Contents: (1) Two sided market definitions (2) How demand- and supply-side economies of scale differ (3) Free goods: when and why to subsidize one side or the other (4) How switching and homing costs affect winner take all outcomes.
These slides provide course materials that complement the second chapter of Platform Revolution: How Networked Markets are Transforming the Economy and How to Make Them Work for You. The final slides provide additional reading suggestions for industry and academia.
Marel Q1 2024 Investor Presentation from May 8, 2024
Platform Revolution - Ch 02 Network Effects: Power of the Platform
1. Geoffrey Parker
Dartmouth College
@g2parker
Marshall Van Alstyne
Boston University
@InfoEcon
Chapter 2
Network Effects: The Power of the Platform
Platform Revolution: Making Networked Markets Work for You
Questrom School of
Business
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne with Choudary –
licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-
ShareAlike 4.0 Int’l (CC BY-SA 4.0).
with Sangeet Choudary
Platform Thinking Labs
@sanguit
2. Platform Revolution: Chapter 2 – Network Effects
1. Introduction: Welcome to Platform World
2. Network Effects: The Power of the Platform
3. Architecture: Basic Principles for Designing Successful Platforms
4. Disruption: How Platforms Conquer &Transform Traditional Industries
5. Launch: Chicken or Egg? 8 Ways To Launch Successful Platforms
6. Monetization: Capturing the Value Created by Network Effects
7. Openness: Defining What Platform Users/Partners Can &Cannot Do
8. Governance: Policies That Increase Value and Enhance Growth
9. Metrics: How Platform Managers Can Measure What Really Matters
10. Strategy: How Platforms Change Competition
11. Policy: How Platforms Should (and Should Not) Be Regulated
12. Future: Industries Facing Imminent Change
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
(click to order on Amazon)
Click on left hand icons to access content (downloaded slides).
3. CONSUMERSPRODUCER
Elements of value exchange
PLATFORM
A PLATFORM:
• Is a nexus of rules and
architecture
• Is open, allowing regulated
participation
• Actively promotes (positive)
interactions among different
partners in a multi-sided
market
• Scales much faster than a
pipeline business because it
does not necessarily bear the
costs of external production.
Source: Platform Revolution2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
4. PLATFORMS LEVERAGE NETWORK EFFECTS
More users = more value = more users …
1
interaction
2 phones
10
interactions
5 phones
66
interactions
12 phones
Source: Wikipedia.org2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
5. IT HELPS TO BREAK EACH INTERACTION INTO 2 SIDES
Phone Callers
Uber Drivers
eBay Sellers
Xbox Developers
Amex Merchants
Aga Khan Doctors
YouTube Videographers
AirBnb Rooms
Tesla Charge Stations
Mechanical Turk Laborers
LinkedIn Employers
Upwork Projects
Android Developers
Phone Callees
Uber Riders
eBay Buyers
Xbox Gamers
Amex CardHolders
Aga Khan Patients
YouTube Viewers
AirBnb Renters
Tesla Car Drivers
Mechanical Turk Jobs
LinkedIn Employees
Upwork Freelancers
Android Users
This helps explain how attraction and feedback happen
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
6. • Businesses can be very complex
• Rapid growth may preclude trial-and-error
• Network effects = winner often takes most/all
• Successes: Windows, Adobe, iPod/iPhone, Alibaba, LinkedIn, Facebook, etc.
• Failures: Betamax, IBM OS/2, Amazon auctions, eBay Japan, MusicNet, N-
Gage, Blackberry, etc.
Distinctive Challenges
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
7. • Network effects are demand-side scale economies. Rising network effects increase existing and
prospective users’ willingness-to-pay (willingness-to-participate)
• Supply-side scale economies are realized when firms reduce unit costs by leveraging fixed costs or
experience effects. With high fixed costs and low unit costs, average costs decline with volume.
• Many businesses that exhibit network effects also enjoy strong supply-side scale economies
• However, demand-side and supply-side economies are conceptually distinct: unit cost reductions
that result from network growth should not be labeled network effects
Demand vs Supply-Side Scale Economies
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
8. Price
Quantity
Supply
Demand
• Rising average costs
• Competitive supply
• Soda, Eggs, Bread
STANDARD GOODS
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
9. • Falling average costs
• Monopolistic supply
• Utilities, SemiconductorsSupply
Price
Quantity
Demand
SUPPLY ECONOMY OF SCALE
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
10. GIANTS OF SUPPLY SIDE ECONOMIES OF SCALE
Electric
Dynamo
1893
Ford Model T
1908
Acklam Ironworks
1924
Standard Oil
1909
Vanderbilt
Colossus of
(Rail) Roads
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
11. • Value grows with volume
• Monopolistic Demand
• Often falling average cost
• Operating Systems, Instant
Messaging, Social Networks
SUPPLY ECONOMY OF SCALE
Price
Quantity
Demand
Supply
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
12. GIANTS OF DEMAND SIDE ECONOMIES OF SCALE
Social Networks
Windows OS Mobile
Merchant Mkts
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
13. TRADITIONAL LINEAR VALUE CHAIN
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
$ $ $
Value accumulates from stage to stage
Minimal Network Effects
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
14. APPLE iPOD PRE-PLATFORM
Apple iPod Retailer
Music
ProducerListener
$ $ $
(1) Product First Thinking
(2) Standard linear value chain
(3) User bought music retail (or P2P)
(4) Minimal network effects
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
15. Apple iPod Retailer
Music
ProducerListener
$ $ $
APPLE iPOD COMBINED WITH iTUNES (AND APPLE MUSIC!)
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
16. CONSUMER PRODUCER
APPLE
(1)Triangular platform supply network
(2) Apple owns financial chokepoint
(3) Apple helps users find content
(4) Stronger network effects
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
17. A TWO-SIDED NETWORK HAS FOUR NETWORK EFFECTS
Side
2
Side
1
PLATFORM
• A same-side effect for each side, i.e.,
preference regarding number of other
users on own side
• A cross-side effect in each direction,
i.e., preference regarding number of
users on other side
Source: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne, 2006. “Strategies
for Two Sided Markets.” Harvard Business Review.2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
18. A TWO-SIDED NETWORK HAS FOUR NETWORK EFFECTS.
THESE CAN BE POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE.
Side
2
Side
1
PLATFORM
+ same-side : Player-to-player contact in Xbox
MMOG, end-user PDF sharing.
+ cross-side : merchants & consumers for Visa,
developers & end-users for Windows
- same-side : competing suppliers in Covisint
auction, competing dates on Match.com
- cross-side : Digital Rights Management costs
to consumers. Advertising clutter to
viewers.
You must manage all such interactions
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
Source: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne, 2006. “Strategies
for Two Sided Markets.” Harvard Business Review.
19. DAVID SACK’S (COO PAYPAL, CEO YAMMER) SKETCH SHOWS HOW POSITIVE FEEDBACK
DROVE UBER GROWTH
Less driver
downtime
Lower
prices
MORE
DEMAND
MORE
DRIVERSFaster
pickups
MORE
Geographic
coverage,
Saturation
Source: David Sacks2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
20. ALL POSITIVE FEEDBACK LOOPS MEET NEGATIVE FEEDBACK LOOPS (ELSE THEY EXPLODE).
MAKE SURE YOU FIND THEM AND MITIGATE THEM.
Less driver
downtime
Lower
prices
MORE
DEMAND
MORE
DRIVERSFaster
pickups
MORE
Geographic
coverage,
Saturation
Source: Adapted from David Sacks
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
21. HOMING AND SWITCHING COSTS
Mono-homing
Switching
Multi-homing
Mobile
Handsets
Xbox
Xbox-
PS4
Credit Card
Netflix/Hulu
1 SETUP + 1ONGOING
2 SETUPS + 1 TERMINATION + 1 ONGOING
2 SETUPS + 2 ONGOING
Source: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne, 2006. “Strategies
for Two Sided Markets.” Harvard Business Review.2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
22. 1. Large Supply/Demand Effects (Utilities & Facebook vs
Consulting). Costs fall or value rises with volume.
2. Large Multi-Homing Costs (OS vs credit cards). Consumers
tend to choose just one
3. Niche specialization is low (geographically unrestricted
courses vs geographically restricted courses). Differentiation
creates protected markets not swamped by scale economies.
WHEN DO WINNER-TAKE-ALL MARKETS
EMERGE?
More Likely Less Likely
Source: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne, 2006. “Strategies
for Two Sided Markets.” Harvard Business Review.
23. TO PRICE A PLATFORM WITH
NETWORK EFFECTS,
WHO GETS THE SUBSIDY?
Answer: The side that is the stronger
attractant (or that creates more value)
Source: Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005. “Two Sided Network
Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design.” Mgmt Sci.2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
24. The Story of
Acrobat Reader/Writer
Adobe first tried to sell PDF readers and writers but
no one wanted to buy readers when there was no
content to read. And, no one wanted to buy writers
when no one had readers. Adobe broke the logjam
by giving PDF readers away.
Source: Tripsas “Adobe Systems Inc.”
Harvard Business School case 801-19.2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
25. Adobe Acrobat: SUBSIDIZE CONSUMERS
Making PDF readers free dramatically increased the value of PDF writers, shifting producer demand out and to the right. Here, Adobe
subsidized consumers. Profit lost on one side of market is more than made up by profit gain on other side of market.
Source: Parker & Van Alstyne, 2000. “Information
Complements, Substitutes and Strategic Product Design”2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
26. Operating Systems: Subsidize Developers
Making System Development Toolkits (SDKs) free dramatically increased the value of operating systems, shifting consumer demand out
and to the right. Here, Microsoft subsidized producers. Profit lost on one side of market is more than made up by profit gain on other side.
Source: Parker & Van Alstyne, 2000. “Information
Complements, Substitutes and Strategic Product Design”2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
27. WHEN DOES FREE MAKE SENSE?
1) People understand the razors & blades strategy
(same as cellphones & minutes, printers & ink)
Give away one thing, charge for another
The SAME person gets both items
2) People often misunderstand 2-sided network pricing
Subsidize one party in order to attract then charge another party
Subsidy side and money side of the market are DIFFERENT parties
(like women & men on ladies’ nights)
3) Monetization is trickier for 2-sided networks
Charging the wrong side (or both) reduces growth and network
effects
PLATFORM
WRITERS READERS
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
28. ISSUES
Q: Why is price more important in network markets?
A: The entire demand curve can change with price.
Q: Why is price more strategic in 2-sided networks?
A: Imagine competing on the subsidy side – you need a source
of subsidy at least as great.
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
29. TAKEAWAYS FROM CHAPTER TWO
Network effects are the main source of value creation and competitive advantage in a platform
business—and, increasingly, in today’s economy.
Whereas giant industrial-era firms were made possible by supply economies of scale, today’s
giants are made possible by demand economies of scale—expressed as network effects.
Network effects are not the same as price effects, brand effects, or other familiar growth-
building tools.
Frictionless entry and other features of scalability maximize the value-building impact of
network effects.
A two-sided market (with both producers and consumers) gives rise to four kinds of network
effects: same-side effects (consumer-to-consumer, producer-to-producer) and cross-side
effects (consumer-to-producer, producer-to-consumer). Polarity on any of these can also be
positive or negative. A growing platform business must manage all four.
The key to minimizing most negative network effects is quality curation and minimizing
congestion, which increases the chances of a happy match between producer and consumer.
Source: Platform Revolution2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
30. Platform Revolution: Next Chapter 3 – Architecture
1. Introduction: Welcome to Platform World
2. Network Effects: The Power of the Platform
3. Architecture: Basic Principles for Designing Successful Platforms
4. Disruption: How Platforms Conquer &Transform Traditional Industries
5. Launch: Chicken or Egg? 8 Ways To Launch Successful Platforms
6. Monetization: Capturing the Value Created by Network Effects
7. Openness: Defining What Platform Users/Partners Can &Cannot Do
8. Governance: Policies That Increase Value and Enhance Growth
9. Metrics: How Platform Managers Can Measure What Really Matters
10. Strategy: How Platforms Change Competition
11. Policy: How Platforms Should (and Should Not) Be Regulated
12. Future: Industries Facing Imminent Change
(click to order on Amazon)
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
Click on left hand icons to access content (downloaded slides).
31. For More Chapter 2 Information
Suggested background: MBA Readings
1. Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2006. “Strategies for Two Sided Markets.” Harvard
Business Review, 84, no. 10: 92–101
2. Tripsas “Adobe Systems Inc.” (2001) Harvard Business School case 801-19.
3. W. Brian Arthur, “Increasing Returns and the New World of Business,” Harvard
Business Review 74, no. 4 (1996): 100–9
4. Bill Gurley, “How to Miss By a Mile: An Alternative Look at Uber’s Potential Market
Size,” Above the Crowd, July 11, 2014
5. Miner, R., (2007) “Android: Building a Mobile Platform to Change the Industry,” Nov.
28, -- YouTube
6. Tiwana, A. (2013) “Core Concepts & Principles” Ch 2 – Platform Ecosystems: Newnes
7. Hagiu & Altman (2013) “Intuit Quickbooks: From Product to Platform” HBS Case N9-
714-433
(click to order on Amazon)
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
Click on left hand icons to access content (downloaded slides).
Geoffrey Parker
@g2parker
Marshall Van Alstyne
@InfoEcon
with Sangeet Choudary
@sanguit
32. For More Chapter 2 Information
Suggested background: PhD Readings
1. Geoffrey Parker and Marshall Van Alstyne, 2000. “Internetwork externalities and free
information goods.” Proceedings of the Second ACM conference on Electronic
Commerce. Association for Computing Machinery, 107-116.
2. Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, 2003. ``Platform Competition in Two-Sided
Markets.’’ Journal of the European Economic Association.
3. Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien, 2003. ``Chicken & Egg: Competing Matchmakers.
Rand Journal of Economics.
4. Geoffrey Parker and Marshall Van Alstyne, 2005. ``Two-Sided Network Effects: A
Theory of Information Product Design.” Management Science, 51 (10): 1494-1504.
5. Andrei Hagiu, 2006. ``Pricing and commitment by two‐sided platforms.’’ The RAND
Journal of Economics.
6. Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, “Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility,” American Economic Review 75, no. 3 (1985): 424–40
(click to order on Amazon)
2016 Parker & Van Alstyne, with Choudary – licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
Click on left hand icons to access content (downloaded slides).
Geoffrey Parker
@g2parker
Marshall Van Alstyne
@InfoEcon
with Sangeet Choudary
@sanguit