1
@ccontrialwww.contrial.co corpocontrial.co@gmail.com
The Fourth Measurement of Social Capital of Colombia
Challenges for Citizenship, Civil Society, Politics and the State
Corporación para el Control Social - CONTRIAL
With the support of:
John Sudarsky
Diana Marcela García

How to build Territorial Settings that
accumulate Social Capital, Trust and
Sustainable Commitment, articulating
participatory and representative
democracy?

4
I. Putnam’s equation, 1993)
Civic Engagement
1900
Civic Engagement
1970
Economic Development
1900
Institutional effectiveness
1980
Economic Development
1970

6
ITEMS OR
QUESTIONS VARIABLES
1
2
3
DIMENSIONS
SocialK
INTRICATE
FUSI
FACTORS
A B C D
II. The Barometer of Social Capital
CivicK

 Interpersonal Trust :"Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust most people or that you can’t be so trusting in dealing with people?". It takes
into account the percentage of respondents who trust people.
 Corruption Perception : "how widespread do you think bribes, and corruption in this country are?" / 0 points to "almost no public official is involved in
bribes or bites" and 10 points to "almost all public officials are involved".
III. Interpersonal Trust and Corruption’s Perception
National and Cities 2017
Corruption’sPerception
Interpersonal Trust

TOTAL Explained
Variance: 75,7 %
IV. Factors’ Composition / 11 dimensions
BARCAS 2017
Social Control
Institutional Trust
Political Participation
Media
Information and Transparency
Social Media
Civic Republicanism
Solidarity and Mutuality
Horizontal Relationships
Civic Participation
INTRICATE
Institutional trust and
indirect control state
EV: 32,9%
SOCIALK
Social Capital
EV: 13,6%
New factor
CIVICK
Civic Capital
EV: 10,7%
Institutional trust and
indirect control of
state
Faith in unvalidated
sources of
information
Civic Capital
FUSI
Faith in unvalidated
sources of information
EV: 18,2%
Social Capital
/ Social Fabric
Hierarchy or Vertical Articulation
Positive effect Negative effect

I. Collective Self-Confession: FUSI falls. When this happens, citizens problematize the
political culture in which they live, permeated by clientelism and political corruption.
II. Actual accumulation of social capital additionally requires the introduction of
governmental policies that include the creation of intermediate territorial reservoirs
between the large city and neighborhoods: localities.
III. Deepening of decentralization and participatory process such as local participatory
planning and budgeting. Build Collective Rationality: Participatory planning and
budgeting must be a process of allocation of limited resources, a zero-sum process
that forces citizens to prioritize collective choices that usually are made privately and
thus destroys trust and legitimacy.
IV. The state publicly offers articulated participatory mechanisms which would induce
citizens to become active members of civic organizations.
V. These processes allow the mobilization of organized civil society which would have
sustainability if and only if…
VI. Accountability is build in localities which eventually become Single Seat Electoral
Districts so their inhabitants would know who their representative is, and make him
accountable.
V. Transformation Theory: The Movement towards Modern Civic Society,
should happen in Cities

VI. The Factor’s Change Over Time (Linear equations)
0.215
0.750
0.281
-0.017
0.400
0.228
0.009
-0.039
2.327
2.522
2.263
0.001
0.429
0.724
0.518
-0.018
-0.500
0.000
0.500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
3.000
1997 2005 2011 2017
Change of factors
Linear equations via dimensions/Equal bases
Social K Civic K Intricate Fusi
0.215
0.750
0.281
-0.017
0.400
0.228
0.009
-0.039
0.465
0.504
0.453
0.000
0.429
0.724
0.518
-0.018
-0.100
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
0.500
0.600
0.700
0.800
1997 2005 2011 2017
Change of factors
Linear equations via dimensions/Equal bases
Social K Civic K *Intricate/(5) Fusi

VII. SocialK
Social Fabric
SocialK grew until 2005, and began to fall, with largest fall in the last period,
mainly due to a decrease in Solidarity and Mutuality (growth of
Opportunism an Atomization)
Although Horizontal Relationship does not change, some of their variables
did: Horizontal solution to collective problems (between all communities’
members) and Third Party Enforcement (increase the need for third parties
intervention to solve them).

Solidarity and Mutuality’s fall: High impact (57%) on SocialK’s decline
3.17
13.73
3.62
-2.77-3.00
-1.00
1.00
3.00
5.00
7.00
9.00
11.00
13.00
15.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change
SOLIDARITY AND MUTUALITY
National sample / Equal bases
Averange Percentage change
1997 2005 2011 2017 05-97 11-05 17-11 17-97
General solidarity 8,06 15,54 11,63 11,43 93% -25% -2% 42%
Reciprocity 0,82 4,47 3,20 3,22 448% -28% 1% 295%
Collective Conflict management 3,05 3,51 2,69 3,85 15% -23% 43% 26%
ATOMIZATION (-) 5,33 6,13 9,79 11,79 15% 60% 20% 121%
OPPORTUNISM (-) 3,42 3,66 4,11 9,48 7% 12% 131% 177%
SOLIDARITY AND MUTUALITY 3,17 13,73 3,62 -2,77 333% -74% -176% -187%
8.06
15.54
11.63
11.43
0.82
4.47
3.2 3.223.05 3.51
2.69
3.85
5.33
6.13
9.79
11.79
3.42
3.66
4.11
9.48
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change variables
SOLIDARITY AND MUTUALITY
National sample / Equal bases
General solidarity
Reciprocity
Management Collective Conflicts
ATOMIZATION (-)
OPPORTUNISM (-)

Increased Atomization contributes 22% to SocialK decline
Average Percentage Change
1997 2005 2011 2017 05-97 11-05 17-11 17-97
Nobody helps *rescaled 3,33 2,62 2,85 4,00 -30% 6% 71% 64%
Not a member of a pension fund*rescaled 5,54 4,88 7,70 8,20 -11% 56% 22% 61%
Never meet with neighbors 2,40 3,08 3,03 1,43 28% -2% -53% -40%
Never meet with coworkers 2,66 2,71 2,57 1,49 2% -5% -42% -44%
Does not belong to any voluntary organization 1,80 3,42 3,04 2,74 90% -11% -10% 52%
Zero linkage 5,46 5,12 6,31 8,76 -6% 23% 39% 61%
ATOMIZATION 5,33 6,13 9,79 11,79 15% 60% 20% 121%
3.33 2.62 2.85
4.00
5.54
4.88
7.70
8.20
2.40
3.08
3.03
1.432.66
2.71
2.57
1.49
1.80 3.42
3.04
2.74
5.46
5.12
6.31 8.76
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average Atomization change
National sample / Equal basis
Nobody helps *rescaled
Not a member of a pension fund*rescaled
Never meet with neighbors
Never meet with coworkers
Does not belong to any voluntary organisation
Zero linkage

55%
8%
5% 5%
3%
5% 4% 4% 4% 4%
2% 2%
51%
10%
5%
9%
3%
5% 3% 4% 3% 4%
1%
3%
63%
6%
4% 4%
3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
3%
2% 2%
88%
4%
2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0%0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Legislative Linkage
National sample / Equal data bases
1997 2005 2011 2017

Opportunism increase contributes 65% to the fall of SocialK
Average Percenge change
1997 2005 2011 2017 05-97 11-05 17-11 17-97
People behave opportunistically and each time they can, skip
their obligations to others (oboport) 2,64 2,61 3,21 3,30 -1% 23% 3% 25%
Collectives problems. You look for a political connection
(palanca) that solves it for you (clpalan) 1,24 2,18 2,23 4,00 77% 2% 79% 223%
Instead worrying that rules apply to everyone equally, you
better see how you get away with what you want (unosuya ) -0,46 -1,13 -1,33 2,18 -148% 17% 264% 577%
OPPORTUNISM 3,42 3,66 4,11 9,48 7% 12% 131% 177%
2.64 2.61
3.21 3.30
1.24
2.18 2.23
4.00
-0.46
-1.13
-1.33
2.18
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change items Opportunism
National sample / Equal bases
People behave opportunistically
and each time they can, skip
their obligations to others
(oboport)
Collective problems. You look a
political connection (palanca)
that solves it for (clpalan)
Instead worrying that rules
apply to everyone equally, you
better see how you get away
with yours (unosuya )

5.33
6.13
9.79
11.79
3.42
3.66
4.11
9.48
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change
ATOMIZATION AND OPPORTUNISM
National sample / Equal bases
ATOMIZATION
OPPORTUNISM

The Triad:
Social Capital Reservoirs
 The Political Reform: Mixed System for election to the Lower
Chamber, Councils and Assemblies in territories of more than
one million people.
Planning Organic Law: Incorporate the elements for
participatory planning.
Simplify the state offer of participatory mechanisms: Task
assigned in law 1757 of 2015 to the National Council of
Participation, chaired by the Ministry of the Interior and
Technical Secretary of the National Planning Department, and
identification of resources allocated for participation so a
cost benefit analysis can be done.

• People know who their representative is
Representation
• There is an equal ratio between the
number of votes that a party receives and
the number of seats that a party gets
Proportionality
Main required criteria for electoral systems

Mark one Political Party and then
mark one the candidate’s number
(Present Electoral System)
Mark one Political Party (closed list)
(Government´s proposal)
Mark one per Political Party (closet list: color), and
one District´s Candidate (photo and name)
CANDIDATE1 CANDIDATE 2 CANDIDATE 3 CANDIDATE 4 CANDIDATE 5 CANDIDATE 6
Logo
Name Name Name Name Name Name
POLITICAL
PARTY
CANDIDATE

Proposed Electoral Reform
Mixed Electoral System: to ensure proportionality 50% of seats are
chosen from a closed and ordered list at the wider territorial level.
Other 50% are chosen from Single Seat Electoral Districts (SSED) to
stablish a Principal-Agent (P-A) linkage and accountable
representation, the main deficit in Colombian politics.
SSED become Territorial Settings capable of accumulating Social
Capital, Trust and Rationality.
Apply to Lower Chamber as well as Departmental Assemblies and
City Councils in territories of more than one million inhabitants.

VIII. Civic Capital: CivicK
Differentiation of Civic Capital from the State (Intricate) is
important; the social capital that bridges appears, the one
which Putnam uses to explain the economic development
and the effectiveness of the State. It shows a slight
recovery compared to 2011. Civic Participation has the
effect of lowering Fusi, Hierarchy increases Fusi.

CIVIC PARTICIPATION: increases 21% 2011-2017, increasing CivicK and
slightly diminishing (6%) Fusi.
28.43
21.94
14.56
17.61
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change Civic Participation
National sample / Equal basis
12.73
8.36
5.68
8.90
4.49
4.08 3.93 3.91
1.76
1.37
0.78
1.33
4.84
3.64
1.63
2.54
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Variable Average Changes Civic Participation
National Sample / Comparable Bases
Membership in Non religious
Voluntary Organizations
Local Activities
Civic Activities
Media Activities
Engages in voluntary work
Average Percentage change
1997 2005 2011 2017 05-97 11-05 17-11 17-97
Membership in Secular Voluntary
Organizations
12,73 8,36 5,68 8,90
-34% -32% 57% -30%
Local Activities 4,61 4,50 2,55 0,93 -2% -43% -64% -80%
Civic Activities 4,49 4,08 3,93 3,91 -9% -4% 0% -13%
Media Activities 1,76 1,37 0,78 1,33 -22% -43% 71% -24%
Engages in voluntary work 4,84 3,64 1,63 2,54 -25% -55% 56% -48%
CIVIC PARTICIPATION 28,43 21,94 14,56 17,61 -23% -34% 21% -38%

Membership in Secular Voluntary Organizations increases 57%, 2011-2017
12.73
8.36
5.68
8.90
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change
Membership in Secular Voluntary Organizations
Nacional sample / Equal Bases
Membership in Secular Voluntary Organizations: Non member (0), non active member (5), active member (10)
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
2.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change Membership in Secular Voluntary Organizations
Nacional sample / Equal Bases
Artistic, musical and culture (119%)
Labor Union (54%)
Cooperative (-2%)
Humanitarian or charitable organization (-11%)
Sport or recreational organization (-14%)
Political party (-31%)
Ethnic (-40%)
Agricultural organizations/farmers associations (-54%)
Educational (-51%)
Safety or vigilance (-53%)
Professional association (-58%)
Environmental (-67%)
Gender (-68%)
Health (-74%)
Communal action/Meetings neighborhoods (-76%)

The thesis of citizen’s demobilization. Historical series
In 2017 I increase the membership but not active
19,698
23,122
26,096
30,797
8,317
13,996
18,038 17,427
4,058
4,670 4,068
10,906
3,336
2,278 2,284
1,188
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
1997 2005 2011 2017
PARTICIPATION IN CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (VALUES / THOUSANDS)
Population over 18 years*
Non member
Not active members
Active members

Engages in voluntary work
48%
36%
16%
25%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
1997 2005 2011 2017
Engages in voluntary work
Nacional sample / Equal bases

HIERARCHY OR VERTICAL ARTICULATION: 26% loss, 2011-2017.
Main cause of loss of CivicK
27.65
30.16
26.81
19.76
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change VERTICAL ARTICULATION
Nacional sample / Equal bases
4.05
4.96
4.20 4.06
1.31
5.15
2.25
1.37
-2.88
-0.86 -0.88
-3.22
12.97
11.31
12.32
10.98
4.19
3.16 2.99
1.78
-6.00
-4.00
-2.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change VERTICAL ARTICULATION
Nacional sample / Equal bases
Membership of interest
group organizations
Vertical Solidarity
Vertical Solutions of
Collective Problems
Mediating organizations:
Church
Mediating organizations:
Professional associations
Mediating organizations:
Political parties
Mediating organizations:
Labor union
Average Percentage change
1997 2005 2011 2017 05-97 11-05 17-11 11-97
Membership of interest group organizations 4,05 4,96 4,20 4,06 22% -15% -3% 0%
Vertical Solidarity 1,31 5,15 2,25 1,37 294% -56% -39% 5%
Vertical Solutions of Collective Problems -2,88 -0,86 -0,88 -3,22 70% -2% -268% -12%
Mediating organizations: Church 12,97 11,31 12,32 10,98 -13% 9% -11% -15%
Mediating organizations: Professional associations 4,26 3,41 3,22 3,20 -20% -6% 0% -25%
Mediating organizations: Political parties 3,76 3,03 2,70 1,59 -19% -11% -41% -58%
Mediating organizations: Labor union 4,19 3,16 2,99 1,78 -25% -5% -41% -58%
VERTICAL ARTICULATION 27,65 30,16 26,81 19,76 9% -11% -26% -29%

How to solve collective problems?
2.97
4.74
4.00
1.95
1.05
1.19
1.94
4.09
3.45
2.56
2.48
2.23
1.67
2.21 2.23
4.00
2.24
3.91
3.84
3.01
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Solutions of colletive porblems
Nacional sample / Equal bases
We can solve them
among all members of
the community
(cltodos)
If someone of greater
position does not
intervene, one cannot
coordinate to solve
them (clmayor)
You can only solve
them on your own
(substact) (clunomi)
You look for a political
connection (palanca)
that solves it for you
(sustract) (clpalan)
A community
representative is
appointed to assist in
their resolution
(clrepre)
Whatdopeopledowhencollectiveproblemsarise?
Dimension
HORIZONTAL
RELATIONSHIPS
HORIZONTAL
RELATIONSHIPS
VERTICAL
ARTICULATION
HorizontalSolutions
ofCollective
Problems
Variable
ThirdParty
Enforcement
(substract)
VerticalSolutions
ofCollective
Problems
Wecansolvethemamong
all membersofthe
community(cltodos)
Ifsomeoneofgreater
positiondoesnot
intervene,onecannot
coordinatetosolvethem
(clmayor)
Youcanonlysolvethem
onyourown(substact)
(clunomi)
Youlookforapolitical
connection(palanca)that
solvesit foryou (sustract)
(clpalan)
Acommunity
representative is
appointedtoassistintheir
resolution(clrepre)
Items

IX. INTRICATE
Institutional trust and indirect control of
state
INTRICATE increases between 1997 and 2005, then it starts to
fall. Its most drastic loss occurred between 2011 and 2017,
mainly for loss of Institutional Trust and increased corruption’s
perception, fall of Social Control ( control of society on the
state) and Political participation.

INSTITUTIONAL TRUST: Fall 30% 2011-2017, diminishing 49% Intricate
119.6
113.9
101.9
71.6
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change INSTITUTIONAL TRUST
National sample /Comparable bases
Organized from highest to lowest for total falls (17-97)
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change INSTITUTIONAL TRUST
National sample /Comparable bases
The congress (-74%)
Labor unions (-72%)
Departmental gobernment (-71%)
Ethnic movement (-69%)
Political parties (-68%)
Environmental organizations (-63%)
Local gobernment (-61%)
Municipal gobernment (-58%)
Major Companies (-58%)
Women’s organizations (-57%)
Educational system (-56%)
Public prosecution (-50%)
Public administration (-48%)
Legal system (-47%)
Nacional gobernment (-47%)
Television (-36%)
The press (-33%)
The police (-27%)
Profesional association (-20%)
The [churches] (-16%)
The armed forces (-14%)
Perception of corruption (19%)

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION falls 31% 2011-2017, decreasing Intricate 20%
127.95
165.16
145.09
100.61
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
120.00
140.00
160.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average changes POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
National sample / Equal bases
Average Percentage change
1997 2005 2011 2017 05-97 11-05 17-11 17-97
Political Skills 31,91 40,01 34,27 30,20 25% -14% -12% -5%
Participatory Mechanisms 22,33 29,42 22,40 19,28 32% -24% -14% -14%
Voting 26,58 37,08 34,69 22,37 40% -6% -36% -16%
Legislative Linkage 22,87 22,60 19,29 4,36 -1% -15% -77% -81%
Executive Linkage 12,69 23,56 23,03 16,18 86% -2% -30% 27%
Political Activities 12,79 14,56 14,18 12,88 14% -3% -9% 1%
Political Party 5,71 5,47 4,76 2,36 -4% -13% -51% -59%
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 127,95 165,16 145,09 100,61 29% -12% -31% -21%
31.91
40.01
34.27
30.20
22.33
29.42
22.40
19.28
26.58
37.08
34.69
22.3722.87
22.60
19.29
4.36
12.69
23.56 23.03
16.18
12.79
14.56 14.18
12.88
5.71
5.47
4.76
2.36
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
45.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average changes POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
National sample / Equal bases
Political Skill
Participatory Mechanistic
Electoral Activity: Voting
Legislative Linkage
Executive Linkage
Political Activities
Political Party

31.91
40.01
34.27
30.20
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average changes POLITICAL SKILL
National sample / Equal bases
Loss of Political Skills
2.72
5.07
6.15
4.33
1.47
2.54
1.79
1.99
3.05
3.51
2.69
3.85
9.71 9.67
8.83
9.89
2.17
4.08
2.28
2.03
8.64
10.89
10.00
7.72
4.16 4.25
2.53
0.40
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average changes POLITICAL SKILL
National sample / Equal bases
Ability to reward positive
leadership
Ability to enforce
agreements
Ability to make problems
explicit
Ability to exert pressure
Ability to monitor
compliance with
agreements
Ability to organize
Ability to negotiate and
enter into agreements

PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: MECHANISM, falls 14% 2011- 2017, diminishing 7% Intricate
22.33
29.42
22.40
19.28
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change Participatory Mechanisms
National sample /Equal bases
Average Percentage Change
1997 2005 2011 2017 05-97 11-05 17-11 17-97
Territorial Planning Councils 0,94 2,00 1,37 1,67 113% -31% 22% 78%
Right to Petition 1,92 3,82 4,19 3,27 99% 10% -22% 70%
Recall 1,47 2,54 1,79 1,99 73% -30% 11% 36%
Rural development Councils 1,53 2,47 1,61 1,54 61% -35% -4% 1%
Open town meeting 1,53 2,47 1,66 1,26 61% -33% -24% -18%
Petition of protection of a fundamental right (Tutela) 5,38 5,61 4,92 4,35 4% -12% -11% -19%
Education sectoral mechanism 4,53 4,63 3,10 3,44 2% -33% 11% -24%
Citizens oversight committes 1,67 2,81 1,87 0,90 68% -33% -52% -46%
Health sectoral mechanism 3,37 3,08 1,89 0,86 -8% -39% -55% -75%
Participatory Mechanism 22,33 29,42 22,40 19,28 32% -24% -14% -14%
0.94
2.00
1.37
1.67
1.92
3.82
4.19
3.27
1.47
2.54
1.79 1.99
1.53
2.47
1.66
1.26
5.38
5.61
4.92
4.35
4.53
4.63
3.10
3.44
1.67
2.81
1.87
0.90
3.37
3.08
1.89
0.86
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average changes Participatory Mechanisms
National sample /Equal bases
Territorial Planning Councils
Petition rights
Recall
Rural development Councils
Open town meeting
Petition of protection of a
fundamental right (Tutela)
Education sectoral mechanism
Citizens oversight committes
Health sectoral mechanism

Direct observation of participatory planning in 162 towns with high
incidence of armed conflict
Observación de la Planeación Participativa en municipios de alto conflicto N°i
Observación de la Planeación Participativa Municipal
Informe Final
Presentado por:
Corporación para el Control Social -CONTRIAL
John Sudarsky, Presidente
Diana Marcela García D., Directora Ejecutiva
Bogotá D.C, enero de 2017
Final report: http://bit.ly/planpart162mun
Presentation : http://bit.ly/PlanPartMunConf

The above elements produce a collective pact
which educates people about the public sphere
and how to solve complex local
investment dilemmas
Citizens acquire the capacity to focus their social
oversight and control, and the eventually clear
territorial representative
knows what priorities have been defined so he
can lobby territorial priorities.
Points of the Reform of the Law on Participatory Planning

Legislative Linkage
The following questions were asked for each legislative body:
(Senate, Lower Chamber, Departmental Assembly, Municipal Council and
Local Government Board)
Did you vote?
Do you know who your representative would have been?
Was the representative you voted for elected?
Which of the elected representatives represents you better?
In regard to the latter, an additional question inquired about the
reasons for voting for him.

Representative Democracy: Loss of Legislative Linkage (77%)
37% who voted for at least one of the legislative elections
Variable has become so uniformly low that it is no longer a critical variable
22.87
22.60
19.29
4.36
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change Legislative Linkage
Nacional sample /Equal Bases
6.53
7.19
5.24
0.88
4.29 4.32 4.33
0.81
3.92
3.59
3.83
0.84
4.32
3.98
2.66
1.03
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change Legislative Linkage
Nacional sample /Equal Bases
Municipal Council
Senate
Lower Chamber
Derpatmental Assembly
Local Government Board

12.7%
23.0%
20.4%
22.9%
23.5%
5.7%
4.3%
4.7% 4.7%
3.6%
3.0% 3.0%
2.4%
3.8%
2.8%2.8%
1.6%
1.2% 0.9%
1.7%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
Local Government
Board
Municipal Council Departmental
Assembly
Lower Chamber Senate
Legislative Linkage ( percentage)
Nacional sample / BARCAS 2017
Did you vote?
Do you know who your
representative would
have been?
Was the representative
you voted for elected?
Which of the elected
representatives
represents you better?

0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
5.000-10.000 10.000-20.000 20.000-50.000 50.000-100.000 100.000-500.000 MAS DE 500.000
BONDING SOCIAL CAPITAL TRANSITION BRIDGING SOCIAL CAPITAL
LEGISLATIVE LINKAGE BY SIZE OF TOWN: THE NEED TO CREATE INTERMEDIATE
RESERVOIR OF SOCIAL CAPITAL ABOVE THE “BARRIO” AND BELOW THE CIT Y
1997 2005 2011 2017

TOTAL EV: 75,7 %
CompositionoftheFactors/11dimensions
BARCAS2017
Social Control
Institutional Trust
Political Participation
Media
Information and Transparency
Social Media
Civic Republicanism
Solidarity and Mutuality
HorizontalRelationships
Civic Participation
INTRICATE
Institutional trust and
indirectcontrol state
EV:32,9%
SOCIALK
Social Capital
EV:13,6%
Nuevofactor
CIVICK
CivicCapital
EV:10,7%
Institutional trust and
indirect control state
Faith in unvalidated
sources information
Civic Capital
FUSI
Faith in unvalidated
sources information
EV:18,2%
Social Capital
/ Social Fabric
Hierarchy orVertical Articulation
Positive effect Negative effect
The disintermediation of Opinion and the Media
In the 10 dimensions model Media is related to INTRICATE, with positive effect and also with positive effect on FUSI. In
the 11 dimensions model, with the entry of Networks, Media effects on factors disappear.
TOTAL EV: 78,8 %
CompositionoftheFactors/10dimensions
BARCAS2017
Social Control
Institutional Trust
Political Participation
Media
Information and Transparency
Civic Republicanism
Solidarity and Mutuality
HorizontalRelationships
Civic Participation
INTRICATE
Institutional trust and
indirectcontrol state
EV:34,4%
SOCIALK
Social Capital
EV:13,7%
Nuevofactor
CIVICK
CivicCapital
EV:10,8%
Institutional trust and
indirect control state
Faith in unvalidated
sources information
Civic Capital
FUSI
Faith in unvalidated
sourcesinformation
EV:19,9%
Social Capital
/ Social Fabric
Positive effect Negative effect
HierarchyorVertical Articulation

X. FUSI
Faith in Unvalidated Sources Information
FUSI increase from 1997 to 2005; afterwards begins to fall, with a drastic
drop between 2011 and 2017 (collective self confession). The main causes
of the fall of FUSI are: Fall of Information and Transparency ( recognition
that the citizenry does not have the valid, timely and sufficient information
to be able to participate) and drop of Civic Republicanism (recognition that
citizens do not take responsibility for the public, are not politically educated
and are immersed in a particularistic and clientelist society).

-22%
-16%
-6%
-4%
-48%
-15%
0%
10%
-50%
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
Media explain
problems in depth
Vertical Solutions of
Collective Problems
Mediating
organizations: Church
Vertical Solidarity Political Education Particularism
(increases)
Responsability for
public sphere success.
Citizen’s Politization
(increases)
INFORMATION AND
TRANSPARENCY(-
35%)
HIERARCHY OR VERTICAL ARTICULATION (-28%) CIVIC REPUBLICANISM (-18%)
Contribution of variables to the fall of FUSI 2011-2017

-3.46
-0.79
-3.46
-8.37
-9.00
-8.00
-7.00
-6.00
-5.00
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change
INFORMATION AND TRANSPARENCY
Nacional sample / Equal bases
Information and Transparency, drop of 142%
-0.23
-0.30
-1.35
-2.80
0.27
0.38
-0.76
-0.84
-0.57
-0.13
-0.82
-2.91
-1.44
-0.93
-1.71
-2.17
2.62
1.37
0.58
1.65
1.13
1.56
1.76
2.00
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change
INFORMATION AND TRANSPARENCY
Nacional sample / Equal bases
The State makes efforts to keep
citizens informed
Citizens inform themselves
appropriately to participate
effectively
Media explain problems in
depth
People have who explains to
them public problems
Colombians do not know where
the country is headed because
no one tell us (-)
Do you know how the resources
of your locality are going to be
invested?

Civic Republicanism: Falls 69% and decreases FUSI
13.39
20.11
11.28
3.54
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change CIVIC REPUBLICANISM
Nacional sample / Equal bases
4.94
5.94
5.26
6.546.87
10.06
6.02
8.67
4.39
1.72 2.06
5.27
21.21
19.10
15.13 15.01
-5.36
-1.39
-2.55
-8.33
-10.00
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change CIVIC REPUBLICANISM
Nacional sample / Equal bases
Clientelism (-)
Citizen’s Politization
Particularism (-)
Responsability for public
sphere success.
Political Education
Average Percentage change
1997 2005 2011 2017 05-97 11-05 17-11 17-97
Clientelism (-) 4,94 5,94 5,26 6,54 20% -11% 24% 32%
Citizen’s Politization 6,87 10,06 6,02 8,67 46% -40% 44% 26%
Particularism (-) 4,39 1,72 2,06 5,27 -61% 20% 156% 20%
Responsibility for public sphere success 21,21 19,10 15,13 15,01 -10% -21% -1% -29%
Political Education -5,36 -1,39 -2,55 -8,33 74% -83% -227% -55%
CIVIC REPUBLICANISM 13,39 20,11 11,28 3,54 50% -44% -69% -74%

ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT CITIZENS ARE LESS EDUCATED POLITICALLY;
DECREASES FUSI BECAUSE IT GETS CLOSER TO THE CITIZENS’ REALITY
 People do not have anyone who explains to them public affairs
 Citizens do not get informed to participate
 The state does not inform citizens
 Political parties do not inform citizens on their ideologies and programs
 Media do not fully explain public problems
Colombians do not know where the country is going
because no one informs us
The Fall of Political Education: collective self
confession

Particularism increases 156% 2011- 2017, diminishing 15% FUSI
4.39
1.72
2.06
5.27
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change Particularism
Nacional sample / Equal bases
Average Percentage change
1997 2005 2011 2017 05-97 11-05 17-11 17-97
If you don’t get paid for public service, you don’t
have to serve 0,55 -0,66 -0,57 -1,07 -221% 15% -90% -296%
Instead of worrying about rules you better worry
about seeing how you get away with it -0,46 -1,13 -1,33 2,18 -148% -17% 264% 577%
When the State takes a decision it does not apply it
equally to all (- ) 0,85 0,96 1,47 1,94 13% 53% 32% 128%
Collective Problems: You can only solve them on your
own 3,45 2,56 2,48 2,23 -26% -3% -10% -35%
PARTICULARISM 4,39 1,72 2,06 5,27 -61% 20% 156% 20%
0.55
-0.66
-0.57
-1.07
-0.46
-1.13
-1.33
2.18
0.85
0.96
1.47
1.94
3.45
2.56
2.48
2.23
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change Particularism
Nacional sample /Equal bases
If you don’t get paid for
public service, you don’t have
to serve
Instead of worrying about
rules you better worry about
seeing how you get away
with it
When the State takes a
decision it does not apply it
equally to all (- )
You can only solve them on
your own

Do political connections work?
Collective problems: You look for a
political connection (palanca) that
solves it for you (clpalan) (via
Oportunism) diminishes SocialK
(contributes 28% to the fall of
SocialK)
Help from political connections no
longer generates SocialK
More demand for political
connections but they do not work.
The electoral systems is designed for
a clientelistic society but it is not
performing its “integrative”
functions.
What is then left?
1.68
2.18 2.23
4.00
-0.74
0.42
-0.17
-0.07
-1.50
-0.50
0.50
1.50
2.50
3.50
4.50
1997 2005 2011 2017
Average change Clientelism
Nacional sample /Equal bases
Collective problems: You look for a political connection
(palanca) that solves it for you (clpalan)
Help from political connections

XI. FACTORS in cities
The full power of diagnosis of the Barcas does not
become apparent until the broad differences between
and within cities are used.
There are longitudinal measurements of main large cities ( Bogotá, Cali,
Medellín, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga and Cartagena, and Cundinamarca.
Very distinct differences in each, and very distinct evolution.
Results for localities, the natural unit of intervention, are available.

XII. Conclusions

The Third Wave of Democracy:
Avritzer, 2002
Avritzer describes the effect of Citizen Mobilization on democracy in its
three Waves.
In the first, since the beginnings of democracy, the Mobilization ends up
destroying democracy: the Weimar Republic, Germany in the 1930s,
where between Spartacist and Nazis destroy democracy.
In the second wave and as consequence of fears aroused form the first
wave, citizen mobilization ends when you vote.
In the third wave, the current one, citizens find a parsimonious structure
within which it can be mobilized rationally. The pioneering milestone in
this regard is the Participatory Budget of Puerto Alegre in Brazil, 1974.
Avritzer, L.(2002). Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America. Princeton. Princeton University Press.

Transformation Theory: The Movement towards Modern Civic Society:
it would happen in Cities
I. Collective Self-Confession: FUSI falls. When this happens, citizens problematize the political culture in
which they live, permeated by clientelism and political corruption. FUSI fell nationally.
II. Actual accumulation of social capital requires additionally the introduction of governmental policies that
include the creation of intermediate territorial reservoirs between the large city and neighborhoods:
localities. SOME CITIES HAVE ADVANCED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THESE INTERMEDIATE
TERRITORIAL RESERVOIRS (Bogotá, Barranquilla, Cartagena, for example. RECENTLY Cali WAS
DECLARED AS A SPECIAL DISTRICT, and is currently grouping communes in localities.
III. Deepening of decentralization and participatory process such as local participatory planning and
budgeting. Build Collective Rationality: Participatory planning and budgeting must be a process of
allocation of limited resources, a zero-sum process that forces citizens to prioritize collective choices
that usually are made privately and destroys trust and legitimacy. PLANNING LAW REFORM (Law 152 OF
1994) agreed in Peace Accords is bogged down in congress.
IV. The state publicly offers articulated participatory mechanisms which would induce citizens to become
active members of civic organizations. NATIONAL PARTICIPATION COUNCIL (NPC) TASKS (Law 1757 of
2015) Simplify the oversupply of participatory mechanisms and spaces.
V. These processes allow the mobilization of organized civil society which would have sustainability if and
only If CITIZENS FIND A PARSIMONIOUS STRUCTURE FOR ITS MOBILIZATION. Not so.
VI. Accountability is created in localities to eventually become Single Seat Electoral districts so their
inhabitants would know who their representative is and make him accountable. LEGISLATIVE LINKAGE
FELL TO THE MINIMUM LEVEL. ELECTORAL REFORM NECESSARY. Proposed reforms do not address the
problem of representation.

Citizens (the principal) collectively define
their priorities ( what they want) and
thus know which is the subject of their
attention to exert social control.
The representative (the agent) lobbies
the collective will
and the citizens control that he does it.
Accountability and Social
Control of citizens materialize
A civil society articulated structure
gets generated from the local up to
the national level
Citizens find a parsimonious
structure
for mobilization
Governance, legitimacy and
collective rationality increases
Participatory
planning
and
Participatory
budgeting
The Virtuous cycle: the Articulation of Participatory
and Representative democracies

FUSI has fallen but the two ways to validate information,
Civic and Political participation, are very weak.
Therefore, space is open space for the emergence of
leftist or right populisms that return us to the First
Wave, where citizen mobilization ravages democracy.
Putnam’s equation backwards:
weak society, weak economy;
weak society, ineffective state.
An anomic, limping, low growth
development

Informe final: http://bit.ly/planpart162mun /Presentación : http://bit.ly/PlanPartMunConf
Informe final : http://bit.ly/planpartbogfinal
Observación de la Planeación Participativa en municipios con alta incidencia
del conflicto armado (Contrial, 2016)
Observación de la Planeación Participativa Local en Bogotá (Contrial, 2017)
Propuesta Reforma Política – Sistema Electoral Mixto
Presentación : http://bit.ly/RefPoliticSisMixto
Formulario BARCAS 2017
http://contrial.co/formulario-barcas-iv-medicion-de-capital-social-de-colombia/
Further references

Cuarta medición del Capital Social de Colombia: Resultados nacionales
Presentación: http://bit.ly/CapSocCol
Cuarta medición del Capital Social de Colombia: Resultados Cali
Presentación: http://bit.ly/capitalSocialCali
Cuarta medición del Capital Social de Colombia: Resultados Medellín
Articulo: http://bit.ly/ComenCapSocialColombia
Articulo: http://bit.ly/ComuniCali
Presentación: http://bit.ly/CapSocialMede
Cuarta medición del Capital Social de Colombia: Resultados Bogotá
Presentación: http://bit.ly/CapSocBog
Cartagena en el contexto de la Cuarta medición del Capital Social de Colombia
Articulo: http://bit.ly/ResCapSocCartgPresentación: http://bit.ly/PreCapSocCartgn
Bucaramanga en el contexto de la Cuarta medición del Capital Social de Colombia
Cundinamarca en el contexto de la Cuarta medición del Capital Social de Colombia
Presentación: http://bit.ly/bucapsoc Articulo : http://bit.ly/artbucapsoc
Presentación: http://bit.ly/CundCapSoc Articulo: http://bit.ly/CunArtCapSoc
Further references

www.contrial.co
@ccontrial
corpocontrial.co@gmail.com
Contact details
THANKS