402 chapter 7 counterintelligence

1. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
CHAPTER 7

2. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI)
• Refers to efforts taken to protect one's own intelligence operations
from penetration and disruption by hostile nations or their
intelligence services.
• CI Should pervade all aspects of intelligence, but it is often pigeon-
holed as a security issue.
• CI does not fit neatly with human intelligence, although CI is, in part,
a collection issue. Nor does it fit with Covert action.
• Successful CI can also lead to analytical and operational
opportunities.
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3. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI)
• This makes CI one of the most difficult intelligence
topics to discuss.
• Most nations have intelligence enterprises of some
sort. As a result, these agencies are valuable
Intelligence targets for other nations.
• Knowing if the other side is undertaking similar
Efforts is extremely helpful. As well as knowing
what they know.
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4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI)
However, counterintelligence is more than a defensive activity. There are at least
three types of CI.
– Collection: gaining information about an opponent's intelligence collection capabilities
that
– May be aimed at one's own country
– Defensive: thwarting efforts by hostile intelligence services to penetrate one's service
– Offensive: having identified an opponent's efforts against one's own system, trying to
Manipulate these attacks either by turning the opponent's agents into double agents or
by Feeding them false information that they report home
The world of spy and counterspy is murky at best. Like espionage,
counterintelligence is a staple of Intelligence fiction.
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5. INTERNAL SAFEGUARDS
• All intelligence agencies establish a series of internal processes
and checks, the main purposes of which are to weed out applicants
who may be unsuitable and to identify current employees whose
Loyalty or activities are questionable.
• The vetting process for applicants includes extensive Background
checks, interviews with the applicants and close associates, and, in
the United States at Least, the use of the polygraph at most
agencies.
• Most applicants likely have engaged in some level of
experimentation:
• sexual • drugs • both
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6. INTERNAL SAFEGUARDS
• Some may have committed minor criminal offenses.
• It is crucial, However, that applicants be forthcoming about their
past and be able to prove that they are no longer Exhibiting
behaviors that are criminal, dangerous, or susceptible to blackmail.
• The ideal candidate is not necessarily someone whose past record
is spotless.
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7. WHO SPIES ON WHOM?
• Some people assume that friendly spy agencies do not spy on one
another But what constitutes "Friendly“
 The United States and its "Commonwealth cousins”
 Australia
 Britain
 Canada
Enjoy a close intelligence partnership and do not spy on one another.
Beyond that, all bets are off
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8. WHO SPIES ON WHOM?
• 1990s, the United States allegedly spied on France for economic
intelligence.
• In the 1980s, Israel willingly used Jonathan Pollard, a U.S. Navy
intelligence employee who passed Sensitive U.S. Intelligence that
he believed Israel needed to know.
– Aldrich Ames
– Robert Hanssen
• In the late 1990s, China stole nuclear secrets from the United
States at a time when the two nations were strategic partners
against the Soviet Union.
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9. He betrayed his country, betrayed his
fellow Americans for no reason other
than greed, and he caused irreparable
harm to the national security of the
United States." - US Attorney Ken
Melson
For decades, thousands of Americans
in the Government and private sector
sworn oaths of allegiance to the
States. The vast majority of these
have honored their oaths and served
pride, loyalty, and integrity. However,
have faltered in their allegiance,
discredit to their country, families,
themselves. Such is the case of Robert
Hanssen, whose lust for fame,
and self-gratification led to his
downfall as a betrayer of the United
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10. "A nation can survive its
fools and even the
ambitious. But it cannot
survive treason from
within." -Cicero (106-43
B.C.)
This quote illustrates the
seriousness of the insider
threat as well as the length
of time this threat has been
a concern. This poster
highlights Cuba because of
the success their recruited
insiders have had against
the United States over the
years. 10

11. The Man of Steel's
x-ray vision can't
detect the spies
among us, but we
mere mortals,
armed with the right
information, can.
Practice good
security and report
suspicious
behavior, and you,
too can become a
CI Super Hero!
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12. A longstanding premise in
U.S. Government circles
is that a security
clearance does not equal
"Need to Know."
This is a critical issue
since the continued loss
of National Security
information through
unauthorized disclosures
denigrates America's
most sensitive
intelligence and analytic
capabilities.
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13. The 1st Amendment to
the Constitution of the
United States was
enacted to guarantee
freedom of speech and
freedom of the press.
Violating this given right,
by either leaking or
mishandling sensitive
information is not only
wrong, it can endanger
the lives of others and the
security of the United
States of America.
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14. The pictures of seven
convicted spies and a quote
from George Washington. In
the ensuing years, the
number of convicted spies
has increased, not
withstanding Washington's
warning that
"There is one evil I dread, and
that is, their spies. I could
wish, therefore, the most
attentive watch be kept..."
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15. WHO SPIES ON WHOM?
• In the 1970s a "senior U.S. government official" (probably Secretary
of State Henry A. Kissinger) observed, "There is no such thing as
'friendly' intelligence agencies. There are only The Intelligence
agencies of friendly powers,“
"WHAT'S A LITTLE SPYING AMONG FRIENDS? If that
weren't the case, then there'd be no use for an intelligence
service," Obama told reporters in Tanzania.
"The United States and its coalition 'Five Eye' partners enjoy a close intelligence partnership and
do not spy each on each other," writes former CIA officer Mark Lowenthal in his book
"Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy." The group includes the U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada and
New Zealand. "Beyond that, all bets are off," he writes.
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16. Americans who spied for foreign countries
CIA
• Aldrich Ames (1994)
• David Henry Barnett (1976)
• Larry Wu-Tai Chin (1985)
• William Kampiles (1977)
• Harold James Nicholson (1996)
• Sharon M. Scranage (1985)
NSA
• David Sheldon Boone (1988 to 1991)
• Ronald Pelton (1980)
FBI
• Robert Hanssen (1979 to 2001)
• Richard Miller (1984)
• Earl Edwin Pitts (1987 to 1992)
Armed Forces
• Clayton John Lonetree (1987)
• Morris Cohen (1961)
• John Anthony Walker (1967)
Other
• Kendall Myers (2009)
Federal Contractors
• Christopher John Boyce (1977)
• Andrew Daulton Lee (1977)
• Jonathan Pollard (1984)
• Stewart Nozette (2009)
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17. Interview of Eric O'Neill by KTLA
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18. Jonathan Pollard Revealed 1985
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19. 1994 Aldrich Ames Arrested for Espionage
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20. WHY SPY?
• U.S. counterintelligence emphasizes personal financial issues in
assessing security risks. Many people involved in the worst espionage
cases suffered by the United States.
– Aldrich Ames,
– Robert Hanssen,
– The Walker spy ring,
– Ronald Pelton.
• They Were motivated largely by greed, not ideology. Some exceptions
were Julius Rosenberg, Alger Hiss, Larry Wu-tai Chin, and Ana Montes.
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21. WHY SPY?
• By contrast, many involved in the worst espionage cases in Britain,
for example? Spied because of ideological devotion to the Soviet
Union.
– Kim Philly and his associates or
– George Blake
• Although espionage cases of either type (greed or ideology) can
arise in either country, some
• Observers have been struck by the difference. It can be explained,
in part, by the fact that Britain has had (and still has) a class system
that makes ideology a more likely reason for betrayal.
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22. WHY SPY?
• In the United States, the main competition has always been based
on economic status, not social class spies may also be motivated
by vengeance toward superiors or agencies, by blackmail against
themselves or family members, by thrills, or by involvement with a
foreign national.
• However, a Defense Department study released in April 2008 found
that "divided loyalty" between the United States and the nation
enlisting the spy had greatly increased as a motive for espionage.
• Although "need to know" was the standard for decades, in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks, many felt that this standard also
served to impede the necessary sharing of intelligence.
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23. WHY SPY?
• In 2003, the Intelligence community began to stress the "need to
share," an important shift in emphasis.
• The clearest sign of this "data ownership" concept was the
classification marking ORCON, or "originator controlled.” ORCON
means that any further distribution of intelligence or its inclusion in
another document must be approved by the originating agency.
• ORCON reflects the concern that the intelligence could reveal a
sensitive source or method, a sensitivity that those wishing to use
the intelligence more broadly might not appreciate.
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24. WHY SPY?
• In 2007, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Mike McConnell signaled a
change in emphasis by promulgating a "responsibility to provide"
standard.
• In other words, officers and agencies now will be evaluated by the degree
to which they actively seek to share intelligence.
• Indirect costs include safes, couriers, and security officers to check
officers' clearances, and color-coded or numerically tagged papers, to
name a few.
• Other safeguards include the certified destruction of discarded material;
the use of secure phones, which cannot be easily tapped, for classified
conversations, In addition restricted access to buildings or to parts of
buildings where sensitive material is used.
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25. WHY SPY?
• It is also means, in a period of greatly increased hiring, like the one
that began across the intelligence community in 2001, that hiring
delays will likely increase.
• The risk-avoidance approach also means that some candidates,
who may not actually pose a security risk, will not be hired because
of the guiding cautious approach.
• There is evidence to suggest that these candidates face particular
burdens under the risk avoidance approach, out of fear of divided
loyalties, family left behind whose influence is unknown or who
could become subject to external pressure, and so on.
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26. WHY SPY?
• There is an irony here in that most of the worst espionage breaches
suffered by the United States came from individuals whose families
had been here for generations.
• As sensible as this approach may be, it can run into opposition from
those people who are supposed to administer it, the individuals
responsible for personnel security.
• These individuals are unlikely to see any benefit to clearing more
people if this means they have also cleared the individual who
becomes a security threat.
• This personnel policy shift will be an interesting test of the DNI's
authority over intelligence officers who work in agencies that the
DNI does not control directly.
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27. Polygraph
• A polygraph (popularly referred to as a lie detector) measures and
records several physiological signs such as blood pressure, pulse,
respiration, and skin conductivity while the subject is asked and
answers a series of questions.
• The polygraph was on the Encyclopedia Britannica 2003 list of
greatest inventions, described as inventions that "have had
profound effects on human life for better or worse." The efficacy of
polygraphs is debated in the scientific community.
• The polygraph was invented in 1921 by John Augustus Larson, a
medical student at the UC Berkeley & a police officer of the
Berkeley PD.
• In some countries polygraphs are used as an interrogation tool with
criminal suspects or candidates for sensitive public or private sector
employment.
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28. Polygraph
• In 2002, a review by the National Academies of Science found that
in populations untrained in countermeasures, polygraph testing can
discriminate lying from truth telling at rates above chance, though
below perfection.
• US law enforcement and federal government agencies such as the
FBI and the CIA and many police departments such as the LAPD
use polygraph examinations to interrogate suspects and screen
new employees.
• The belief underpinning the use of the polygraph is that deceptive
answers will produce physiological responses that can be
differentiated from those associated with non-deceptive answers,
i.e., the polygraph is used for lie detection.
• Effectiveness may also be worsened by counter measures.
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29. • The polygraph, sometimes
mistakenly referred to as a lie
detector, is a machine that
monitors Physical responses
(such as pulse and breathing
rate) to a series of questions
A 2002 study by the National
Research Council found that
polygraphs are more useful in
criminal investigations, where
specific questions can be
asked, than for
counterintelligence, where
the questions are more
general and therefore are
more likely to yield false-
positive responses.
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30. • In addition to new employees,
current Employees are
polygraphed at intervals of several
years; contractors are subject to
polygraphs; and the machines are
used with defectors.
• The Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), National
Reconnaissance Office, and
National Security Agency (NSA) all
use polygraphs; the State
Department and Congress do not.
• The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) began using
Polygraphs in the aftermath of the
2001 Robert Hanssen espionage
case, which revealed that
Polygraphs had not been in use at
the FBI.
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31. • Despite the fact that so many agencies use polygraphs as part of
their security practice, there is no Standard procedure for these
tests.
• Each agency administers polygraphs to its own standards, which,
according to press accounts, can lead to different results for the
same subject.
• Thus, intelligence agencies have what they call the lifestyle poly
(Personal Behavior) and the counterintelligence poly (foreign
contacts, handling of classified information).
• Beyond taking a polygraph (known as "being put on the box"),
employees and prospective Employees are evaluated for other
possible indicators of disloyalty.
• Intelligence increased the amount of personal financial information
that intelligence personnel must report on a regular basis.
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32. EXTERNAL INDICATORS AND
COUNTERESPIONAGE
• Besides internal measures taken to prevent or to identify problems,
counterintelligence agents look for external indicators of problems.
• They may be more obvious, such as the sudden loss of a spy network overseas,
a change in military exercise patterns that corresponds to satellite tracks, or a
penetration of the other services apparatus that reveals the possibility of ones
own having been penetrated as well.
• As VENONA showed, SIGINT can offer indications of ongoing espionage,
although the references to spying may be oblique and are unlikely to identify the
spy outright.
• The serious problems resulting from having been penetrated by a hostile service
also highlight the gains to be made by carrying out ones own successful
penetration of the hostile service.
• Possible penetrations of ones own service or other services; The agents also
present opportunities, as they are conduits to their own intelligence services.
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33. PROBLEMS IN
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
• Several problems arise in assessing counterintelligence operations.
• First, by its very nature, any counterintelligence penetration is going to be
covert.
• Counterintelligence officers are unlikely to come across initially compelling
evidence about a successful hostile penetration.
• Second, the basic tendency within any intelligence organization (or any
organization, for that matter) is to trust its own people, who have been
vetted and cleared.
• This appears to have been a problem in uncovering the espionage of
Ames; the CIA was slow to look inward for the cause of severe losses of
assets in Moscow.
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34. PROBLEMS IN
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
• It was originally thought that Hanssen escaped detection for more than
twenty years because of his familiarity with U.S. counterintelligence policy
and techniques.
• However, a 2003 report by the Inspector General of the Justice
Department (the FBI is part of that department) found that internal laxity
and poor oversight allowed Hanssen, who was portrayed as erratic and
bumbling, to avoid detection.
• Most telling, the FBI first concentrated on a CIA officer when hunting for
the spy who turned out to be one of his or her own, Hanssen.
• James Angleton, who was in charge of the CIA's counterintelligence from
1954 to 1974, became convinced that a Soviet mole; A deeply hidden spy;
had penetrated the CIA.
• Angleton was unable to find the mole, and some believe that he tied the
CIA in knots by placing virtually anyone under suspicion.
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35. PROBLEMS IN
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
• Angleton remains a controversial figure, but his activities give Some
indication of the intellectual issues that can be involved me in spying and
counterintelligence.
• For many years counterintelligence was a major source of friction
between the CIA and the FBI.
• Lee, who was born in Taiwan, had been under investigation since 1994,
but the investigation was fitful and inconclusive.
• A good example is Edward Howard, a CIA Directorate of Operations (DO)
officer who was slated to be posted to Moscow in the 1980s.
• He eluded surveillance (using techniques he learned as a DO officer) and
fled to Moscow, claiming that he had not been a spy but had been driven
away by the CIA.
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36. PROBLEMS IN
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
• If One is able to answer this question it will reveal the nature of the penetration
and the goals of the Nation running the spy.
• Once a spy has been identified and arrested, the intelligence community
conducts a damage assessment, to determine what intelligence has been
compromised.
• In the United States, this cooperation often becomes a major negotiating point
between government prosecutors and the spy's attorney: cooperation in
exchange for a specific sentence or for consideration for the spy's family.
• Domestic phones can be tapped, but only after intelligence agents have obtained
a warrant from a special federal court (the foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Court), which was set up by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(FISA, pronounced "fy-za").
• Prosecuting intelligence officers for spying was a major concern for the
intelligence agencies, which feared that accused spies, would threaten to reveal
classified information in open court as a means of avoiding prosecution.
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37. PROBLEMS IN
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
• In 1999, as part of government-wide response to revelations about
Chinese espionage, the FBI Proposed splitting its National Security
division into two separate units, one to deal with counterespionage and
the other with terrorism in 2003, the FBI created an Intelligence Division,
concentrating primarily on terrorism the 2004 intelligence legislation
formally recognized the new Office as the Intelligence Directorate.
• In addition to the FBI, which has the primary CI responsibility in the United
States, and the CIA, the Defense Investigative Service and the
counterintelligence units of virtually all intelligence agencies Or offices
share some CI responsibility.
• The diffusion of the CI effort reflects the organization of the community
and also highlights why coordination on CI cases has been problematic.
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38. Great moments in espionage
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39. LEAKS
• They may not be seen as being as dangerous as an espionage penetration
but they can have obvious counterintelligence concerns, because leaks often
entail the unauthorized release of classified information.
• (President Franklin Roosevelt, decrying leaks during his tenure, wondered
why the British had so many fewer leaks, even though Britain had freedom of
speech and tea parties.) The Intelligence Identities Protection Act (1982)
makes it a crime for someone who has access to classified information to
reveal the identity of a covert agent.
• The "pattern of activities" clause was aimed at individuals such as former CIA
officer Philip Agree, who made a practice of revealing the identity of CIA case
officers overseas after he quit the CIA.
• The Espionage Act (1917) has also been used in leak prosecutions.
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40. LEAKS
• Enacted months prior to the United States' entry into World War 1, this act
covers traditional espionage but is also deemed broad enough to cover leaks,
even of information that is not classified but is related to the national defense.
• Use of the Espionage Act became controversial in 2006 when it was used as
the basis for prosecuting two officials of the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (commonly called AIPAC) who received classified information
from a DOD official, Lawrence Franklin, and then passed it on to an Israeli
official and a journalist.
• It can be argued that the president cannot leak because the president also
has the right to declassify intelligence, but the motives behind a revelation
can be debated, as they were in this case.
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41. Bradley Manning Sentenced To 35 Years
For Espionage
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42. NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS
• One investigative technique that has been used in espionage
cases, as well as counterterrorism, is National security letters
(NSLs).
• The USA Patriot Act, passed after the 2001 attacks, expanded the
authority to issue NSLs from FBI headquarters only to field offices,
included terrorism as a cause as well as espionage, and eliminated
the requirement that the information being sought pertain to a
Foreign power or its agent.
• The most obvious is the fact that they are not subject to judicial
review and that they come under a gag order, which raises civil
liberties concerns.
• Second, The use of NSLs has expanded greatly since 2001.
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43. 43

44. CONCLUSION
• As VENONA confirms, the espionage threat during the cold war was
pointed and obvious.
• Russian espionage did not end with the cold war. Neither did U.S.
activities against Russia, given the Russians arrested Agent of
Ames's spying or the source who led to Hanssen.
• In 2003, Russia arrested Alexander Zaporozhsky, a former
intelligence officer who had settled in the U.S. but had been lured
Back to Russia, was sentenced to eighteen years for spying for the
U. S.
• In 1999, The Cox Committee found that China had stolen U.S.
nuclear weapons designs during the 1980s, when the two states
were tacit allies against the Soviet Union.
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45. • A 2002 report prepared for Congress listed China, France, India,
Israel, Japan, and Taiwan as being among the most active
collectors.
• In 2001, Ana Belen Montes, a DIA analyst, was arrested for spying
for Cuba. U.S. officials assume that much of the intelligence that
Montes provided over seventeen years was shared by Cuba with
Russia and possibly other nations.
• A 2002 report. Espionage against the U. S. by American Citizens,
1947-2001, prepared by the Defense Personnel Security Research
Center, noted changes in the demographics of U.S. citizens who
spied against their country. .
• Since the end of the Cold war, spies have tended to be older, to
have lower clearances, to be naturalized citizens instead of native-
born, and to include more women. Thus, it would be naive to
believe that the need for rigorous counter intelligence and
counterespionage ceased with the end of the cold war.
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