A report on the scope of e-commerce in the Indian Economy , class 12 economics project, cbse, Indian economic development, macroeconomics.

2. TABLE OF CONTENT:
1. Understanding E-Commerce:
• What is E-Commerce?
• History of E-Commerce.
• Working Mechanism of E-Commerce.
• Bene
f
its of E-Commerce.
• Disadvantages of E-Commerce
2. Factors a
ff
ecting the Business Model Of E-Commerce.
3. Understanding Inventory and Marketplace Models in E-Commerce.
4. Analysing the Economics and Strategies behind E-Commerce giants and
Retailers:
• Amazon
• Flipkart
• D-Mart
• JioMart
5. Unfair business practices by e-commerce giants— Amazon&Flipkart
6. Policy framework to regulate E-Commerce:
• The Consumer Protection(E-Commerce) Rules, 2020
• Foreign Direct Investment Rules and policy framework for E-Commerce
7. Open Network for Digital Commerce: The way forward.

3. I. UNDERSTANDING E-COMMERCE
i. WHAT IS E-COMMERCE?
E-commerce, also called electronic commerce or internet
commerce, describes the trading of products or services using
the internet, and the transfer of cash and data to carry out these
transactions. E-commerce is frequently utilised to describe the
sale of physical items online; however, it can likewise explain any
kind of industrial transaction that is facilitated through the
internet.Whereas e-business refers to all aspects of running an
online organisation, e-commerce refers particularly to the deal of
items and services.
ii. HISTORY OF E-COMMERCE
The
f
irst e-commerce deal was made in 1994. A man named Phil
Branden Berger used his Mastercard to buy Sting’s 10
Summoners’ Tales by means of the internet for $12.48. This
particular deal made history and signalled to the world that the
“internet is open” for e-commerce transactions. It was the very
f
irst time that
f
ile encryption technology was utilised to make it
possible for internet purchase.
Unnecessary to say, e-commerce has actually grown by leaps
and bounds since. The increase of e-commerce giants like
Amazon and Alibaba in the mid -1990 s changed the face of the
retail market. They largely took advantage of the international
internet penetration and digitalisation of the
f
inancial system

4. which added to the decline in sales for numerous brick-and-
mortar organisations.
iii. WORKING MECHANISM OF E-COMMERCE
E-commerce is powered by the internet, where customers can
access an online store to check out, and place orders for
products or services via their own gadgets.
As the order is placed, the customer’s internet browser will
interact back and forth with the server hosting the online store

5. site. Information relating to the order will then be relayed to a
central computer known as the order manager– then forwarded
to databases that manage stock levels, a merchant system that
manages payment info (using applications such as PayPal,
Stripe), and a bank computer– prior to circling back to the order
supervisor.
This is to make sure that shop inventory and consumer funds
su
ff
ice for the order to be processed. After the order is
con
f
irmed, the order supervisor will notify the shop’s internet
server, which will then display a message alerting the consumer
that their order has been successfully processed. The order
manager will then send out order information to the warehouse
or consummation department, in order for the services or
product to be e
ff
ectively dispatched to the consumer. At this
point tangible and/or digital products may be shipped to a
consumer, or access to a service may be granted.
Platforms that host e-commerce transactions may consist of
online marketplaces that sellers simply sign up for, such as
Amazon.com; software application as a service (SaaS) tools that
allow customers to ‘lease’ online shop facilities; or open-source
tools for business to use in-house advancement to manage.
iv. BENEFITS OF E-COMMERCE
• E-commerce provides the sellers with a global reach. They
get rid of the barrier of place (location). Now sellers and
buyers can meet in the virtual world, without the obstacle of
location.

6. • Electronic commerce will considerably decrease the deal
expense. It gets rid of numerous
f
ixed expenses of keeping
physical shops. This allows the business to delight in a much
greater margin of pro
f
it.
• It provides quick shipment of items with minimal e
ff
ort on
part of the customer. Customer grievances are also
addressed quickly. It likewise conserves time, energy, and
e
ff
ort for both the customers and the company.
• Another fantastic advantage is the bene
f
it it uses. A
customer can go shopping 24 × 7. The site is functional at all
times, it does not have working hours like a shop.
• Electronic commerce also permits the consumer and
business to be in touch directly, with no intermediaries. This
permits quick communication and transactions. It likewise
o
ff
ers a valuable individual touch.
v. DISADVANTAGES OF E-COMMERCE
• The start-up costs of the e-commerce portal are very high.
The setup of the hardware and the software, the training
cost of sta
ff
members, the continuous maintenance and
upkeep are all rather costly.
• Although it might look like a safe bet, the e-commerce
industry has a high danger of failure. Many businesses
riding the dot-com wave of the 2000s have failed miserably.
The high risk of failure remains even today.
• At times, e-commerce can feel impersonal. So, it does not
have the warmth of an interpersonal relationship which is
important for many brand names and items. This absence of
a personal touch can be a downside for numerous kinds of

7. products and services like interior designing or the precious
jewellery business.
• Security is another area of concern. Just recently, we have
witnessed numerous security breaches where the info of the
consumers was stolen. Credit card theft, identity theft, and
so on stay big interest in the consumers.
II. FACTORS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS MODEL OF
E-COMMERCE
The success of retailing on online is deployed by various
strategies based on the unique selling proposition of a platform.
In case of Amazon and Flipkart, it’s the data that enables the
consumer speci
f
ic products which made them billion dollar
companies. For D-Mart, it’s the “Deep Discounting” strategy
which increased the volume of buying. For Reliance, it’s the
accessibility factor. In this way, the business model are way more
diversi
f
ied and saturated in the market. But fundamentally, there
are some key factors which is common for all these companies
in terms of consumer-centric as well in terms of business point
of view. These factors are listed below:
1. From consumers’ point of view:
• Cost
• Delivery time

8. • Variety and quality.
• Clear return policy.
2. From business point of view:
• Customer Retention.
• Supply Chain.
• Margins.
• Quality of Search Engine Optimisation.
Apart from these factors, the government policies is the most
important factor which determines the success of an E-
Commerce company. Since 2016, the government of India is
very aggressive to check the adverse e
ff
ects of the e-commerce
companies on the business ecosystem and the consumer
preferences, more this will be discussed in the later section.
III. UNDERSTANDING MARKETPLACE AND
INVENTORY BUSINESS MODELS
MARKETPLACE MODEL
Marketplace model of e-commerce means providing an
information technology platform by an e-commerce entity on a
digital and electronic network to act as a facilitator between
buyer and seller.

9.
In this model:
• Marketplace acts as a medium for the seller to sell his
goods to buyers.
• Invoices are issued directly from Seller to buyers.
• Seller is responsible for the collection of taxes on the
products and services that it is selling.
• Marketplace charges a fee/commission to sellers on items
listed/sold on the marketplace and charges service tax on
those fees.
• Examples: eBay, ShopClues
INVENTORY MODEL
Inventory model of e-commerce means an e-commerce activity
where the inventory of goods and services is owned by e-
commerce entity and is sold to the consumers directly.

10.
In this model:
• Marketplace purchases the goods from the sellers and
sells them to customers directly.
• Marketplace issues purchase order to the sellers and seller
issues invoices against the purchase orders.
• Marketplace issues invoice directly to customers for the
products sold.
• Examples: JABONG

11. Apart from these two models, the e-commerce giants: Amazon
and Walmart led Flipkart changed the rules of the game by
introducing hybrid model to in order to comply to the policies of
the India government. It Is a hybrid model, which is a mix of
Marketplace and Inventory led models. The model works similar
to Marketplace model except that in this model the marketplace
o
ff
ers sellers ful
f
ilment services which include inventory storage,
packaging and delivery but sellers are free to choose between
self-ful
f
ilment and marketplace-ful
f
ilment.
Moreover, the inventory model is more lucrative compared to
marketplace model from a e-commerce company’s view point
because of the “Power of Bargaining”.
IV. ANALYSING THE ECONOMICS AND STRATEGIES
BEHIND E-COMMERCE GIANTS AND RETAILERS
Amazon, by far is one of biggest e-commerce
Pros
Marketplace Inventory
Highly scalable Speed delivery
Wide product and
a large number of
sellers
Better quality
control-seller and
products, both
Investor friendly Best customer
experience and
trust
Cons
Marketplace Inventory
Di
ff
icult to conduct
quality check
Di
ff
icult to scale
Shipping cost is
higher
High
f
ixed cost
Di
ff
icult to build
trust and loyalty
Restricted cash
f
low

12. giant in India with a market share of around 32% in 2021. Since
its inception in
India in 2013, it
had aggressively
grown from mere
7.3% of the
market share to
the present
f
igures. The
Amazon business
model, which was
initially based on
e-commerce has
changed and now incorporates entertainment, music, cloud
computing, meal deliveries and much more. Amazon uses these
other avenues in which it had entered to hook to it’s platform You
can clearly notice from the below informatics, the revenue from
the e-commerce had exponentially grown from $140 billion
dollars in 2017 to $195 billion dollars because of the Amazon’s
foothold in the other pro
f
itable ventures which ramped up it’s
pro
f
its.

13. Amazon Business model: Financial Results
1. Online stores. Includes product sales and digital media
content where we record revenue gross. We leverage our
retail infrastructure to o
ff
er a wide selection of consumable
and durable goods that includes media products available in
both a physical and digital format, such as books, music,
videos, games, and software. These product sales include
digital products sold on a transactional basis. Digital product
subscriptions that provide unlimited viewing or usage rights
are included in “Subscription services.”
2. Physical stores. Includes product sales where our
customer’s physically select items in a store. Sales from
customers who order goods online for delivery or pick up at
our physical stores are included in “Online stores.”
3. Third-party seller services. Commissions and any related
ful
f
ilment and shipping fees, and other third-party seller
services.
4. Subscriptions: Annual and monthly fees associated with
Amazon Prime memberships, as well as audiobook, digital
video, digital music, e-book, and other non-AWS
subscription services. Amazon’s standard Prime subscription
rate is $119/year, which would translate into revenue of more
than $17.8 billion, although the company o
ff
ers discounted
memberships for students and others.
5. AWS: AWS includes global sales of computing, storage,
database, and other services.
6. Other: primarily includes sales of advertising services, as
well as sales related to our other service o
ff
erings.

14. Analysing Amazon’s strategies:
Like many other platforms, the Amazon business model
increasingly relies on Arti
f
icial Intelligence. It is used to maximise
pro
f
its through dynamic pricing, bundling products and o
ff
er
personalised promotions and recommendations.These are some
of the classical marketing levers to drive volume and growth.The
Amazon business model depends on not just o
ff
ering the lowest
pricing but o
ff
ering pricing that rapidly re
f
lects market changes
and pricing changes. Amazon tracks pricing across the web to
identify its price point and that of its competition.In practice, as
is the practice for many online retailers, the lowest prices are for
the most popular products, with less popular products
commanding higher prices and a greater margin for Amazon.
• One of the strategies that Amazon use is the “Sunk-Cost
Fallacy”, which states: A person is reluctant to abandon a
strategy or course of action because they have invested
heavily in it, even when it is clear that abandonment would be
more bene
f
icial. For lucid explanation of Sunk-Cost fallacy, we
tend to watch a movie that we bought ticket for till end
because we paid for it; although, we loss time watching it. Or
in the case of business perspective, non-rationale business
owners invest in the old capital regardless of the improved
state of technological advancements thinking it would be
much cheaper, but he/she doesn’t apply the economics of
scale which improves the productivity of the
f
irm, rather
causing diseconomies. In the case of Amazon, the Prime
Membership had increased the tra
ff
ic and generating billions

15. of dollars in revenue by
the prime users
because of the Sunk-
Cost Fallacy. In fact, by
the regulatory
f
ilings in
the SEC in 2019, it had
been found that the
Prime users are
spending 4.6x more as
compared to Non-Prime users. This chart displays the
Weighted Average Spend per Shopper in dollars.
• One of the most important factor of an e-commerce company
as mentioned in the
section II is the low
cost of Customer
Retention, the most
challenging aspect
of this is that
according to a
survey more than 70% of the online consumers seeks a clear
return policy. But Amazon mastered in this by a billion dollar
idea known as Je
ff
Bezos’
f
lywheel
Amazon’s strategy in Marketplace Model:
• Price dynamism: Amazon makes millions of price changes
every day. Some estimate, they change the pricing of 15-20%
0
650
1300
1950
2600
544
2,486
Prime Non-Prime

16. of their products per day. Dynamic pricing also called surge
pricing, demand pricing, real-time pricing or algorithmic
pricing is where the price is
f
lexible based on demand, supply,
competition price, subsidiary product prices.
• Price perception strategy: One e-commerce service
company points out that Amazon’s “[…] consistently low
prices on the highest-viewed and best-selling items drive a
perception among consumers that Amazon has the best
prices overall”.
• Demand/supply pricing: It is presumed that inventory levels
(supply) and demand in
f
luence the dynamic pricing. For
example, when demand for a product spikes within a short
period, say, due to a promotional campaign, this may lead
to surging prices. Some accounts state that Amazon
keeps surplus pro
f
its on a Marketplace product for themselves
rather than passing it onto the merchant.
• Seasonal prices: up to 30% of annual sales are concentrated
in the period between Black Friday and Christmas, with some
categories being particularly popular in this time frame.
• Bundling/recommendations: Another tactic is bundling
(sometimes with discounts) whereby Amazon suggest similar
products for you to buy, e.g. under “customers who bought
this item also bought”.
Acquisitions:

17. As mention in section II, ‘Variety’ is the
one of the most customer-centric
factor in e-commerce, and Amazon’s
systematic acquisitions over the years
made it a market leader in the
consumer-centric approach.Amazon
has traditionally been a conservative
buyer. Despite the historic Whole
Foods acquisition ($13.7Bn), as well as a
few other purchases like
Zappos ($1.2Bn, 2009) and smart
doorbell system Ring ($1.2Bn, 2018).
Overall, Amazon has historically been
far less focused on acquisitions than its
tech giant rivals. However, that seems
to have changed. There are now
multiple business models besides the
core Amazon business model that
started and remains within the
marketplace.

18. Flipkart was launched in the year 2007. It was a loss making
venture initially for 7 long years due to lack of internet
penetration in the country. Thanks to the Jio revolution in 2014,
revenue of Flipkart skyrocketed from ₹1,163.1 Cr in FY13 to
₹10,245.8 Cr in FY15 which is a growth of 9x in a span of two
years. And by 2015, it had a market share of around 56%. In 2018,
American retail giant Walmart acquired the home-grown retailer
for $16 billion and became a 77% stakeholder. Flipkart’s product
portfolio is widespread, standing out in the online sales of
apparel with more than 75 percent.
The business model of Flipkart is same as that of Amazon.
Flipkart, which has rede
f
ined shopping in India, works on a B2C
(business to consumer model). Flipkart started o
ff
with a direct-
to-consumer model selling books and some other products,
before turning to a marketplace model which connect sellers
and buyers and expanding its catalogue. Today, it sells
everything from smartphones to clothes to furniture
refrigerators to FMCG goods. But the market share of Flipkart is
comparatively more than that of Amazon with 33% in 2021;
moreover, Flipkart has a comparative advantage in Tier II and
Tier III cities in India.
Business model of Flipkart
• Seller Commission: Flipkart charges a commission from the
sellers since it provides a platform for sale for them

19. • Convenience Charge: Flipkart charges a convenience fee to
the buyers for faster delivery
• Logistics: E-Kart is Flipkart’s logistics company and
facilitates the ful
f
ilment of orders from sellers to buyers
through its logistics arm. It charges a fee from the sellers for
the same. There is no standard charge levied as it changes
according to the geography
• Advertisement: Flipkart sells advertising space to
companies on its website. This o
ff
ers a leverage to the
companies buying the advertising space as they are
presented
f
irst to the millions of customers visiting the
Flipkart website daily
• Media Buying: Flipkart releases ads for certain brands in the
popular newspapers, radios, televisions, etc, In doing so,
Flipkart charges a sum from the brands that it advertises for.
Acquisitions, Partnerships and Investments
Acquisitions are the most critical aspect for creating a hook for
customer redemption, low cost customer acquisition and
making an e-commerce company loyal towards it’s customers.
In 2011, Flipkart acquired the digital distribution business
mime360.com and the digital content library of the Bollywood
portal CHAPAK. Following this acquisition, Flipkart launched their
DRM-free online music store Flyte in 2012. Because of
competition from free streaming sites, the site was unsuccessful
and shut down in June 2013.
With its eyes on India's retail market, Flipkart acquired Let’s buy,
an online electronics retailer, in 2012, and Myntra, an online

20. fashion retailer, for $280 million in May 2014. Myntra continues
to operate alongside Flipkart as a standalone subsidiary focusing
on separate market segments. In April 2015, Flipkart acquired
app ITERATE , a Delhi-based mobile marketing automation
f
irm.
Flipkart stated that it would use app ITERATE’s technology to
enhance its mobile services. In December 2015, Flipkart
purchased a minority stake in the digital mapping provider
MapmyIndia. In 2016, Flipkart acquired the online fashion retailer
Jabong.com from Rocket Internet for $70 million and the UPI
mobile payments startup PhonePe. In January 2017, Flipkart
made a $2 million investment in TinyStep, a parenting
information startup. Flipkart invested $35 million in Arvind
Fashions Limited's newly formed subsidiary Arvind Youth Brands
for a 27% stake in the company. Arvind Youth Brands owns Flying
Machine.Flipkart Wholesale recently launched a digital platform
for grocery and
MSMEs. In October
2020, Flipkart
acquired a 7.8%
stake in Aditya Birla
Fashion and Retail
for $204 million.In
April 2017, eBay
announced that it
would sell its Indian
subsidiary, eBay.in,
to Flipkart and
invest $500 million
in the company.
While eBay

21. suggested that the partnership would eventually allow Flipkart to
access eBay's network of international vendors, these plans
never actually came to fruition.[34][35] In July 2017, Flipkart made
an o
ff
er to acquire its main domestic competitor, Snapdeal, for
$700–800 million. It was rejected by Snapdeal, which was
seeking at least $1 billion.
In August 2019, Flipkart entered into a partnership with
Authentic Brands to license and distribute Nautica in India.[37]
Flipkart invested $4 million in the customer engagement and
rewards platform EasyRewardz on 19 November 2019.
Analysing Flipkart’s strategies
Although the business models of both Amazon and Flipkart
same, but Flipkart has more foothold. Like Prime membership
was a billion dollar strategy of Amazon; the hook for customer
redemption is the launch of Flipkart plus membership and it has
an absolute advantage over Prime membership due to low
acquisition cost. Let’s understand the mechanism of Flipkart plus
membership and Flipkart Super-coins.
The low cost of acquisition is because if you opt to subscribe to
Flipkart Plus, you will not be charged any additional fees. The
subscription service is based on a coin system. Flipkart
membership comes with a variety of bene
f
its, like quicker
shipping, early access to big sales, and free shipping on some
purchases
Purchasing products on Flipkart is the way to earn money. You
get four SuperCoins for every Rs.100 you spend. However, if you
are not a plus member, you will receive two SuperCoins. You

22. may also earn coins by purchasing items
from their partner brands—this makes
acquisitions critical to a e-commerce
company. The process is quite simple, and
all a person has to do is earn 200 SuperCoins in 12 months to
avail of the annual Plus membership.
D-Mart is a supermarket chain across India owned by 'Avenue
Supermarkets.' None other than 'Radhakrishnan Damani’, one of
India's famous value investors founded the company in the year
2000. Mr Damani's journey from a successful value investor to
the founder of D-Mart has been an inspiration. D-Mart started its
journey from 2 stores in the state of Maharashtra and has 176
stores across 12 states in India by FY20. 'Avenue Supermarkets,'
the owner company of D-Mart supermarkets, was a privately held
company till 2016.In the year 2017, the company came up with
an IPO of Rs.1,870 Cr., which was opened with a bang. The
company's shares were listed at almost a 114% premium, which
re
f
lects the positive sentiment for the company among the
investors. The company got listed at the price of Rs. 632 and the
CMP (Current Market Price) stand at Rs. 2544, implying that the
shares of the company have given a compounded growth of
almost 60% over three years.
Business Model
A successful business model is the crucial element of any
business to
f
lourish, grow and beat its competition. D-Mart’s
business model has made the company grow exponentially and
become the most pro
f
itable supermarket chain in India. The

23. company's mission is to be the low-priced retailer in its area of
operation.
• Product-Mix: The company comprises everyday use products
for its customers, which are categorised as Foods, Non-foods
and General Merchandise & Apparel. The chain operates on a
B2C (Business to Consumer) model, where goods are directly
sold from the manufacturer to the end-user.The demand for
these goods is on-going as they comply with the basic day-to-
day needs, thereby creating a demand throughout the year.
This eliminates the risk of high demand
f
luctuations and
provides consistency to the business.
• Slotting Fees: It is a payment that is made by the
manufacturer of goods to the superstore to keep its products
on the shelf for sale. Also called an entry fee for the products,
which are held in the supermarket. Being a supermarket chain
D-Mart also charges a 'Slotting Fee.'The store attracts high
volumes of customers, making it an attractive and
opportunistic place for the manufacturers to keep their
products. This attracts more and more manufacturers willing
to put their products in the store.A slotting fee indirectly
reduces the product's purchasing price for the retailer,
thereby allowing it to o
ff
er the products at discounted prices,
i.e., less than the MRP (Maximum Retail Price), hence
attracting large buyers.
• Reduce Expense: A low-cost business model with high pro
f
its
is one of the most attractive and successful forms of running
a business. As simple, it sounds like it is not that easy to
achieve.However, D-Mart has successfully achieved it. How?

24. D-Mart operates on a low-interior-cost concept where it has
tried to reduce the operational expenses for the company.
These low operating expenses are a result of- e
ff
icient space
utilisation by putting more products in less space thereby
creating space for more products; less number of billing
counters reduces the requirement of more workforce and
systems thereby reducing employee cost; a very basic and
low-maintenance interior of the store, are some of the ways
through which D-Mart has controlled its expenses.
• Low purchase price for the products: The credit cycleof D-,
Mart i.e. the time in which it returns the payment to the
manufacturers for the goods purchased from them is quite
less than other retail operators. This allows the company to
avail massive cash discounts from the manufacturers, thereby
cutting the purchase price of the goods.
• Volume Sales: Being a low-priced retailer gives an edge toD-
Mart. Low price leads to high footfall in the store leading to
high sales volume, thereby attracting more and more
manufacturers to keep their products inD-Mart. This is a cycle
created by D-Mart, which keeps the loop ongoing. Further,
due to high volume sales, manufacturers also extend a
volume discount, reducing the purchasing price. This
supports the low-cost business model and makes it stronger.
• Regional Goods: India being a diverse country has various
regional speci
f
ic goods. D-Mart grabbed this opportunity by
stocking its stores with area-speci
f
ic products. People
across di
ff
erent states have unique lifestyles habits and hence
lead to slightly di
ff
erent consumption habits.D-Mart

25. pooled the popular local brands of a particular region in one
place, making it more convenient for the buyers to avoid
going to the local Kirana shops. This helps D-Mart to cut the
competition from general Kirana stores gaining more market
share.
• Self-owned stores: The Company operates on self-owned
stores, which allows it to be a low or no debt company making
it stronger
f
inancially. Further, no rental cost helps in high
positive cash
f
lows, which are used for opening more stores.
Although the expansion and growth in self-owned stores are
slow, it has its own advantages. Of all the existing stores to
date, almost 80% are self-owned.
• Target Audience: D-Mart’s target customers are low-income
groups who are looking for low-cost goods. Thus by providing
excellent quality and branded products at a lower cost, D-
Mart’s attracts a more extensive customer base than other
retailers.
• Eliminates middlemen: Operating on a B2C model eliminates
intermediaries and hence the added cost to the product's
price. This further helps the company to sell goods at a lower
price.
• Advantage of Consumer Behavioural Patterns: O
ff
ering a
variety of products at low-prices creates psychology in
customers to buy more, which is o
ff
ered at a discount. This
behavioural pattern among the consumers has been evident
when the 'Sales Period' of the year arrives in stores

26. JioMart is an O2O(online-to-o
ff
line) grocery retail market place,
where users can browse products and place their orders online,
and complete the transaction o
ff
line at the nearest store located
in the customer’s locality.
JioMart is an O2O(online-to-o
ff
line) grocery
retail market place, where users can browse
products and place their orders online, and
complete the transaction o
ff
line at the
nearest store located in the customer’s
locality. Jiomart provides 50,000+ grocery products at
discounted rates at your doorstep through an express delivery
system. It follows an on-demand model. In this model, Jiomart
will avoid the system of warehousing the products and partner
with local retailers instead. These retailers will source the
grocery products and deliver them to the customers.
JioMart claims to o
ff
er the following consumer-friendly services:
• Free home delivery: It will give you the bene
f
it of delivery of
commodities at your doorstep by procuring it from the
nearby store, and that too free of cost, which your ‘Local
General Store’ may not.
• No minimum value: Generally, e-commerce sites set up a
minimum value of a purchase to validate free delivery. For
example, Big Basket has the policy of free delivery on a
minimum purchase of INR 500. JioMart will not expect a
‘minimum payment’ and abstain from delivery charges, even
for the smallest of items ordered.

27. • Express Delivery: Express delivery means quicker delivery
than ordinary services. In the e-commerce segment, it is
generally within 24 hours.
Business model
JioMart will operates in Online to O
ff
line model. JioMart will
connect with local retailers and deliver the goods to
customers by procuring them from the nearest store
located in the customer’s area.
This model is di
ff
erent from the
warehouse model used by
Grofers and Amazon. The
company wants to develop the
unorganised retail sector and
help local shopkeepers whose
businesses were adversely a
ff
ected due to competitive
pricing and warehousing strategies of online retail stores.
In addition to increased sales and margins, these shopkeepers
will be equipped with point of sale (PoS) terminals, integrated
billing applications, and GST compliance. It will also up skill
them in inventory management and supply chain management.
The revenue model of JioMart is lucrative, it tends to change the
traditional supply chain of the local grocery shops(Kirana),
wherein the JioMart acts like a hub from the manufacturers to
the shopkeepers, in this way, JioMart gets the incredible
superpower of “Bargaining” and sell it to the local grocery shops.

28. If executed right, because of it’s scale and software, it can
revolutionise the retail sector in India by locking horns with the
D-Mart.
Since JioMart has been launched in 2020, it doesn’t have enough
foothold yet. Now let’s analysis the execution plans of JioMart:
The below chart illustrates the procedure if a local grocery shop
wants to convert into a JioMart Exclusive store.
The important aspects of the above informatics is the
requirement of more than 200 sq.ft of store size and regular
orders to JioMart Ful
f
ilment Centre. As mentioned earlier, more

29. than 70% of the online consumer
seeks a return policy. Since
JioMart operates in a online to
o
ff
line model eliminating the requirement of warehouse and
creating a micro-warehouse in the Exclusive stores gives it two
incredible super powers that no e-retailer has:
• Reduction on workforce and havocking environmental
damage: When an online consumer returns a product in an
inventory model, it gets stored in the Warehouse where it is
either trashed out or placed in the ful
f
ilment category. In most
of the cases, the products gets dumped in land
f
ills creating a
lot of environmental damage because of the peoples’
perception of it being of an inferior quality. In addition to that,
e-retailers burn a lot of cash on package, transportation and
the logistics which creates an ine
ff
icient system. But whereas
in the case of JioMart, since there are already 12,000 Reliance
retail across India embellished with JioMart it can cut a lot of
cash. And place it in the “Ful
f
ilment Centre” at discounted
rates.

30. • Increases the tra
ff
ic: Since most of the products in the
JioMart in the ful
f
ilment centre are groceries, the perception
of inferior quality gets eliminated, hence the cheap rates
attracts the masses, increasing the overall size of the billing.
Challenges and limitations
• Store size and location: JioMart demands the Kiranas to be of a
size more than 200 sq.ft and in a prime location, but these two
qualities are highly impossible and contradicting. Because of the
huge rental costs in prime locations which can reduce the
margins of the store.
• Time constraints for credit: JioMart tends to change the traditional
supply chains of the stores. But kirana stores enjoy a credit
clearance period of at least one month, wherein they can enjoy
the liquidity from the pro
f
it of the goods sold. But since JioMart
seeks immediate credit clearance, it might be inertial for kirana
stores to transform into JioMart Exclusive stores because of the
huge initial capital requirement.
• Requirement of huge initial capital to transform into JioMart
Exclusive stores: JioMart charges the shopkeepers to transform
into a premium looking mini shopping mall which attracts more
customers and it makes sure that any order within one kilometre
radius to be dispatched from that store, but it all come with the

31. cost which can be a critical challenge to be executed, even tough
it comes with six months EMI option, it doesn’t seem lucrative to
most of the shopkeepers.
• Exclusive stores must provide home-delivery service: Since the
service of the delivery is outsourced to the Exclusive stores, it
derails the margins of the shopkeepers.
V. UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES
As inventory model has a comparative advantage over the
marketplace model from an e-commerce company’s view point as
mentioned earlier in section III. E-Commerce giants— Amazon and
Flipkart came up with their own ventures to eliminate MSME sector
from their platform and adopted strategies to sell its products on the
platform. Globally, about 58% of Amazon sales of physical goods in
2018 came from third-party merchants; the rest come from direct
sales to consumers. But according to government policy, the
revenue form inventory model should be less than 25% of the total
revenue to promote small businesses. To deal with the restrictions on
direct sales, Amazon found an indirect way of reaching consumers
and boosting sales quickly. It entered a joint venture with an entity
formed by one of India’s most famous tech moguls, N.R. Narayana
Murthy, founder of software services giant Infosys Ltd. The venture
was used to create a seller named Cloudtail, which began offering
goods on Amazon.in after it was set up in August 2014. In March
2016, Cloudtail’s share of sales on Amazon.in was around 47%
In case of Amazon, it had heavily invested in Cloudtail India PVT Ltd
in 2013. And in 2017, it partnered with Appario India PVT Ltd, wherein
Amazon holds 90% stake in both the
f
irms. In 2017, a new special

32. merchant named Appario – referred to as “SM2” in an internal
document – was created. This time, Amazon entered into another
joint venture, with an entity backed by the family of Ashok Patni, a
pioneer in the Indian IT outsourcing
sector.
One internal Amazon document
from 2019 states that the two
special merchants get
“subsidised fees” and access to
Amazon global retail tools.
These tools are used for things like
inventory and invoice
management.Whereas, Flipkart has
WS Retail PVT Ltd as its biggest
seller which is a subsidiary of
Flipkart.
Investigations & complaints
• Amazon copied products to promote its own brands- The
Solimo strategy: Amazon.com Inc has been repeatedly
accused of knocking o
ff
products it sells on its website and of
exploiting its vast trove of internal data to promote its own
merchandise at the expense of other sellers. Amazon
employees studied proprietary data about other brands on
Amazon.in, including detailed information about customer
returns. The aim: to identify and target goods - described as
“reference” or “benchmark” products - and “replicate” them.
As part of that e
ff
ort, the 2016 internal report laid out

33. Amazon’s strategy for a brand the company originally created
for the Indian market called “Solimo.” The Solimo strategy, it
said, was simple: “use information from Amazon.in to develop
products and then leverage the Amazon.in platform to market
these products to our customers.” The 2016 document
further shows that Amazon employees working on the
company’s own products, known as private brands or private
labels, planned to partner with the manufacturers of the
products targeted for copying. That’s because they learned
that these manufacturers employ “unique processes which
impact the end quality of the product.” The document,
entitled “India Private Brands Program,” states: “It is di
ff
icult
to develop this expertise across products and hence, to
ensure that we are
able to fully match
quality with our
reference product,
we decided to only
partner with the
manufacturers of
our reference
product.” It termed
such manufacturer
expertise “Tribal Knowledge.” With the Solimo line, Amazon
aimed to o
ff
er items that equaled or exceeded the quality of
competing brands but were 10% to 15% cheaper, the 2016
Private Brands document shows. Amazon employees studied
di
ff
erent product categories, and compared their overall
market size with how well those segments were doing on
Amazon.in. They then targeted categories such as home

34. furnishings. Amazon found that furnishings was a $2 billion
business in India - but its own website’s three-month sales in
mid-2014 totalled about $1 million.In its analysis, Amazon
used a metric called “glance views” that quanti
f
ied which
products were being viewed by customers on its website.
Explaining why it zeroed in on glance views, the 2016 Amazon
document noted that monitoring its India website tra
ff
ic
provides “an opportunity to in
f
luence interested customers
who are actively considering” a purchase in a product
category.
• Systemic Campaign of Copying: In 2018, home-goods
retailer Williams-Sonoma Inc
f
iled a federal lawsuit against
Amazon, accusing the e-commerce
giant of copying its proprietary
designs for chairs, lamps and other
products for an Amazon private
brand called Rivet. “Amazon has
engaged in a systematic campaign
of copying,” the lawsuit alleged.
The exhibits
f
iled in the case
included pictures of similar-looking
products from Amazon and a
Williams-Sonoma brand.
• Data Privacy and Safety: Amazon has been accused before
by employees who worked on private-brand products of
exploiting proprietary data from individual sellers to launch
competing products and manipulating search results to
increase sales of the company’s own goods. In sworn
testimony before the U.S. Congress in 2020, Amazon founder

35. Je
ff
Bezos explained that the e-commerce giant prohibits its
employees from using the data on individual sellers to help its
private-label business. And, in 2019, another Amazon
executive testi
f
ied that the company does not use such data
to create its own private-label products or alter its search
results to favour them. But the internal documents seen by
Reuters show for the
f
irst time that, at least in India,
manipulating search results to favour Amazon’s own
products, as well as copying other sellers’ goods, were part of
a formal, clandestine strategy at Amazon – and that high-level
executives were told about it. The documents show that two
executives reviewed the
India strategy – senior
vice presidents Diego
Piacentini, who has since
left the company, and
Russell Grandinetti, who
currently runs Amazon’s
international consumer
business.seven current
and former Indian sellers
on Amazon.in told Reuters
they can’t access internal sales data of rival brands o
ff
ered on
the website. Four of the sellers said they can access glance
views, but only for their own products. Amazon has access to
more data on sellers, including the number of product units
shipped and details about customer returns, the 2016
document shows, giving it an advantage in market
intelligence. Amazon’s own use of the data to develop and
promote its private-brand products.

36. • Preferential treatment – ‘Winning the buy box’:
In January 2020, India’s antitrust watchdog, the Competition
Commission of India, announced it was investigating Amazon
and Walmart Inc’s Flipkart following a complaint by an Indian
trader group. The commission cited four alleged anti-
competitive practices: exclusive launch of mobile phones by
the e-commerce
f
irms, promoting preferred sellers on their
websites, deep discounting, and prioritising some seller listings
over others. Two more sellers on the e-commerce giant’s India
platform merchants in which Amazon had indirect equity stakes
– accounted for around 35% of the platform’s sales revenue in
early 2019. That meant some 35 of Amazon’s more than 400,000
sellers in India at the time accounted for around two-thirds of its
online sales.
Amazon had big plans for Cloudtail. The target was to ensure
Cloudtail accounted for 40% of Amazon.in sales, “and build this
into a $1+B business” in 2015,
according to the report. To that
end, the report reveals, Amazon
helped Cloudtail “acquire key
relationships” with major tech
companies, including Apple,
Microsoft and OnePlus. This
included exclusive deals with
these companies to sell their
products, such as smartphones. The tech companies got a big
new sales channel, while Cloudtail got coveted products that it
listed on Amazon.in.

37. The deals Amazon facilitated with smartphone makers, coupled
with deep discounts Cloudtail was o
ff
ering on the Amazon
website, hit India's o
ff
line mobile sellers hard. While some 10% of
smartphones in India were being sold online in 2013, by 2016
that
f
igure had jumped to 30%, according to Forrester. By 2019 it
was 44%. And Amazon and Flipkart dominate these sales,
accounting for roughly 90% of all online smartphone sales.
Cat and mouse game: Again when an investigation spilled the
beans, Amazon moved the procurement of some mobile phone
brands Cloudtail was o
ff
ering to Amazon Wholesale, a wholesale
business-to-business operation in India which did not fall under
the foreign investment restrictions. Amazon Wholesale then
supplied these products to “certain” sellers, who in turn sold
them on amazon.in
The new 2016 government rules explicitly stated that “e-
commerce entities providing [a] marketplace will not directly or
indirectly in
f
luence the sale price of goods or services and shall
maintain [a] level playing
f
ield.”
Following the rule change, however, Amazon lowered the fees it
charged some big sellers on its platform to enable them to o
ff
er
more competitive prices. “We adjusted our business model by
activating a fee incentive program (Platinum Seller Program or
PSP) to provide discounted fees to a subset of large managed
sellers (Platinum Sellers) to help them match” prices of e-
commerce rivals, said the global regulatory update document.
• Search seeding: How high products rank when customers
search the Amazon website is critical to online sellers’

38. success. An internal document in 2017 noted that more than
half of users’ clicks on search results
are for the products listed in the top
eight. Amazon has said its search
algorithms don’t favour its private-
brand products. Asked during the
2019 congressional hearing whether Amazon alters
algorithms to direct consumers to its own goods, associate
general counsel Nate Sutton replied: “The algorithms are
optimised to predict what customers want to buy regardless
of the seller.” Yet the internal Amazon documents show that
in India, Amazon manipulated search results to favour its own
products.The company used a technique called “search
seeding” to boost the rankings of its AmazonBasics and
Solimo brand goods, according to the 2016 private-brand
report. Referring to Amazon’s product codes – known as
ASINs, or Amazon Standard Identi
f
ication Numbers – the
report stated: “We used search seeding for newly launched
ASINs to ensure that they feature in the
f
irst 2 or three ASINs
in search results.”
• Search Sparkles: Amazon has used seeding to alter search
rankings to boost products, such as new ones, whose sales
are so low that there’s insu
ff
icient data for the company’s
technology to rank them. Sparkles are banners that Amazon
has planted above search results to direct customers to
certain products the company wants to promote. While such
tools have legitimate uses to assist online shoppers
f
ind
certain hot new products, using search seeding to boost the
rankings of Amazon’s own products hurts rival merchants’

39. sales on the platform, one of the former employees said.
Search seeding and sparkles were both used to promote
AmazonBasics products on the company’s India platform, the
2016 document reveals. Within months of the launch of
AmazonBasics in India in 2015, four of its products were “#1
Bestsellers in their category week after week,” the 2016
document said. It added that “promos” were placed on “detail
pages of competitor products to direct tra
ff
ic to
AmazonBasics brands products.”
VI. POLICY FRAMEWORK TO REGULATE E-
COMMERCE
1. CustomerProtection(E-Commerce)Rules,2020
The Consumer Protection Act, 2020 provides for the protection
of the interests of consumers and establishes consumer courts
for settlement of disputes.
[i] The Act empowers the central government to take measures
for preventing unfair trade practices and protecting the interests
and rights of consumers in e-commerce. The Act de
f
ines e-
commerce as buying or selling goods or services over an
electronic network. In July 2020, the Consumer Protection (E-
Commerce) Rules, 2020 were noti
f
ied under the Act to specify
duties and liabilities of e-commerce entities and sellers on their
platforms.
[ii] In July 2021, the Department of Consumer A
ff
airs released
draft amendments to the 2020 Rules for public feedback.

40. [iii] It noted that amendments are necessitated due to
widespread cheating and unfair trade practices in the e-
commerce ecosystem.
[iv] These include practices such as preferential treatment to
some sellers and reduction in consumer choice due to back-to-
back sales.
KEY FEATURES
▪ De
f
inition of e-commerce entities: The Consumer
Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020 de
f
ine an e-
commerce entity to include any person who owns,
operates, or manages a digital or electronic facility or
platform for e-commerce. The Draft Rules add that the e-
commerce entity will also include:
(i) any entity engaged by an e-commerce entity for the ful
f
ilment
of orders
(ii) any related party (as de
f
ined under the Companies Act, 2013)
of an e-commerce entity.
▪ Fallback liability: In case of non-delivery of goods or
services by a seller on a marketplace platform, which
causes loss to the consumer, the marketplace will be
subject to a fallback liability.
▪ Regulation of associated enterprises: Marketplace e-
commerce entities are prohibited from:
(i) listing associated enterprises as sellers on its platform
(ii) sharing information for the unfair advantage of its associated
enterprises. An enterprise is not allowed to do anything that is

41. prohibited for the marketplace e-commerce entity itself.
Associated enterprises include enterprises:
• related through a common chain of managing directors,
partners or shareholders
• having 10% of more common ultimate bene
f
icial ownership
• having a relationship of mutual interest, as may be prescribed.
▪ Use of name or brand associated with marketplace entity:
Marketplaces may not use its name or brand for promotion
or o
ff
er for sale of goods or services, to suggest that these
o
ff
erings are from the marketplace itself.
▪ Abuse of dominant position in a market: An e-commerce
entity is not allowed to abuse its dominant position in any
market.
▪ Requirement to appoint certain personnel: All e-
commerce entities are required to appoint:
(i) a Grievance O
ff
icer to address consumer grievances
(ii) a nodal person for coordination with law enforcement
agencies
(iii) a Chief Compliance O
ff
icer for ensuring compliance with the
Consumer Protection Act and Rules thereunder. These
persons should be residents in India.
▪ Information requests by law enforcement: The Draft Rules
require e-commerce entities to provide information under
their control or possession upon request by a government
agency. The government agency which is lawfully
authorised for investigative, protective or cybersecurity

42. activities may place such a request in writing. The request
may be placed for veri
f
ication of identity, or prevention,
detection, investigation, or prosecution of o
ff
ences under
any law or for cybersecurity incidents.
▪ Country of origin of goods: The 2020 Rules require e-
commerce entities to disclose the country of origin of
goods. The Draft Rules add that e-commerce entities
should:
i) provide a
f
ilter mechanism on their website based on country
of origin
ii) display noti
f
ication regarding origin of goods at pre-purchase
stage
iii) display suggestions of alternatives to ensure a fair
opportunity for domestic goods.
▪ Flash sale: The Draft Rules prohibit e-commerce entities
from organising
f
lash sales. Flash sale is de
f
ined as a sale
organised by fraudulently intercepting the ordinary course
of business using technology means, to allow only a
speci
f
ied seller or group of sellers managed by the e-
commerce entity to sell highly-discounted goods and
services. Further, the sale would be termed a
f
lash sale
only if it is operational for a pre-determined period, on
selective goods or services or otherwise, to draw a large
number of consumers.
▪ Cross-selling: The Draft Rules de
f
ine cross-selling as sale
of goods or services which are related, adjacent, or
complementary to a purchase made by a consumer at a

43. time from any e-commerce entity, with an intent to
maximise the revenue of such an e-commerce entity. The
e-commerce entity engaging in cross-selling has to provide
adequate disclosure to users about:
(i) name of the entity providing data for cross-selling
(ii) data of such entity used for cross-selling.
▪ Mis-selling: The Draft Rules prohibit mis-selling of goods or
services by e-commerce entities. Mis-selling is de
f
ined as
a deliberate misrepresentation of information (by e-
commerce entities) about such goods or services as
suitable for the user who is purchasing them.
▪ Misleading advertisements: An e-commerce entity should
not allow misleading advertisements on its platform.
Under the Act, misleading advertisement is de
f
ined to
include:
(i) falsely describing product or service
(ii) falsely guaranteeing or misleading about nature, substance,
quantity, or quality of product or service
(iii) representation which may be considered unfair trade
practice
(iv) deliberately concealing important information.

44. 2. Foreign Direct Investment Rules and Policy
framework for E-Commerce
At the heart of the problem is India’s view on the two e-
commerce models that exist today: marketplace and
inventory.
• India allows 100 percent foreign direct investment (FDI) in the
marketplace model of e-commerce, which it de
f
ines
as a tech platform that connects buyers and sellers.
• India has not allowed FDI in inventory-driven models of e-
commerce. The inventory model, which Walmart
and Amazon use in the United States, is where the
goods and services are owned by an e-commerce
f
irm that sells directly to retail customers.
• The restriction is aimed largely at protecting India’s vast
unorganised retail sector that does not have the
clout to purchase at scale and o
ff
er big discounts.
• It means that Amazon and Flipkart can only operate the
marketplace model in India. Both companies have
wholesale units that bulk purchase goods and sell
them to vendors listed on their platform. These
vendors in turn sell to retail customers.

45. • Existing regulations state that e-commerce
f
irms cannot
exercise ownership over the goods sold on their
online marketplace.
• Both Amazon and Flipkart developed complicated seller
structures that helped them comply with the
inventory control rule while exercising some level of
control over inventory.
• Traders and small online sellers have accused Amazon and
Flipkart of violating the spirit of the law and of using
the structures to o
ff
er deep discounts, accusations
they deny.
• The new rules state that the inventory of a seller or vendor
will be seen as being controlled by a marketplace if
the vendor purchases more than 25 percent of its
inventory from the marketplace, or any of its group
f
irms.
• The rule would not allow sellers on Flipkart and Amazon to
make bulk purchases from the wholesale units of
the companies.
• The new regulation replaces a rule that said an e-commerce
f
irm could not permit one vendor’s retail sales to
overshoot 25 percent of the overall sales of the
marketplace by value in a
f
iscal year.

46. • The rules now bar any entity in which an e-commerce
f
irm or
its group companies have a stake from selling on their online
platform.
• This is a problem for Amazon, which had been picking up
stakes in o
ff
line Indian retailers to boost its market share.
• The U.S. company’s investment arm owns a 5 percent stake in
Indian department store chain Shopper’s Stop. Through an
investment vehicle it also picked up a stake in the More retail
chain. Amazon also owns a minority stake in the parent
companies of Cloudtail and Appario, even though it does not
have a direct stake on either of the two sellers.
• The government has also prohibited e-commerce
f
irms from
pushing merchants to sell any product exclusively on its
platform. The sellers can, however, choose to have a preferred
online partner.
• Amazon and Flipkart launch products such as smartphones
exclusively on their online portals and apps. While such
arrangements may continue, e-commerce
f
irms are unlikely to
use the word “exclusive” anymore and will likely re-negotiate
contracts to give brands more freedom to sell elsewhere.
• The new rules also stipulate that an e-commerce marketplace,
as well as any companies the marketplace has equity stakes
in, should provide services such as ful
f
ilment, logistics and
payments to all sellers on the platform in a fair manner.

47. • Providing such services to one seller and not to others in
similar circumstances would be deemed as unfair and
discriminatory, according to the rules.
VII. OPEN NETWORK FOR DIGITAL COMMERCE:
THE WAY FORWARD
Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC) is a network based
on open protocol and will enable local
commerce across segments, such as
mobility, grocery, food order and delivery,
hotel booking and travel, among others, to
be discovered and engaged by any
network-enabled application.
The platform aims to create new
opportunities, curb digital monopolies and
by supporting micro, small and medium
enterprises and small traders and help them get on online
platforms. It is an initiative of the Department for Promotion of
Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) under the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry.
Key Features
• ONDC, a UPI of e-commerce, seeks to democratise digital or
electronic commerce, moving it from a platform-centric
model to an open-network. Through ONDC, merchants will be

48. able to save their data to build credit history and reach
consumers.
• The proposed government-backed platform aims to create a
level playing
f
ield for e-commerce behemoths such as
Amazon, Flipkart, and o
ff
line traders who have been crying
foul at the unfair trade practices of these e-tailers. The
platform will also be compliant with the Information
Technology Act, 2000 and designed for compliance with the
emerging Personal Data Protection Bill.
• In this system, ONDC plans to enable sellers and buyers to be
digitally visible and transact through an open network,
regardless of what platform or application they use. It will also
empower merchants and consumers by breaking silos to form
a single network to drive innovation and scale, transforming
all businesses from retail goods, food to mobility.
• The new framework aims at promoting open networks
developed on open-sourced methodology, using open
speci
f
ications and open network protocols independent of
any speci
f
ic platform.
• It is expected to digitise the entire value chain, standardise
operations, promote inclusion of suppliers, derive e
ff
iciencies
in logistics and enhance value for consumers.
• According to the government's o
ff
icial statement, ONDC shall
take all measures to ensure con
f
identiality and privacy of data
in the network. ONDC shall not mandate sharing of any
transaction-level data by participants with ONDC. Will work
with its participants to publish anonymised aggregate metrics
on network performance without compromising on
con
f
identiality and privacy.

49. How does aim to boost the competition?
The government says existing platforms work in silos and are
tightly controlled, keeping out many small players. It expects
ONDC to increase competition and foster innovation by start-
ups. It also hopes to bring in logistics
f
irms and others who can
collaborate with sellers to deliver products to customers. The
focus would be on small merchants and rural consumers, with
apps in Indian languages. ONDC o
ff
icials liken the network to a
mall with 1,000 gates instead of just two, thereby limiting
opportunities for selected sellers to receive preferential
treatment - a common accusation against major e-commerce
companies. Users will be able to rate service providers on ONDC,
which will be applicable and visible across the network. The
government says ONDC will help to end "predatory pricing,
especially in high-margin, high-value products". Amazon and
Flipkart deny that they have engaged in predatory pricing.
Challenges
• ONDC aims mainly to tap millions of small businesses that
often lack technological expertise, so the government will
have to run a massive awareness campaign to get them on
board, said the Confederation of All India Traders, a group
that represents 80 million such businesses.

50. • Smaller businesses with low volumes may also lack the
resources to match the discounts o
ff
ered by heavyweights
like Amazon and Flipkart.
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