1. Execution of unexecuted or compromised decree
Fundamentally , once a lawsuit or decree is compromised ,the litigant parties are
barred from raising the issue again in the courts .They are also barred from raising
another issue arising from the same claim or transaction
Smt. Manju Lata Sharma vs Vinay Kumar Dubey AIR 2004 All 92, 2003 (4) AWC
2758
The respondent gave a draft of Rs. 3 lacs within the stipulated time. Subsequently, the daughter
died on 19th of February, 1998. The respondent did not give the second instalment of Rs. 2 lacs.
The appellant filed an application for executing the decree on 19.12.1999. It was dismissed on
2.5.2000 on the ground that:
* The daughter was dead.
* The decree had become inexecu table.
* The respondent was not liable to pay the second instalment of Rs. 2 lacs. Hence, the present
F.A.F.O.
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1012252/
However there are some ways by which we can execute the compromised
decree:
for example : 1. If the compromise is not recorded in the court or 2. if the appellant
fulfill it‟s part but the defendant doesn‟t or 3. if the beneficiary doesn‟t get it‟s benefits
or breach of agreement if recorded ( In 1978 (1) SCC 58 the compromise terms
provided that in case of breach or default of any of the terms the plaintiff therein would
be entitled to execute ) etc.

2. Here is a citation by Supreme Court which tells about this issue:
Pushpa Devi Bhagat (D) Th. LR.Smt. Sadhna Rai Vs. Rajinder Singh & Others. 2006 (3)
TLNJ 350 (Civil)
Civil Procedure Code 1908 as amended – Section 96 and Order 23, Rule 3 – Proviso -
The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23, can be summed up thus.
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar
contained in section 96(3) CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or
refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) Rule 1 Order 43.
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground
that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3A.
(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set
aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the
proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent
decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of
it,and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the
compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid
compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree, is nothing but contract between parties
superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends
wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made.
Civil Procedure Code 1908 as amended – Order 6 – New plea – regarding jurisdiction - It
is no doubt true that the landlords did not content either before the first appellate court or before
the High Court that the appeal against the consent decree was not maintainable. This contention
is urged for the first time in this Court. The contention relates to jurisdiction of the appellate
court and is evident from the record. Such a plea does not require any evidence. Further, being a

3. contention relating to the jurisdiction of the appellate court, it does not require any „pleading‟.
Though this Court will not normally permit a new plea to be raised at the hearing of the special
leave petition or an appeal under Article 136, where such plea does not involve any question of
fact or amendment of pleading and is purely one of law, particularly relating to jurisdiction of the
appellate court, it can be entertained by this Court.
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/363952/
There are some case law regarding execution of compromised decree:
1. Hiralal Moolchand Doshi Vs. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas [1993] INSC 89 (18
February 1993)
Yogeshwar Dayal (J) Yogeshwar Dayal (J) Kasliwal, N.M. (J)
CITATION: 1993 AIR 1449 1993 SCR (1)1113 1993 SCC (2) 458 JT 1993 (4) 97 1993 SCALE
(1)629
“On the failure of the tenant to deliver possession of the premises by the due date, as agreed, the
appellant-landlord filed an application for execution. The tenant filed objections to the
executability of the decree and, contended that an the eviction decree was not executable, as it
was a nullity, and that there was no material before the court which passed the decree to show
the availability of the various grounds of eviction alleged against the tenant.
The executing court held that the decree was not a nullity and was executable. This was affirmed
by the first appellate court. However, a Single Judge of the High Court, in further revision filed
by the tenant, held that the decree was not executable as it was a nullity.”
http://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/index.php?go=1993/february/43.php
2. Chandramohan vs Unknown on 15 February, 2012
„It is the case of the Defendant that he is in possession and enjoyment of the property of
Chinnamadiammal for the past 20 years. But, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the
Defendant was in exclusive possession of the property of Chinnamadiammal. The first appellate
court has considered the whole evidence placed on record and held that there was no ouster of
the Plaintiff, in so far as the properties of Chinnamadiammal are concerned. In the absence of

4. any evidence and in the absence of any open denial of title, even assuming that the Defendant
was in possession, it cannot amount to ouster or adverse possession on the part of the Defendant.
Unless there is clear evidence of exclusion or open denial of title, the plaintiff's claim cannot be
held to be barred by limitation. In the present case, there is absolutely no evidence to prove
ouster and the courts below have come to the right conclusion that the Defendant has not
perfected his title by adverse possession and I do not find any perversity in the said findings.‟
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/8546800/
3. Trilok Chand Kapur vs Dayaram Gupta on 28 September, 1966
(AIR 1967 Cal 541)
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/112485/
4. Bajirao Narhar Peshwa vs Sakharam Balvant Peshwe on 15 October, 1930
Equivalent citations: (1931) 33 BOMLR 463
„On the main question as to whether the portion of the decree in regard to the turn for five
years from 1924 is executable, the lower appellate Court says: "And even the learned pleader for
the respondent had to concede that it did as a matter of fact include matters which did not relate
to the suit". Such a concession, if made, is not a pure concession of fact but largely a concession
of law by which the appellant is not bound in second appeal: Krishnaji v. Rajmal (1899) I.L.R.
24 Bom. 360, s.c. 2 Bom. L.R. 25. It need not further be considered.‟
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1472621/