1.
CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY RESEARCH
CIRES/University of Colorado at Boulder
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu
Climate Politics As
Manichean Paranoia
Roger A. Pielke, Jr.
University of Colorado
20 July 2017
Global Warming Policy Foundation
London, UK

2.
slide 2
Main points of this talk
• Debate over US climate policy can
be characterized in terms of
“Manichean paranoia”
• This debate is pathological
• The quality of the debate can be
improved
• I offer 5 suggests how that might
happen
• Improving the debate matters for
much more than just climate policy

3.
slide 3
Manichean Paranoia
Drawing on Brzezinski, Z. (2008). Second chance:
Three presidents and the crisis of American
superpower. Basic Books.
http://www.cc.com/video-clips/o7hest/the-daily-
show-with-jon-stewart-zbigniew-brzezinski
A politics defined by:
• Belief that the issue
is good versus evil
• Sense that the ends
justify the means
• Unwillingness to
engage in
substantive policy
debate
• Millenarian rhetoric

4.
slide 4
Example: Senator James Inhofe (R-OK)
“With all the hysteria, all the fear, all
the phony science, could it be that
manmade global warming is the
greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the
American people? I believe it is.
And if we allow these detractors of
everything that has made America
great, those ranging from the liberal
Hollywood elitists to those who are in it
for the money, if we allow them to
destroy the foundation, the greatness
of the most highly industrialized nation
in the history of the world, then we
don't deserve to live in this one nation
under God. So I say to the real people:
Wake up, make your voice heard.”
US Congressional Record, 28 July 2003
https://goo.gl/9KSD2D

5.
slide 5
Example: Prof. Michael Mann, Penn State
“[T]he villainy that we long suspected was taking place within
ExxonMobil really was. It wasn't just a conspiracy theory. It was a
legitimate conspiracy. . .
As I've described in my book, fossil fuel interests, including ExxonMobil
in particular, have been waging a bad faith assault on me (and on other
climate scientists) for decades now. It makes me angry that they would
knowingly risk the degradation of our planet for future generations in
the name of their own short-term profits.”
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/12112015/michael-mann-climate-change-scientist-interview-exxon-mobil-
investigation-global-warming

6.
slide 6
The paranoid style in American politics
“[T]he paranoid is a militant leader. He does not see social
conflict as something to be mediated and compromised, in
the manner of the working politician. Since what is at
stake is always a conflict between absolute good and
absolute evil, what is necessary is not compromise but the
will to fight things out to a finish. Since the enemy is
thought of as being totally evil and totally unappeasable,
he must be totally eliminated—if not from the world, at
least from the theatre of operations to which the paranoid
directs his attention.”
Hofstadter, R. (1964). The paranoid style in American
politics. Harper’s Magazine, 229:77-86.
https://harpers.org/archive/1964/11/the-
paranoid-style-in-american-politics/

7.
slide 7
Clearing the Field

8.
slide 8
There can be no total elimination of enemies
“This demand for total triumph leads to
the formulation of hopelessly unrealistic
goals, and since these goals are not even
remotely attainable, failure constantly
heightens the paranoid’s sense of
frustration. Even partial success leaves
him with the same feeling of
powerlessness with which he began, and
this in turn only strengthens his
awareness of the vast and terrifying
quality of the enemy he opposes.”
Hofstadter 1964

9.
slide 9
Does this sound familiar?
“The enemy is clearly delineated: he is a perfect
model of malice, a kind of amoral superman—
sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual,
luxury-loving. Unlike the rest of us, the enemy is
not caught in the toils of the vast mechanism of
history, himself a victim of his past, his desires, his
limitations. He wills, indeed he manufactures, the
mechanism of history, or tries to deflect the
normal course of history in an evil way. He makes
crises, starts runs on banks, causes depressions,
manufactures disasters, and then enjoys and
profits from the misery he has produced. The
paranoid’s interpretation of history is distinctly
personal: decisive events are not taken as part of
the stream of history, but as the consequences of
someone’s will. Very often the enemy is held to
possess some especially effective source of power:
he controls the press; he has unlimited funds; he
has a new secret for influencing the mind
(brainwashing); he has a special technique for
seduction (the Catholic confessional).”
Hofstadter 1964

10.
slide 10
Manichean paranoid-in-chief?

11.
slide 11
World’s leading climate scientist?

12.
slide 12
Should we care about Manichean Paranoia?
• We have to want to
• But why should we?
• Current state of the debate benefits both sides
• It doesn’t benefit many others
• The rest of the world is moving forward
“Here, then, is the crux of the West’s crisis: our
societies are split between the will of the people and
the rule of experts – the tyranny of the majority versus
the self-serving insiders. Britain versus Brussels; West
Virginia versus Washington.”
Edward Luce
The Retreat of Western Liberalism (2017)

13.
slide 13
How democracy works
“In democratic countries you get
things done by compromising your
principles in order to form alliances
with groups about whom you have
grave doubts.”
Richard Rorty 1998
Politics is not about getting everyone
to think alike, but getting people who
think differently to act alike.
Walter Lippmann 1923 (paraphrased)

14.
slide 14
How to improve the climate debate*
* If you really wanted to
Three criteria I employed to
propose 5 recommendations:
• Efficacy must be grounded in
solid research, evidence based;
• Must apply to all/both sides of
the issue;
• Must jibe with my experiences.

15.
slide 15
Five ways to improve the climate debate
1. Talk & listen in person with those
you most disagree with
2. Maintain the integrity of science
assessments
3. Understand the Eff-U principle
4. Discuss policy proposals in terms
of first-year benefits
5.Debate policies through causal
pathways

16.
slide 16
1. Talk & listen in person with those you most disagree with

17.
slide 17
Engagement with others is frowned upon

18.
slide 18
Investigated by US Congress

19.
slide 19
Wikileaks revealed behind the scenes

20.
slide 20
Groupthink is an empirical fact
Sunstein, C. R., & Hastie, R. (2014). Making dumb
groups smarter. Harvard business review, 92: 90-98.
Schkade, D., Sunstein, C. R., & Hastie, R. (2010).
When deliberation produces extremism. Critical
Review, 22(2-3), 227-252.
“What are the effects of deliberation about political issues
by likeminded people? An experimental investigation
involving two deliberative exercises, one among self-
identified liberals and another among self-identified
conservatives, showed that participants' views became
more extreme after deliberation. Deliberation also
increased consensus and significantly reduced diversity of
opinion within the two groups. Even anonymous
statements of personal opinion became more extreme
and homogeneous after deliberation.”

21.
slide 21
Strategies to counter groupthink 1/2
• Silence the leader.
Leaders often promote self-censorship by expressing their own
views early, thus discouraging disagreement. Leaders and high-
status members can do groups a big service by indicating a
willingness and a desire to hear uniquely held information.
• “Prime” critical thinking.
We have seen that when people silence themselves in deliberating
groups, it is often out of a sense that they will be punished for
disclosing information that runs counter to the group’s inclination.
https://hbr.org/2014/12/making-dumb-groups-smarter
Sunstein, C. R., & Hastie, R. (2014). Making dumb
groups smarter. Harvard business review, 92: 90-98.

22.
slide 22
• Appoint a devil’s advocate.
If hidden profiles and self-silencing are sources of
group failure, a tempting approach is to ask some
group members to act as devil’s advocates, urging
a position that is contrary to the group’s inclination.
• Establish contrarian teams.
Red teams come in two basic forms: those that try
to defeat the primary team in a simulated mission,
and those that construct the strongest possible
case against a proposal or a plan. Red teams are
an excellent idea in many contexts, especially if
they sincerely try to find mistakes and exploit
vulnerabilities and are given clear incentives to do
so.
Strategies to counter groupthink 2/2

23.
slide 23
1. Talk & listen in person with those you most disagree with
Actionable recommendations
• Seek out those with whom you
disagree
• Engage (How? See #2, 3, 4, 5)
• Agree to disagree
• Call out those who demonize others
or penalize engagement
• Reward engagement

24.
slide 24
2. Maintain the integrity of science assessments

25.
slide 25
From my March, 2017 Congressional testimony:
Scientific assessments can be essential to policy

26.
slide 26
A climate “red team”? Likely a bad idea

27.
slide 27
2. Maintain the integrity of science assessments
Actionable recommendations
• Hold scientific assessments to high
standards
• Include within them critical and
minority perspectives (i.e., include
the “Red Team”)
• Engage with decision makers to
ensure knowledge is relevant
• Clarify purpose – policy options or
science arbitration?
• Watch out for stealth advocacy

28.
slide 28
3. Understand the Eff-U principle

29.
slide 29
What I learned in North Dakota in 1997
What did
“49 feet” mean?
• To forecasters? WORRY. A huge flood!
• To citizens? NO PROBLEM.
We survived 48.8 feet.
LESSON: Words and numbers are vessels
that carry meaning – Message sent not
always the message received.

30.
slide 30
What is really being communicated?
“All the ‘social marketing’ of ‘scientific
consensus’ does is augment the toxic
idioms of contempt that are poisoning
our science communication
environment.
The unmistakable social meaning of
the material featuring this ‘message’
… is that ‘you and people who share
your identity are morons.’ It's not
‘science communication’; it's a
clownish bumper sticker that says,
‘fuck you.’”
Dan Kahan, Yale University
http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2016/2/9/they-already-got-the-
memo-part-2-more-data-on-the-public-con.html
Kahan, D. M. (2015). Climate‐science communication and the
measurement problem. Political Psychology, 36(S1), 1-43.

31.
slide 31
Some science issues are really about politics

32.
slide 32
Environmental issues are partisan in US Congress

33.
slide 33
What do people hear here?

34.
slide 34
This 
97%
97%
97%
97%
97%
97%
97%
97%
97% 97%
97%
97%
97%
97%
97%
97%

35.
slide 35
Some advocates get it

36.
slide 36
Climate policy as symbolic politics

37.
slide 37
Spot the difference
TRUMP’S BLM
OBAMA’S BLM

38.
slide 38
3. Employ the Eff-U principle
Actionable recommendations
• Understand that words are symbols, and
some of those symbols say “Eff U”
• Conduct research on symbols in the
climate debate
• Candidate terms? temperature trends, hoax,
consensus …
• To avoid polarization, use symbols that
work and avoid those that do not

39.
slide 39
4. Discuss policy proposals in terms of first-year benefits

40.
slide 40
The Iron Law of Climate Policy
“Efforts to sell the public on policies that
will create short-term economic
discomfort cannot succeed if that
discomfort is perceived to be too great. . .
The "iron law" thus presents a boundary
condition on policy design . . .
It says that even if people are willing to
bear some costs to reduce emissions (and
experience shows that they are), they are
willing to go only so far.”
Pielke Jr, R. (2010). A positive path for meeting the
global climate challenge. Yale E360, 1-7.

41.
slide 41
The Iron Law

42.
slide 42
The Iron Law has been quantified
Jenkins, J. D. (2014). Political economy constraints on carbon pricing policies: What are the
implications for economic efficiency, environmental efficacy, and climate policy design?. Energy Policy,
69:467-477.
“the political preferences of both producers and consumers can
significantly constrain efforts to implement the optimal Pigouvian
carbon price. Political economy theory and corroborating evidence from
the United States context indicate the potential for both intense
political resistance from producers in carbon-intensive sectors with high
asset specificity and increasing consumer resistance as carbon prices
rise. In the United States context, this WTP threshold may bind policy
below an average household cost of $80–$200 per year, translating
into a direct carbon price on the order of $2–$8 per ton of CO2. . . The
estimated WTP range falls anywhere from roughly 60 percent
below the lower-range estimates of the social cost of carbon
to roughly two orders of magnitude below the higher-range
estimates.”

43.
slide 43
US Paris withdrawal consequences estimated:
Looks big $8.2 trillion is real money
http://www.g-feed.com/2017/06/the-cost-of-paris-withdrawal.html
Burke, M., Hsiang, S. M., & Miguel, E. (2015). Global non-linear effect of temperature on
economic production. Nature, 527(7577), 235-239.

44.
slide 44
Actually, it’s just noise after we are all dead
Burke, M., Hsiang, S. M., & Miguel, E. (2015). Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic production.
Nature, 527(7577), 235-239.

45.
slide 45
Short-term cost estimates of Paris implementation
http://www.heritage.org/environment/report/consequences-paris-protocol-devastating-economic-costs-essentially-zero

46.
slide 46
The Iron Law is central to climate politics
Key point: It is not whether one of these studies is right
and the other is wrong (both are probably wrong). Rather,
only one of these studies has been produced on a
meaningful time scale of politics: which is always next year.

47.
slide 47
4. Discuss policy proposals in terms of first-year benefits
Actionable recommendations
• Know that while climate policies focus
on the long term, the politics will always
play out in the short term
• Quantify the short-term costs and
benefits of policy proposal, where short-
term = first-year benefits
• Understand that the Iron Law offers a
path to effective policy design

48.
slide 48
5. Debate policies through causal pathways

49.
slide 49
How is that going to work?
MODERATION OF VIEWS
“Asking people to explain how policies work decreased their
reported understanding of those policies and led them to
report more moderate attitudes toward those policies. We
observed these effects both within and between participants.”
Fernbach, P. M., Rogers, T., Fox, C. R. & Sloman, S. A. (2013). Political
extremism is supported by an illusion of understanding. Psychological Science,
24 :939-945.

50.
slide 50
Causal Mechanisms vs Reason Giving
“reductions in rated
understanding of policies
were less pronounced
among participants who
enumerated reasons for
their positions than among
participants who generated
causal explanations for
them. “
Fernbach, P. M., Rogers, T., Fox, C. R. &
Sloman, S. A. (2013). Political
extremism is supported by an illusion of
understanding. Psychological Science,
24:939-945.
REASONS FOR ACTION
• The oceans are rising
• Weather is more extreme
• Fossil fuels produce pollution
REASONS AGAINST ACTION
• I don’t believe the science
• It costs too much
• It’s not fair to the poor
EXAMPLES

51.
slide 51
Debate policy mechanics, not your beliefs
“Political debate might be
more productive if
partisans first engaged in
a substantive and
mechanistic discussion of
policies before engaging
in the more customary
discussion of preferences
and positions.”
Fernbach, P. M., Rogers, T., Fox, C. R. &
Sloman, S. A. (2013). Political extremism
is supported by an illusion of
understanding. Psychological Science,
24:939-945.

52.
slide 52
Source: BP 2017
R. Pielke, Jr.
Example: Global carbon-free energy consumption

53.
slide 53
NOTE: To achieve >90% global
carbon-free energy by ~2090
requires a linear (additive) increase
of ~1% per year. From 2015 to
2016 the increase was 0.5% (from
14.0% to 14.5%). This is half the
needed rate of increase.
Source: BP 2017, R. Pielke, Jr.
Context for decarbonizing global energy

54.
slide 54
Climate Policy Conventional Wisdom
Win public opinion via closing
the science deficit (consensus!
extreme weather!), defeating
the skeptics & deniers
The now-scientifically
informed public will
pressure politicians for
action
Politicians respond by
passing laws, and
international treaties
are signed
Dirty fossil energy
becomes more
expensive
People consequently
feel economic pain
(incentives)
Not liking economic
pain, people change
their behavior & the
market responds
with more energy
efficiency and fossil
fuel alternatives
Such market demand
stimulates
innovation in the
public and private
sectors, as well as in
civil society
The resulting
innovation delivers
low carbon
alternatives
GHG emissions go
down to ~zero,
extreme weather (and
other) problems are
thus solved
Source: Updated from Pielke (2014)

55.
slide 55
Where Conventional Wisdom Fails
Win public opinion via closing
the science deficit (consensus!
extreme weather!), defeating
the skeptics & deniers
The now-scientifically
informed public will
pressure politicians for
action
Politicians respond by
passing laws, and
international treaties
are signed
Dirty fossil energy
becomes more
expensive
People consequently
feel economic pain
(incentives)
Not liking economic
pain, people change
their behavior & the
market responds
with more energy
efficiency and fossil
fuel alternatives
Such market demand
stimulates
innovation in the
public and private
sectors, as well as in
civil society
The resulting
innovation delivers
low carbon
alternatives
GHG emissions go
down to ~zero,
extreme weather (and
other) problems are
thus solved
Source: Updated from Pielke (2014)
VOTERS DO
RESPOND TO
HIGHER PRICED
ENERGY . . . AT
THE BALLOT BOX.

56.
slide 56
What Really Happens
Win public opinion via closing
the science deficit (consensus!
extreme weather!), defeating
the skeptics & deniers
The now-scientifically
informed public will
pressure politicians for
action
Politicians respond by
passing laws, and
international treaties
are signed
Dirty fossil energy
becomes more
expensive
People consequently
feel economic pain
(incentives)
Source: Updated from Pielke (2014)
Not liking economic
pain, people change
their behavior & vote
for politicians who
promise cheaper
energy (Iron Law!)
Climate policy
becomes an
economic issue,
framed along
partisan lines
The result is
gridlock, rancor &
myopia
GHG emissions
respond to economics
& legacy innovation
policies, extreme
weather becomes a
symbol and the rest of
the world moves
ahead on pragmatic
energy policies

57.
slide 57
An Alternative: Climate Policy Pragmatism
Focus on innovation with the
goal of making clean energy
cheap. Pay for this with a low
carbon tax
Successful energy
innovation lowers the costs
of energy production and
consumption
The price on carbon is
ratcheted higher as
the political context
allows
Dirty fossil energy
becomes more
expensive
Lower cost
alternatives fill the
gap
Energy access is
expanded, economic
growth continues,
people are generally
better off because of
energy innovation
policies.
Energy innovation
policies create a
virtuous cycle where
public support is
reinforced by felt
short-term benefits
The resulting
innovation delivers
low carbon
alternatives
GHG emissions go
down, unlikely to
zero, but innovation
focuses on backstop
technologies to help
finish the job

58.
slide 58
5. Debate policies through causal pathways
Actionable recommendations
• Express the mechanics of your preferred
policy – How, exactly will it work?
• Focus on causal pathways rather than
reason giving
• Examine each step in a policy causal
pathway for realism, feasibility and
evidence that it can actually work
• Remember Walter Lippmann on politics

59.
slide 59
Why improve the climate debate at all?
1. POLITICS

60.
slide 60
Why improve the climate debate at all?
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/china-new-silk-road-bumpy-ride/
2. POLICY

61.
slide 61
Five ways to improve the climate debate
1. Talk & listen in person
with those you most
disagree with
2. Maintain the integrity of
science assessments
3. Understand the Eff-U
principle
4. Discuss policy proposals
in terms of first-year
benefits
5. Debate policies through
causal pathways

62.
slide 62
Thank You
 pielke@colorado.edu
 Blogs:
– http://theclimatefix.wordpress.com
– http://thehonestbroker.org
– http://theleastthing.blogspot.com
 About me: http://rogerpielkejr.com/
2007 2010 2011 2014
2016