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Software Defined Perimeter:

Reducing the Attack Surface 
GTSC
August 17, 2017
Juanita Koilpillai 
Waverley Labs
THE STATE OF CYBER SECURITY - STATUS QUO
2
Machine to Machine
Connections FORCE
securing machines
Access to Services
allowed BEFORE
Authentication
Firewalls are Static –
ONLY network
information
BUSINESS
SERVICES
IT
PERIMETER
-  Conventional wisdom is just that – conventional
Waverley Labs
SMART COMPANIES ARE SAYING - CYBER SECURITY
SOLUTIONS AREN’T GOOD ENOUGH!
VPNs - don’t scale and once
inside the network there is no
control over what users can
access without additional tools
Authentication - multi-factor vs. multi-level is
hard to implement according to the guidelines.
ID mgmt typically not tied to access control
3
Key Management - too many
to effectively manage ie. user
keys, device keys, encryption keys
Firewalls - are static and the more rules
that need to be added, the more
maintenance it needs, logs are hard to
analyze in real-time, onboarding
applications is a long process, services are
not just exposed to one user.
Vulnerability/Patch Mgmt
- number of vulnerabilities is
increasing, hard to prioritize
and IT held hostage by old/
legacy applications that are
hard to upgrade
Waverley Labs
THE DIGITAL THREAT LANDSCAPE
4
…. Today, many paths exist to attack enterprises
Insider threats within a user group (role).
External Threats from all over the
world..
Insider threats, across user group
boundaries.
Waverley Labs
Hackers can’t attack what they can’t
see
Insiders can’t steal what they can’t
see
Enter Software Defined Perimeters (SDP)
•  Connectivity
–  Based on need-to-know access model
–  Device posture & identity verified before access to application
infrastructure is granted
•  Application infrastructure
–  Effectively invisible or black
–  No visible DNS information or IP addresses
•  Combines security protocols previously not integrated
–  Single Packet Authentication
–  Mutual Transport Layer Security
–  Device Validation
–  Dynamic Firewalls
–  Application Binding
•  Cloud Security Alliance adopted SDP for its membership
•  Follows NIST guidelines: crypto protocols & securing apps in
cloud
SDP Architecture
SDP	
Controller	
Protected	
Host	
SDP	Client	
Device	
Control	Plane	
Data	Plane	
Access	in	order	
to	Authen6cate	
Perimeter	has	User	
Context	+	Dynamic	
Authen6ca6on	
Before	Access	
Firewall	
has	only	Network	
Info	+	Sta6c	
Protected	
Host	
Current
 SDP
SDP Integration
SDP	
Controller	
Protected	
Host	
SDP	Client	
Device	
Control	Plane	
Data	Plane	
Firewall/Gateway	
provides	network	
awareness	
Applica6on	
provides	user	
awareness	
Protected	
Host	
Client	provides	
device	awareness
SDP cryptographically signs
clients into the perimeter
1-Net	facing	servers	hidden	
2-Legit	user	given	unique	ID	
3-Legit	user	sends	the	token	
4-Perimeter	checks	the	token	
5-Valid	device	+	user	=	access	
SDP	
Controller	
Protected	
Host	
SDP	Client	
Device	
Control	Plane	
Data	Plane	
AuthN	+	Encryp6on	Key		
Protected	
Host
Use Case – Anti-DDoS
SDP	Client	
Device	
Control	Plane	
Data	Plane	
AuthN	+	Encryp6on	Key		
Today	packet	filtering	and	load	
distribu6on	techniques	affect	
all	good	traffic	
•  Hosts	are	hidden	
•  Clients	coordinate	w/	mul6ple	perimeters	
•  Good	packets	known	
•  Upstream	routers	informed	about	bad	
packets		
•  Akamai	(content	distribu6on)	
•  Avaya	(networking	hardware)	
•  Verizon	(network	provider)	etc.	
With	SDP
Open Source Community
Software
Defined
Perimeter
12
Coca Cola: removing VPN and
2-Factor AuthN has improved
user experience
Coca Cola: Users access
limited to a single connection
to each authorized
application – eliminating
malware and information
theft
Coca Cola: Removing access to
business applications on the
internet is reducing attacks
 Mazda: easier to isolate authorized
and unauthorized users/devices
Google: Enabled BYOD and
reduced the number of
company laptops
SDP: New model with many benefits
•  Wrap applications in a black cloud – inaccessible by the
bad guys
•  Simplifying what has been a complex landscape
–  Point products go to background
•  Clear vision to the security failure presenting greatest
risk 
•  Cost effective
–  Over time eliminate costs of some point solutions
and the headcount to manage them
•  Less vulnerable to talent drain 
–  SDP is smart
•  Lower risk: Effort equal to risk
–  Prioritize applications that present the greatest risk
–  Optimized by defining failure scenarios
•  Effective assurance for risk insurance
Continue the conversation . . .
Juanita Koilpillai
jkoilpillai@waverleylabs.com
linkedin.com/in/juanita-
koilpillai-5551b111
	
Cybersecurity	Assessments	
SDP	Design	&	Implementa6on	
Defini6on	of	Failure	Scenarios

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Software Defined Perimeter - A New Paradigm for Securing Digital Infrastructures/ Systems

  • 1. Software Defined Perimeter:
 Reducing the Attack Surface GTSC August 17, 2017 Juanita Koilpillai Waverley Labs
  • 2. THE STATE OF CYBER SECURITY - STATUS QUO 2 Machine to Machine Connections FORCE securing machines Access to Services allowed BEFORE Authentication Firewalls are Static – ONLY network information BUSINESS SERVICES IT PERIMETER -  Conventional wisdom is just that – conventional Waverley Labs
  • 3. SMART COMPANIES ARE SAYING - CYBER SECURITY SOLUTIONS AREN’T GOOD ENOUGH! VPNs - don’t scale and once inside the network there is no control over what users can access without additional tools Authentication - multi-factor vs. multi-level is hard to implement according to the guidelines. ID mgmt typically not tied to access control 3 Key Management - too many to effectively manage ie. user keys, device keys, encryption keys Firewalls - are static and the more rules that need to be added, the more maintenance it needs, logs are hard to analyze in real-time, onboarding applications is a long process, services are not just exposed to one user. Vulnerability/Patch Mgmt - number of vulnerabilities is increasing, hard to prioritize and IT held hostage by old/ legacy applications that are hard to upgrade Waverley Labs
  • 4. THE DIGITAL THREAT LANDSCAPE 4 …. Today, many paths exist to attack enterprises Insider threats within a user group (role). External Threats from all over the world.. Insider threats, across user group boundaries. Waverley Labs
  • 5. Hackers can’t attack what they can’t see
  • 6. Insiders can’t steal what they can’t see
  • 7. Enter Software Defined Perimeters (SDP) •  Connectivity –  Based on need-to-know access model –  Device posture & identity verified before access to application infrastructure is granted •  Application infrastructure –  Effectively invisible or black –  No visible DNS information or IP addresses •  Combines security protocols previously not integrated –  Single Packet Authentication –  Mutual Transport Layer Security –  Device Validation –  Dynamic Firewalls –  Application Binding •  Cloud Security Alliance adopted SDP for its membership •  Follows NIST guidelines: crypto protocols & securing apps in cloud
  • 10. SDP cryptographically signs clients into the perimeter 1-Net facing servers hidden 2-Legit user given unique ID 3-Legit user sends the token 4-Perimeter checks the token 5-Valid device + user = access SDP Controller Protected Host SDP Client Device Control Plane Data Plane AuthN + Encryp6on Key Protected Host
  • 11. Use Case – Anti-DDoS SDP Client Device Control Plane Data Plane AuthN + Encryp6on Key Today packet filtering and load distribu6on techniques affect all good traffic •  Hosts are hidden •  Clients coordinate w/ mul6ple perimeters •  Good packets known •  Upstream routers informed about bad packets •  Akamai (content distribu6on) •  Avaya (networking hardware) •  Verizon (network provider) etc. With SDP
  • 12. Open Source Community Software Defined Perimeter 12 Coca Cola: removing VPN and 2-Factor AuthN has improved user experience Coca Cola: Users access limited to a single connection to each authorized application – eliminating malware and information theft Coca Cola: Removing access to business applications on the internet is reducing attacks Mazda: easier to isolate authorized and unauthorized users/devices Google: Enabled BYOD and reduced the number of company laptops
  • 13. SDP: New model with many benefits •  Wrap applications in a black cloud – inaccessible by the bad guys •  Simplifying what has been a complex landscape –  Point products go to background •  Clear vision to the security failure presenting greatest risk •  Cost effective –  Over time eliminate costs of some point solutions and the headcount to manage them •  Less vulnerable to talent drain –  SDP is smart •  Lower risk: Effort equal to risk –  Prioritize applications that present the greatest risk –  Optimized by defining failure scenarios •  Effective assurance for risk insurance
  • 14. Continue the conversation . . . Juanita Koilpillai jkoilpillai@waverleylabs.com linkedin.com/in/juanita- koilpillai-5551b111 Cybersecurity Assessments SDP Design & Implementa6on Defini6on of Failure Scenarios