1. A U.S. ground raid targeting an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) compound signals a sustained shift away from the use of drone strikes alone to counter AQAP. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted an intelligence-gathering raid in Ma’rib governorate, central Yemen. This operation is the first acknowledged U.S. ground raid in Yemen since a similar operation in January 2017 resulted in the death of one U.S. Navy SEAL and several Yemeni civilians.
2. The breakdown of a ceasefire in southwestern Libya threatens recent political progress and sets the stage for the civil war to escalate. A militia coalition that included groups associated with al Qaeda overran the Brak al Shati airbase on May 18, executing dozens of Libyan National Army (LNA) personnel. The LNA retaliated with airstrikes and may resume ground operations in the southwest. Continued conflict in Libya empowers al Qaeda and associated groups that have positioned themselves as the defenders of vulnerable populations in the civil war.
3. Civil unrest is spreading in Tunisia. Protests escalated in the country’s marginalized southern regions after President Beji Caid Essebsi deployed troops to protect industrial sites from demonstrators. Clashes between police and protesters killed at least one civilian. Continued violence by security forces risks generating broad backlash against the state.
2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1
3
2
1) U.S. forces conducted the first acknowledged U.S. ground raid against an
AQAP target since the death of a U.S. Navy SEAL in a January 2017 raid.
2) Militias in southwestern Libya conducted a mass execution that will derail
political progress and allow hardline actors to escalate hostilties.
3) Protests against economic conditions and police brutality may grow into
national civil unrest in Tunisia.
3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda challenged Saudi Arabia’s position as a representative of Islam during U.S.
President Donald Trump’s visit to the Kingdom. The group published two propaganda pieces
deriding Saudi Arabia as a puppet of the West, continuing a narrative advanced by Osama
bin Laden since the 1990s. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, contributed to a
publication for the second time in May 2017. Al Qaeda is likely grooming Hamza bin Laden
for a leadership role in the organization.
Outlook: Al Qaeda propaganda will continue to target Saudi Arabia’s religious legitimacy
during the Ramadan season.
4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The UN-led effort to negotiate a ceasefire broke down. The al Houthi-Saleh bloc rejected the
UN envoy’s proposed ceasefire terms and accused him of pro-Saudi bias.
Outlook: The current UN envoy will not regain credibility with al Houthi-Saleh leadership.
Security
Al Houthi-Saleh forces signaled opposition to U.S.-Saudi ties by launching a ballistic missile
toward Riyadh and claiming to shoot down a Saudi jet during the week of President Trump’s
visit. The U.S.-backed Hadi government is incapable of advancing the frontline without
relying on Saudi-led coalition forces or AQAP-affiliated militias.
Outlook: Al Houthi-Saleh forces will increasingly target Saudi cities.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
U.S. forces conducted an intelligence-gathering raid targeting AQAP militants in central
Yemen. The raid continues the Trump administration’s strategy of increased military action to
counter the group. AQAP claimed that the raid will increase recruitment.
Outlook:The raid will temporarily disrupt AQAP’s operations in central Yemen.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 19 MAY: Saudi air
defenses
intercepted an al
Houthi-Saleh
ballistic missile
over al Rayn.
2) 21 MAY: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces
claimed to down a
Saudi fighter jet
over Sa’ada.
3) 22 MAY: AQAP-
affiliated popular
resistance forces
resumed an
offensive against al
Houthi-Saleh forces
in eastern Taiz city.
4) 22 MAY: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces killed
several Sudanese
soldiers near Midi
city.
5) 23 MAY: U.S. SOF
raided an AQAP
outpost in Ma’rib
governorate.
3
5
4
1
2
6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Kenya’s military involvement in Somalia is a divisive issue leading into August 2017 general
elections. Al Shabaab seeks to influence Kenyan public opinion to pressure the Kenyan
government to withdraw its forces.
Outlook: Kenyan public opinion may turn against the deployment in Somalia.
Security
Financial constraints limit the Somali government’s ability to counter al Shabaab. SNA
soldiers seized the Ministry of Defense to protest delayed salary payments. Security sweeps
failed to prevent al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab also ambushed forces
attempting to clear roadblocks along major supply routes in food-insecure Bay region.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may intensify attacks in Mogadishu during Ramadan.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab increased attacks in Kenya in an effort to influence upcoming elections. Militants
attacked Kenyan police and civilians in Mandera County, northeastern Kenya.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may conduct a mass-casualty attack in Kenya in June or July.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
4
2
3
1
1) 17 MAY: Al
Shabaab detonated
a VBIED in Wadajir
district, Mogadishu.
2) 17 MAY: Al
Shabaab seized
part of Halgan
town.
3) 21 MAY: SNA
forces repelled an
al Shabaab raid on
a base near Mahas
town.
4) 22 MAY: Al
Shabaab
ambushed a SNA
convoy in Baidoa.
5) 23 MAY: An ISIS-
linked group
conducted its first
suicide bombing in
Boosaaso.
5
8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Egypt and the UAE support a political track that is supplanting the UN-backed dialogue
process in Libya. Factions that previously supported the Government of National Accord
(GNA) criticized it in response to rapprochement between GNA leadership and Libyan
National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar, whom many see as a threat.
Outlook: The GNA will lose the support of political Islamists and other anti-Haftar groups.
Security
The breakdown of a ceasefire in southwestern Libya sets the stage for a broader escalation.
A militia coalition led by Misratan forces overran an LNA base and executed approximately
130 personnel. The LNA conducted airstrikes and mobilized forces in response.
Outlook: The LNA will attack Tamnahent base near Sebha in retaliation.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
The U.S. military signaled willingness to bring rival factions into a joint counterterrorism force
to fight ISIS in Libya. ISIS’s presence has failed to unite Libyan factions in the past.
Outlook: Libyan factions will not prioritize fighting ISIS over core objectives in the civil war.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA
9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
2
3
1
1) 18 MAY: The
Libyan coast guard
rescued 500
migrants.
2) 18 MAY: The
Misratan 13th
Battalion and the
Benghazi Defense
Brigades executed
more than 100 LNA
personnel at Brak
al Shati airbase.
3) 19 MAY: Militants
detonated a car
bomb that killed the
leader of the
Awagir tribe in
Soloug.
4) 21 MAY: The LNA
conducted
airstrikes in Jufra
district.
4
10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
Protests escalated in southern Tunisia after the state deployed troops to protect industrial
infrastructure. Tunisian security forces used tear gas and clashed with protesters, killing one
civilian. Protesters closed down two oil pumping stations in southern Tunisia.
Outlook: Civil unrest will harm Tunisia’s hydrocarbon industry and disrupt recent gains in the
tourism sector.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
AQIM affiliate JNIM is raising the cost of the UN mission in Mali. Likely JNIM militants killed
at least two MINUSMA peacekeepers on patrol in northern Mali on May 23. The group
conducted a series of attacks on MINUSMA bases in May that injured several peacekeepers.
Boko Haram-Shekau militants are likely returning to their stronghold in the Sambisa forest in
northeastern Nigeria. The group decapitated four civilians and detonated two SVESTs in the
area between May 17 and 20. The group’s return forced the Nigerian government to delay
the closure of IDP camps in the area.
Outlook: JNIM will expand its area of control in northern Mali. Boko Haram-Shekau will
increase its attack tempo in central Borno State.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL
11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 20 MAY: Tunisian
security forces
arrested two
suspected ISIS
militants in Bizerte
governorate.
2) 21 MAY: The
Algerian army
defused two
homemade bombs
in Bejaia province.
3) 22 MAY: Tunisian
security forces
used tear gas and
clashed with
protesters in El
Kamour, Tatatouine
governorate.
2
3
1
12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
2
3
1
4
1) 18 MAY: JNIM
militants ambushed
a GATIA patrol in
Acharaba, Kidal
region, Mali.
2) 20 MAY: Boko
Haram-Shekau
beheaded four
civilians near
Dalori, Konduga,
Borno State.
3) 21 MAY: Nigerian
security forces
clashed with Boko
Haram militants in
the Lake Chad
region.
4) 23 MAY: Likely
JNIM militants
killed two
MINUSMA
peacekeepers in
Kidal region, Mali.
13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)
Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569