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Paulson, Kathleen, Unit 6 Research Proposal, HM598

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Running head: [SHORTENED TITLE UP TO 50 CHARACTERS] 1
Introduction
A Study of Illegal Immigration Effects on the United St...
Immigration Research Proposal
Abstract
This proposal strives to establish a correlation between illegal immigration and ho...
Immigration Research Proposal
A Study of Illegal Immigration Effects on the United States
The nation’s borders remain unse...
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Paulson, Kathleen, Unit 6 Research Proposal, HM598

  1. 1. Running head: [SHORTENED TITLE UP TO 50 CHARACTERS] 1 Introduction A Study of Illegal Immigration Effects on the United States HM 598 Kathleen Paulson Kaplan University
  2. 2. Immigration Research Proposal Abstract This proposal strives to establish a correlation between illegal immigration and how policies towards embracing or encouraging illegal immigration will have disastrous effects on the economy, the public safety, and constitutional law. The hypothesis simply states that by authorizing amnesty for more than five million or more illegal immigrants already in the United States, is encouraging illegal immigration into the United States, causing a burden to an already declining economy, public safety, and ignores Federal immigration laws set in place by the Constitution. In conjunction with illegal immigration, executive policies such the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals are studied and analyzed as contributing to an already systemic problem. Part of this hypothesis will also include the advocacy for the benefits for illegal immigration and open borders. The proposal will include a methodology that is quantitative and qualitative in nature through surveys provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, the American Community Survey and the Community Population Survey, apprehension rates from the U.S. Border Patrol, and submitting surveys to various border cities and points of entry along the United States and Mexico border. Data from various agencies, such as ICE, DHS, the Center for Immigration Studies, the Pew Research Center, and various other immigration studies will be used in conjunction with a residual method, an observational analysis, and a survey analysis.
  3. 3. Immigration Research Proposal A Study of Illegal Immigration Effects on the United States The nation’s borders remain unsecure and as 2014, seven hundred miles of the Southern border remain unsecure with little security remaining at the Northern border. This is partly due to a lack of a comprehensive strategy, a lack of ability to effectively use assets, and a lack of enforcing immigration laws. The Department of Homeland Security established in 2003 that there were eight to twelve million illegal aliens residing in the United States with 700,000 new illegals entering and staying each year. As of 2014, those estimates have not shown change for eleven years, even though the annual increase alone would result in a corrected estimate of 15.7 million to 19.7 million illegal aliens today. This number would not allow for adjustment for President Obama’s 2014 executive amnesty order and the 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). Since the issuance of the DACA and with the debate over larger amnesty for as many as five million illegal immigrants, the number of individuals crossing the U.S. border illegally has increased significantly. Lax enforcement at the border and at the State and local level, means that most illegal immigrants will not be deported once they enter the interior of the U.S., in fact they will most likely receive sanctuary benefits within “sanctuary cities”. This is making the issuance of the DACA and amnesty for illegals costly on the economy and the taxpayers, unconstitutional, a public safety concern, and an ineffective method for establishing effective border and immigration control.
  4. 4. Immigration Research Proposal This proposal is intended to research the specific issues of illegal immigration through various literature and studies. This research will use four questions to determine how illegal immigration through amnesty, the DACA, and visa overstays and programs is affecting the issues of cost, safety, and unconstitutionality. Those four questions are; how many unauthorized immigrants enter between ports of entry; how many unauthorized immigrants enter through ports of entry; how many unauthorized immigrants overstay their visa and become unauthorized; and how many unauthorized immigrants reside in the United States? The proposal will develop a valid methodology for showing how an estimated realistic number of illegal immigrants can be determined in relation to how this number translates into an economic burden. This will be proposed to show how the expected results can work towards establishing immigration reform that enforces legalization and border security while promoting safety and the growth of the economy. Literature Review U.S. Census Bureau figures show that ninety percent of the illegal immigration population come from Latin America, seventy percent of that total being from Mexico. The Center for Immigration Studies states that “within the last decade, between 1990 and 2000, the number of illegal immigrants doubled from 4.2 million to 9.2 million, with thirty percent of the entire foreign-born population in the United States being unauthorized” (Elbel, 2016). The U.S. government, specifically the DHS Secretary Tom Ridge at the time, stated in 2003 that estimates of illegal immigrants residing in the United States were at uniformly low numbers. It was estimated by DHS that the numbers were approximately eight to twelve million, which was disputed by the Census Bureau to be higher than ten million (Elbel, 2016). Studies from the Border Patrol stated on their website that there are currently fifteen to twenty million illegal
  5. 5. Immigration Research Proposal aliens in this country and the real numbers could be higher because the numbers are increasing every day since our borders are insecure (Elbel, 2016). In 2003, Georgia State Senator Sam Zamarripa told the Georgia State Senate that “there were more than twenty million illegal immigrants in the United States, constituting more than six percent of the population. This was larger than most states” (Elbel, 2016). In January of 2005 the Bear Stearns Report criticized the Border Patrol estimates of illegal immigration as being inaccurate and incomplete. The report stated that the number may be as high as twenty million, not the nine million estimated by the CBP. While numbers do fluctuate on a yearly basis, illegal immigration has been steadily increasing since 1986. Entering without inspection individuals account for six to seven million people, which is slightly more than half of the total unauthorized population, per the Pew Hispanic Center (FAIR, 2011). Deep divisions continue to persist about the state of border security at the United States and Mexico border, considering the absence of timely, reliable, and widely accepted indicators of border security and immigration control, which is a fundamental obstacle (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.1). Illegal immigrants take advantage of weak border points and points of entry by using fraudulent documents and hiding in vehicles and cargo. The Department of Homeland Security claims the U.S. and Mexico border is more secure than ever before and the estimated stock of unauthorized immigrants has fallen for the first time in thirty years. “Others describe the border as out-of-control and broader reforms are needed, especially in absence of timely, reliable, and publicly trusted indicators of immigration control. Changes in the immigration flows and the effectiveness of policies and programs cannot be authoritatively answered” (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.5). These are verifiable reasons why Congress and America should doubt any significant progress the DHS claims it has made.
  6. 6. Immigration Research Proposal DeferredAction for Childhood Arrivals and Illegal Immigration “DHS requirements for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals involves; being under the age of thirty-one as of June 15, 2012; arrived in the United States before reaching his or her sixteenth birthday; has continued to reside in the United States since June 15, 2007 to the present; is physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012 at the time of making the request for consideration of deferred action with the United States Customs and Immigration Service; entered the United States without inspection before June 15, 2012, or the lawful immigration status has expired as of June 15, 2012; is currently in school, has graduated and obtained a certificate of completion from high school; has obtained a GED, or is an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard and Armed Forces of the United States; and has not been convicted of a felony, a significant misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors, and does not pose a threat to national security or public safety” (DHS, n.d.). Applications accepted by the United States Customs and Immigration Services, as of June 2016, were 238,206 with an immediate eligible application rate of sixty-three percent and potential eligible application rate of forty-eight percent. Top countries included Mexico, Guatemala, Korea, and El Salvador (MPI, 2016). The United States eligible population for DACA is 1,932,000, with 1,307,000 immediate eligible applications, 398,000 eligible except for education restrictions, and 228,000 eligible in the future. Under President Obama, the Border Patrol has been considered incapacitated since the issuance of DACA and amnesty was issued. Illegal immigration involving children has increased and deportation numbers have been changed to create the idea that these two programs have not affected illegal immigration flow. It is reasonable to believe per the Colorado Alliance for
  7. 7. Immigration Research Proposal Immigration Reform that “if twenty million illegal aliens were present in 2005, thirty-eight to forty million could have resided in 2014” (Elbel, 2016). The DACA has essentially been compared to an administrative version of the DREAM Act that congress repeatedly rejected. The Center for Immigration Studies called the DACA program as a “temporary reprieve from deportation” (Miano, 2016). The estimated number of beneficiaries has been steadily climbing, with an estimation growth of 800,000 to two million. The fact that DACA provides what is considered a temporary reprieve from deportation is not a guarantee from future deportation. Illegal immigrants are not protected from disclosure to ICE or CBP in regards to immigration enforcement or immigration proceedings. With a new administration taking office on January 20, 2017, the DACA list, as well as the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans program, can be modified, suspended, and rescinded at any time without notice by DHS. These programs provide no authorization to work, are independent of having authority to be in the United States, and guaranteeing no protection against deportation. Amnesty and Illegal Immigration A report in 2004 by Fox News stated that between fifty to ninety percent of the illegal immigrants apprehended claimed they were coming for the “amnesty”. Border Patrol was told now to not collect this information and that is was simply a rumor spread beyond Mexico (Elbel, 2016). In fact, recent Border Patrol directives have been to “sit on x’s” to lower apprehensions and sanitize published statistics. In 2004, John Kerry was quoted as stating that “President Bush did not go far enough and he would have offered legislation offering amnesty and a path to full voting citizenship to the millions of illegal aliens” (Elbel, 2016). The Government Accountability Office analyzed the outcomes of “595,795 asylum applications completed by the Department of Justice’s Executive Order for Immigration Review
  8. 8. Immigration Research Proposal Fiscal Year 1995 through 2014 and identified outcome variations both over time and across immigration courts and judges” (GAO, 2016). Fiscal years 2008 through 2014 annual grant rates for affirmative asylum applications, filed with DHS, at the initiative of the individuals and referred to an immigration judge, ranged from twenty-one to forty-four percent. During that same period, grant rates for defensive asylum applications, that is, those in which the removal process has already begun, and has been initiated by an immigration judge is fifteen and twenty- six percent. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) data shows that asylum grant rates varied by immigration courts. In May of 2007 through fiscal Year 2014, the grant rate was sixty-six percent affirmative, those that filed an I-589 application and are present in the United States, and fifty-two percent defensive in New York. In Omaha, Nebraska, and Atlanta, Georgia there was only a five percent affirmative and defensive rate, which shows that certain cases and judge-related factors are associated with variance in the outcomes in the asylum applications. If an immigrant applying for asylum is represented by legal counsel, the rate of granting asylum affirmative was 3.1 and defensive was 1.8 times higher versus applicants not represented. Other factors controlling the outcomes statistically was judicial experience and whether the applicant had dependents. Tens of thousands of foreign nationals in the United States apply annually for asylum in which EOIR judges make the decision on approval without a system of performance measures including a baseline to regularly evaluate the effect of the EOIR judge (GAO, 2016). A 2010 report and internal memorandum to the U.S.CIS blatantly advised leadership and DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano “to ignore the law and to not issue Notice to Appear letters to illegal immigrants who have no other avenue to delay their deportation. ICE began to review and
  9. 9. Immigration Research Proposal dismiss cases of non-criminal illegal immigrants, allowing them to remain in the United States” (Mayer, Carafano, Zuckerman, 2011). The most harmful effect of the adoption of amnesty is the message it would send around the world as the United States is periodically prepared to forgive individuals who violate our immigration laws by granting them entitlements and jobs they came seeking. If foreigners are encouraged by the actions of Congress to ignore the immigration laws, the United States will have more difficulty in defending the borders. Illegal Immigration and the Visa Program Illegal aliens are divided into two categories; those who cross illegally and those who entered with visas as nonimmigrants and stayed illegally. The former is considered entering without inspection. The advocates for illegal immigration tend to “exaggerate the share of illegal aliens who arrived with visas, believing that doing so will lessen the public’s apprehension our borders are out of control and to minimize concern about aliens who have not been screened for criminal records, terrorist connections, and contagious diseases” (FAIR, 2011). Estimations placing the over-stayer share at about half and as low as two-fifths of the total illegal population is considered misleading. Approximately one-third and one-half of illegal immigrants come into the United States lawfully with a temporary, non-immigrant visa and remain after their visa expires and “otherwise violate the terms of their visas” (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.15). The government went nineteen years between the last overstay report, conducted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 1997, and the 2016 report conducted by the Department of Homeland Security, which was limited to a specific sector of the non-immigrant population. This population was those entering by air and sea carriers as visitors for business and pleasure. Many of those in the report were scheduled to depart between October of 2014 and September of 2015,
  10. 10. Immigration Research Proposal which totaled close to forty-five million visitors. The report finds that “527,127 of these individuals overstayed their visas for some period, with a total overstay rate of 1.17 percent” (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.15). More than 100,000 of these overstays had deported the country by January 4, 2016, leaving 416,500 individuals believed by DHS to remain in the U.S. The obstacle in this situation is that the U.S. does not require travelers to pass through an immigration inspection process prior to exiting the country. U.S. ports of entry lack the infrastructure for collecting this data, despite Congress requiring INS in 1996 to develop and implement an automated entry-exit central system by 1998 that would collect and automatically match the records of non-citizen arrivals and departures to identify and verify visa over stayers. Past surveys, such as the Weststat Survey, were conducted among only sixty-five percent of amnesty applicants who applied based on being in the United States for specific period. The other thirty-five percent applied based on working in the agriculture sector. Half of the 8.4 million workers in the workforce, are in the underground economy, i.e. day laborers, independent contractor, domestics, and pieceworkers; the other half are in the formal economy using fake or stolen documents (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.11). Each year, the Department of Homeland Security processes millions of applications and petitions for more than fifty types of immigrant and non-immigrant-related benefits for persons seeking to study, work, visit, and live in the United States and for persons seeking to become U.S. citizens. President Bush and supporters of the McCain – Kennedy Senate bill, which established the guest-worker program, strived for easing the path to citizenship for an estimated eleven million already in the U.S., and creating the “Y” visa, allowing current illegal immigrants to stay legally for the rest of their lives. The House of Representatives, specifically the Republicans, backed a bill in 2005, HR 4437, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal
  11. 11. Immigration Research Proposal Immigration Control Act of 2005, “requiring the illegal immigrants in the country to return home and strengthen border security without guaranteeing any relaxation of the legal obstacles to immigration, enforcing what many considered a more dramatic response to stricter immigration” (Powell, 2012, p.195). The estimations that are provide by Senator McCain to establish the McCain – Kennedy Senate Bill were over generous in apprehensions and that the claimed three to four million that are apprehended does not include the millions that the Government Accountability Office reports enter legally on temporary visas and continue to say after their visas expire (Elbel, 2016). Visa overstays contribute to a significant number of illegal immigration. The latest numbers are from 2000, with an estimated 2.3 million overstays, not including short-term overstays. One-third to one-half of the illegal immigrant population enter lawfully, however fail to depart when their temporary visa expires. A common myth is that it is easy to immigrate to America, when in fact, studies have proven that it is particularly difficult to obtain a legal visa for lower-skilled jobs. Employers must wade through a “regulatory maze to achieve some sort of basic understanding of what is required of them” (Anderson, 2012, p.71). Bureaucratic red tape deters employers from hiring high- skilled foreign workers or possible entrepreneurs. Temporary visas have been considered a method of preventing illegal immigration and even preventing possible deaths at the border of those seeking economic opportunities. There has been great debate over the guest-worker program stating that it only affects approximately one million of the possible eleven million illegal immigrants in the U.S. Advocates of illegal immigration consider temporary visas to encourage illegal immigrants as method for setting down roots and avoiding traveling back and forth due to the hazardous conditions and the chances of being apprehended.
  12. 12. Immigration Research Proposal Mexico does not collect entry data from most southbound travelers and exit data is not collected at the Southern border land ports. The U.S. has limited information on nonimmigrants entering the U.S. from Mexico who fail to depart the country before their temporary visa expires. Many of these reports are not released to the public, causing the perception of a lack of transparency about the government efforts to identify over stayers (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.19). Between 1975 and 2015, there were 154 foreign-born terrorists in the United States. Ten were illegal immigrants, fifty-four were lawful permanent residents (LPR), nineteen were students, one was on a K-1 fiancé (e) visa, 20 were refugees, four were asylum seekers, thirty- four were on tourist visas, three were on the Visa Waiver Program, and nine others were undetermined (Nowrasleh, 2016, p.4). These figures show that while the number of illegal immigrants committing acts of terror are small, the number of terror acts are being committed by individuals with specific types of Visas, and they are more likely to commit acts of terror than an illegal immigrant. B-Tourist Visas, entrants through the Visa Waiver Program, student visas, and asylum seekers are showing, per the Department of Homeland Security, more risk for acts of terrorism, than those that are undocumented. The LPR visa, or the green card, has been shown to have been taken advantage more by terrorists than any of the visa categories. Between 1975- 2015, there were fifty-four foreign born terrorists with LPR visas, which is an average of 1.32 per year. More than thirty-five million LPRs were allowed during the time between 1975-2015, showing that for every 644,990 non-terrorists, there was one terrorist authorized for an LPR (Nowrasleh, 2016, p.11). Both illegal immigrants and temporary visa holders may apply for asylum by convincing the government of the fear of persecution if they are returned to their homeland. “If they are here
  13. 13. Immigration Research Proposal legally as a nonimmigrant, this claim is referred to as an affirmative claim, and if they are illegally here and in the deportation proceedings, they are referred to as a defensive claim” (Martin, Rosenbaum, 2013, p.22). If the affirmative claim is denied and the individual does not leave, the individual becomes illegal. Asylum adjudication is a multi-layered process and is considered by many to be a never-ending legal process intended to delay deportation and extend the individual’s stay. The individual’s case is first reviewed by an asylum officer in the Customs and Immigrations Service division. If the claim is deemed as valid, the proceedings are referred to the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) where a hearing and decision is made. If the applicant is denied, which most reports and statistics claim they are, they may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. If the appeal is denied, the case may go to a Federal judge. As of 2009, there was a “favorable decision rate of forty-seven percent, a grant rate of fifty-percent for affirmative application, and a thirty-six percent rate for defensive application” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.22). In the statistics of the EOIR, those who were denied, were anticipated to become illegal aliens. Of the sixty-four percent, defensive applicants that are denied asylum status, there is reasonable expectation that they will become illegal aliens. This implies that in addition to breaking immigration laws to enter and stay illegally, the alien was also “attempting to abuse the due process system and compassion of the U.S. to game the system and gain legal residence” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.22). Border Security immigration enforcement through DHS has not developed a process for identifying and analyzing program risks, such as a process to evaluate prior suspected cases of fraud in its Student and Exchange Visitor Program, a program intended to ensure that foreign students studying in the United States comply with the terms if their admission into the country, despite spending $120 million in 2012. (Berrick, 2013, p.2).
  14. 14. Immigration Research Proposal Illegal Immigration and the Cost to the American Economy There is a shortcoming in academic research regarding the economics of illegal immigration. Much of the research ignores literature on the political determinants of illegal immigration policy and rarely examines how illegal immigration will affect income redistribution and how fiscal spending can influence illegal immigration in an open labor market. There are numerous articles establishing the impact of immigration on the economy including; “wages and employment opportunities of the native-born population; the fiscal costs and benefits of immigration; how immigration and trade interact; the immigration impact on long-term growth; and the size and net benefit of the immigration surplus created for native citizens” (Powell, 2012, p.195). The immigration surplus is considered the net benefit that accrues because of immigration; however, as the size of gains to capital owners and consumers who benefit from the services provided by the illegal immigrants increases, the labor net of the cost lowers in terms of lower wages to the native-born for whom the illegal immigrant is considered to represent, but substitutes. In other words, despite capital gains for the business owner and lower prices for the consumer, wages for the legal individual lowers because of the hiring of the illegal immigrant. In fact, by recent estimates the illegal immigrant only raises the real income for native-born individuals by 0.2 percent (Powell, 2012, p.195). This is considered reason enough for supporting tighter restrictions on immigration, since this increase is small compared to the size of the U.S. economy. The estimated annual cost of illegal immigration at the Federal, State, and local level is about $113 billion; $29 billion at the Federal level and $84 billion at the State and local level. The estimated tax collections from illegal alien workers for “above-ground economy and underground economy” do not come close to the level of expenditures and are considered
  15. 15. Immigration Research Proposal “misleading as an offset to the unemployed and underemployed U.S. workers that would replace illegal alien workers” (Martin, Ruark, 2013). The annual cost that illegal immigration burdens to the U.S. taxpayer is an average amount per native of $1,117. The largest share of the burden is shown to fall to the State and local taxpayers, depending on the size of the illegal immigrant population in that location. Illegal immigration costs hundreds of billions in healthcare, housing, education, and welfare. “The annual cost of the free tax credits alone paid to illegal immigrants quadrupled to $4.2 billion in 2011” (Trump, 2016, p.1). For immigration to benefit the economy, reform should encourage those that enter the country and participate for better or worse in local economies, pay taxes, and interact with U.S. residents, and rely on government benefits and services on a limited basis. Education for the children of illegal aliens “constitute the single largest cost to the taxpayers at an annual cost of nearly $52 billion, which the majority is absorbed by State and local and government” (Martin, Ruark, 2013). At the Federal level, about one-third of the costs are matched by tax collections from illegal aliens. At the State and local level, an average of less than five percent of the public costs associated with illegal immigration is regained through taxes collected from illegal aliens. Reports of taxes collected by illegal aliens’ state that “most illegal aliens do not pay income taxes, and for those who do, they are refunded to the illegal aliens in tax credits and returns” (Martin, Ruark, 2013). California as of 2010 through 2011, had a budget deficit of more than $14.4 billion, with an estimated $21.8 billion in annual expenses on illegal aliens. New York had a deficit in the same time frame of $6.8 billion and a $9.5 billion expenditure in illegal alien costs. This cost would only increase if the amnesty of millions of illegal immigrants continues, as did it did in the amnesty of 1986.
  16. 16. Immigration Research Proposal Recent estimates of access to medical insurance by illegal aliens, conducted by the Center of Immigration Studies, put the share of that population with coverage from their employer or by a spouse’s employer at thirty-eight percent. The study put the number of illegal aliens without access to medical insurance at 6.6 million individuals. The Medicaid coverage of births to illegal aliens, with the Federal taxpayer assuming at least half of the cost of this expense, at $1,238,100,000. In 2009, there were nine states in which the Federal government shares exceed seventy percent and an additional eighteen with more than sixty percent. Medicaid fraud by illegal aliens, using fraudulent or stolen documents or ID’s, has reached more than $2,470,000,000. However, there is no true reliable data “since medical facilities are not required to verify the identification of patients” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.16). A final medical expense that is used by illegal aliens is the medical costs for their children after birth. This cost, at taxpayer expense, is more than $2,382,800,000. The child receives this benefit if the household meets the income eligibility criteria, Two-thirds of the illegal alien population does not have insurance and more than one-third will meet the criteria for eligibility. Apologists for illegal aliens convince policymakers that it is “better to give those residing in the U.S. illegally permanent access to jobs versus removing and freeing up those jobs for the unemployed U.S. citizen and legal foreign worker” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.8). These same advocates claim amnesty would be a plus for the economy because it would help illegal aliens compete for better jobs and raise their income and their taxes that they pay. This makes sense until those same advocates understand this in terms of against whom they would be competing for better jobs; the U.S. citizens and legal residents. This essentially benefits the employers, and not the job seekers.
  17. 17. Immigration Research Proposal The claimed benefits for amnesty is another misleading debate. Wages from the 1986 amnesty did rise. In general, wages rose for everyone due to this being an “inflationary period. Per the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistic (BLS), beneficiaries of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), amnesty raised wages by a meager fifteen percent between 1986 and 1991. In fact, legalized, this did not make any gains and more than three-fifths remained in the same work that they had before the amnesty. Illegal immigrants showed low probability of employment gain” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.8). Essentially, the deficit of education, skills, and limited English proficiency dampens the proposal of their upward job movement regardless of legal status. The implications of amnesty are that this would “bring illegal aliens out of the shadows into the legal workforce, paying taxes, and more likely to file a tax return. What is not mentioned and implied is the fact that giving amnesty would add another 4.7 million claimants, causing an additional drain of more than $20.2 billion annually for EITC and an additional $2.6 billion in child credits” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.37). Part of this debate also includes stating that newly legalized alien workers would increase earnings, reducing the drain. Studies from the 1986 legalized amnesty population found that “five years after legalization, the gap between median earnings for the legalized workers and U.S. workers had not changed. Even if typical earnings increased by fifty percent or more, the EITC could still be claimed, just for a lesser amount” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p37). Another argument for support for amnesty is the Social Security tax benefits. Advocates believe that amnesty will allow for contribution to social security without having the payout these individuals. What they fail to note is that the benefits from unclaimed payments would cease and taxes would be paid and credited towards their retirement benefits. The key point of the social security system is that it is a redistributive tax system in which low-wage earners receive more benefits than contributions.
  18. 18. Immigration Research Proposal Several national studies have established that illegal immigration, given its steady increase over the decades has hurt the economy to different degrees and the labor market opportunities of the “least skilled and experienced U.S. workers. The policy goal should be to improve the prospects of the U.S. workers who have not graduated from high school” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.10). Research, per the Federation for American Immigration Reform, shows that changing the skill composition of legal immigrants and reducing the flow of unauthorized aliens might be a more fruitful course of action (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.10). The cost of welfare used by illegal aliens is primarily expended in the Free and Reduced Meal Program; cash assistance, Temporary Assistance of Needy Families (TANF); child care; public housing; the Earned Income Tax Credit; and the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC). Those who receive the benefits of the free meal program, which is costing the country more than two billion dollars, “requires the illegal individual to be at or below 130 percent of the poverty level, and to receive the reduced meal, the individual must be between 130 percent and 185 percent of the poverty level. 25.5 percent of the illegal immigrant population participates in the breakfast program, causing an expenditure of $612,000,000 and eighteen percent participate in the lunch program, costing the taxpayers $1,652,600,000” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.27). TANF, which has an expenditure of over one billion dollars to illegal immigrants, allows parents of children born in the U.S.to collect welfare benefits, requiring that they have satisfied their five- year waiting period and are documented. This is not the case. Many parents collect these welfare benefits, having not satisfied the five-year waiting period and are undocumented, on behalf of their children. The Child Welfare League of America reports that “most of the child-only caseload includes a parent” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.28). Estimates by TANF reports show that
  19. 19. Immigration Research Proposal Federal funding to the states for the children of illegal immigrants has increased to more than one billion, about six percent of the total TANF disbursements. Child care is a joint Federal and State expenditure for assistance for low-income children. In 2010, $4.9 billion was appropriated for this program towards children of illegal immigrants. 6.5 percent of those enrolled in this program are illegal immigrants. Per the Pew Hispanic Center, “one-third of the children and one-fifth of the adult illegal immigration population live in poverty and are much more likely to live in poverty. This nearly doubles the poverty rate for children of U.S. born parents” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.28). Public housing in theory, is intended to be unavailable to illegal immigrants. In practice, this is not the case. The qualification to obtaining subsidized housing is to have at least one legally documented individual in the household and any other family member can pay their rent, regardless of legality. $787 million annually is spent in subsidized housing per year towards the housing of undocumented individuals. During the Clinton administration and the Obama administration, Congress deemed it “a violation to fail to screen out illegal aliens from the Department of Housing and Urban Development” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.29). Not only do illegal immigrants benefit from public housing living arrangements, they benefit through Federal mortgage subsidies for developers of low-cost housing. The loophole exists in the fact that the ban on occupancy does not apply if admissions are not through HUD or are with a stolen identification. There are as many as three million low-income families with one or more illegal parent and U.S. born child participating in HUD. This constituted for approximately three percent of the public housing community. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Additional Child Tax Credits (ACTC) expend more than five billion dollars combined in distributing refunds to illegal immigrants and tax
  20. 20. Immigration Research Proposal credits. A family with two dependents earning $31,200 can earn a EITC of $2,693, even if the illegal immigrants is not paying Federal income tax. This is net drain on Federal tax revenues of approximately $1.78 billion, representing 600,000 illegal immigrant tax returns. Many obtain an EITC by filing a Social Security Number (SSN) assigned to a child or a fictitious SSN. Those claiming ACTC, must have an income of less than $110,000 and have been in the U.S. for at least half a year. This can earn an illegal alien one thousand dollars per child. “In January of 2010, Representative Sam Johnson (R-TX) submitted H.R. 4528, to change the Child Tax Credit program to eliminate the possibility of illegal aliens applying using an Immigration Tax Identification Numbers (ITIN)” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.36). The Internal Tax Service allows tax credits even when there is no SSN provided on tax returns. ITINs are permitted for tax filing purposes regardless of legal status. With 5.4 million children of illegal immigrants in the United States, seventy-three percent being U.S. born, they are all potential ACTC deductions. Per an Inspector General report, “the average annual spending total for the ACTC is $1.75 billion, with seventy-seven percent claimed by illegal aliens. Advocates for illegal immigration “argue that this population is not eligible for Federal benefits and are not a burden to the taxpayer” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.13). This ignores that fact that the burden falls onto the State and local government because it is compensated by the Federal government for the major expenses they incur for; special education programs, compensation for medical costs; and compensation for the incarceration of illegal aliens. Two trends have been intertwining within the cost of illegal immigration: the number of people incarcerated and inflow, and the integration of immigrants nationally (Waters, 2016, p.34). Immigration and Customs Enforcement reports have stated to have a mandated quota of 34,000 beds per day, as obligated by law. This means that 34,000 illegal immigrants must be in
  21. 21. Immigration Research Proposal detention every day of the year for there to be a cost-benefit. In 2013, there were 441,000 illegal immigrants in private detention facilities, local jails, state prisons, and federal facilities. The Federal government pays state and local prisons a set amount per night for every person detained, while claiming to reduce incarceration in conjunction with mandating a quota for filling the detention beds. Currently, Louisiana takes in the largest number of illegal immigrant detainees from across the country to “help cover the cost of maintaining their prisons” (Waters, 2016, p.34). The Federal government is responsible for appropriating funds to State and local governments to compensate for the costs they incur for incarceration of convicted illegal aliens. The Federal government is then responsible for those individuals after their release from State and local detention for deporting them. Recent studies found that non-citizens made up approximately nine percent of the total local jail population (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.19). The GAO estimates that the States spend approximately $1.7 billion to incarcerate criminal illegal aliens. The annual cost per prisoner in Federal prison is approximately $27,700, not including assistance while in prison or deportation costs. Total deportation and removal of illegal criminal aliens has reached more than two billion dollars, “with ICE Air, operated by the Detention and Removal Office, it flies six days a week costing $680 per passenger. In 2008, this cost the taxpayers more than $142,120,000. Other costs that affect the taxpayer is illegal immigration litigation, “Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), and Operation Community Shield (OCS), which target illegal gun crime, violent gangs and gang crime” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.21). PSN and OCS spend approximately $39,500,000, and are considered valuable assets. In 2005, “more than eight thousand individuals belonging to more than seven hundred different gangs were arrested. The Eighteenth Street Gang
  22. 22. Immigration Research Proposal out of Los Angeles was compromised of approximately eighty percent illegal aliens from Mexico and Central America” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.21). The cost of terrorism by an illegal immigrant, while small, is still approximately $26.5 million if taken from the period of 1975 through 2015, with ten committing acts of terrorism. This states that for every illegal immigrant that resulted in being a terrorist, 2.65 million illegal immigrants entered the United States (Nowrasleh, 2016, p.10). Border security and immigration enforcement has cost the taxpayers more than $250 billion in expenditures over the past three decades, including the size of the Border Patrol, the addition of hundreds of miles of fencing, and the invention of technology such as, ground sensors and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to detect illegal entries. The United States Customs and Border Patrol in 2015 spent $13. 3 billion, Immigration and Customs Enforcement spent $5.5 billion, and Immigration and Naturalization Service spent $3.6 billion. DHS experiences scheduled delays and performance problems with its information technology programs for securing the border between ports of entry and after implementing the “Secure Border Initiative Network (SBI Net), it was cancelled after five years. It had already been installed fifty-three miles along the Arizona border and spending had already reached one billion dollars” (Berrick, 2013, p.6). DHS has now implemented another program along the Arizona border, the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan with an estimated life cycle cost of $1.5 billion. Congress, key stakeholders, and the public lack significant benchmarks that could be used to track any progress on border security as broader immigration reforms are considered, making it difficult to evaluate existing policies and programs to make informed choices regarding the costs and benefits of current and potential investments.
  23. 23. Immigration Research Proposal Mexico’s poverty is the ultimate source of the migration challenge. If Mexico was to increase its economic development and its income per capita passes $8,000, Mexican immigrants would be less likely to leave their homes and families. However, increased salaries can also increase migration simply for the fact that the truly impoverished now have the means to leave. Mexico and the countries south of Mexico, have highly unequal societies, even with increased social spending in political democratization, such as anti-poverty programs. The income per capita causes the biggest increases of illegal immigrants from Central American countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Mexico makes billions in remittances sent from illegal immigrants to the United States back to Mexico. As of 2013, they had taken in $22 billion. President Bush had made it clear that the immigration issue was too large to deal with through deportation as to justify amnesty. Senator Harry Reid stated that “no one believes it is fiscally responsible or physically possible to deport an estimated twelve million undocumented people. No serious proposal to round up and deport all illegal immigrants is possible and there is an alternative to amnesty” (Martin, Ruark, 2013, p.83). Illegal Immigration and the Effects to Public Safety A report by the Government Accountability Office in 2011 stated that three million arrests were attached to the incarcerated alien population including tens of thousands of violent beatings, rapes, and murders. It is estimated that there are an approximate 56,280 illegal alien inmates, with sixty-two percent from Mexico. The Detention and Removal Office (DRO) of DHS removes the illegal alien after a detainer has been placed on the prisoner, they have served their sentence, and interviewed by ICE and DHS. DRO then deports the individual to the border of Mexico or flies the individual to the interior of Mexico if there is a high risk of re-entering. If the individual is not of Mexican descent, then the individual is flown to their homeland.
  24. 24. Immigration Research Proposal Per ICE records, as of October 2014, “276 jurisdictions in a study over an eighteen- month period in 2014, reported that more than 8.100 criminal aliens who were the subject of detainers, were released back to the streets because of local non-cooperative policies” (Vaughan, 2015). Two-thirds of these individuals had serious criminal history at the time of their release and nearly 1,900 have re-offended. Only twenty-eight percent of those individuals have been re- apprehended by ICE. Sanctuary cities do nothing to build trust between immigrant communities and the local law enforcement and do nothing to improve access to law enforcement for immigrants. They also do not show that immigrant crime victims will report crime because of sanctuary cities. The 276 jurisdictions in the ICE study represent a small fraction of the more than 17,000 law enforcement jurisdictions in the nation. This only represents jurisdictions with large populations of illegal immigration, such as Chicago, San Francisco, New York City, Philadelphia, Miami, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C. There was widespread outrage at the San Francisco Sheriff’s policies that caused the release of a man with “five prior deportations, seven felony convictions, and the subject of an ICE detainer, who went on to murder Kathryn Steinle. It is clear, that certain jurisdictions will not budge from their criminal alien sanctuary policies” (Vaughan, 2015). In the study of the 276 jurisdictions in the ICE report, local law enforcement agencies refused to comply with a total of 8,811 detainers and these detainers were associated with 8,145 individuals, and were then released from custody. “As of June 2015, the total number of detainers declined were over 17,000. Most offenders released had prior records; one-fourth were already felons. 5,132 were previously convicted, charged with a crime, and labeled as a public safety concern” (Vaughan, 2015). 8,145 of those released, later reoffended and were arrested again. 1,867 or 23 percent were arrested again for a criminal offense. 1,116, or sixty percent were considered at large at the
  25. 25. Immigration Research Proposal time of the study. The 1,867 that were re-arrested for a criminal offense, were arrested 4,298 times during the eight-month study and had accumulated 7,491 new charges after their release. Ten percent involved “dangerous drugs and seven percent involved driving under the influence (DUI). There were six instances of very serious crimes that were sought by ICE with a detainer, but released by local law enforcement with sanctuary policies” (Vaughan, 2015). With the implementation of Section 287 (g), allowing law enforcement entities to enter agreements with ICE to “act in the stead of ICE agents by processing illegal aliens for removal, law enforcement must sign Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) with ICE and participating officers, as well as undergo a five-week training course, a background check, and mandatory certificates” (Mayer, Carafano, Zuckerman, 2011). Before the 287 (g), law enforcement officers would simply notify ICE after apprehension of an individual who could not demonstrate legal presence, and wait for them to take custody of the individual. In practice, most went free and laws were not enforced. Seven years since the creation of the 287 (g), “roughly sixty-six state and local agencies have been deputized to enforce Federal immigration law, and more than 120,000 individuals have been identified as illegal” (Mayer, Carafano, Zuckerman, 2011). In 2010, ACLU and other pro-illegal immigration groups report that Section 287 (g) programs encourage racial profiling and other undesirable consequences by law enforcement agencies. In July of 2009, the Obama administration reported that there were plans to make the MOAs more uniform, causing law enforcement agencies disruption in the program and discouraging any real attempt to enforce the law. Advocates for illegal immigration tend to exaggerate the number of illegal aliens that enter with visas to change the perception of the public that our borders are safe and not out of control and to lessen the concern regarding illegal
  26. 26. Immigration Research Proposal aliens that have not been screened for criminal records, terrorist connections, and contagious diseases (FAIR, 2011). Center for Immigration Studies Mark Kirkorian was informed by the head of Border Patrol that approximately eighty percent of the apprehensions that occur result in a “catch and release” (OAN, 2016). While Border Patrol provides numbers of apprehensions, in reports provided, leadership has declined to answer specific questions regarding rates of apprehensions and evasions. Jim Koibe, previous House Representative for Arizona, stated in 2004 that the “Border Patrol figures that there are about one out of four or five illegal aliens apprehended crossing the border” (Elbel, 2016). Michael Nicley, Chief of the Tucson Sector of the U.S. CBP at the time stated that it was closer to one out of seven apprehended. In a November 2006, United States House Committee Report on Homeland Security, Federal law enforcement reported that estimates for the apprehension of illegal aliens was approximately ten to thirty percent, with ten to twenty percent of the drugs entering being seized. In this same report, it was estimated that as many as four to ten million illegal aliens cross into the U.S. (Elbel, 2016). Many illegal immigrants have the assistance of a “sophisticated smuggler or a “coyote” to cross the border, some paying as much as $1,500. Many illegal immigrants adopt to an initial apprehension and develop a different strategy on subsequent crossing attempts. They may also vary the portions of the border they make the illegal crossing” (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.7). The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, passed by the House of Representatives, was intended to “make illegal immigrants felons, increase the penalties on employers who hired illegal immigrants, and erect a fence along much of the border between the U.S. and Mexico. This bill offered no path toward permanent citizenship for current illegal immigrants and no guest-worker program for future immigrants”
  27. 27. Immigration Research Proposal (Powell, 2012, p.202). The goal was to move the current illegal immigrant population out in contrast to the U.S. Senate’s 2006 McCain-Kennedy immigration reform bill which was to provide a path to permanent citizenship and create a guest-worker program allowing approximately more than 200,000 migrant workers in over the next five years. Per the Migration Policy Institute, the priority at the ports of entry is to facilitate lawful travel and trade, not the use of fraudulent documents or illegal immigrants hiding in private or commercial vehicles or shipping containers (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.12). The COMPEX system that is used by CBP is confined to air passengers and private vehicles at land ports, excluding all other points of entry, including cargo containers. It does not capture the two most common ways migrants enter illegally; through points of entry as pedestrians with false documents and as stowaways in commercial vehicles. Fingerprints are not always collected during COMPEX screening, which means that cases in which crossers used or borrowed stolen documents are not detected. The Obama administration has restricted the effectiveness of cooperative programs, i.e. the 287 (g) under the pressure of advocacy groups. This administration has also explicitly allowed, through the “Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), lower jurisdictions to obstruct ICE; establishing the entire country as a sanctuary for nearly all illegal aliens by further narrowing enforcement priorities; and restricting the ability of ICE officers to deport removable aliens, including many with criminal records” (Vaughan, 2015). The most common reason for non- cooperation policies is that “law enforcement needs to enable immigrants to feel comfortable reporting crime, while this has never been substantiated” (Vaughan, 2015). Most crimes in general are not reported, and per the Bureau of Justice statistics in 2012, “only forty-four percent of violent victimizations and fifty-four percent of serious violent victimizations were reported”
  28. 28. Immigration Research Proposal (Vaughan, 2015). In fact, the most effective way to encourage crime reporting is through community outreach, hiring personnel that speak the language of the community, and establishing anonymous tip lines. Proposals to increase ICE and local law enforcement capacity, such as through the Davis Oliver Act, have strong support to support ICE and a willingness to assist in detaining illegal criminals. Local sanctuary polices shield illegal aliens from detection and provide access to public benefits and driver’s licenses’. In a 2007 Department of Justice audit, an even higher recidivism rates after release from custody versus the 2014 ICE analysis over the eight- month period was reported. The audit showed that in a random sample, seventy-three out of one hundred illegal aliens had re-offended, resulting in six new crimes a piece. The argument from sanctuary jurisdictions is that holding illegal aliens is too costly and that there was a lack of resources. The DOJ audit found that no agency showing the release of illegal criminal aliens was not due to a lack of resources. Detainers have been used for decades, and they have shown to help protect the public and ICE officers by taking custody in a secure setting and not at the criminal illegal alien’s home, in the street, or at their workplace. The Obama administration has scaled back immigration enforcement and has created an image of pretending to abandon enforcement due to unfavorable court rulings. Top leaders contribute to these rulings by reversing long-standing policies and claiming that detainers were an option for local agencies to honor. This has also been accepted by certain Federal judges leaving local law enforcement to fend for themselves. If local law enforcement follows the policies that have been set forth for decades, cooperate in good faith and compliance with federal regulations, they have fear of being subjected to significant legal and financial liability. The establishment of Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) allows local jurisdictions to obstruct ICE
  29. 29. Immigration Research Proposal by choosing to ignore requests to be notified of an illegal alien’s release date. Five of the largest jurisdictions, per DHS, have indicated “they will still obstruct ICE and refuse to participate in PEP, no matter how much enforcement is watered down by the prioritization guidelines” (Vaughan, 2015). This essentially states that policy supporters need to beware of proposals that attempt to spell out specific criminal convictions that trigger mandatory cooperation and that Congress must clarify ICE’s authorization to issue detainers and provide qualified immunity to legal and financial liability. Methodology Using government numbers are often too hard to come by and are routinely scrubbed. To answer the first question of, how many unauthorized immigrants enter between ports of entry, a model-based recidivism analysis would be used to produce an estimate of illegal immigrant apprehensions compared to the number that are later apprehended. Data from migrant surveys distributed at key ports of entry along the United States and Mexico border would be able to estimate inflow numbers. Observational measures could be conducted with a variety of metrics collected during Border Patrol surveillance. Methodology to question two, how many unauthorized immigrants enter through ports of entry, would have to be done by acquiring the percentage of admitted travelers determined unauthorized that the United States CBP estimates through the “Random Compliance Examination (COMPEX) program. This programs selects a random sample of cleared travelers and subjects them to more rigorous inspection (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.2). This total of unauthorized immigrants would have to be compared to overall admissions to estimate port of entry inflows. A key issue in this method is to ensure that the sample collected is representative due to the randomness of the sample.
  30. 30. Immigration Research Proposal Research for question number three, how many unauthorized immigrants overstay their visa and become unauthorized, is a challenge. Acquiring the records of nonimmigrant arrivals need to be compared to nonimmigrant departures with the difference being the number of overstays. Why this is a challenge is because DHS did not provide an official estimate until 2016, nineteen years after the first official estimate. Data departures are incomplete, specifically with people leaving through the Southwest borders. DHS is still working on developing arrival and departure records collected by carriers at air and seaports and the Canadian government at the Northern border. Essentially there is no definitive data that exists, so this study will be reluctant to identify and count this population in the study. The methodology to estimate question number four, how many unauthorized immigrants reside in the U.S., is the most important measure and encompasses the ability to not only determine the methodology for determining the effects of illegal immigration, but for determining true inflow and the effects of interior enforcement and other variables. The methodology used will be the residual method which uses the U.S. Census and DHS data to calculate the total non-citizen population and the number of legal non-citizens, then subtracting the legal non-citizens from the total non-citizens. The difference from the two, or the residual, is the estimated unauthorized population. These four questions will provide a full perspective of the scope of illegal immigrants by using a recidivism analysis, which is model based; a survey-based analysis; and an observational analysis. This analysis will also use the estimation of the number of illegals in the United States that is derived from the U.S. Border Patrol apprehension rates and “got aways”. These numbers are not reliably known, but can be estimated and this will produce a range of results versus a single estimation. This would involve first, estimating the gross number of illegals entering the
  31. 31. Immigration Research Proposal United States including the number of those that evade apprehension by the Border Patrol. In Border Patrol reports, a “get away” ratio is applied to the numbers of illegals entering, resulting in a gross estimate of illegals entering and avoiding apprehension. Second, the proposed method would need to factor in repeat apprehensions of the same individuals and legalizations out of this estimation. What this translates to is that many that are apprehended and returned home attempt try to return and are re-apprehended. A third step would be to factor in those considered “short- term stays” out of the overall estimate taking into the variable that some immigrants do voluntarily return home in less than one year. A final step would be to estimate the total number of illegal aliens living in the United States based on the estimated illegals entering and avoiding apprehension each year. The survey-based analysis, while covering many years, would contribute to the understanding of the effects of illegal immigration, while being conducted in a range of locations, specifically migrant-sending communities in Mexico, popular immigrant destinations in the U.S., and points along the U.S. and Mexico border. Interviewing migrants regarding their prior and current trips to the U.S. and how many they have taken would allow for determining the effectiveness of enforcement, whether they are entering on a specific visa, whether they overstay that visa, their purpose of their visit to the U.S, such as seeking amnesty or asylum, or if they are using fraudulent documentation. This would also determine if they are entering because they currently have family in the U.S., whether they will need government assistance, and if they are intending on pursuing employment and integrating into society. This would also determine whether they had nefarious purposes such as drug trafficking, gang activity, human trafficking, or any other criminal activity. This would be based on CBP authorizing admission into the U.S. Two of the surveys that have been used in similar analyses are the “Mexican Migrant Project
  32. 32. Immigration Research Proposal (MMP) at Princeton University, and the Mexican Migration Field Research and Training Program (MMFRP) at the University of California San Diego” (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.8). The MMP incorporates ethnographic fieldwork and survey techniques to gather social, demographic, and economic information from approximately 600 to 1,000 households in selected communities throughout Mexico. Surveys are then conducted within the U.S. of unauthorized migrants from the communities sampled in Mexico, resulting in a combined binational sample. The MMFRP collects information from households, approximately 700 to 7,000 in three rural and high immigration communities in Mexico and U.S. communities, mainly Southern California, where such migrants settle. These surveys are not intended to claim a clear representation of the entire Mexican migrant population, which is why they should be used in combination. Partnering with the private sector and academic researchers would gain additional information regarding individual migration histories. Surveys conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, while do not provide definitive data sources on the exact number of illegal immigrants currently living in the U.S., allow for use in the residual method to calculate the total number of non-citizens based on census questions about birthplace and citizenship status. These three surveys are the “American Community Survey (ACS), which surveys a nationally representative sample of households; the Community Population Survey (CPS), which is conducted monthly and surveys a smaller sample considered to be a nationally representative sample of households; and the decennial Census which accounts for every person in the country” (Rosenbaum, Hipsiman, 2016, p.20). The survey that would be used in this proposal would be sent to various cities statistically known to have a high population of illegal immigrants. These would include sanctuary cities. The questions would involve
  33. 33. Immigration Research Proposal birthplace, citizenship status, and length of time in the country, and exactly how they crossed. This method would require an ethnographic method to create more reliable results. Using the observational analysis method, which has been used by the Border Patrol since the mid-2000’s, provides metrics based on; “turn backs”, or individuals who attempt to enter without inspection and are deterred because of Border Patrol presence; dangerous conditions; apprehensions; or “got aways”, which are individuals who are detected but evade arrest and cross the border successfully. To estimate, both observations would be made in sectors with the highest immigration inflow, in which agents use a combination of; surveillance footage that is taken by aircraft; fixed cameras; ground or motion sensors; ground observation; or technology to observe the terrain and track the motion of people. Methodology will be done for estimating visa overstays. This can be done with one of three methods; using indirect departure records; model-based estimates; and the direct collection of exit data. Using indirect departure records would involve INS reports on the number of I-94 forms filled out by non-immigrant travelers at the time of their entry, which is returned at the time of their departure. This however would be considered problematic considering the gap between reports submitted by INS in 1997 and the report submitted by DHS in 2016. This also relies on travelers submitting their own paperwork, which could be susceptible to fraud. This is also inefficient and very labor intensive. The model-based estimate uses the assumption that the reports submitted of the current share of unauthorized immigrants who are visa over stayers, is broken down by country of origin and the year of arrival. It would be possible to estimate the number of visa over stayers simply based on a demographic picture of the unauthorized population.
  34. 34. Immigration Research Proposal Direct collections of exit data would require obtaining information from DHS regarding four pilot programs to collect data directly from travelers at certain land and air points of entry. This programs used biometrics, or fingerprint data collection by both CBP and TSA; Radio Frequency Identification Data (RFID) collection at certain land ports of entry which are added to the traveler’s documents in the form of a tag; biometric data collection at certain land ports of entry; and in 2015 the CBP began collecting biometric exit data from passengers departing on selected international flights from ten U.S. airports. The issue with this data collection is that it performed by a third-party and is limited to biographical data and the pilot programs mentioned were not expanded or made permanent. The benefits in this case do not match the costs. The third-party exit data collection, as stated in the use of direct collections of exit data, is limited. The primary way this is collected is through DHS exit data and through information sharing agreements of third-parties. Again, due to cost-benefit issues and limited biographical data, this would not be beneficial in this study. To estimate the cost of illegal immigration, the methodology would first begin with the number estimated from the determining the number of illegal immigrants in the U.S. This would include U.S. citizen minor children of illegal aliens. This is because generally any benefits that are sought for the minor child will more likely be utilized by the adult illegal immigrant or if the illegal parent (s) voluntarily or involuntarily leave the U.S., they will take their children with them. An estimation of incarceration expenses would need to be collected from the “State and Criminal Alien Assistance Program, which provides State and local detention facilities Federal compensation for the cost of detention of criminal and deportable aliens” (Martin, Ruark, 2013). State and local Data from Federal and State entities such as the Department of Education, INS, The Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Health and Human
  35. 35. Immigration Research Proposal Services, would need to be obtained to determine school expenses, Limited English Proficiency enrollment, school meal programs, university enrollment, and other public assistance programs. Incarceration assistance could be determined by interviewing prison personnel regarding the number of illegal immigrants currently incarcerated, as well as, any information on record regarding benefits currently being provided. Other costs may include use of police and fire services, but those will not be included for this study. To determine the safety effects of illegal immigration, data from the number of detainees refused from January 2015 through January 2016 by local law enforcement agencies and ICE in key cities with large numbers of illegal immigrants such as Chicago, San Francisco, and Miami could be collected and compared to how many of those same illegal aliens were re-arrested, how many had prior arrests and records, and the crimes they had committed prior to re-arrest and after. Using methodology from previous estimates of the unauthorized population and using the remainder and residual estimates after subtracting the legally permanent residents (LPR), naturalized citizens, asylum seekers, refugees, and non-immigrants. Data is taken primarily from DHS and the American Community Survey, a survey provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. As of 2012, there were an estimated 11.4 million unauthorized individuals in the United States, with forty-percent entering in or after the year 2000. Since 2005, the number of unauthorized individuals accounted for fourteen percent of the total population in the United States. Fifty-nine percent of this population is from Mexico. There are two population estimates to derive unauthorized population estimates from; the total foreign-born population living in the United States since 2012, and the number of LPRs on the same data (Baker, Rytina, 2012).
  36. 36. Immigration Research Proposal Data by the Migration Policy Institute, has been estimated for forty-one states and one- hundred and eighteen counties through application rates and top countries of origins. Eligible population estimates at the United States level are from eighteen origin countries and application rates by country of origin (MPI, 2016). The Population Reference Bureau is another source of methodology that provides mid-year data for Mexico’s birth rate, death rate, emigration rates. This also provides population breakdown by country within Mexico and the United States. Alternative methodology could be used in this analysis to produce a much more realistic estimate of the number of illegal aliens, which is based on Border Patrol apprehension rates and estimates of the numbers of illegals that escaped apprehension, which is referred to as “got aways”. This methodology would not factor in amnesty because calculations to do so would involve the following additional steps; selecting a realistic number of illegal immigrants present in 2007 based on this research proposal or an equivalent analysis; subtracting five million illegal aliens who were amnestied by the Obama amnesty order; extracting the number to the current year; and factoring in increased inflow of illegal aliens based upon the incentive if future amnesty in addition to President Obama’s non-enforcement of existing immigration laws and de- emphasized border security. Expected Results The expected results will vary based on the model and analysis used. In regards to the recidivism analysis, this will show the measurement, to a reasonably high-degree of precision, the number of illegal immigrants that have been apprehended and those that been re- apprehended. This however, may be limited by the assumption that intending crosser continues to attempt to enter illegally until they succeed and whether they are equally likely to be apprehended on every try. A possible method to improve this is to focus on the overall
  37. 37. Immigration Research Proposal probability of successful enforcement rather than focusing on apprehensions. This may allow for more metrics and border dynamics such as illegal inflows and how the illegal border crossers respond to enforcement. The survey-based research provides a more detailed approach regarding patterns and behaviors versus generic enforcement data. This would collect data on border crossing history, the motivations for migrating, how long they stay on a trip, and even how much they pay a smuggler. These surveys are based on actual experiences in which data points can be measured directly compared to being estimated. Using different surveys allows for comparison against each other and provides an alternative to possible sanitized government data that is not systematically released to the public. Surveys have been a proven methodology used by the PEW Research Center, DHS, and the Migration Policy Institute. The only limitation to conducting a survey of this size is that it may under-represent the intended population and respondents may not always provide candid responses. To improve upon the survey to accommodate for the underrepresentation, an investment of additional resources to expand the sample size and scope could be done to yield more accurate and detailed information. By incorporating relevant migration-related questions into a separate survey, such as from the American Community Survey or the Community Population Survey, this would identify additional unauthorized households. The advantage of using observation analysis is that is done in real-time activity. However, the limitation is that the surveillance is concentrated in urban areas and stretches along the border where the most illegal immigration and smuggling activity takes place. The cameras and technological devices used cannot be broken down into counts of illegal crossings and smuggling
  38. 38. Immigration Research Proposal activities. There is also an issue with double-counting, in the case of “got aways” and “turn backs”. In using the model-based estimate in determining the number of visa over stayers is, outside of observational analysis, is uncomplicated and reliable. However, the estimates are only as good as the many assumptions associated with them. The issue in this is that there is a nineteen-year difference between the INS report in 1997 and the DHS report in 2016. More accurate estimates could be discovered with updated and complete information. The expected results of this study with the methodology used is to estimate the unauthorized population and the illegal flow between points of entry; through points of entry; and over stays. Part of this methodology is to also show how these inflows affect the economy and the public safety and how adopting a fair, honest, and realistic approach to immigration enforcement can be achieved by recognizing State and local authorities as responsible partners. An “amnesty first” strategy would encourage more illegal border crossings and result in an unlawful presence. The proposal is intended to demonstrate that sensible and functional border security and immigration and workplace laws are essential to focusing resources on the pressing security threat posed by illegal immigration and the transnational criminal cartels crossing the border into the United States. Conclusion Passage of a series of immigration enforcement measures in Arizona contributed to a steep decline of forty percent in the state’s unauthorized immigrant population between 2007 and 2012. Arizona also strived to make it more difficult for employers to hire illegal immigrants. “Arizona enacted a law in 2010 that directs a law enforcement officer to ask about a person’s
  39. 39. Immigration Research Proposal legal status in situations of reasonable suspicion that the person stopped and detained or arrested is lawfully present in the U.S. The Obama administration sued Arizona and demonized Arizonians in what was considered a crass effort to further its political effort” (Mayer, Carafano, Zuckerman, 2011). States and localities have won most of the resulting lawsuits and in June of 2010, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Arizona’s Legal Workers Act, which requires businesses to use the E-Verify system and punish businesses that hire illegal immigrants. Other states have moved in the opposite direction extending more legal protection, while the Federal government has badly undermined state and level immigration enforcement efforts by issuing executive orders that shield approximately half of the illegal immigrants currently in the U.S. from deportations. State and local level law enforcement and ICE follow a program called the “Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security (ACCESS) which allows localities to take action on illegal immigration if they wish to do so. Obama rolled back both the ACCESS program and Section 287 (g) of the Immigration and Nationalization Act” (Mayer, Carafano, Zuckerman, 2011). There have been advocates of a total immigration moratorium, which was estimated by Professor Benjamin Powell of Texas Technological University as costing $229 billion annually. A total immigration moratorium would in no way be constitutional nor would it be a benefit to the economy. The costs vastly exceed the benefits. A nation without borders and laws is not a nation. Laws need to be passed in accordance with the constitutional system of government and must be enforced. This study provides methodology to show how illegal immigration affects the economy, the public safety, and the visa programs. This study is intended to show policy makers, academics, and government agencies how DACA and amnesty would only enhance the illegal immigration issue, thus,
  40. 40. Immigration Research Proposal causing further damage to the economy, especially at the State and local level, and the public safety. Illegal immigration raises the costs of infrastructure, social service benefits, crime, increases job loss and reduces tax revenues. Failing to use the over one million law enforcement at the State and local level makes little sense, especially when there are only six hundred ICE agents. These two in combination would be a great force multiplier if utilized appropriately and in a cost-benefit method. State and local law enforcement have the most familiarity with the communities, and are in a better position to detect, detain, and deport illegal aliens. An immigration policy that follows immigration laws, places stricter regulations on illegal aliens that over stay their visas, that collect welfare benefits and tax revenues and credits, and eliminates Federal funding to sanctuary cities that have been proven to purposely protect illegal aliens and criminals, and refuse to cooperate with ICE officers and detainers should be eliminated. States have clear authorization to act in the interests of the public safety of their own citizens and retain the inherent authority to enforce Federal civil law per the Constitution. Congress needs to, possibly through methods in this proposal, examine innovative and compassionate means to efficiently process and deport illegal immigrants, while properly funding the Customs and Immigration Service to not place unfair costs on the backs of other immigrants seeking entry legally.
  41. 41. Immigration Research Proposal References Anderson, S. (2012). America's incoherent immigration system. The CATO Journal, p. 71- 82, Retrieved from: https://www.eds.b.ebscohost.com.lib.kaplan.edu/eds/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer. Baker, B. R. (2012). Estimates of the unauthorized immigration population residing in the U.S. Population Estimates, Retrieved from: https://www.eds.b.ebscohost.com.lib.kaplan.edu/eds/pdfviewer?sid. Berrick, K. (2013). DHS: Progress made and work remaining after nearly 10 years in operation. GAO-13--3701T, p.2-7, Retrieved from: https://gao.gov/assets/660/65227.txt. Coburn, T. (2015). A review of the DHS's missions and performances. Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, 113th Congress, p. 3-14, Retrieved from: https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=B92138382-DBCE-403C. DHS. (n.d.). DACA. DHS, Retrieved from: https://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood- arrivals. Elbel, F. (2016). How many illegal aliens reside in the United States? A methodology using the border patrol "got away" statistics. Colorado Alliance for Immigration Reform, Retrieved from: https://www.cairco.org/issues/how-many-illegal-aliens-reside-united-states-elbel. FAIR. (2011). How did illegal aliens arrive: Withour inspection or with visas? Federation for American Immigration Reform, Retrieved from: https://www.fairus.org/issue/how-did- illegals-aliens-arrive-without-inspection-or-with-visas. GAO. (2016). Asylum: Variation exists in outcomes of applications across immigration courts and judges. GAO-17-72, Retrieved from: https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-72.
  42. 42. Immigration Research Proposal Institute, C. (2016). Downsizing the federal government: DHS. CATO Institute, Retrieved from: https://www.catoinstitute.downsizinggovernment.org/homelandsecurity. Martin, J. R. (2013). The fiscal burden of illegal immigration on U.S. taxpayers. Federation for American Immigration Reform, p. 8-87, Retrieved from: https://www.fairus.org/publications/the-fiscal-burden-of-illegal-immigration-on-united- states-taxpayers. Mayer, M. C. (2011). Homeland security 4.0: Overcoming centralization, complacency, and politics. Special Report No.97, Retrieved from: https://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/homeland-security-4-0-overcoming- centralizing. Miano, J. (2016). DACA. Center for Immigration Studies, Retrieved from: https://www.cis.org/AdministrativeAmnesty. MPI. (2012). DACA data tools. Migration Policy Institute, Retrieved from: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals- daca-profiles. Nowrasleh, A. (2016). Terrorism and immigration: A risk analysis. Policy Analysis No.798, p.1- 17, Retrieved from: https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/terrorism- immigration-risk-analysis. OAN, December 18, 2016, Video: The First 100 days anti-corruption agenda, Center for Immigration Studies, Mark Kirkorian, Judicial Watch, One America News Passel, J. (2016). Measuring illegal immigration: How the Pew Research Center counts unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. Pew Research Center Fact Tank, Retrieved from: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank-2016/09/20/measuring-illegal-immigration-how.
  43. 43. Immigration Research Proposal Passel, J. C. (2016). Overall number of U.S. unauhtorized immigrants holds steady since 2009. Hispanic Trends, Pew Research Center, Retrieved from: https://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/09/20/methodology.10/. Powell, B. (2012). Coyote ugly: the deadweight cost of rent seeking for immigration policy. Public Choice Vol. 150, Issue 112, p. 195-208, Retrieved from: https://www.eds.a.ebscohost.com.lib.kaplan.edu/eds/detail/detail?vid=3&sid=37e7e9c7- ab22-4865. Renshon, S. (2010). Behind the Pew study on illegal immigration part III: Estimating illegal immigration-The basic model and it's limitations. Center for immigration Studies, Retrieved from: https://www.cis.org/renshon/behind-pew-study-3. Rosenbaum, M. H. (2016). Border metrics: How to effectively measure border security and immigration control. Migration Policy Institute, p.1-25, Retrieved from: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/BorderMetrics- FINAL.pdf. Solum, R. (2016). Beyond the wall, on immigration from Mexico, Trump is not entirely wrong. National Review, p.22, Retrieved from: https://www.eds.a.ebscohost.com.lib.kaplan.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid. Trump, D. (2016). The three core principles of Donald J. Trump's immigration plan. Immigration Reform That Will Make America Great Again, p. 1-6, Retrieved from: https://www.assets.donaldjtrump.com/immigration-reform-trump.pdf. Vaughan, J. (2015). Sanctuary cities: A threat to public safety. Center for Immigration Studies, Retrieved from: https://www.cis.org/Testimony/Vaughan-Sanctuary-Cities-072315.
  44. 44. Immigration Research Proposal Waters, M. (2016). Crime and immigration: New forms of exclusion and discrimination. Issues in Science and Technology, p.29-38, Retrieved from: https://www.eds.b.ebscohost.com.lib.kaplan.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer.

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