1. Kaitie Watson
EU-3 Position on Iran’s Pursuit of Uranium Enrichment Capabilities
1. Introduction
Iran’s recent defiance of international agreements with respect to its uranium enrichment
activities has emerged as a pressing concern in the international community. Finding a solution to
this issue is a priority for the United Nations Security Council. The UE-3 (France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) represent the interests of the
European Union at the United Nations Security Council. The UE-3 considers the most critical
European concerns in this matter to be the threat of nuclear proliferation and the preservation of
EU-Iran relations. In response to these concerns, the EU-3 proposes a policy path that includes
diplomatic negotiations and trade concessions in order to reach an agreement with Iran.
2. Background and Existing Policy
Iran is a major player in today’s energy-hungry world. Iran holds over 10% of the world’s
oil and gas reserves and operates an extensive nuclear research program. Since the 1950’s, Iran
has run nuclear research and development programs. Iran has received support from countries
such as Russia and China to run its nuclear facilities. In 2002, it was revealed to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran’s uranium enrichment program was much larger than
expected. Iran claims to be in compliance with Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty which allows a state to develop uranium enrichment programs with peaceful intentions.
However, Iran was not in compliance with IAEA Safeguard Agreements and this lack of
transparency in its program raised international suspicions. In November 2004, facing harsh
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2. pressure from the United States, Iran froze its enrichment activities. It then proceeded to resume
the program in August 2005. This defiance of international agreements by Iran is disappointing
to the EU-3 and perhaps warrants a reevaluation of our foreign policy options. The EU-3 must
now carefully weigh their options of diplomatic or forceful actions with the economic and
security concerns of the EU-3 and the rest of the European Union.
3. Concerns Held by the EU-3
a. Threat of Nuclear Proliferation
The threat of nuclear proliferation for military use is of great concern to the EU-3. As
outlined in the European Security Strategy of 2003, the “proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security.” It is in Europe’s best interest to do
all that is in its power to promote non-proliferation and effectively enforce the agreements of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other such pacts. The spread of nuclear weapons
technology is a threat to both Europe and the international community as a whole, and as such
the EU-3 must act both assertively and tactfully to ensure that non-proliferation agreements are
respected.
b. Preservation of EU-3-Iran Relations
Preserving economic and political relations with Iran is a second pressing concern for the
EU-3. Since the early 1990’s, European states (France, Germany and the United Kingdom in
particular) have forged stronger political and economic ties with Iran. In a move away from
historically strained relations with Iran, the EU-3 have created stronger ties with Iran in the past
decade and a half. We have identified Iran as a potential long-term energy source for Europe, and
maintaining this connection requires strong diplomatic and economic ties between the two
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3. regions. The reliance on Iran to help fuel an ever-expanding and developing European Union is a
factor that cannot be overlooked in this situation. Iran has become an invaluable trade partner for
the European Union, and continued economic and diplomatic links with the state are important to
foster a stronger relationship with Iran.
4. Policy Options
a. Sanctions
The first policy option faced by the EU-3 is to impose sanctions on Iran, a hardline
approach that has been strongly supported by the United States. This option would include
political and economic sanctions imposed on Iran to coerce the state into complying with IAEA
Safeguard Agreements and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States has also
made clear its belief that a preemptive strike, though it is a worst-case scenario, would be a real
option to tackle Iran’s non-compliance. While some states deem this strategy effective, it has the
capacity to permanently derail economic relations between Iran and members of the international
community. The EU-3 feel that this type of coercive technique will have the opposite of the
desired effect, and will ultimately lead to increased tension and a heightened threat to security for
all states. The prospective interstate tensions created by a coercive policy for compliance are too
risky for the EU-3 and the European Union to consider it as a potential policy option.
b. Continued Negotiations
It is in the best interest of the EU-3 to pursue a path to cooperation through non-coercive
diplomatic means. Continued negotiations and incentive programs are the best option available
for the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, as well as the other members of the European
Union. Through diplomatic and transparent negotiations, both economic and political relations
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4. with Iran can be preserved. It is important at this time for Iran to build its confidence in the
international community. The EU-3 recognizes Iran’s right to pursue nuclear energy research for
peaceful reasons under Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
However, Iran’s lack of transparency in its nuclear programs and its failure to comply with IAEA
Safeguard Agreements and other regulations have presented its nuclear program in a very bad
light. As diplomatic and trade partners, we must give Iran the opportunity to demonstrate this
peaceful development to the world and regain the trust of the international community. It is
important for the EU-3 and the European Union to give Iran the chance to re-build international
faith in their state. By pursuing cooperation through peaceful and diplomatic means, it will be
possible for this faith to be restored and for Iran to forge stronger ties with Europe and well as
the rest of the international community.
Iran’s track-record of non-compliance in this area remains a great concern to the EU-3.
While the EU-3 and other European Union member states prefer to take a diplomatic and non-
coercive route to cooperation, if Iran continues to reject agreement proposals and defy
international agreements such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty the time may come for the
EU-3 to adopt more forceful policy options in the form of economic sanctions and trade barriers.
The EU-3 strongly urges Iran to freeze uranium enrichment programs immediately. However, in
recognition of Iran’s rights under Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, we are willing to pursue diplomatic negotiations at the present time in hopes of
reaching a peaceful resolution to this issue. The EU-3 strongly advocate a policy of diplomatic
talks and trade concessions in order to persuade Iran to freeze uranium enrichment programs, and
we urge the United States to adopt a similar strategy rather than one of force and coercion.
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5. 5. Conclusion
In this delicate time, it is important for the EU-3 to stay true to their diplomatic roots and
keep to the current path of cooperation found through peaceful means. The EU-3 are
disappointed by Iran’s recent defiance, but maintain that a combination of continued negotiations
and trade concessions will be the most effective way of reaching a resolution to this issue.
Through continued talks, the EU-3 are confident that an agreement can be reached with Iran that
will reinforce confidence in Iran and increase security in the international community.
Reference List
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