on multiple successful projects. Creating human factors requirements at a higher level is important in gaining acceptance of human factors requirements at lower levels. Future NASA programs should consider incorporating all Level 2 (L2) human factors requirements into one document such as CxP 70024, Constellation Program: Human-Systems Integration Requirements (HSIR), i.e., include the ground processing human factors requirements for ground hardware with the ground processing human factors requirements for flight hardware. Recommend that pilot testing of new processes be done as soon as possible, but make sure that the pilot test will produce added value.
1-G Human Factors for Optimal Processing and Operability of Constellation Ground SystemsLesson(s) Learned: Because MIL-STD-1472 was used as a human factors standard in the past, it is hard to adopt a requirements document with less content, even though complying with the more than 1,700 requirements in MIL-STD-1472 would have been very difficult. Human factors engineers should perform the human factors assessment as embedded members of the design team. When processes already exist, try to modify them to incorporate the human factors design considerations. Exercise patience and be ready to compromise in gaining acceptance of new requirements. From the beginning, make sure existing documentation is understood. Work early to improve the existing documentation or obtain a buy-in from all parties that the human factors requirements document can supersede existing documentation. Do not disregard work that is not accepted when first proposed. To add value for the stakeholders, the work may need to be adjusted or used at a later time.
1-G Human Factors for Optimal Processing and Operability of Constellation Ground SystemsRecommendation(s): Leverage the use of human factors to improve the design for the human aspect of nominal operability, including assembly, maintenance, inspection, and the integrated and stand-alone testing required for initial flight tests. Develop and refine the Human Factors Engineering Analysis (HFEA) Tool and processes as an efficient and effective means to develop design packages for 30%, 60%, and 90% design reviews, and as a tool for final design reviews. Formally document the human factors assessment process and tool in the L3, L4, and L5 System Engineering Management Plans (SEMPs). Once the requirements used in the HFEA Tool mature, do the following: - Incorporate a complete set of the high-level (parent) ground systems human factors requirements into NASA STD-5005 and KSC-DE-512-SM. - Incorporate these requirements into revisions of the L3 document, CxP 72006, Ground Systems: System Requirements Document (GS-SRD). - Revise CxP 72210, Ground Systems: Human Factors Requirements Document (GS-HFRD) to develop a stand-alone human factors requirements and assessment process document. - Work to have these ground human factors requirements written into CxP 70024, HSIR, or future L2 NASA human factors documents.
1-G Human Factors for Optimal Processing and Operability of Constellation Ground SystemsRecommendation(s): Once the revised NASA-STD-5005C is accepted by the Constellation Program (CxP), incorporate the FAA’s Human Factors Design Standard into the HFEA Tool. Apply human factors principles and analysis during the design of ground processing activities to prepare flight hardware for CxP test flights. Prove the usefulness of human factors engineering so that it will be commonly accepted as part of the work breakdown structure of projects at KSC. As future work for the HFEA Tool, identify associated HF standards and lessons learned from previous NASA programs and industry as well as identify solutions and analysis methods proven from use of the HFEA Tool, design of subsystems, and from other sources. Incorporate this information into the HFEA Tool so the human factors engineer may better select requirements and methods when designing ground processing systems. Employ the human factors systems engineering processes and lessons learned from development of Ares I ground systems to the development of ground systems for Ares V.