SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 17
SolvingICS Cybersecurity Challengesin the Electric
Industry
Dragos
Matt Cowell
mcowell@dragos.com
@m_p_cowell
Dragos Platform
Threat Detection & Response
technology for ICS
Dragos WorldView
ICS/OT Threat Intelligence
Threat Operations Center
Experienced assistance &
training
The Dragos Offering
Case Study Background
• Mid-sized US Electric utility
• Generation, Transmission and
Distribution networks
• Diverse mix of control system vendors
• Limited team to support OT cyber
security functions
• Network infrastructure supportive of
monitoring
• Converging IT/OT SOC
Customer Objectives
Improve visibility of networked OT assets
Improve visibility of OT threats
Improve NERC/CIP compliance functions
Better enable limited OT security team
Architecture
• Passive network monitoring
• Sensor/Server based
• 16 distributed sensors
• Centralized monitoring
Objective 1: Asset Visibility
Summary
• 30,000+ assets
• Vast volumes of data available
• Distributed across hundreds of
miles
• Some physical network separation
Objective 1: Asset Visibility
Solution
• Asset characterization
• Connections & protocols
• Zoning
• Timeline analysis
Objective 2: Compliance
Summary
• NERC CIP regulated utility
• Required high level of manual effort
• Apprehensive of outside vendors
Objective 2: Compliance
Solution
• Consultative discussion to
understand compliance pains
• Address specific CIP requirements
through technology
• Establish credibility through
industry trusted partners
Security Patch Management
 CIP-007-6 R2:
Malicious Code Prevention
 CIP-007-6 R3:
Security Event Monitoring
 CIP-007-6 R4:
Incident Reporting & Response
Planning
 CIP-008-5 R1:
Vulnerability Assessments
 CIP-010-2 R3:
Objective 3: Personnel
Summary
• Small, dedicated team
• Varied experience levels
• Performing many different functions
• Converging OT/IT SOC
Objective 3: Personnel
Solution
• Leverage Dragos experience
through technology
• On site assistance and ongoing
support
• Training to empower customer
personnel
• IR support escalation through
retainer
Objective 4: OT Threats
Summary
• Limited information sharing of
industry-wide threats
• Improve detection based on
known TTP’s & behaviors
• Reduce amount of work
performed by analysts to
validate alerts
• Know how to respond to
threats.
Objective 4: OT Threats
Solution
• Threat behavior analytics
• Query focused datasets
• Investigation playbooks
• Threat intelligence reports
provide additional context &
details
Additional resources
https://dragos.com/resource/implementing-the-dragos-
platform-to-solve-ics-cybersecurity-challenges-in-the-electric-
industry/
https://dragos.com/media/dragos-ics-threat-detection-response-
platform-demo/
Summary
Threats are increasing but defense is doable
IT and OT teams are blending
Solution requires combination of tech. & personnel to be effective+
Pursue proactive threat hunting vs reactive IR
Many companies are facing similar challenges
Thank you
https://dragos.com
@DragosInc

More Related Content

What's hot

Trisis in Perspective: Implications for ICS Defenders
Trisis in Perspective: Implications for ICS DefendersTrisis in Perspective: Implications for ICS Defenders
Trisis in Perspective: Implications for ICS Defenders
Dragos, Inc.
 
An Approach to Closing the Gaps between Physical, Process Control, and Cybers...
An Approach to Closing the Gaps between Physical, Process Control, and Cybers...An Approach to Closing the Gaps between Physical, Process Control, and Cybers...
An Approach to Closing the Gaps between Physical, Process Control, and Cybers...
EnergySec
 
New Threats, New Approaches in Modern Data Centers
New Threats, New Approaches in Modern Data CentersNew Threats, New Approaches in Modern Data Centers
New Threats, New Approaches in Modern Data Centers
Iben Rodriguez
 

What's hot (20)

Trisis in Perspective: Implications for ICS Defenders
Trisis in Perspective: Implications for ICS DefendersTrisis in Perspective: Implications for ICS Defenders
Trisis in Perspective: Implications for ICS Defenders
 
Reassessing the 2016 CRASHOVERRIDE Cyber Attack
Reassessing the 2016 CRASHOVERRIDE Cyber AttackReassessing the 2016 CRASHOVERRIDE Cyber Attack
Reassessing the 2016 CRASHOVERRIDE Cyber Attack
 
Neighborhood Keeper - Introduction
Neighborhood Keeper - Introduction Neighborhood Keeper - Introduction
Neighborhood Keeper - Introduction
 
Dressing up the ICS Kill Chain
Dressing up the ICS Kill ChainDressing up the ICS Kill Chain
Dressing up the ICS Kill Chain
 
TRISIS in Perspective
TRISIS in PerspectiveTRISIS in Perspective
TRISIS in Perspective
 
Dragos and CyberWire: ICS Ransomware
Dragos and CyberWire: ICS Ransomware Dragos and CyberWire: ICS Ransomware
Dragos and CyberWire: ICS Ransomware
 
How to Respond to Industrial Intrusions
How to Respond to Industrial Intrusions  How to Respond to Industrial Intrusions
How to Respond to Industrial Intrusions
 
Dragos S4x20: How to Build an OT Security Operations Center
Dragos S4x20: How to Build an OT Security Operations CenterDragos S4x20: How to Build an OT Security Operations Center
Dragos S4x20: How to Build an OT Security Operations Center
 
The Current ICS Threat Landscape
The Current ICS Threat LandscapeThe Current ICS Threat Landscape
The Current ICS Threat Landscape
 
How Long to Boom: Understanding and Measuring ICS Hacker Maturity
How Long to Boom: Understanding and Measuring ICS Hacker MaturityHow Long to Boom: Understanding and Measuring ICS Hacker Maturity
How Long to Boom: Understanding and Measuring ICS Hacker Maturity
 
Unraveling Detection Methodologies: Indicators vs. Anomalies vs. Behaviors
Unraveling Detection Methodologies: Indicators vs. Anomalies vs. Behaviors Unraveling Detection Methodologies: Indicators vs. Anomalies vs. Behaviors
Unraveling Detection Methodologies: Indicators vs. Anomalies vs. Behaviors
 
From Air Gap to Air Control
From Air Gap to Air ControlFrom Air Gap to Air Control
From Air Gap to Air Control
 
Debunking the Hacker Hype: The Reality of Widespread Blackouts
Debunking the Hacker Hype: The Reality of Widespread BlackoutsDebunking the Hacker Hype: The Reality of Widespread Blackouts
Debunking the Hacker Hype: The Reality of Widespread Blackouts
 
Kofax Document Security
Kofax Document Security Kofax Document Security
Kofax Document Security
 
An Approach to Closing the Gaps between Physical, Process Control, and Cybers...
An Approach to Closing the Gaps between Physical, Process Control, and Cybers...An Approach to Closing the Gaps between Physical, Process Control, and Cybers...
An Approach to Closing the Gaps between Physical, Process Control, and Cybers...
 
Dragos 2019 ICS Year in Review
Dragos 2019 ICS Year in ReviewDragos 2019 ICS Year in Review
Dragos 2019 ICS Year in Review
 
The Four Types of Threat Detection and Use Cases in Industrial Security
The Four Types of Threat Detection and Use Cases in Industrial SecurityThe Four Types of Threat Detection and Use Cases in Industrial Security
The Four Types of Threat Detection and Use Cases in Industrial Security
 
A Buyers Guide to Investing in Endpoint Detection and Response for Enterprise...
A Buyers Guide to Investing in Endpoint Detection and Response for Enterprise...A Buyers Guide to Investing in Endpoint Detection and Response for Enterprise...
A Buyers Guide to Investing in Endpoint Detection and Response for Enterprise...
 
BSidesLV 2018 - Katie Nickels and John Wunder - ATT&CKing the Status Quo
BSidesLV 2018 - Katie Nickels and John Wunder - ATT&CKing the Status QuoBSidesLV 2018 - Katie Nickels and John Wunder - ATT&CKing the Status Quo
BSidesLV 2018 - Katie Nickels and John Wunder - ATT&CKing the Status Quo
 
New Threats, New Approaches in Modern Data Centers
New Threats, New Approaches in Modern Data CentersNew Threats, New Approaches in Modern Data Centers
New Threats, New Approaches in Modern Data Centers
 

Similar to Solving ICS Cybersecurity Challenges in the Electric Industry

Using NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber Threats
Using NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber ThreatsUsing NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber Threats
Using NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber Threats
Emulex Corporation
 

Similar to Solving ICS Cybersecurity Challenges in the Electric Industry (20)

AFAC session 2 - September 8, 2014
AFAC session 2 - September 8, 2014AFAC session 2 - September 8, 2014
AFAC session 2 - September 8, 2014
 
Soc analyst course content v3
Soc analyst course content v3Soc analyst course content v3
Soc analyst course content v3
 
Soc analyst course content
Soc analyst course contentSoc analyst course content
Soc analyst course content
 
Lessons Learned Fighting Modern Cyberthreats in Critical ICS Networks
Lessons Learned Fighting Modern Cyberthreats in Critical ICS NetworksLessons Learned Fighting Modern Cyberthreats in Critical ICS Networks
Lessons Learned Fighting Modern Cyberthreats in Critical ICS Networks
 
New Horizons SCYBER Presentation
New Horizons SCYBER PresentationNew Horizons SCYBER Presentation
New Horizons SCYBER Presentation
 
Offensive cyber security engineer pragram course agenda
Offensive cyber security engineer pragram course agendaOffensive cyber security engineer pragram course agenda
Offensive cyber security engineer pragram course agenda
 
Offensive cyber security engineer
Offensive cyber security engineerOffensive cyber security engineer
Offensive cyber security engineer
 
Offensive cyber security engineer updated
Offensive cyber security engineer updatedOffensive cyber security engineer updated
Offensive cyber security engineer updated
 
IEEE PES GM 2017 Cybersecurity Panel Talk
IEEE PES GM 2017 Cybersecurity Panel TalkIEEE PES GM 2017 Cybersecurity Panel Talk
IEEE PES GM 2017 Cybersecurity Panel Talk
 
Embedded Security and the IoT – Challenges, Trends and Solutions
Embedded Security and the IoT – Challenges, Trends and SolutionsEmbedded Security and the IoT – Challenges, Trends and Solutions
Embedded Security and the IoT – Challenges, Trends and Solutions
 
An introduction to SOC (Security Operation Center)
An introduction to SOC (Security Operation Center)An introduction to SOC (Security Operation Center)
An introduction to SOC (Security Operation Center)
 
IoT Security Assessment - IEEE PAR Proposal
IoT Security Assessment - IEEE PAR ProposalIoT Security Assessment - IEEE PAR Proposal
IoT Security Assessment - IEEE PAR Proposal
 
Proactive Approach to OT incident response - HOUSECCON 2023
Proactive Approach to OT incident response - HOUSECCON 2023Proactive Approach to OT incident response - HOUSECCON 2023
Proactive Approach to OT incident response - HOUSECCON 2023
 
Mastering IoT Design: Sense, Process, Connect: Processing: Turning IoT Data i...
Mastering IoT Design: Sense, Process, Connect: Processing: Turning IoT Data i...Mastering IoT Design: Sense, Process, Connect: Processing: Turning IoT Data i...
Mastering IoT Design: Sense, Process, Connect: Processing: Turning IoT Data i...
 
Cyber security: A roadmap to secure solutions
Cyber security: A roadmap to secure solutionsCyber security: A roadmap to secure solutions
Cyber security: A roadmap to secure solutions
 
Using NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber Threats
Using NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber ThreatsUsing NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber Threats
Using NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber Threats
 
Software Defined Networking in the ATMOSPHERE project
Software Defined Networking in the ATMOSPHERE projectSoftware Defined Networking in the ATMOSPHERE project
Software Defined Networking in the ATMOSPHERE project
 
Final Master's Defense Presentation : Policy-driven Security Management in Ga...
Final Master's Defense Presentation : Policy-driven Security Management in Ga...Final Master's Defense Presentation : Policy-driven Security Management in Ga...
Final Master's Defense Presentation : Policy-driven Security Management in Ga...
 
Stephen Wallo
Stephen WalloStephen Wallo
Stephen Wallo
 
chapitre1-cloud security basics-23 (1).pptx
chapitre1-cloud security basics-23 (1).pptxchapitre1-cloud security basics-23 (1).pptx
chapitre1-cloud security basics-23 (1).pptx
 

More from Dragos, Inc.

Meet Me in the Middle: Threat Indications and Warning in Principle and Practice
Meet Me in the Middle: Threat Indications and Warning in Principle and PracticeMeet Me in the Middle: Threat Indications and Warning in Principle and Practice
Meet Me in the Middle: Threat Indications and Warning in Principle and Practice
Dragos, Inc.
 

More from Dragos, Inc. (9)

Dragos S4X20: Mapping ICS Incidents to the MITRE Attack Framework
Dragos S4X20: Mapping ICS Incidents to the MITRE Attack FrameworkDragos S4X20: Mapping ICS Incidents to the MITRE Attack Framework
Dragos S4X20: Mapping ICS Incidents to the MITRE Attack Framework
 
Purple Teaming ICS Networks
Purple Teaming ICS NetworksPurple Teaming ICS Networks
Purple Teaming ICS Networks
 
Rising Cyber Escalation US Iran Russia ICS Threats and Response
Rising Cyber Escalation US Iran Russia ICS Threats and Response Rising Cyber Escalation US Iran Russia ICS Threats and Response
Rising Cyber Escalation US Iran Russia ICS Threats and Response
 
2018 Year in Review- ICS Threat Activity Groups
2018 Year in Review- ICS Threat Activity Groups2018 Year in Review- ICS Threat Activity Groups
2018 Year in Review- ICS Threat Activity Groups
 
Insights To Building An Effective Industrial Cybersecurity Strategy For Your ...
Insights To Building An Effective Industrial Cybersecurity Strategy For Your ...Insights To Building An Effective Industrial Cybersecurity Strategy For Your ...
Insights To Building An Effective Industrial Cybersecurity Strategy For Your ...
 
Meet Me in the Middle: Threat Indications and Warning in Principle and Practice
Meet Me in the Middle: Threat Indications and Warning in Principle and PracticeMeet Me in the Middle: Threat Indications and Warning in Principle and Practice
Meet Me in the Middle: Threat Indications and Warning in Principle and Practice
 
Threat Activity Groups - Dragos
Threat Activity Groups - Dragos Threat Activity Groups - Dragos
Threat Activity Groups - Dragos
 
Behavior-Based Defense in ICS
Behavior-Based Defense in ICSBehavior-Based Defense in ICS
Behavior-Based Defense in ICS
 
TTPs for Threat hunting In Oil Refineries
TTPs for Threat hunting In Oil RefineriesTTPs for Threat hunting In Oil Refineries
TTPs for Threat hunting In Oil Refineries
 

Recently uploaded

Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and MythsArtificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Joaquim Jorge
 
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
?#DUbAI#??##{{(☎️+971_581248768%)**%*]'#abortion pills for sale in dubai@
 
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire businessWhy Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
panagenda
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone ProcessorsExploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
 
Manulife - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Manulife - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Manulife - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Manulife - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data DiscoveryTrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
 
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of TerraformAWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
 
Top 10 Most Downloaded Games on Play Store in 2024
Top 10 Most Downloaded Games on Play Store in 2024Top 10 Most Downloaded Games on Play Store in 2024
Top 10 Most Downloaded Games on Play Store in 2024
 
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : UncertaintyArtificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
 
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
🐬 The future of MySQL is Postgres 🐘
🐬  The future of MySQL is Postgres   🐘🐬  The future of MySQL is Postgres   🐘
🐬 The future of MySQL is Postgres 🐘
 
Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)
Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)
Powerful Google developer tools for immediate impact! (2023-24 C)
 
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and MythsArtificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
 
Polkadot JAM Slides - Token2049 - By Dr. Gavin Wood
Polkadot JAM Slides - Token2049 - By Dr. Gavin WoodPolkadot JAM Slides - Token2049 - By Dr. Gavin Wood
Polkadot JAM Slides - Token2049 - By Dr. Gavin Wood
 
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
 
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost SavingRepurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
 
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
 
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...
 
GenAI Risks & Security Meetup 01052024.pdf
GenAI Risks & Security Meetup 01052024.pdfGenAI Risks & Security Meetup 01052024.pdf
GenAI Risks & Security Meetup 01052024.pdf
 
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire businessWhy Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
 

Solving ICS Cybersecurity Challenges in the Electric Industry

Editor's Notes

  1. “What’s the goal for the conference?” Personal intro 2nd Energysec conference
  2. First things first, how many attended BeerISAC last night? – hopefully you are all caffeinated and awake by now How many unfamiliar with BeerISAC?
  3. Some of you might not be familiar with Dragos so id like to start with a quick introduction but will keep it brief so we can spend more time on the good stuff Know that Dragos has a 3 pronged approach to OT cybersecurity Know - Detect - Respond
  4. The purpose of this presentation is to highlight the experience of an electric utility that Dragos worked with as we feel it could be applicable to many other utilieis Serves over 750k people Generation (coal, gas, wind, solar) Including Emerson, GE, SEL, Rockwell, Siemens, Honeywell, Yokogawa Managed switch infrastructure Team of 3 supported by IT security team Converging OT into existing IT Security operations
  5. Customer is always right Knowing ALL OT Assets and changes over time Compliance efficiencies Limited personnel, performing lots of tasks – better equip so they are more efficient Rather than working in dark, try to better understand the threat landscape “That’s it”
  6. Before we jump into the objectives and solutions it’s important to understand the primary technology being used in this instance Decreased risk of interruption to operations On prem server (cloud is an option too) Sensors positioned strategically to SPAN ports to give maximum visibility of different networks Deployed over 3 months - Coordinated with Dragos and customer field personnel
  7. If you don’t know everything you have, you cannot protect In this case they already have a lot of infrastructure and data collection already available BUT too much data for limited team to manually process Utility covers expansive territory so network visibility essential Physical separation challenges need to be addressed – usually recommend architecture review before deployment to ensure coverage goals meet infrastructure capability
  8. ASSET Visualizing on an easy to read graphical UI or map makes it easier for all experience levels. IP, MAC, TCP/UDP ports useful but need more. Deep Packet Inspection drills into useful application layer content but requires a broad coverage of protocol dissectors (some proprietary). The more seen, the more learned - Serial numbers, fw versions, configurations High level characterizations – HMI, Switch, Protective relay – all important for crown jewel analysis and investigations based upon intel – treat different device types differently COMMUNICATIONS Relationships between assets and between zone. Does it align to expectations. Are there any odd connections that require further exploration – ie unexpected internet connections ZONES Visualizing and analyzing thousands of assets is challenging. Breaking up the view into a representation that best meets your requirements – graphical, function, type, IP address range TIMELINE When did assets first appear/disappear? Does this correlate with other timestamps – surveillance cameras, door entry logs? BENEFITS Save analysts time in collecting asset details – more efficient, less money. Assists compliance requirements with standard reports. Aids improved threat detection and IR
  9. Often security tools purchased to the benefit of security teams but important to explore other stakeholders such as those responsible for compliance (increase overall value) Compliance != good security but is a legal requirement Enhance compliance by developing improvements beyond current capability Reduce people with clipboards and manual work Outside vendors disrupting operations – inadvertent violations or downtime
  10. Technology can enable enhanced NERC requirements inc: Patch management, Security event monitoring, IR planning, vuln assessments, etc Begins with asset inventory AND knowing more about vulns – actual cvss score, impact, alternative work arounds – integrated threat intelligence expands on open source details – available through platform Pasive vulnerability discovery coming Behavior analytics – knowing what malicious behaviors observed in wild (intelligence) and known ‘expected’ behaviors based on assets and protocols – able to detect and alert and then take action Log collection and analysis – easier collection and review for limited team Playbooks and IR case management – augment with services – TTX to test and validate 15 months -> CIP-009-6 R1: Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems Platform + Intel + Services Asset inventory, ports and services Specific compliance pains – apply understanding of NERC/CIP, customer pains and technology capabilities to improve Improved credibility through partnerships with trusted partners such as SEL, DOE, EISAC
  11. Better enable existing OT team Wearing many hats – need to be focused/efficient with time Assessments, patching, incident response Utility does have security operations expanding coverage of OT
  12. Dragos has over 200+ years combined ICS cyber security experience – further more develop asset characterizations through custom dev and working with partners Analytics to improve detection – reduce false positive to focus efforts on real threats Playbooks to guide effective IR Emerging technology and limited resources, Dragos field team assisted with deployment until customer was comfortable – even helped run wire! Full spectrum from detection through response Expand domain areas of limited experience such as threat intelligence (knowing what we have learned of ICS focused adversaries) and proactive threat hunting – YIR highlighted 1/3 IR cases adversaries were undetected over 12 months Augment existing team capabilities with Dragos support, training and IR team
  13. Threats to OT are increasing in frequency and sophistication Not a lot of industry wide information sharing ALSO Limited information sharing compounded with inaccurate reporting and hype – wild goose chase Lots of lessons to be learned False positives Having foresight to know what to do in a situation not experienced before
  14. Derived from intelligence – ie observed in wild or collaboration with vendors – Dragos team shares detections and response through continuously updated content packs TBA’s improve confidence and provide context – TTPs and IOC’s QFD’s streamline IR and proactive hunts by providing reports of key data in one view Playbooks provide experience from the field on the appropriate response for new events Intel reports provide supporting data
  15. You might be able to relate to some of this… Individual needs might be different – but likely need combination of tech and people “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” With that, thank you for your time and pass back to Tim