CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. A coordinated release of strategic guidance across al Qaeda’s affiliates indicates continued centralized direction from al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri to the al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent issued a detailed statement outlining how its followers should interact with other Salafi-jihadi groups and treat Muslim civilians in order to cultivate the support of the masses. The document also listed and prioritized legitimate targets for attacks. Al Shabaab emir Ahmed Umar (Abu Ubaidah) issued guidance for Muslims in East Africa, couching the local objectives in terms of the global fight. 2. Ongoing negotiations between members of the Saudi-led coalition and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s block are occurring outside of the UN-led process. An elite-brokered deal is unlikely to address the core underlying grievances that feed conflict in Yemen’s civil war and therefore may not stabilize the country. Current reports indicate that former Yemeni prime minister Khaled Bahah could replace Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi as president and Saleh’s son, Ahmed Saleh, would take the office of the vice president. 3. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is attacking oil infrastructure in Libya. ISIS in Libya has reconstituted sufficiently to launch a counter-counter-offensive to destabilize Libya further and create space for its forces to regroup. The Misratan counter-ISIS offensive in Libya degraded ISIS significantly, but did not defeat the group.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
June 28, 2017

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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3
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1) Al Qaeda nodes provided local and global guidance in accordance with the
group’s strategic doctrine, showing continued coordination of effort.
2) A Yemeni peace deal may be brokered outside of UN channels, which would
be an elite bargain and not resolve local conflicts feeding the civil war.
3) ISIS factions have reconstituted sufficiently to contest the stability of Libya’s
oil production.

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
A series of statements from al Qaeda nodes reiterated their subscription to al Qaeda’s
strategic doctrine and role in the global jihad. Key among these is a guide from al Qaeda in
the Indian Subcontinent identifying how groups should interact with other Muslims and
Salafi-jihadi organizations and what types of targets are legitimate and acceptable. Al
Shabaab echoed this guidance in a statement from the emir, Ahmed Umar (Abu Ubaidah).
Outlook: Al Qaeda will retain a leading role in the global jihad and is preparing to capture
disenchanted ISIS elements as operations against ISIS degrade the group.
Tehrik-e-Taliban, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda Associates
Militant activity in Pakistan was at the highest levels seen in 2017 in advance of Eid al
Fitr celebrations. The Pakistani military’s Operation Raddul Fasaad, which aims to combat
militant activity, is failing to achieve its objectives. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a Pakistani Sunni
militant group, killed 72 people in a double suicide bombing on June 23 in Parachinar, a
predominantly Shi’a city in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. ISIS Wilayat Khorasan
and Jamatul Ahrar detonated a car bomb in Quetta on June 23, killing at least 14 people.
Outlook: Pakistani security forces will escalate offensives under Operation Raddul Fasaad
to attempt to combat deeply-rooted militant organizations across the country.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Saudi-led coalition and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s faction may reach
a political settlement outside of the UN framework that replaces President Abdu Rabbu
Mansour Hadi with former Yemeni prime minister Khaled Bahah. Saleh’s son could be the
vice president, according to rumors.
Outlook: An elite-brokered political settlement will not end the local conflicts in the civil war.
Security
The Hadi government is deploying brigades from Aden to multiple contested fronts in the war
in what is likely a bid to achieve a military victory to the conflict before a political settlement is
reached that would exclude him.
Outlook: The Hadi government will not advance the frontline sufficiently.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP leaders continue to provide ideological guidance for the overall al Qaeda network.
AQAP religious scholar Ibrahim al Banna called on Muslims to conduct global jihad and
condemned Saudi Arabia for hosting the U.S. president at the 2017 Riyadh summit.
Outlook: AQAP will provide and echo centralized strategic guidance for al Qaeda.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 22 JUN: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces
launched a ballistic
missile at al Tiwal
border crossing.
2) 22 JUN: Hadi
forces killed 12 al
Houthi-Saleh
fighters in Ma’rib.
3) 24 JUN: Coalition
airstrikes killed 15
al Houthi-Saleh
fighters in Taiz.
4) 25 JUN: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces
claimed to strike a
coalition ship.
5) 27 JUN: AQAP
militants attacked al
Houthi-Saleh
fighters in al Bayda
governorate.
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5
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1
2

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The U.S. is increasing its diplomatic footprint in Somalia, which may compel the Somali
Federal Government (SFG) to conduct additional operations in Mogadishu to secure the city.
The U.S. Department of State announced a forthcoming diplomatic office in Mogadishu.
Outlook: U.S. presence in Mogadishu may lead to increased al Shabaab attacks in the city.
Security
Somali security forces prevented attacks during Eid celebrations. Police deployments to
southern and central Somalia enabled roadblock clearing and search operations targeting al
Shabaab. Somali National Army (SNA) seized a town from al Shabaab in central Somalia.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will intensify its IED and ambush attacks targeting SNA soldiers.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab continued its campaign to delegitimize the SFG. The group detonated a car
bomb targeting a police station in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab also released propaganda photos
of Eid celebrations in areas it controls, showing its ability to exert governing authority.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may intensify its car bomb attacks in the capital to challenge the SFG.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
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1) 21 JUN: Puntland
security forces
shelled al Shabaab
in Af Urur.
2) 21 JUN: Al
Shabaab detonated
an SVBIED at a
police station in
Mogadishu.
3) 22 JUN:Al
Shabaab detonated
an IED targeting
SNA troops in
Bardhere town.
4) 22-23 JUN: Al
Shabaab attacked
security forces in El
Wak town.
5) 25-27 JUN: ISIS-
linked militants
clashed with locals
in Qandala town.

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Zintani leaders are pursuing a political settlement to end the civil war. Two Zintani House of
Representatives (HoR) members called upon Ageela Saleh, Khalifa Haftar, and Fayez al
Serraj to meet in Zintan for tripartite talks.
Outlook: Saleh and Haftar will not engage in genuine political negotiations, prolonging the
civil war.
Security
The Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB) may be attempting to co-opt a future Libyan army.
The BDB offered to demobilize and help build a legitimate army. Ansar al Sharia also
disbanded in late May, although its militants are still present on the battlefield.
Outlook: The BDB will not disband under current conditions.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS is targeting oil resources in Libya. Suspected ISIS militants seized fuel trucks near
Sabratha, west of Tripoli.
Outlook: ISIS will continue to attack oil infrastructure to hinder Libya’s economic recovery.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
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3
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1) 21 JUN: Suspected
ISIS militants
seized two fuel
trucks in Bay
Valley, southwest
of Sirte.
2) 22 JUN: Suspected
pro-GNA forces
clashed with pro-
GNC and Libyan
National Guard
groups near
Tripoli’s Mitiga
airport.
3) 25 JUN: The LNA
launched an
offensive to take
Sabri district,
Benghazi.
4) 26 JUN: Tebu tribe
clashed with the
Qadadfa tribe in
Sebha.
4

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
Al Qaeda is attempting to outcompete ISIS as the dominant Salafi-jihadi group in the
Maghreb. AQIM militants detonated an IED targeting an Algerian military vehicle. AQAP
released a nashid dedicated to the Islamic Maghreb following the attack and the
dismantlement of an ISIS cell in Morocco.
Outlook: AQIM will exploit ISIS failures to become the dominate militant group in the region.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (JNIM, Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
Violence increased in Mali’s majority-Fulani Mopti region as JNIM bolstered support to Fulani
militants. The Mopti region is a key recruiting pool for JNIM and provides a corridor to the
country’s south. The militants that attacked Bamako in June were Fulanis from Mopti.
Boko Haram-Shekau staged a successful coordinated attack on Maiduguri after security
forces foiled Eid al Fitr attacks in several other states. Counterterrorism efforts have
thwarted the group’s repeated attempts to undermine security in other states.
Outlook: JNIM will increase operational tempo in Mopti region to recruit from Fulani
populations and maintain strategic access to southern Mali. Boko Haram will increase
attacks outside Borno State.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 17 JUN: AQIM
militants detonated
a VBID targeting an
Algerian military
vehicle in
Khenchela, Algeria.
2) 22 JUN: Moroccan
security forces
dismantled an ISIS-
linked cell in
Essaouira,
Morocco.
3) 23 JUN: The
Spanish Civil
Guard arrested a
suspected Salafi-
jihadi recruiter in
Melilla.
4) 26 JUN: Protesters
clashed with
security forces in al
Hoceima, Morocco.
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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
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1) 22 JUN: Boko
Haram clashed with
Cameroonian
security forces
along Lake Chad in
Hile Alifa, Extreme-
Nord region,
Cameroon.
2) 24-25 JUN:
Chadian security
forces clashed with
Boko Haram
militants on Lake
Chad, reportedly
killing 162 militants.
3) 25-26 JUN: Seven
Boko Haram
suicide bombers
attacked Maiduguri,
Borno State,
Nigeria, killing at
least nine civilians.

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ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)
Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569