In his article Arguing and bargaining in two constituent assemblies, John Elster suggested that the constitution-making enterprise can be understood more generally resorting to two types of speech acts: “arguing” and “bargaining”. The two models are used by Elster with the aim of exploring on the one hand, “the role of the rational argument”, on the other hand that of “threatbased bargaining”. More specifically, Elster insists on the role of rational argument in constituent decision-making and claims that even the actors with “purely self-interested” concerns may be “forced or induced to substitute the language of impartial argument for the language of self-interest”. A kind of “substitution” that Elster attributes to what he calls “the civilizing force of hypocrisy”. However, Elster makes also reference (without further explanations) to a “third type of speech acts”, namely “rhetorical statement aiming at persuasion”, defining it as an “appeal to the passions of [the] audience, rather to their reason or self-interest”. For this reason, Elster's model seems to be triadic: arguing (“reason speaks to reason”), bargaining (“interest to interest”) and persuading (“passion to passion”). In order to analyze real constitution-making processes, it may be interesting to test and, if necessary, developing this triadic model, perhaps combining it with other concepts developed in legal theory, such as the idea of “incompletely theorized agreement” proposed by Cass Sunstein as a peculiar method of statute-making, aiming at reduce the potential for conflict. A method particularly used in order to draft statutory definitions.
2. The process of constitution-making can illuminate two
types of speech acts: arguing and bargaining
! the matters that have to be decided are far removed
from petty, self-interested, routine politics
! constituent assemblies are often more polarized
than ordinary law-making bodies
Argumentation, negotiation and persuasion
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt ArgLab Research Colloquium, April 8, 2014
3. role of rational argument / threatbased bargaining
! bargaining on the basis of extra-parliamentary
resources;
! even the actors whose concerns are purely self-
interested may be forced or induced to substitute the
language of impartial argument for the language of
self-interest;
! civilizing force of hypocrisy
Argumentation, negotiation and persuasion
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt ArgLab Research Colloquium, April 8, 2014
4. third type of speech acts:
rhetorical statements aiming at persuasion
«I distinguish among reason, passion and interest as
motives of speakers in constitutional or legislative
assemblies. Applying the same distinction to the motives
imputed by the speakers to their audience, rhetoric may
perhaps be defined by the feature that its practitioners
appeal to the passions of their audience rather than to
their reason or self-interest. In some debates, reason
speaks to reason: in others, interest to interest; in still
others, passion to passion».
Argumentation, negotiation and persuasion
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt ArgLab Research Colloquium, April 8, 2014
5. «Rational argumentation on the one hand, threats and
promises on the other, are the main vehicles by
which the parties seek to reach agreement. The
former is subject to criteria of validity, the latter to
criteria of credibility»
! a speaker who aims at achieving understanding
rather than success is committed to three validity
claims: propositional truth, normative rightness, and
truthfulness [Habermas]
! Veil-of-ignorance argument
Argumentation, negotiation and persuasion
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt ArgLab Research Colloquium, April 8, 2014
6. Argumentation, negotiation and persuasion
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt ArgLab Research Colloquium, April 8, 2014
! Assemblea Costituente (1946-1948)
! constitutional compromise
! tensions inherent in the antifascist parties: christian
democrats, social-communists, liberals
! political clash – 1948 general elections
! civil war
! foreing intervention
7. Argumentation, negotiation and persuasion
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt ArgLab Research Colloquium, April 8, 2014
! Assemblea Costituente (1946-1948)
! Constitutional Commission (75 deputies) divided into three
sub-commissions:
" Rights and Obligations of the Citizens, chaired by Umberto Tupini
(DC)
" Constitutional Organization of the State, chaired by Umberto
Terracini (PCI)
" Economical and Social Relationships, chaired by Gustavo Ghidini
(PSI)
! “Committee of the 18”: charged of writing the draft of the
constitution in accordance with the work of the three sub-
commissions.
8. Argumentation, negotiation and persuasion
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt ArgLab Research Colloquium, April 8, 2014
! Art. 29 of the Italian Constitution
“The Republic recognizes the rights of the family as a
natural society founded on matrimony”
“Matrimony is based on the moral and legal equality of
the spouses within the limits established by law to
guarantee the unity of the family ”
9. Argumentation, negotiation and persuasion
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt ArgLab Research Colloquium, April 8, 2014
Draft of the First Subcommission
! Art. 1 (later 23, later 29)
! The family is a natural society and the State recognizes its
rights with the aim of increasing the moral solidarity and the
prosperity of the Nation
! Art. 2
! Matrimony is based on the moral and legal equality of spouses.
The spouses have the right and the duty to support, instruct
and educate their children
! The law establishes the juridical condition of spouses, in order
to guarantee family unity.
10. Argumentation, negotiation and persuasion
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt ArgLab Research Colloquium, April 8, 2014
Draft of the Commission of 75
! Art. 23 (later 29/31)
! The family is a natural society and the Republic recognizes its
rights for ensuring the fulfillment of its mission and with the
aim of increasing the moral solidarity and the prosperity of the
Nation
! The Republic guarantees to the family the economic conditions
necessary for its establishment, defense and development, with
particular regard to large families
11. Argumentation, negotiation and persuasion
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt ArgLab Research Colloquium, April 8, 2014
Draft of the Commission of 75
! Art. 24 (later 29/30)
! Matrimony is based on the moral and legal equality of spouses.
! The law establishes the juridical condition of spouses, in order
to guarantee the indissolubility of matrimony and the unity of
the family.
12. Argumentation, negotiation and persuasion
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt ArgLab Research Colloquium, April 8, 2014
Draft of the Redaction Committee
! Art. 23 (later 29)
! The Republic recognizes the rights of the family as a natural
society founded on the indissolubility of matrimony
! The matrimony is ruled on the base of the juridical and moral
equality of spouses, within the limits required in order to
guarantee the unity of the family”
13. Argumentation, negotiation and persuasion
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt ArgLab Research Colloquium, April 8, 2014
Well-functioning constitutional orders try to solve
problems through incompletely theorized
agreements. Sometimes these agreements involve
abstractions, accepted as such amidst severe
disagreements on particular cases. Thus people who
disagree on incitement to violence and hate speech
can accept a general free speech principle, and those
who argue about same-sex relationships can accept
an abstract antidiscrimination principle. This is an
important phenomenon in constitutional law and
politics; it makes constitution-making possible.
14. Argumentation, negotiation and persuasion
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt ArgLab Research Colloquium, April 8, 2014
Constitution-makers can agree on abstractions without
agreeing on the particular meaning of those
abstractions.
[Sunstein 2006]
Agreement on the normative text, which can be
regarded as a delegation of powers to the bodies in
charge of interpreting the statutes
[Tarello 1980]
15. ! Elster, John. 2000. Arguing and bargaining in two
Constituent Assemblies in University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, 2
! Sunstein, Cass. 2007. Incompletely Theorized
Agreements in Constitutional Law. Social Research
74 (1): 1-24.
! Tarello, Giovanni. 1980. L’interpretazione della
legge. Milano: Giuffrè.
Argumentation, negotiation and persuasion
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt ArgLab Research Colloquium, April 8, 2014