BIOSAFETY MANAGEMENT.ppt

BIOSAFETY
Dr. Esther Shoba R
Assistant Professor
Kristu Jayanti College
Introduction
Bio-related research activities may involve manipulation of
microbial, animal or plant cells.
The risks associated with these activities arise from the
samples and /or the procedural requirements.
Adherence to standard microbiological techniques and
using facilities suitable to the risk level of the pathogen
helps to protect the researcher from laboratory-acquired
infections.
Bio hazards
Hazards related to bio research can be classified into two
categories.
• hazards related with the pathogen or
human/animal cells being used in research.
• related with the procedures and practices
followed in the lab.
Pathogenic risks
Cell cultures
• Researchers who handle or manipulate human
or animal cells are at risk of possible exposure to
potentially infectious pathogens that may be present in
those cells/ tissues.
• The human cell lines may contain blood borne
pathogens, which can be transmitted due to
improper handling.
Routes of entry for pathogen
The probable routes of entry are
•Inhalation of infectious aerosols.
•Contact of the agent with the skin, eyes or mucous
membrane.
•Inoculation by contaminated sharps.
•Bites from infected animals or contact with their body
fluids.
•Ingestion of infectious agent through mouth pipetting or
contaminated hands.
Aerosols
Aerosols generated during research activities remain
undetected and can spread easily and remain suspended
in the laboratory atmosphere for a long time.
They possess a serious hazard to the person performing
the task and also to others who are exposed to the air
from the laboratory.
Aerosols
Aerosols can be generated during the following activities
•Pipetting
•Blending
•Centrifugation
•Use of sonicators and
vortex mixers
These respirable size particles when inhaled are
retained in the lungs and can cause infection to the
person.
Pathogenic risks
The risk from the pathogen handled depends on the
following factors.
•Capability to cause infection in the host and the severity
of the same.
•Preventive measures and treatment available.
•Route of entry
•Infective dose level
•Stability in the environment
•The range of cells/strains that can act as a host.
Based on the above factors the microorganisms are
classified into four risk groups.
Classification of pathogenic microorganisms
Risk group I
A pathogen that is unlikely to cause any disease in humans
or animals.
All bacterial, fungal and parasitic agents not included in
higher groups.
Classification of pathogenic microorganisms
Risk group II
A pathogen that can cause disease in humans or animals
but is unlikely to be a serious hazard.
Effective treatment and preventive measures are available
and the risk of spread of infection is limited.
• Bacterial- Vibrio cholerae
• Fungal- Aspergillus fumigatus, Actinomycetes
• Parasitic- P.falciparum, Plasmodium thcilera
• Viral and Rickettssial -Vole rickettsia, Mumps virus
Classification of pathogenic microorganisms
Risk group III
A pathogen that can cause serious human or animal
disease , but does not ordinarily spread from one infected
person to another.
Effective treatment and preventive measures are
available.
•Bacterial - Clostridium botulium, Francisella tularensis
•Fungal - Coccidioides immitis,Histoplasma capsulatum
•Parasitic- Schisistosoma mansomi
•Viral and Rickettssial - Foot-and- Mouth disease virus
Classification of pathogenic microorganisms
Risk group IV
A pathogen that usually causes serious human or animal
disease and that can be readily transmitted from one
individual to another, directly or indirectly.
Effective treatment and preventive measures are not
usually available.
•Korean hemorrhagic fever
•Omsk hemorrhagic fever and
•Central European Encephalitis viruses
Containment
The term containment is used to describe the safe work
practices in handling infectious agents to reduce exposure
to laboratory personnel and others.
Types of containment
•Biological containment
•Physical containment
Biological containment (BC)
Any combination of vector and host which is to provide
biological containment must be chosen or constructed to
limit the infectivity of vector to specific hosts and control
the host-vector survival in the environment.
Physical Containment (PC)
Physical containment helps to confine the pathogenic
organisms being handled and prevent exposure to
personnel.
Physical containment is achieved by
Primary containment
• Laboratory practices
• Containment equipment
• Special laboratory design Secondary containment
Primary containment offers protection to personnel and
immediate laboratory environment whereas secondary
containment offers protection to the environment outside
the laboratory.
Primary containment
Laboratory practices
Consists of adhering to standard microbiological practices
and techniques and awareness of potential hazards.
Primary containment
Containment equipment
This includes biological safety cabinets and enclosed
containers (e.g. safety centrifuge cup).
Secondary containment
Proper design of the facility helps in protecting personnel
inside the facility and also prevents the release of
pathogenic organisms outside the facility.
Facility designs are of three types
Basic Laboratory (for Risk Group I and II)
Containment Laboratory (for Risk Group III)
Maximum Containment Laboratory (for Risk Group IV)
CONTAINMENT LEVELS
Biosafety containment levels have to be designated for a facility
depending on the level of risk associated with the biological and
chemical agents used and released from it. Following NIH
(National Institute of Health, USA) and DBT (Department of
Biotechnology, India) guidelines, different facilities for biological
research have been classified under three containment levels)
CONTAINMENT LEVELS - I
Viable organisms should be handled in a production system which physically
separates the process from the environment;
Exhaust gases should be treated to minimize (i.e. to reduce to the lowest
practicable level consistent with safety) the release of viable organisms;
Sample collection, addition of materials to the system and the transfer of viable
organisms to another system should be done in a manner which minimizes
release;
Bulk quantities of culture fluids should not be removed from the system unless
the viable organisms have been inactivated by validated means;
Effluent from the production facility should be inactivated by validated means
prior to discharge.
CONTAINMENT LEVELS - II
•Viable organisms should be handled in a production system which physically
separates the process from the environment;
•Exhaust gases should be treated to prevent the release of viable organisms;
•Sample collection, addition of materials to a closed system and the transfer of
viable organisms to another closed system should be done in a manner which
prevents release;
CONTAINMENT LEVELS – II - CONTD
•Culture fluids should not be removed from the closed system unless the viable
organisms have been inactivated by validated chemical or physical means;
•Seals should be designed to prevent leakage or should be fully enclosed in
ventilated housings;
•Closed systems should be located in an area controlled according to the
requirements;
•Effluent from the production facility should be inactivated by validated chemical
or physical means prior to discharge.
CONTAINMENT LEVELS – III
•Viable organisms should be handled in a production system which physically
separates the process from the environment;
•Exhaust gases should be treated to prevent the release of viable organisms;
•Sample collection, addition of materials to a closed system and the transfer of
viable organisms to another closed system should be done in a manner which
prevents release;
•Culture fluids should not be removed from the closed system unless the viable
organisms have been inactivated by validated chemical or physical means;
•Seals should be designed to prevent leakage or should be fully enclosed in
ventilated housings;
CONTAINMENT LEVELS – III - CONTD
•Production systems should be located within a purpose built controlled
area according to the requirements;
•Entry should be restricted in the laboratory area and only persons with
appropriate authority should be allowed access to the working area.
Effluent from the production facility should be inactivated by validated
chemical or physical means prior to discharge.
Different containment levels have been assigned for rDNA GILSP (Good
industrial large scale practice) micro-organisms.
Examples of containment approaches for recombinant organisms are
discussed
CONTAINMENT LEVELS - I
It consists of a combination of laboratory practices,
equipment and facilities suitable to the procedures being
performed and hazards of the pathogen.
The four biosafety levels corresponds to four risk groups.
A lower risk group can be assigned a higher biosafety
level, if a biological risk assessment carried out requires
so.
Biosafety levels
Biosafety level I
Suitable for teaching laboratories and for facilities in
which work is done with defined and characterised strains
of agents not known to cause any disease.
Good microbiological techniques(GMT) to be followed.
Biosafety Level II
Applicable to facilities in which work is done with
indigenous moderate-risk agents present in the
community and associated with human disease of varying
severity.
BSL II is appropriate when work is done with any human-
derived blood, body fluids, tissues, or primary human cell
lines, in which presence of an infectious agent may be
unknown
BSL II requires
•Following GMT
•Use of personal protective equipment
•Use of BSC
•Use of autoclaves
Biosafety level III
Applicable to facilities in which work is done with
indigenous or exotic agents where the potential for
infection by aerosols is real and the disease may have
serious or lethal consequences.
BSL III requires in addition to that of BSL II requirements
•Special clothing
•Directional airflow
•Controlled access
•Double door entry/Anteroom
•Supervision
Biosafety level IV
Applicable to work with dangerous and exotic agents which
pose a high individual risk of life-threatening disease.
BSL IV requires in addition to BSL III requirements
•Positive pressure personnel suits
•Strictly limited access
•Double ended autoclave
•Class III BSC
•Airlock with shower
•Supervision
BIOSAFETY GUIDE LINES - RDNA
Biosafety guidelines are designed and applied to
research involving recombinant DNA (rDNA) techniques.
Handling, production, storing and transportation of
genetically modified organism (GMOs) involve different
biosafety issues under different category.
Biosafety practices deal with the application of standard
safety principles handling hazardous material/agents to
minimize potential harmful effect on human health and
environment.
BIOSAFETY MANAGEMENT - RDNA
Biosafety regulatory principles and protocols regulates the
potential risk and allow access to the benefits of rDNA
technology.
RISK ASSESSMENT
RISK MANAGEMENT
Are the components of biosafety
BIOSAFETY MANAGEMENT - RDNA
The foundation of any safety program is the use of control measures
appropriate for the risk posed by the activities and the agents in use.
The process of analyzing and determining the risk associated with
recombinant DNA work is called as Risk analysis.
The principle behind biosafety regulations is to minimize the risk to
human health and safety, and the conservation of environment including
safe handling of hazardous material. Risk analysis consists of three
components: risk assessment, risk management and risk communication.
BIOSAFETY MANAGEMENT - RDNA
Risk Assessment: Estimation and determination of risk associated with
the handling and production of a recombinant DNA molecule.
Risk Management: The process of analyzing possible prevention
measures to minimize the risk and designing policies accordingly
including implementation of them.
Risk Communication: The exchange of information and opinions on risk
management between academic parties, industry, consumers and
policy makers.
RISK ASSESSMENT - RDNA
The biosafety level is determined based on the risk associated with the work.
The principle investigator is responsible for implementing the necessary safety
requirements in his/her laboratory.
Risk assessment process accounts the following criteria to determine
biosafety level:
i.Pathogenicity – The ability of an organism to cause disease in human
system.
ii.Virulence – The severity of the disease (lethal/non lethal, availability of cure
etc) in a healthy adult.
iii.Proliferation – the subsequent multiplication, genetic reconstruction,
growth, transport, modification and die-off of these micro-organisms in the
environment, including possible transfer of genetic material to other micro-
organisms.
RISK ASSESSMENT - RDNA
iii.Transmission route – The possible route of transmission (mucous
membrane, inhalation etc) to establish the disease in human or other
organism.
iv.Infectious dose (ID) – The amount of infectious agent required to
cause disease in healthy human.
vi.Antibiotic/disinfectant resistance – The resistance acquired by the
infectious agent to available antibiotic/disinfectant.
RISK MANAGEMENT - RDNA
Risk management in biosafety issues is related to the target site
where the practice is conducting (laboratory, industry,
agriculture field etc.).
Recommendations: General
i.Harmonization of approaches to rDNA techniques can be
facilitated by exchanging principles or guidelines for national
regulations; developments in risk analysis; and practical
experience in risk management. Therefore, information should
be shared as freely as possible.
ii.There is no scientific basis for specific legislation for the
implementation of rDNA techniques and applications.
RISK MANAGEMENT - RDNA
Member countries should examine their existing oversight and
review mechanisms to ensure that adequate review and control
may be applied while avoiding any undue burdens that may
hamper technological developments in this field.
iii. Any approach to implement guidelines should not impede
future developments in rDNA techniques. International
harmonization should recognize this need.
RISK MANAGEMENT - RDNA
iv. To facilitate data exchange and minimize trade barriers
between countries, further developments such as testing
methods, equipment design and knowledge of microbial
taxonomy should be considered at both national and
international levels.
Due account should be taken of ongoing work on standards
within international organizations.
v. Special efforts should be made to improve public
understanding of the various aspects of rDNA techniques.
RISK MANAGEMENT - RDNA
v.For rDNA applications in industry, agriculture and the
environment, it will be important for member countries to watch
the development of these techniques.
vi.For certain industrial applications and for environmental and
agricultural applications of rDNA organisms, some countries may
wish to have a notification scheme.
vii.Recognizing the need for innovation, it is important to consider
appropriate means to protect intellectual property and
confidentiality interests while assuring safety.
BIOSAFETY LEVELS - RDNA
All the facilities handling microorganisms and materials
containing recombinant DNA molecules have risk
assessment program.
Depending on the risk possessed by the samples, four
biosafety levels have been assigned to rDNA research
facilities.
Each BSL facility has requirement of unique design features
and safety equipments
BIOSAFETY LEVEL I (BSL –I) - RDNA
•Agents: Characterized strains of microorganisms known to cause
no disease in healthy adults. eg. E. coli,
S. cerevesiae, B. subtilis etc.
•Recombinant DNA based research activities involving non-
pathogenic micro-organisms for expression of genes using plasmid
vectors or low risk viral vectors.
•Work practice: Standard aseptic microbiological techniques.
•Safety equipment requirement: Lab coats and eye protection
recommended.
•Facilities: Bench top, sink etc.
BIOSAFETY LEVEL II (BSL - II) - RDNA
•Agents: Handling of micro-organisms which possess moderate
hazard to personal and environment.
•rDNA based research activities in micro-organisms using non-viral or
viral vectors.
•Work practice: Standard BSL-I practices with addition of limited
access, biohazard sign, defined procedure for disposal of “Regulated
Medical Waste”, proper training to lab personal and medical
surveillance.
•Safety equipment: Class-II biological safety cabinet, lab coats,
gloves, eye/face protection, physical containment equipment to
reduce infectious aerosol exposure or splashes.
•Facility: BSL-I facility with addition of autoclave, decontamination
facility and proper airflow.
BIOSAFETY LEVEL III (BSL -III) - RDNA
•Agents: Handling of micro-organisms which are designated as
hazardous or potentially lethal agents to personal and
environment.
•Laboratory personnel must have specific training in handling
infectious micro-organisms and should be supervised by
scientist competent in handling infectious agents.
•Work practices: BSL-2 practices, with the addition of:
controlled access, on-site decontamination of all waste and
lab clothing and medical surveillance.
BIOSAFETY LEVEL III (BSL -III) - RDNA
•Safety equipment: Class-III biological safety cabinet, lab
coats, gloves, eye/face protection, respiratory protection,
physical containment equipment to reduce infectious aerosol
exposure or splashes.
•Facility: BSL-III facility has specific criteria to meet. Lab should
have double door entry with physical separation of working
area from the access corridors, directional airflow in lab, and
no recirculation of exhaust air in the lab, sufficient
decontamination facility, in lab autoclave etc.
BIOSAFETY LEVEL IV (BSL -IV) - RDNA
•Agents: Hazardous and potentially lethal organisms that
posses high individual risk of laboratory transmitted disease
for which there is no vaccine or treatment, or a related
agent with unknown risk of transmission.
•Laboratory personnel must have specialized training in
handling BSL-IV agents and should be supervised by
scientist competent in handling infectious agents.
BIOSAFETY LEVEL IV (BSL -IV) - RDNA
•Safety equipment: Class-IV biological safety cabinet, lab
coats, gloves, eye/face protection, respiratory protection,
physical and containment equipment to reduce infectious
aerosol exposure or splashes.
•Facility: BSL-IV facility requires specialized design to
minimize the exposure to risk and only the authorized entry
should be permitted in laboratory area in BSL-IV labs.
Good microbiological techniques (GMT)
• Specimen containers must be correctly labelled for
easy identification.
• Use secondary containers (autoclavable) while
transporting specimens to contain spill.
• Specimen containers received from external agencies
must be opened in the biosafety cabinet.
• Use mechanical pipettes.
Good microbiological techniques
• Open flame must not be used in BSC as it can distort
the air flow pattern and damage the filters.
•Always use disposable gloves. Do not touch mouth, eyes
and face with contaminated hands.
Good microbiological techniques
• Food and drink must not be stored or consumed in the
laboratory.
• Glassware must be replaced with plasticware
wherever possible.
Good microbiological techniques
• Sharps(e.g., needle sticks, glass) must be avoided
wherever possible as it can transmit blood borne
pathogens in case of injury.
Good microbiological techniques
• Use engineered sharp-safety devices when syringes and
needles are necessary.
• Needles must not be recapped, to prevent needle
stick injury.
• Puncture-proof containers fitted with covers must be used
for disposing sharps.
Good microbiological techniques
• Tubes and specimen containers must always be securely
capped (screw-capped if possible) for centrifugation.
• Refer to manufacturer’s instructions before
operating equipments.
• Work area must be decontaminated with a suitable
disinfectant at the end of the work.
• Hands must be thoroughly washed before leaving the lab.
Personal protective equipment
• Personal protective equipment act as a barrier to
minimize the risk of exposure to aerosols, splashes and
other injuries.
•Personal protective equipment must be selected on
the basis of the risks involved in the task performed.
• Lab coat, safety glasses and toe covered footwear is a
minimum requirement while working in the lab.
• Face shield must be used if there is any risk of
splashing of infectious materials.
Personal protective equipment
• Gloves must be worn for all procedures that may
involve direct contact with blood, infectious materials, or
infected animals.
• Gloves must be removed aseptically and autoclaved
with other laboratory wastes before disposal.
• If re-usable gloves are used, on removal they must
be cleaned and disinfected before re-use.
• Lab coats and other personal protective equipment used
must not be used outside the laboratory.
Biosafety cabinets(BSC)
Biological safety cabinets provide containment of
infectious aerosols generated during the laboratory
procedures.
Three types of BSCs are used in microbiological
laboratories.
These are Class I Class II Class III
Biosafety Cabinets
Class I BSC
Offers protection to laboratory personnel and to the
laboratory environment .
It doesn’t protect the samples from external contamination.
Class II BSC
Provides protection to the samples in the cabinet from
external contamination in addition to personnel and
laboratory environment protection.
Class III BSC
Provides the maximum attainable level of protection to
personnel and the environment.
The following factors reduce the efficiency of the BSC
• Poor location
• Room air currents
• Decreased airflow
• Leakage in HEPA filters
• Working with raised sashes
• Overcrowding the work surface
• Improper user methodology
Emergency measures
In case of exposure to bio samples
• Remove the contaminated clothing.
• Wash the skin thoroughly with soap and water.
• In case of eye contact flush the eyes with water.
• Report the exposure to the Lab in charge.
• Get medical attention immediately.
Decontamination
• Decontamination renders an item (work bench,
equipment, etc.) safe to handle by reducing the number
of organisms to below the threshold infectious dose level
such that transmission is unlikely to occur.
• Decontamination requirements will depend on the
experimental work and the nature of the infectious agent
handled.
• Decontamination is usually accomplished by steam
sterilization or autoclaving.
• Sterilization and disinfection are different forms of
decontamination.
Decontamination
Sterilisation
•Sterilisation makes an item free from all living
microorganisms and viruses.
• The process of sterilization can be
accomplished by applying heat.
Decontamination
Disinfection
•Is not as effective as sterilization, as some organisms
such as bacterial endospores may survive.
•A disinfectant is a chemical or mixture of chemicals used
to kill microorganisms, but not spores. They are usually
applied to inanimate surfaces or objects.
Decontamination
Disinfectants
•Sodium hypochlorite and formaldehyde are the
disinfectants recommended for general laboratory use.
•For special purposes phenolic compounds, alcohols,
iodine etc., can be used effectively.
Biohazard waste disposal
Biohazard waste generated in laboratories must be
segregated into the following:
•Non-contaminated general waste
•“Sharps”-needles, glass pieces, etc
•Contaminated material for autoclaving and recycling
•Contaminated material for incineration
• Biohazard waste for autoclaving must be collected in
red plastic bags and those for incineration in yellow non
chlorinated plastic bags.
• Biohazard waste of human and animal origin must be
incinerated.
Biohazard waste disposal
1 de 65

Recomendados

BIO SAFETY por
BIO SAFETY BIO SAFETY
BIO SAFETY CentiBlogs
20 visualizações42 slides
Bio safety iitb 1 por
Bio safety iitb 1Bio safety iitb 1
Bio safety iitb 1Adnan Ahmad [Seena Medical Collage]
32 visualizações42 slides
Biosafety and Cartagena Protocol por
Biosafety and Cartagena ProtocolBiosafety and Cartagena Protocol
Biosafety and Cartagena ProtocolAmrutha Hari
9.4K visualizações44 slides
Biosafety levels.pdf por
Biosafety levels.pdfBiosafety levels.pdf
Biosafety levels.pdfssuser8f10bd
88 visualizações24 slides
Laboratory oranization and biosafety requirements of microbiology laboratory por
Laboratory oranization and biosafety requirements of microbiology laboratoryLaboratory oranization and biosafety requirements of microbiology laboratory
Laboratory oranization and biosafety requirements of microbiology laboratoryAuricle Nissim
4.7K visualizações60 slides
BIOSAFETY.pptx por
BIOSAFETY.pptxBIOSAFETY.pptx
BIOSAFETY.pptxNSaiKishore1
40 visualizações10 slides

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Similar a BIOSAFETY MANAGEMENT.ppt

Lecture 3: biosafety levels por
Lecture 3: biosafety levels  Lecture 3: biosafety levels
Lecture 3: biosafety levels raghdasaad6
908 visualizações16 slides
Biosafety por
BiosafetyBiosafety
BiosafetySaajida Sultaana
5.1K visualizações15 slides
Module 3 biosafety principles & microbiologycal risk group 21 1-18 por
Module 3 biosafety principles & microbiologycal risk group 21 1-18Module 3 biosafety principles & microbiologycal risk group 21 1-18
Module 3 biosafety principles & microbiologycal risk group 21 1-18EhealthMoHS
3.4K visualizações26 slides
7.Laboratory safety and Biohazard por
7.Laboratory safety and Biohazard7.Laboratory safety and Biohazard
7.Laboratory safety and BiohazardShailendra shera
2K visualizações14 slides
Biosafety levels with video guideline por
Biosafety levels with video guidelineBiosafety levels with video guideline
Biosafety levels with video guidelineHuy Hoang
3.5K visualizações36 slides
Biosafety Levels by Francis and Prasoona .pptx por
Biosafety Levels by Francis and Prasoona .pptxBiosafety Levels by Francis and Prasoona .pptx
Biosafety Levels by Francis and Prasoona .pptxUniversity of Petroleum and Energy studies
36 visualizações27 slides

Similar a BIOSAFETY MANAGEMENT.ppt(20)

Lecture 3: biosafety levels por raghdasaad6
Lecture 3: biosafety levels  Lecture 3: biosafety levels
Lecture 3: biosafety levels
raghdasaad6908 visualizações
Biosafety por Saajida Sultaana
BiosafetyBiosafety
Biosafety
Saajida Sultaana5.1K visualizações
Module 3 biosafety principles & microbiologycal risk group 21 1-18 por EhealthMoHS
Module 3 biosafety principles & microbiologycal risk group 21 1-18Module 3 biosafety principles & microbiologycal risk group 21 1-18
Module 3 biosafety principles & microbiologycal risk group 21 1-18
EhealthMoHS3.4K visualizações
7.Laboratory safety and Biohazard por Shailendra shera
7.Laboratory safety and Biohazard7.Laboratory safety and Biohazard
7.Laboratory safety and Biohazard
Shailendra shera2K visualizações
Biosafety levels with video guideline por Huy Hoang
Biosafety levels with video guidelineBiosafety levels with video guideline
Biosafety levels with video guideline
Huy Hoang3.5K visualizações
Biosafety - History, Levels and issues por Prof SD Tidke
Biosafety - History, Levels and issuesBiosafety - History, Levels and issues
Biosafety - History, Levels and issues
Prof SD Tidke2.6K visualizações
Principle of biosafty por Microbiology
Principle of biosaftyPrinciple of biosafty
Principle of biosafty
Microbiology783 visualizações
biosafety levels 1, 2, 3 and 4 por Microbiology
biosafety levels 1, 2, 3 and 4biosafety levels 1, 2, 3 and 4
biosafety levels 1, 2, 3 and 4
Microbiology5.7K visualizações
biosafety levels por Microbiology
biosafety levels biosafety levels
biosafety levels
Microbiology499 visualizações
Introduction to cell culture.pptx por Smart Karthi
Introduction to cell culture.pptxIntroduction to cell culture.pptx
Introduction to cell culture.pptx
Smart Karthi13 visualizações
Laboratory biosafety levels and transfer of biological samples por Mintah Dadzie Francis
Laboratory biosafety levels and transfer of biological samplesLaboratory biosafety levels and transfer of biological samples
Laboratory biosafety levels and transfer of biological samples
Mintah Dadzie Francis2.6K visualizações
Biosafety por Niladri Roy
BiosafetyBiosafety
Biosafety
Niladri Roy424 visualizações
An introduction on biosaftey por Vipin Shukla
An introduction on biosafteyAn introduction on biosaftey
An introduction on biosaftey
Vipin Shukla205 visualizações
Biosafty por Dr.Dinesh Jain
BiosaftyBiosafty
Biosafty
Dr.Dinesh Jain466 visualizações
Biosafety por sijiskariah
BiosafetyBiosafety
Biosafety
sijiskariah64.5K visualizações
Biosafety in the laboratories por VAIBHAV RAJHANS
Biosafety in the laboratoriesBiosafety in the laboratories
Biosafety in the laboratories
VAIBHAV RAJHANS39.3K visualizações
10 safety guidelines for recombinant dna research por Indranil Bhattacharjee
10 safety guidelines for recombinant dna research10 safety guidelines for recombinant dna research
10 safety guidelines for recombinant dna research
Indranil Bhattacharjee19.9K visualizações

Mais de EstherShobhaR

CYTOSKELETON STRUCTURE.ppt por
CYTOSKELETON STRUCTURE.pptCYTOSKELETON STRUCTURE.ppt
CYTOSKELETON STRUCTURE.pptEstherShobhaR
4 visualizações19 slides
APPLICATION OF IE.ppt por
APPLICATION OF IE.pptAPPLICATION OF IE.ppt
APPLICATION OF IE.pptEstherShobhaR
7 visualizações19 slides
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN SLIME PROBLEM.ppt por
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN SLIME PROBLEM.pptBIOTECHNOLOGY IN SLIME PROBLEM.ppt
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN SLIME PROBLEM.pptEstherShobhaR
16 visualizações20 slides
Production of oils and fuels from wood waste.ppt por
Production of oils and fuels from wood waste.pptProduction of oils and fuels from wood waste.ppt
Production of oils and fuels from wood waste.pptEstherShobhaR
70 visualizações15 slides
BIOREMEDIATION.ppt por
BIOREMEDIATION.pptBIOREMEDIATION.ppt
BIOREMEDIATION.pptEstherShobhaR
40 visualizações61 slides
Anaerobic Digestion and Biogas.ppt por
Anaerobic Digestion and Biogas.pptAnaerobic Digestion and Biogas.ppt
Anaerobic Digestion and Biogas.pptEstherShobhaR
18 visualizações34 slides

Mais de EstherShobhaR(13)

CYTOSKELETON STRUCTURE.ppt por EstherShobhaR
CYTOSKELETON STRUCTURE.pptCYTOSKELETON STRUCTURE.ppt
CYTOSKELETON STRUCTURE.ppt
EstherShobhaR4 visualizações
APPLICATION OF IE.ppt por EstherShobhaR
APPLICATION OF IE.pptAPPLICATION OF IE.ppt
APPLICATION OF IE.ppt
EstherShobhaR7 visualizações
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN SLIME PROBLEM.ppt por EstherShobhaR
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN SLIME PROBLEM.pptBIOTECHNOLOGY IN SLIME PROBLEM.ppt
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN SLIME PROBLEM.ppt
EstherShobhaR16 visualizações
Production of oils and fuels from wood waste.ppt por EstherShobhaR
Production of oils and fuels from wood waste.pptProduction of oils and fuels from wood waste.ppt
Production of oils and fuels from wood waste.ppt
EstherShobhaR70 visualizações
BIOREMEDIATION.ppt por EstherShobhaR
BIOREMEDIATION.pptBIOREMEDIATION.ppt
BIOREMEDIATION.ppt
EstherShobhaR40 visualizações
Anaerobic Digestion and Biogas.ppt por EstherShobhaR
Anaerobic Digestion and Biogas.pptAnaerobic Digestion and Biogas.ppt
Anaerobic Digestion and Biogas.ppt
EstherShobhaR18 visualizações
LIPOPROTEINS.ppt por EstherShobhaR
LIPOPROTEINS.pptLIPOPROTEINS.ppt
LIPOPROTEINS.ppt
EstherShobhaR8 visualizações
PROSTOGLANDINS.ppt por EstherShobhaR
PROSTOGLANDINS.pptPROSTOGLANDINS.ppt
PROSTOGLANDINS.ppt
EstherShobhaR6 visualizações
PHOSPHOLIPIDS.ppt por EstherShobhaR
PHOSPHOLIPIDS.pptPHOSPHOLIPIDS.ppt
PHOSPHOLIPIDS.ppt
EstherShobhaR27 visualizações
EXPRESSION SYSTEMS.ppt por EstherShobhaR
EXPRESSION SYSTEMS.pptEXPRESSION SYSTEMS.ppt
EXPRESSION SYSTEMS.ppt
EstherShobhaR73 visualizações
ENZYMES IN GENETIC ENGINEERING.ppt por EstherShobhaR
ENZYMES IN GENETIC ENGINEERING.pptENZYMES IN GENETIC ENGINEERING.ppt
ENZYMES IN GENETIC ENGINEERING.ppt
EstherShobhaR108 visualizações
RECOMBINANT PROTEINS - INSULIN.pptx por EstherShobhaR
RECOMBINANT PROTEINS - INSULIN.pptxRECOMBINANT PROTEINS - INSULIN.pptx
RECOMBINANT PROTEINS - INSULIN.pptx
EstherShobhaR42 visualizações
tool of gentic engg.ppt por EstherShobhaR
tool of gentic engg.ppttool of gentic engg.ppt
tool of gentic engg.ppt
EstherShobhaR15 visualizações

Último

ELECTRON TRANSPORT CHAIN por
ELECTRON TRANSPORT CHAINELECTRON TRANSPORT CHAIN
ELECTRON TRANSPORT CHAINDEEKSHA RANI
10 visualizações16 slides
A Ready-to-Analyze High-Plex Spatial Signature Development Workflow for Cance... por
A Ready-to-Analyze High-Plex Spatial Signature Development Workflow for Cance...A Ready-to-Analyze High-Plex Spatial Signature Development Workflow for Cance...
A Ready-to-Analyze High-Plex Spatial Signature Development Workflow for Cance...InsideScientific
105 visualizações62 slides
1978 NASA News Release Log por
1978 NASA News Release Log1978 NASA News Release Log
1978 NASA News Release Logpurrterminator
15 visualizações146 slides
Evaluation and Standardization of the Marketed Polyherbal drug Patanjali Divy... por
Evaluation and Standardization of the Marketed Polyherbal drug Patanjali Divy...Evaluation and Standardization of the Marketed Polyherbal drug Patanjali Divy...
Evaluation and Standardization of the Marketed Polyherbal drug Patanjali Divy...Anmol Vishnu Gupta
7 visualizações10 slides
A giant thin stellar stream in the Coma Galaxy Cluster por
A giant thin stellar stream in the Coma Galaxy ClusterA giant thin stellar stream in the Coma Galaxy Cluster
A giant thin stellar stream in the Coma Galaxy ClusterSérgio Sacani
18 visualizações14 slides
Note on the Riemann Hypothesis por
Note on the Riemann HypothesisNote on the Riemann Hypothesis
Note on the Riemann Hypothesisvegafrank2
7 visualizações20 slides

Último(20)

ELECTRON TRANSPORT CHAIN por DEEKSHA RANI
ELECTRON TRANSPORT CHAINELECTRON TRANSPORT CHAIN
ELECTRON TRANSPORT CHAIN
DEEKSHA RANI10 visualizações
A Ready-to-Analyze High-Plex Spatial Signature Development Workflow for Cance... por InsideScientific
A Ready-to-Analyze High-Plex Spatial Signature Development Workflow for Cance...A Ready-to-Analyze High-Plex Spatial Signature Development Workflow for Cance...
A Ready-to-Analyze High-Plex Spatial Signature Development Workflow for Cance...
InsideScientific105 visualizações
1978 NASA News Release Log por purrterminator
1978 NASA News Release Log1978 NASA News Release Log
1978 NASA News Release Log
purrterminator15 visualizações
Evaluation and Standardization of the Marketed Polyherbal drug Patanjali Divy... por Anmol Vishnu Gupta
Evaluation and Standardization of the Marketed Polyherbal drug Patanjali Divy...Evaluation and Standardization of the Marketed Polyherbal drug Patanjali Divy...
Evaluation and Standardization of the Marketed Polyherbal drug Patanjali Divy...
Anmol Vishnu Gupta7 visualizações
A giant thin stellar stream in the Coma Galaxy Cluster por Sérgio Sacani
A giant thin stellar stream in the Coma Galaxy ClusterA giant thin stellar stream in the Coma Galaxy Cluster
A giant thin stellar stream in the Coma Galaxy Cluster
Sérgio Sacani18 visualizações
Note on the Riemann Hypothesis por vegafrank2
Note on the Riemann HypothesisNote on the Riemann Hypothesis
Note on the Riemann Hypothesis
vegafrank27 visualizações
Nitrosamine & NDSRI.pptx por NileshBonde4
Nitrosamine & NDSRI.pptxNitrosamine & NDSRI.pptx
Nitrosamine & NDSRI.pptx
NileshBonde418 visualizações
Discovery of therapeutic agents targeting PKLR for NAFLD using drug repositio... por Trustlife
Discovery of therapeutic agents targeting PKLR for NAFLD using drug repositio...Discovery of therapeutic agents targeting PKLR for NAFLD using drug repositio...
Discovery of therapeutic agents targeting PKLR for NAFLD using drug repositio...
Trustlife142 visualizações
Small ruminant keepers’ knowledge, attitudes and practices towards peste des ... por ILRI
Small ruminant keepers’ knowledge, attitudes and practices towards peste des ...Small ruminant keepers’ knowledge, attitudes and practices towards peste des ...
Small ruminant keepers’ knowledge, attitudes and practices towards peste des ...
ILRI5 visualizações
vitamine B1.pptx por ajithkilpart
vitamine B1.pptxvitamine B1.pptx
vitamine B1.pptx
ajithkilpart28 visualizações
How to be(come) a successful PhD student por Tom Mens
How to be(come) a successful PhD studentHow to be(come) a successful PhD student
How to be(come) a successful PhD student
Tom Mens537 visualizações
Structure of purines and pyrimidines - Jahnvi arora (11228108), mmdu ,mullana... por jahnviarora989
Structure of purines and pyrimidines - Jahnvi arora (11228108), mmdu ,mullana...Structure of purines and pyrimidines - Jahnvi arora (11228108), mmdu ,mullana...
Structure of purines and pyrimidines - Jahnvi arora (11228108), mmdu ,mullana...
jahnviarora9897 visualizações
MILK LIPIDS 2.pptx por abhinambroze18
MILK LIPIDS 2.pptxMILK LIPIDS 2.pptx
MILK LIPIDS 2.pptx
abhinambroze189 visualizações
Exploring the nature and synchronicity of early cluster formation in the Larg... por Sérgio Sacani
Exploring the nature and synchronicity of early cluster formation in the Larg...Exploring the nature and synchronicity of early cluster formation in the Larg...
Exploring the nature and synchronicity of early cluster formation in the Larg...
Sérgio Sacani1.2K visualizações
DEVELOPMENT OF FROG.pptx por sushant292556
DEVELOPMENT OF FROG.pptxDEVELOPMENT OF FROG.pptx
DEVELOPMENT OF FROG.pptx
sushant29255611 visualizações
Radioactive and Non- radioactive probes por Nathiya .T Nathiya.T
Radioactive and Non- radioactive probesRadioactive and Non- radioactive probes
Radioactive and Non- radioactive probes
Nathiya .T Nathiya.T5 visualizações
Light Pollution for LVIS students por CWBarthlmew
Light Pollution for LVIS studentsLight Pollution for LVIS students
Light Pollution for LVIS students
CWBarthlmew12 visualizações

BIOSAFETY MANAGEMENT.ppt

  • 1. BIOSAFETY Dr. Esther Shoba R Assistant Professor Kristu Jayanti College
  • 2. Introduction Bio-related research activities may involve manipulation of microbial, animal or plant cells. The risks associated with these activities arise from the samples and /or the procedural requirements. Adherence to standard microbiological techniques and using facilities suitable to the risk level of the pathogen helps to protect the researcher from laboratory-acquired infections.
  • 3. Bio hazards Hazards related to bio research can be classified into two categories. • hazards related with the pathogen or human/animal cells being used in research. • related with the procedures and practices followed in the lab.
  • 4. Pathogenic risks Cell cultures • Researchers who handle or manipulate human or animal cells are at risk of possible exposure to potentially infectious pathogens that may be present in those cells/ tissues. • The human cell lines may contain blood borne pathogens, which can be transmitted due to improper handling.
  • 5. Routes of entry for pathogen The probable routes of entry are •Inhalation of infectious aerosols. •Contact of the agent with the skin, eyes or mucous membrane. •Inoculation by contaminated sharps. •Bites from infected animals or contact with their body fluids. •Ingestion of infectious agent through mouth pipetting or contaminated hands.
  • 6. Aerosols Aerosols generated during research activities remain undetected and can spread easily and remain suspended in the laboratory atmosphere for a long time. They possess a serious hazard to the person performing the task and also to others who are exposed to the air from the laboratory.
  • 7. Aerosols Aerosols can be generated during the following activities •Pipetting •Blending •Centrifugation •Use of sonicators and vortex mixers These respirable size particles when inhaled are retained in the lungs and can cause infection to the person.
  • 8. Pathogenic risks The risk from the pathogen handled depends on the following factors. •Capability to cause infection in the host and the severity of the same. •Preventive measures and treatment available. •Route of entry •Infective dose level •Stability in the environment •The range of cells/strains that can act as a host. Based on the above factors the microorganisms are classified into four risk groups.
  • 9. Classification of pathogenic microorganisms Risk group I A pathogen that is unlikely to cause any disease in humans or animals. All bacterial, fungal and parasitic agents not included in higher groups.
  • 10. Classification of pathogenic microorganisms Risk group II A pathogen that can cause disease in humans or animals but is unlikely to be a serious hazard. Effective treatment and preventive measures are available and the risk of spread of infection is limited. • Bacterial- Vibrio cholerae • Fungal- Aspergillus fumigatus, Actinomycetes • Parasitic- P.falciparum, Plasmodium thcilera • Viral and Rickettssial -Vole rickettsia, Mumps virus
  • 11. Classification of pathogenic microorganisms Risk group III A pathogen that can cause serious human or animal disease , but does not ordinarily spread from one infected person to another. Effective treatment and preventive measures are available. •Bacterial - Clostridium botulium, Francisella tularensis •Fungal - Coccidioides immitis,Histoplasma capsulatum •Parasitic- Schisistosoma mansomi •Viral and Rickettssial - Foot-and- Mouth disease virus
  • 12. Classification of pathogenic microorganisms Risk group IV A pathogen that usually causes serious human or animal disease and that can be readily transmitted from one individual to another, directly or indirectly. Effective treatment and preventive measures are not usually available. •Korean hemorrhagic fever •Omsk hemorrhagic fever and •Central European Encephalitis viruses
  • 13. Containment The term containment is used to describe the safe work practices in handling infectious agents to reduce exposure to laboratory personnel and others. Types of containment •Biological containment •Physical containment
  • 14. Biological containment (BC) Any combination of vector and host which is to provide biological containment must be chosen or constructed to limit the infectivity of vector to specific hosts and control the host-vector survival in the environment.
  • 15. Physical Containment (PC) Physical containment helps to confine the pathogenic organisms being handled and prevent exposure to personnel. Physical containment is achieved by Primary containment • Laboratory practices • Containment equipment • Special laboratory design Secondary containment Primary containment offers protection to personnel and immediate laboratory environment whereas secondary containment offers protection to the environment outside the laboratory.
  • 16. Primary containment Laboratory practices Consists of adhering to standard microbiological practices and techniques and awareness of potential hazards.
  • 17. Primary containment Containment equipment This includes biological safety cabinets and enclosed containers (e.g. safety centrifuge cup).
  • 18. Secondary containment Proper design of the facility helps in protecting personnel inside the facility and also prevents the release of pathogenic organisms outside the facility. Facility designs are of three types Basic Laboratory (for Risk Group I and II) Containment Laboratory (for Risk Group III) Maximum Containment Laboratory (for Risk Group IV)
  • 19. CONTAINMENT LEVELS Biosafety containment levels have to be designated for a facility depending on the level of risk associated with the biological and chemical agents used and released from it. Following NIH (National Institute of Health, USA) and DBT (Department of Biotechnology, India) guidelines, different facilities for biological research have been classified under three containment levels)
  • 20. CONTAINMENT LEVELS - I Viable organisms should be handled in a production system which physically separates the process from the environment; Exhaust gases should be treated to minimize (i.e. to reduce to the lowest practicable level consistent with safety) the release of viable organisms; Sample collection, addition of materials to the system and the transfer of viable organisms to another system should be done in a manner which minimizes release; Bulk quantities of culture fluids should not be removed from the system unless the viable organisms have been inactivated by validated means; Effluent from the production facility should be inactivated by validated means prior to discharge.
  • 21. CONTAINMENT LEVELS - II •Viable organisms should be handled in a production system which physically separates the process from the environment; •Exhaust gases should be treated to prevent the release of viable organisms; •Sample collection, addition of materials to a closed system and the transfer of viable organisms to another closed system should be done in a manner which prevents release;
  • 22. CONTAINMENT LEVELS – II - CONTD •Culture fluids should not be removed from the closed system unless the viable organisms have been inactivated by validated chemical or physical means; •Seals should be designed to prevent leakage or should be fully enclosed in ventilated housings; •Closed systems should be located in an area controlled according to the requirements; •Effluent from the production facility should be inactivated by validated chemical or physical means prior to discharge.
  • 23. CONTAINMENT LEVELS – III •Viable organisms should be handled in a production system which physically separates the process from the environment; •Exhaust gases should be treated to prevent the release of viable organisms; •Sample collection, addition of materials to a closed system and the transfer of viable organisms to another closed system should be done in a manner which prevents release; •Culture fluids should not be removed from the closed system unless the viable organisms have been inactivated by validated chemical or physical means; •Seals should be designed to prevent leakage or should be fully enclosed in ventilated housings;
  • 24. CONTAINMENT LEVELS – III - CONTD •Production systems should be located within a purpose built controlled area according to the requirements; •Entry should be restricted in the laboratory area and only persons with appropriate authority should be allowed access to the working area. Effluent from the production facility should be inactivated by validated chemical or physical means prior to discharge. Different containment levels have been assigned for rDNA GILSP (Good industrial large scale practice) micro-organisms. Examples of containment approaches for recombinant organisms are discussed
  • 26. It consists of a combination of laboratory practices, equipment and facilities suitable to the procedures being performed and hazards of the pathogen. The four biosafety levels corresponds to four risk groups. A lower risk group can be assigned a higher biosafety level, if a biological risk assessment carried out requires so. Biosafety levels
  • 27. Biosafety level I Suitable for teaching laboratories and for facilities in which work is done with defined and characterised strains of agents not known to cause any disease. Good microbiological techniques(GMT) to be followed.
  • 28. Biosafety Level II Applicable to facilities in which work is done with indigenous moderate-risk agents present in the community and associated with human disease of varying severity. BSL II is appropriate when work is done with any human- derived blood, body fluids, tissues, or primary human cell lines, in which presence of an infectious agent may be unknown BSL II requires •Following GMT •Use of personal protective equipment •Use of BSC •Use of autoclaves
  • 29. Biosafety level III Applicable to facilities in which work is done with indigenous or exotic agents where the potential for infection by aerosols is real and the disease may have serious or lethal consequences. BSL III requires in addition to that of BSL II requirements •Special clothing •Directional airflow •Controlled access •Double door entry/Anteroom •Supervision
  • 30. Biosafety level IV Applicable to work with dangerous and exotic agents which pose a high individual risk of life-threatening disease. BSL IV requires in addition to BSL III requirements •Positive pressure personnel suits •Strictly limited access •Double ended autoclave •Class III BSC •Airlock with shower •Supervision
  • 31. BIOSAFETY GUIDE LINES - RDNA Biosafety guidelines are designed and applied to research involving recombinant DNA (rDNA) techniques. Handling, production, storing and transportation of genetically modified organism (GMOs) involve different biosafety issues under different category. Biosafety practices deal with the application of standard safety principles handling hazardous material/agents to minimize potential harmful effect on human health and environment.
  • 32. BIOSAFETY MANAGEMENT - RDNA Biosafety regulatory principles and protocols regulates the potential risk and allow access to the benefits of rDNA technology. RISK ASSESSMENT RISK MANAGEMENT Are the components of biosafety
  • 33. BIOSAFETY MANAGEMENT - RDNA The foundation of any safety program is the use of control measures appropriate for the risk posed by the activities and the agents in use. The process of analyzing and determining the risk associated with recombinant DNA work is called as Risk analysis. The principle behind biosafety regulations is to minimize the risk to human health and safety, and the conservation of environment including safe handling of hazardous material. Risk analysis consists of three components: risk assessment, risk management and risk communication.
  • 34. BIOSAFETY MANAGEMENT - RDNA Risk Assessment: Estimation and determination of risk associated with the handling and production of a recombinant DNA molecule. Risk Management: The process of analyzing possible prevention measures to minimize the risk and designing policies accordingly including implementation of them. Risk Communication: The exchange of information and opinions on risk management between academic parties, industry, consumers and policy makers.
  • 35. RISK ASSESSMENT - RDNA The biosafety level is determined based on the risk associated with the work. The principle investigator is responsible for implementing the necessary safety requirements in his/her laboratory. Risk assessment process accounts the following criteria to determine biosafety level: i.Pathogenicity – The ability of an organism to cause disease in human system. ii.Virulence – The severity of the disease (lethal/non lethal, availability of cure etc) in a healthy adult. iii.Proliferation – the subsequent multiplication, genetic reconstruction, growth, transport, modification and die-off of these micro-organisms in the environment, including possible transfer of genetic material to other micro- organisms.
  • 36. RISK ASSESSMENT - RDNA iii.Transmission route – The possible route of transmission (mucous membrane, inhalation etc) to establish the disease in human or other organism. iv.Infectious dose (ID) – The amount of infectious agent required to cause disease in healthy human. vi.Antibiotic/disinfectant resistance – The resistance acquired by the infectious agent to available antibiotic/disinfectant.
  • 37. RISK MANAGEMENT - RDNA Risk management in biosafety issues is related to the target site where the practice is conducting (laboratory, industry, agriculture field etc.). Recommendations: General i.Harmonization of approaches to rDNA techniques can be facilitated by exchanging principles or guidelines for national regulations; developments in risk analysis; and practical experience in risk management. Therefore, information should be shared as freely as possible. ii.There is no scientific basis for specific legislation for the implementation of rDNA techniques and applications.
  • 38. RISK MANAGEMENT - RDNA Member countries should examine their existing oversight and review mechanisms to ensure that adequate review and control may be applied while avoiding any undue burdens that may hamper technological developments in this field. iii. Any approach to implement guidelines should not impede future developments in rDNA techniques. International harmonization should recognize this need.
  • 39. RISK MANAGEMENT - RDNA iv. To facilitate data exchange and minimize trade barriers between countries, further developments such as testing methods, equipment design and knowledge of microbial taxonomy should be considered at both national and international levels. Due account should be taken of ongoing work on standards within international organizations. v. Special efforts should be made to improve public understanding of the various aspects of rDNA techniques.
  • 40. RISK MANAGEMENT - RDNA v.For rDNA applications in industry, agriculture and the environment, it will be important for member countries to watch the development of these techniques. vi.For certain industrial applications and for environmental and agricultural applications of rDNA organisms, some countries may wish to have a notification scheme. vii.Recognizing the need for innovation, it is important to consider appropriate means to protect intellectual property and confidentiality interests while assuring safety.
  • 41. BIOSAFETY LEVELS - RDNA All the facilities handling microorganisms and materials containing recombinant DNA molecules have risk assessment program. Depending on the risk possessed by the samples, four biosafety levels have been assigned to rDNA research facilities. Each BSL facility has requirement of unique design features and safety equipments
  • 42. BIOSAFETY LEVEL I (BSL –I) - RDNA •Agents: Characterized strains of microorganisms known to cause no disease in healthy adults. eg. E. coli, S. cerevesiae, B. subtilis etc. •Recombinant DNA based research activities involving non- pathogenic micro-organisms for expression of genes using plasmid vectors or low risk viral vectors. •Work practice: Standard aseptic microbiological techniques. •Safety equipment requirement: Lab coats and eye protection recommended. •Facilities: Bench top, sink etc.
  • 43. BIOSAFETY LEVEL II (BSL - II) - RDNA •Agents: Handling of micro-organisms which possess moderate hazard to personal and environment. •rDNA based research activities in micro-organisms using non-viral or viral vectors. •Work practice: Standard BSL-I practices with addition of limited access, biohazard sign, defined procedure for disposal of “Regulated Medical Waste”, proper training to lab personal and medical surveillance. •Safety equipment: Class-II biological safety cabinet, lab coats, gloves, eye/face protection, physical containment equipment to reduce infectious aerosol exposure or splashes. •Facility: BSL-I facility with addition of autoclave, decontamination facility and proper airflow.
  • 44. BIOSAFETY LEVEL III (BSL -III) - RDNA •Agents: Handling of micro-organisms which are designated as hazardous or potentially lethal agents to personal and environment. •Laboratory personnel must have specific training in handling infectious micro-organisms and should be supervised by scientist competent in handling infectious agents. •Work practices: BSL-2 practices, with the addition of: controlled access, on-site decontamination of all waste and lab clothing and medical surveillance.
  • 45. BIOSAFETY LEVEL III (BSL -III) - RDNA •Safety equipment: Class-III biological safety cabinet, lab coats, gloves, eye/face protection, respiratory protection, physical containment equipment to reduce infectious aerosol exposure or splashes. •Facility: BSL-III facility has specific criteria to meet. Lab should have double door entry with physical separation of working area from the access corridors, directional airflow in lab, and no recirculation of exhaust air in the lab, sufficient decontamination facility, in lab autoclave etc.
  • 46. BIOSAFETY LEVEL IV (BSL -IV) - RDNA •Agents: Hazardous and potentially lethal organisms that posses high individual risk of laboratory transmitted disease for which there is no vaccine or treatment, or a related agent with unknown risk of transmission. •Laboratory personnel must have specialized training in handling BSL-IV agents and should be supervised by scientist competent in handling infectious agents.
  • 47. BIOSAFETY LEVEL IV (BSL -IV) - RDNA •Safety equipment: Class-IV biological safety cabinet, lab coats, gloves, eye/face protection, respiratory protection, physical and containment equipment to reduce infectious aerosol exposure or splashes. •Facility: BSL-IV facility requires specialized design to minimize the exposure to risk and only the authorized entry should be permitted in laboratory area in BSL-IV labs.
  • 48. Good microbiological techniques (GMT) • Specimen containers must be correctly labelled for easy identification. • Use secondary containers (autoclavable) while transporting specimens to contain spill. • Specimen containers received from external agencies must be opened in the biosafety cabinet. • Use mechanical pipettes.
  • 49. Good microbiological techniques • Open flame must not be used in BSC as it can distort the air flow pattern and damage the filters. •Always use disposable gloves. Do not touch mouth, eyes and face with contaminated hands.
  • 50. Good microbiological techniques • Food and drink must not be stored or consumed in the laboratory. • Glassware must be replaced with plasticware wherever possible.
  • 51. Good microbiological techniques • Sharps(e.g., needle sticks, glass) must be avoided wherever possible as it can transmit blood borne pathogens in case of injury.
  • 52. Good microbiological techniques • Use engineered sharp-safety devices when syringes and needles are necessary. • Needles must not be recapped, to prevent needle stick injury. • Puncture-proof containers fitted with covers must be used for disposing sharps.
  • 53. Good microbiological techniques • Tubes and specimen containers must always be securely capped (screw-capped if possible) for centrifugation. • Refer to manufacturer’s instructions before operating equipments. • Work area must be decontaminated with a suitable disinfectant at the end of the work. • Hands must be thoroughly washed before leaving the lab.
  • 54. Personal protective equipment • Personal protective equipment act as a barrier to minimize the risk of exposure to aerosols, splashes and other injuries. •Personal protective equipment must be selected on the basis of the risks involved in the task performed. • Lab coat, safety glasses and toe covered footwear is a minimum requirement while working in the lab. • Face shield must be used if there is any risk of splashing of infectious materials.
  • 55. Personal protective equipment • Gloves must be worn for all procedures that may involve direct contact with blood, infectious materials, or infected animals. • Gloves must be removed aseptically and autoclaved with other laboratory wastes before disposal. • If re-usable gloves are used, on removal they must be cleaned and disinfected before re-use. • Lab coats and other personal protective equipment used must not be used outside the laboratory.
  • 56. Biosafety cabinets(BSC) Biological safety cabinets provide containment of infectious aerosols generated during the laboratory procedures. Three types of BSCs are used in microbiological laboratories. These are Class I Class II Class III
  • 57. Biosafety Cabinets Class I BSC Offers protection to laboratory personnel and to the laboratory environment . It doesn’t protect the samples from external contamination. Class II BSC Provides protection to the samples in the cabinet from external contamination in addition to personnel and laboratory environment protection. Class III BSC Provides the maximum attainable level of protection to personnel and the environment.
  • 58. The following factors reduce the efficiency of the BSC • Poor location • Room air currents • Decreased airflow • Leakage in HEPA filters • Working with raised sashes • Overcrowding the work surface • Improper user methodology
  • 59. Emergency measures In case of exposure to bio samples • Remove the contaminated clothing. • Wash the skin thoroughly with soap and water. • In case of eye contact flush the eyes with water. • Report the exposure to the Lab in charge. • Get medical attention immediately.
  • 60. Decontamination • Decontamination renders an item (work bench, equipment, etc.) safe to handle by reducing the number of organisms to below the threshold infectious dose level such that transmission is unlikely to occur. • Decontamination requirements will depend on the experimental work and the nature of the infectious agent handled. • Decontamination is usually accomplished by steam sterilization or autoclaving. • Sterilization and disinfection are different forms of decontamination.
  • 61. Decontamination Sterilisation •Sterilisation makes an item free from all living microorganisms and viruses. • The process of sterilization can be accomplished by applying heat.
  • 62. Decontamination Disinfection •Is not as effective as sterilization, as some organisms such as bacterial endospores may survive. •A disinfectant is a chemical or mixture of chemicals used to kill microorganisms, but not spores. They are usually applied to inanimate surfaces or objects.
  • 63. Decontamination Disinfectants •Sodium hypochlorite and formaldehyde are the disinfectants recommended for general laboratory use. •For special purposes phenolic compounds, alcohols, iodine etc., can be used effectively.
  • 64. Biohazard waste disposal Biohazard waste generated in laboratories must be segregated into the following: •Non-contaminated general waste •“Sharps”-needles, glass pieces, etc •Contaminated material for autoclaving and recycling •Contaminated material for incineration
  • 65. • Biohazard waste for autoclaving must be collected in red plastic bags and those for incineration in yellow non chlorinated plastic bags. • Biohazard waste of human and animal origin must be incinerated. Biohazard waste disposal