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Platform Strategy: Openness, Innovation & Control

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We present an economic framework to understand and manage platform growth. This builds from a model of network complements and two sided markets. The intuitions help set prices, openness, and features to absorb into the platform. The intuitions also help shape the transition from a traditional business model to a platform strategy.

Presented at the IBM executive education summit July 27, 2011.

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Platform Strategy: Openness, Innovation & Control

  1. 1. Open / Closed Platform Strategies:How, When & Why<br />Geoffrey Parker<br />Freeman School of Business, Tulane<br />gparker@tulane.edu<br />Marshall Van Alstyne<br />Boston University & MIT<br />mva@bu.edu,marshall@mit.edu<br />
  2. 2. MVA Information Economics Research<br />Platforms &<br />Network Effects<br />Communications<br />Markets<br />Information &<br />Productivity<br />Economics of<br />IP<br />
  3. 3. Why we are here today<br />How can firms such as IBM, AT&T and others create nonlinear <br />shareholder value from platforms in ways that Apple, Google, <br />Facebook and Salesforce.com do?<br />
  4. 4. 1981-1997 Microsoft beats Apple<br />Apple launched the personal computer market but Microsoft licensed widely, building a huge developer ecosystem. By the time of the antitrust trial, Microsoft had more than 6 times the number of developers.<br />© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne<br />
  5. 5. Apple 1996<br />Michael Dell “I’d shut it down and give the money back to the shareholders.”<br />
  6. 6. Apple 2000<br />
  7. 7. Apple passes Microsoft May 26, 2010<br />Using a platform strategy, Apple becomes the most valuable tech firm in the US, representing $310Bn to Microsoft’s $204Bn. Chart shows % growth.<br />© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne<br />
  8. 8. Technology Smackdown<br />
  9. 9. 9<br />Google vs. Microsoft<br />vs. Apple<br />
  10. 10. Technology Smackdown<br />
  11. 11. 11<br />Technology Smackdown<br />
  12. 12. 12<br />Network vs Computer<br />Network as the Computer<br />Computer as the Network<br />
  13. 13. Managerial Implications<br />Understand: Winners in a platform market generally have the “best” platform strategy, not necessarily the “best” product<br />Best platform?<br />Open (but not too open) interfaces<br />Modular architectures (easy to build on/extend)<br />Compelling complements (generally result of vibrant ecosystem)<br />Best product? Best standalone value proposition, but while starting here is good, usually not enough to win a platform market<br />Decision for YOU and IBM: product strategies or platform strategies?<br />13<br />Source: Cusumano 2011<br />
  14. 14. Agenda<br />Understanding platforms <br />Externalities and network effects in ecosystems<br />Winner-Take-All<br />Elements of platform strategy<br />Choke points and platform evolution<br />Pla<br />
  15. 15. Ongoing Platform Battlegrounds<br />15<br />
  16. 16. 16<br />Platform Definition<br />A foundation technology or set of components (could also be a service) used beyond a single firm <br />Allows multiple parties (“market sides”) to transact across the platform<br />Value of the platform may increase non-linearly with more users – depends on strength of network effects.<br />
  17. 17. Platform Examples<br />Desktop OS: Unix, Mac, Windows<br />PDAs: Palm, Psion, Newton<br />Game Consoles: Wii, Xbox, Playstation<br />Network Switches: Cisco, IBM, HP<br />Multimedia: Adobe/Flash, MS/Silverlight, Google-Apple/HTML5 <br />Payment Systems: Paypal, Google Checkout, Visa, Apple, Mobile Felica<br />Mobile Devices: iPhone, Android, Symbian, Blackberry<br />Enterprise Systems: Salesforce, Oracle, i2, IBM, SAP<br />Social Networks: Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, Monster, Twitter<br />Batteries: Sony, Panasonic, Sanyo, A123<br />Web Search: Google, Bing+Yahoo!, Baidu<br />Ebooks: Amazon, iPad, Nook, Sony<br />Smart Grids: IBM etc.<br />Health Care: Microsoft, WebMD, IBM etc.<br />
  18. 18. Agenda<br />Understanding platforms <br />Externalities and network effects in ecosystems<br />Winner-Take-All Effect<br />Elements of platform strategy<br />Choke points and platform evolution<br />AT&T Platforms: Breakout exercise<br />Pla<br />
  19. 19. 19<br />Pop Quiz: What are “network externalities?”<br />Hint: they matter for pricing, winner-take-all markets, and strategy…<br />
  20. 20. 20<br />A “network externality” is a demand economy of scale.<br />Examples: phone, fax, IM, email networks.<br />
  21. 21. 21<br />Supply vs. Demand Scale Economies<br />Cost Econ of Scale<br />Demand Econ of Scale<br />Demand<br />Demand<br />Supply<br />Supply<br /><ul><li> Falling average costs
  22. 22. Monopolistic supply
  23. 23. Utilities, Semiconductors
  24. 24. Often falling avg cost
  25. 25. Monopolistic supply
  26. 26. OS, IM, MMOG</li></ul>Standard Goods<br />Price<br />Demand<br />Supply<br />Quantity<br /><ul><li> Rising average costs
  27. 27. More competitive supply
  28. 28. Oil, Soda, Bread</li></li></ul><li>22<br />FAX<br />(Re)interpreting Network Externalities<br />“Network Externalities” are demand economies of scale.<br />They imply at least some level of interaction as when I email you, or you FAX or IM me.<br />E-Mail<br />IM<br />Phone<br />See: Parker & Van Alstyne (2005). “Two Sided Network Effects,” Management Science.<br />
  29. 29. 23<br />Reinterpreting Network Externalities<br />Where is the interaction when your neighbor rents “Lord of the Rings”?<br />In fact, his rental may mean you have to wait!<br />
  30. 30. 24<br />Traditional Linear Value Chain<br />Stage 1<br />Stage 2<br />Stage 3<br />$<br />$<br />$<br />Value accumulates from stage to stage<br />Minimal Network Effects<br />
  31. 31. Apple iPod pre-Platform<br />User<br />Content<br />Apple<br />$<br />$<br /> Product First Thinking<br />Standard linear value chain <br /> User matches MP3 player to library<br /> Minimal network effects<br />© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne<br />
  32. 32. Apple iPod post-Platform<br />User<br />Content<br />$<br />$<br />Apple<br /> Triangular platform supply network<br /> Apple owns financial chokepoint<br /> Apple matches users to content<br /> Stronger network effects<br />© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne<br />
  33. 33. 27<br />A two-sided network has four network effects<br />Asame-sideeffect for each side, i.e., preference regarding number of other users on own side<br />Across-side effect in each direction, i.e., preference regarding number of users on other side<br />Side 1<br />Side 2<br />$<br />$<br />Platform<br />
  34. 34. 28<br />Managing network effects often involvessubsidy; Who should get it?<br />
  35. 35. Pricing<br />Ability to capture cross-side effects<br />Mistake of Netscape<br />See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.<br />
  36. 36. Pricing<br />Ability to capture cross-side effects<br />User sensitivity to price & quality<br />Mistake of Netscape<br />Denver vs. Boston real estate markets<br />See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.<br />
  37. 37. Pricing<br />Ability to capture cross-side effects<br />User sensitivity to price & quality<br />Value added<br />Mistake of Netscape<br />Denver vs. Boston real estate markets<br />Mistake of 1984 Apple<br />See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.<br />
  38. 38. Pricing<br />Ability to capture cross-side effects<br />User sensitivity to price & quality<br />Value added<br />Marginal costs<br />Mistake of Netscape<br />Denver vs. Boston real estate markets<br />Mistake of 1984 Apple<br />Mistake of FreePC<br />See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.<br />
  39. 39. Pricing<br />Ability to capture cross-side effects<br />User sensitivity to price & quality<br />Value added<br />Marginal costs<br />Interfering same-side effects<br />Mistake of Netscape<br />Denver vs. Boston real estate markets<br />Mistake of 1984 Apple<br />Mistake of FreePC<br />Mistake of Covisint<br />See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.<br />
  40. 40. Pricing<br />Ability to capture cross-side effects<br />User sensitivity to price & quality<br />Value added<br />Marginal costs<br />Interfering same-side effects<br />Marquee users<br />Mistake of Netscape<br />Denver vs. Boston real estate markets<br />Mistake of 1984 Apple<br />Mistake of FreePC<br />Mistake of Covisint<br />Mistake of Microsoft<br />See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.<br />
  41. 41. Agenda<br />Understanding platforms <br />Externalities and network effects in ecosystems<br />Winner-Take-All Effect<br />Elements of platform strategy<br />Choke points and platform evolution<br />AT&T Platforms: Breakout exercise<br />Pla<br />
  42. 42. Homing and Switching Costs<br />1 SETUP + 1ONGOING<br />Mono-homing<br />2 SETUPS + 1 TERMINATION + 1 ONGOING<br />Switching<br />2 SETUPS + 2 ONGOING<br />Multi-homing<br />See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.<br />
  43. 43. When do Winner-Take-All Networks Emerge?<br />Large Supply/Demand Effects (FB vs gas engine)<br />Large Multi-Homing Costs (OS vs credit cards).<br />Niche specialization is less feasible.<br />Windows<br />© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne<br />
  44. 44. How Apple is killing standalone platforms<br />Usr<br />Book<br />Usr<br />Mus<br />Kindle<br />Zune<br />Sony<br />Amazon<br />Microsoft<br />Usr<br />Gam<br />User<br />Music<br />TV<br />User<br />Dvpr<br />HTML<br />Publi<br />PSP<br />MP3<br />Video<br />Calls<br />Games<br />Web<br />eBooks<br />Apple has vastly stronger network effects.<br />© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne<br />
  45. 45. How Apple is killing standalone platforms<br />Usr<br />Book<br />Usr<br />Mus<br />Kindle<br />Zune<br />Sony<br />Amazon<br />Microsoft<br />Usr<br />Gam<br />User<br />Music<br />TV<br />User<br />Dvpr<br />HTML<br />Publi<br />PSP<br />MP3<br />Video<br />Calls<br />Games<br />Web<br />eBooks<br />Sony could have done this – has many great standalone products.<br />Google is not making this mistake with Android<br />© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne<br />
  46. 46. How Apple is killing standalone platforms<br />Usr<br />Book<br />Usr<br />Mus<br />Kindle<br />Zune<br />Amazon<br />Sony<br />MS Zune<br />Usr<br />Gam<br />User<br />Music<br />TV<br />User<br />Dvpr<br />HTML<br />Publi<br />PSP<br />MP3<br />Video<br />Calls<br />Games<br />Web<br />eBooks<br />Message for IBM: A great standalone product might not be sufficient.<br />© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne<br />
  47. 47. How Apple is killing standalone platforms<br />Usr<br />Book<br />Usr<br />Mus<br />Kindle<br />Zune<br />Sony<br />Amazon<br />Microsoft<br />Usr<br />Gam<br />User<br />Music<br />TV<br />User<br />Dvpr<br />HTML<br />Publi<br />PSP<br />MP3<br />Video<br />Calls<br />Games<br />Web<br />eBooks<br />See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2011). “Platform Envelopment,” Strategic Management Journal.<br />
  48. 48. Agenda<br />Understanding platforms <br />Externalities and network effects in ecosystems<br />Winner-Take-All Effect<br />Elements of platform strategy<br />Choke points and platform evolution<br />AT&T Platforms: Breakout exercise<br />Pla<br />
  49. 49. Identifying choke points that matter<br /><ul><li>PC – OS, applications, microprocessor; Pheonix BIOS story
  50. 50. Telecom – CPE equipment, physical pipe (last mile), billing
  51. 51. Online retail (Amazon.com) – customer base, distribution infrastructure, affiliate relationships
  52. 52. SAP – Access rights of developers to participate on the platform, certification, in-store sales, billing.</li></li></ul><li>44<br />Openness vs. Control<br />Maximum protection ≠ Maximum Value<br />Proprietary<br />Your Share<br />Open<br />Industry Value Add<br />Your reward = (Value added to industry) x (Your share)<br />Based on: Shapiro & Varian ‘99<br />
  53. 53. 45<br />Openness vs. Control<br />Maximum protection ≠ Maximum Value<br />Proprietary<br />Your Share<br />Open<br />Industry Value Add<br />Set-Top Boxes were too closed, 3rd parties never added value.<br />
  54. 54. 46<br />Openness vs. Control<br />Maximum protection ≠ Maximum Value<br />Proprietary<br />Your Share<br />Open<br />Industry Value Add<br />Linux is so open (viral GPL) it’s difficult to control and make money.<br />
  55. 55. Does Openness Work?<br />What did Facebook do in early 2007?<br />
  56. 56. Does Openness Work?<br />It opened to developers and overtook MySpace!<br />
  57. 57. Why does openness work?<br />Platform sponsor gives away (yellow) platform value<br />Price<br />V1<br />p1<br />q1<br />Quantity<br />Downstream enhancements add value<br />See: Parker, Van Alstyne (2011). “Innovation, Openness & Platform Control,” SSRN.com.<br />
  58. 58. Why does openness work?<br />V2<br />Platform sponsor gives away (yellow) platform value<br />Developers build apps for installed base, adding new layers of value.<br />Benefits:<br />Sponsor from increased sales, and downstream royalties.<br />Developer from cost savings and installed base.<br />Price<br />V1<br />p1<br />q1<br />Quantity<br />Downstream enhancements add value<br />See: Parker, Van Alstyne (2011). “Innovation, Openness & Platform Control,” SSRN.com.<br />
  59. 59. V4<br />V3<br />V2<br />Why does openness work?<br />Platform sponsor gives away (yellow) platform value<br />Developers build apps for installed base, adding new layers of value.<br />Benefits:<br />Sponsor from increased sales, and downstream royalties.<br />Developer from cost savings and installed base.<br />Repeat<br />Price<br />V1<br />p1<br />q1<br />Quantity<br />Downstream enhancements add value<br />See: Parker, Van Alstyne (2011). “Innovation, Openness & Platform Control,” SSRN.com.<br />
  60. 60. Platforms get enormous value from 3rd party developers<br />Most firms can only concentrate on most valuable apps<br />Profits increase when others add to platform’s “Long Tail”<br />Consider an operating system like MS Windows, Apple Mac, or Google Android<br />
  61. 61. 53<br />What does control mean?<br />Split IP rights from point of customer contact.<br /> Open access<br /> Extend platform<br /> Touch customers<br /> Change platform<br />Side 1<br />Side 2<br />Side 1<br />Side 2<br />Platform<br />Platform Provider<br />Platform Provider<br />Platform Sponsor<br />Platform Sponsor<br />
  62. 62. 54<br />What does control mean?<br />Split IP rights from point of customer contact.<br /> Open access<br /> Extend platform<br /> Touch customers<br /> Change platform<br />Side 1<br />Side 2<br />Side 1<br />Side 2<br />Platform Provider<br />Platform Provider<br />Platform Sponsor<br />Platform Sponsor<br />
  63. 63. 55<br />Actually Parallels Concepts from OSS<br />Split IP rights from point of customer contact.<br />Consider 4 “freedoms” of open source:<br />Ability to access & execute<br />Side 1<br />Side 2<br />Side 1<br />Platform Provider<br />Platform Sponsor<br />
  64. 64. 56<br />Actually Parallels Concepts from OSS<br />Split IP rights from point of customer contact.<br />Consider 4 “freedoms” of open source:<br />Ability to access & execute<br />Ability to study how the program works and change it. <br />Side 1<br />Side 2<br />Side 1<br />Side 2<br />Platform Provider<br />Platform Sponsor<br />
  65. 65. 57<br />Actually Parallels Concepts from OSS<br />Split IP rights from point of customer contact.<br />Consider 4 “freedoms” of open source:<br />Ability to access & execute<br />Ability to study how the program works and change it. <br />Ability to redistribute copies.<br />Side 1<br />Side 2<br />Side 1<br />Side 2<br />Platform Provider<br />Platform Provider<br />Platform Sponsor<br />
  66. 66. 58<br />Actually Parallels Concepts from OSS<br />Split IP rights from point of customer contact.<br />Consider 4 “freedoms” of open source:<br />Ability to access & execute<br />Ability to study how the program works and change it. <br />Ability to redistribute copies.<br />Ability to distribute mods. <br />Side 1<br />Side 2<br />Side 1<br />Side 2<br />Platform Provider<br />Platform Provider<br />Platform Sponsor<br />Platform Sponsor<br />
  67. 67. 59<br />Apple tried to control too much of the original Mac<br />Remember MacWrite, MacPaint?<br />Charged ~$10,000 for SDKs. <br />Controlled OS & HW and dominant Apps.<br />Vertical integration choked network effects.<br />Users<br />Claris<br />Apple Mac<br />Mac OS<br />
  68. 68. 60<br />Microsoft opened much more of its ecosystem <br />Microsoft had 6-10X developers<br />Open APIs / Cheap SDKs<br />Controlled OS, licensed.<br />Strong network effects.<br />Users<br />Dvprs<br />IBM<br />Dell<br />…<br />HP<br />MS Windows<br />
  69. 69. 61<br />For real profits, control full layer<br />Users<br />Users<br />Users<br />Dvprs<br />Flights<br />Dvprs<br />Providers<br />Acer<br />Provider<br />Dell<br />…<br />HP<br />Sponsors<br />Debian<br />Sponsor<br />RedHat<br />Ubuntu<br />…<br />Linux: <br />No one driving the bus. Limited scope of control.<br />Joint Venture: <br />e.g. Orbitz airline collaboration<br />Licensing: <br />e.g. Google Android <br />
  70. 70. 62<br />Danger!<br />Users<br />Dvprs<br />Providers<br />Sponsor<br />Watch for new control points closer to customer.<br />See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Opening Platforms: How, When & Why” Ch 6 in Platforms, Markets and Innovation (ed Gawer).<br />
  71. 71. 63<br />Danger!<br />Users<br />Dvprs<br />Providers<br />Sponsor<br />Watch for new control points closer to customer.<br />See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Opening Platforms: How, When & Why” Ch 6 in Platforms, Markets and Innovation (ed Gawer).<br />
  72. 72. When should you close (absorb) parts of a platform ecosystem?<br />Openness &Time: Having opened its platform, does Microsoft (or Cisco or Google or Apple) kill its ecosystem by bundling developer value into Windows?<br />Windows: Multithreading, Disk Compression, Internet Browsing, Streaming Media, Instant Messaging, …<br />iPhone: Flashlight, Voice Memo, shake-to-shuffle, iBooks, Voice Control, …<br />© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne<br />
  73. 73. Should Apple have opened the iPod?<br />65<br />Most firms can only concentrate on most valuable apps<br />Profits increase when others add to platform’s “Long Tail”<br />No! It does 1 thing only, so make it “insanely great” and own it.<br />
  74. 74. Should Apple have opened the iPhone?<br />Most firms can only concentrate on most valuable apps<br />Profits increase when others add to platform’s “Long Tail”<br />Of Course! It has video, wifi, camera (scanner), accelerometer, mobile, MP3, web browsing, etc. Platforms benefit from broad contributions. <br />But control the top several complements.<br />
  75. 75. Which applications to absorb?<br />Apps offered by <br />Platform Sponsor<br />Apps offered by <br />Developers<br />Rule 1: Absorb the highest value applications from the ecosystem. This adds value for users and mitigates threat of disintermediation.<br />Example: Apple iPad absorbed e-books<br />Example: Microsoft Windows absorbed web browsing<br />
  76. 76. Anything else to absorb?<br />Apps offered by <br />Platform Sponsor<br />Apps offered by <br />Developers<br />
  77. 77. Anything else to absorb?<br />Rule 2: Absorb features that emerge in multiple places in the ecosystem. This increases compatibility, ensures efficient implementation, and benefits other apps. <br />Examples: Operating systems support for (i) spell check (ii) cut & paste (iii) PDF.<br />
  78. 78. We have explored the platform strategies of many firms<br />How will you build IBM’s platform strategy?<br />
  79. 79. Background<br /><ul><li>G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne (2000). “Information Complements, Substitutes, and Strategic Product Design.” SSRN.com
  80. 80. A. Gawer, M. Cusumano (2002). Platform leadership: How Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco drive industry innovation. Harvard Business School Press.
  81. 81. A. Gawer, M. Cusumano (2002). “The elements of platform leadership,” MIT Sloan Management Review
  82. 82. G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne (2005). “Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design.” Management Science.
  83. 83. T. Eisenmann, G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.
  84. 84. A. Gawer and M. Cusumano (2008). “How Companies become Platform Leaders.” MIT Sloan Management Review
  85. 85. A. Gawer, (2009). Platforms, Markets, and Innovation. Elgar.
  86. 86. G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne (2009). “Opening Platforms: How, When & Why Ch. 6 in Gawer, A. (ed) Platforms, Markets and Innovation.
  87. 87. M. Cusumano (2010). Staying Power: Six Enduring Principles for Managing Strategy and Innovation. Oxford University Press.
  88. 88. M. Cusumano (2010). The evolution of platform thinking. Communications of the ACM.
  89. 89. T. Eisenmann, G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne. (2011) “Platform Envelopment.” Strategic Management Journal.</li></li></ul><li>Thank you <br />gparker@tulane.edu, mva@bu.edu, marshall@mit.edu<br />Twitter: infoEcon<br />

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